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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
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Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE:



Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date:

JAN 04 2011

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a residential care facility. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a caregiver. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's October 3, 2008 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$1,988.16 per month or \$23,857.92 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires 6 years of grade school education, no training, and no experience.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹ The record before the director closed on September 18, 2008 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner's 2007 federal income tax return was the most recent return available. Relevant evidence in the record includes statements of personal monthly household expenses for June 2001, May 2002, October 2003, August 2004, June 2005, April 2006, and January 2007, the petitioner's Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, and the first page of the petitioner's monthly bank statements beginning January 23, 2001 through May 8, 2008.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a sole proprietorship. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established on an unspecified date in 1998 and to currently employ two workers. On the labor certification, signed by the beneficiary on August 26, 2008, the beneficiary does not claim to have worked for the petitioner.²

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

² We note that the case involves the substitution of a beneficiary on the labor certification. Substitution of beneficiaries was permitted by the DOL at the time of filing this petition. The DOL had published an interim final rule, which limited the validity of an approved labor certification to the specific alien named on the labor certification application. *See* 56 Fed. Reg. 54925, 54930 (October 23, 1991). The interim final rule eliminated the practice of substitution. On December 1, 1994, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, acting under the mandate of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in *Kooritzky v. Reich*, 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994), issued an order invalidating the portion of the interim final rule, which eliminated substitution of labor certification beneficiaries. The *Kooritzky* decision effectively led 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.30(c)(1) and (2) to read the same as the regulations had read before November 22, 1991, and allow the substitution of a beneficiary. Following the *Kooritzky* decision, the DOL processed substitution requests pursuant to a May 4, 1995 DOL Field Memorandum, which reinstated procedures in existence prior to the implementation of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90). The DOL delegated responsibility for substituting labor certification beneficiaries to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) based on a Memorandum of Understanding, which was recently rescinded. *See* 72 Fed. Reg. 27904 (May 17, 2007) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 656). The DOL's final rule became effective July 16, 2007 and prohibits the substitution of alien beneficiaries on permanent labor certification applications and resulting certifications. As the filing of the instant case predates the rule, substitution will be allowed for the present petition. An I-140 petition for a substituted beneficiary retains the same priority date as the original Form ETA 750. Memo. from Luis G. Crocetti, Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, to Regional Directors, *et al.*, Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Substitution of Labor Certification Beneficiaries*, at 3, http://ows.doleta.gov/dmstree/fm/fm96/fm_28-96a.pdf (March 7, 1996).

On appeal, counsel asserts that director made an error in stating that the petitioner claimed two dependents on the Form 1040 tax returns filed from 2001 to 2007. Counsel contends that the director also failed to consider depreciation, bad debts, dividends, and special deductions in determining the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's Form 1040 tax returns for the period from 2001 to 2007. Counsel includes copies of previously submitted documentation in support of the appeal.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date on April 30, 2001 onwards.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009). *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873, (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 116.

"[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The petitioner is a sole proprietorship, a business in which one person operates the business in his or her personal capacity. Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (7th Ed. 1999). Unlike a corporation, a sole proprietorship does not exist as an entity apart from the individual owner. See *Matter of United Investment Group*, 19 I&N Dec. 248, 250 (Comm. 1984). Therefore the sole proprietor's adjusted gross income, assets and personal liabilities are also considered as part of the petitioner's ability to pay. Sole proprietors report income and expenses from their businesses on their individual (Form 1040) federal tax return each year. The business-related income and expenses are reported on Schedule C and are carried forward to the first page of the tax return. Sole proprietors must show that they can cover their existing business expenses as well as pay the proffered wage out of their adjusted gross income or other available funds. In addition, sole proprietors must show that they can sustain themselves and their dependents. *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

In *Ubeda*, 539 F. Supp. at 650, the court concluded that it was highly unlikely that a petitioning entity structured as a sole proprietorship could support himself, his spouse and five dependents on a gross income of slightly more than \$20,000 where the beneficiary's proposed salary was \$6,000 or approximately thirty percent (30%) of the petitioner's gross income.

Although counsel's assertion that the director made an error in stating the petitioner listed two dependents on the Form 1040 tax returns filed from 2001 to 2007 is technically correct, the petitioner did list himself and spouse as exemptions at parts 6a, 6b, and 6d of the Form 1040 tax returns from 2001 to 2007, which is most likely to what the director was referring. Thus, the sole proprietor supported himself and his spouse in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. The petitioner reported annual living expenses³ as follows:

- 2001 – \$45,060.00
- 2002 – \$44,820.00.
- 2003 – \$44,880.00.
- 2004 – \$48,360.00.
- 2005 – \$48,912.00.
- 2006 – \$66,804.00.
- 2007 – \$69,240.00.

Thus, it is necessary to show that the petitioner had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage of \$23,857.92 per year, plus the annual living expenses of the petitioner and his dependents. Those sums are set forth below:

- 2001 – \$68,917.92
- 2002 – \$68,677.92.
- 2003 – \$68,737.92.
- 2004 – \$72,217.92.
- 2005 – \$72,769.92.
- 2006 – \$90,661.92.
- 2007 – \$93,097.92.

The proprietor's tax returns reflect the following:

- Proprietor's adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 33) for 2001 was \$67,948.00.
- Proprietor's adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 35) for 2002 was \$54,571.00.
- Proprietor's adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 34) for 2003 was \$75,653.00.
- Proprietor's adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 36) for 2004 was \$43,479.00.

³ The sole proprietor provided a self estimate of expenses for June 2001, May 2002, October 2003, August 2004, June 2005, April 2006, and January 2007. The monthly expenses listed in these reports shall be multiplied by 12 to determine the petitioner's annual living expenses for each respective year. In any further filings the petitioner should submit documentation to verify such expenses.

- Proprietor's adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 37) for 2005 was \$39,029.00.
- Proprietor's adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 37) for 2006 was \$114,132.00.
- Proprietor's adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 37) for 2007 was \$116,497.00.

The evidence in the record reflects that the petitioner had sufficient gross income to pay the proffered wage plus family living expenses in 2003, 2006, and 2007. However, the record does not establish that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage plus family living expenses in 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005.

Counsel's contention that depreciation, bad debts, dividends, and special deductions should be considered in determining the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's Form 1040 tax returns for the period from 2001 to 2007 is without merit, *see, e.g., River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009), *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 686 F. Supp. 2d 873, (E.D. Mich. 2010).

Although the ownership of personal assets should be taken into account when considering a sole proprietor's ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage, the petitioner has neither claimed to possess nor provided evidence reflecting the ownership of significant and substantial assets. Further, it is not credible that the petitioner would exhaust his assets to pay the proffered wage. It has also not been established that any assets would be readily liquidated or that any liens or encumbrances on the assets would not exceed their value. It is noted that the petitioner did not submit audited financial statements which would have given a complete and accurate picture of the petitioner's financial abilities and the relevance, or existence, of any assets.

While the petitioner has provided the first page of the its monthly bank statements beginning January 23, 2001 up through May 8, 2008, any reliance on the balances in the sole proprietor's bank accounts is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Regardless, as noted by the director, the bank statements do not establish that the petitioner has maintained a balance since the eligibility date sufficient to pay the proffered wage. A sustained ability to pay the proffered wage has not been established.

In some cases, USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612. That case, however, relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years within a framework of profitable or successful years. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had

been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

In this matter, no specific detail or documentation has been provided similar to *Sonegawa*. The instant petitioner has not submitted any evidence demonstrating that uncharacteristic losses, factors of outstanding reputation, or other circumstances that prevailed in *Sonegawa* are persuasive in this matter. The AAO cannot conclude that the petitioner has established that he has had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Based on a review of the underlying record and argument submitted on appeal, it may not be determined that the petitioner has established his continuing financial ability to pay the proffered wage. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.