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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
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U.S. Citizenship  
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
Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a school. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a Montessori preschool teacher. As required by statute, an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor (the DOL), accompanied the petition.<sup>1</sup> Upon reviewing the petition, the director determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary satisfied the minimum level of education stated on the labor certification.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary. The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>2</sup>

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), also provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's priority date. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). The priority date of the petition is November 2, 2006, which is the date the labor certification was accepted for processing by the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).<sup>3</sup> The Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140) was filed on February 12, 2007.

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<sup>1</sup> On March 28, 2005, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.17, the ETA Form 9089 replaced the Application for Alien Employment Certification, Form ETA 750. The new ETA Form 9089 was introduced in connection with the re-engineered permanent foreign labor certification program (PERM), which was published in the Federal Register on December 27, 2004 with an effective date of March 28, 2005. *See* 69 Fed. Reg. 77326 (Dec. 27, 2004).

<sup>2</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

<sup>3</sup> If the petition is approved, the priority date is also used in conjunction with the Visa Bulletin issued by the Department of State to determine when a beneficiary can apply for adjustment of status or for

The proffered position's requirements are found on ETA Form 9089 Part H. This section of the application for alien labor certification, "Job Opportunity Information," describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. It is important that the ETA Form 9089 be read as a whole. The instructions for the ETA Form 9089, Part H, provide:

***Minimum Education, Training, and Experience Required to Perform the Job Duties.*** Do not duplicate the time requirements. For example, time required in training should not also be listed in education or experience. Indicate whether months or years are required. Do not include restrictive requirements which are not actual business necessities for performance on the job and which would limit consideration of otherwise qualified U.S. workers.

On the ETA Form 9089, the "job offer" position description for a Montessori preschool teacher requires the worker to teach preschool-aged children in accordance with Montessori teaching methods.

Regarding the minimum level of education and experience required for the proffered position in this matter, Part H of the labor certification reflects the following requirements:

- H.4. Education: Minimum level required: Bachelor's degree.
- 4-B. Major Field Study: Education field.
- 6. Experience: Yes, 24 months in the position offered.
- 7. Is there an alternate field of study that is acceptable.  
The petitioner responded "no" to this question.
- 8. Is there an alternate combination of education and experience that is acceptable?  
The petitioner responded "no" to this question.
- 9. Is a foreign educational equivalent acceptable?  
The petitioner responded "yes" that a foreign educational equivalent would be accepted.

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. USCIS will not accept a degree equivalency or an unrelated degree when a labor certification plainly and expressly requires a candidate with a specific degree. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor

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an immigrant visa abroad. Thus, the importance of reviewing the *bona fides* of a job opportunity as of the priority date is clear.

may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986); see also *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

As set forth above, the proffered position requires bachelor's degree in an education field and 2 years of experience in the job offered.

On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary represented that the highest level of achieved education related to the requested occupation was a bachelor's degree in education. She listed the institution of study where that education was obtained as the University of Karachi, Pakistan, and the year completed as 2000. The Form ETA 9089 also reflects that she previously worked in Montessori education at institutions in Pakistan from February 1998 to January 2001; in New York from October 2001 to February 2005; and for the petitioner beginning August 1, 2005. The beneficiary signed the ETA Form 9089 on January 22, 2007.

The record further indicates that the beneficiary has also earned a two-year Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Karachi, Pakistan, in 1993 and a one-year diploma from the Association Montessori Internationale (AMI) in 1994.

The petitioner claims that the beneficiary has earned the equivalent of a U.S. bachelor's degree through the combination of her various educational experiences in Pakistan. In support of this claim, the petitioner has submitted several evaluations of her education:

- A September 21, 2001 evaluation from [REDACTED] of the American Evaluation Institute (AEI) concluding that the beneficiary's one-year bachelor's degree in education from the University of Karachi is equivalent to 126 credits from an accredited American college or university. The evaluator also included a list of courses taken by the beneficiary which appears to combine the courses taken in the education program completed in 2000 with the courses taken in bachelor of art's program completed in 1993. The evaluator also randomly assigned credit hour values to each of these courses without substantiation resulting in a total of 126 credit hours.
- A December 3, 2008 evaluation from World Education Services (WES) concluding that the beneficiary's Pakistani bachelor of arts degree is equivalent to two years of undergraduate study in the U.S. and that the beneficiary's one-year Pakistani bachelor of education degree is equivalent to one year of undergraduate study in the U.S. Contrary to the AEI evaluation, the WES evaluation valued the beneficiary's combined credit hour total at 96.
- A May 6, 2010 evaluation from [REDACTED] concluding that the beneficiary's one-year Pakistani education program, when combined with her two-year Pakistani bachelor's of arts degree and her one-year AMI

diploma, is equivalent to a four-year U.S. bachelor's of arts degree in primary education.

- A December 2, 2008 evaluation by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officer (AACRAO) concluding that:

[The beneficiary] completed a two-year Bachelor of Arts degree from University of Karachi. This is comparable to two years of undergraduate study at a regionally-accredited college or university in the United States. The [beneficiary] also completed a two-year part-time Bachelor of Education from the University of Karachi. This is comparable to an additional year of undergraduate study at a regionally-accredited college or university in the United States.

The [beneficiary] also submitted documentation regarding further training in Education [e.g. the AMI diploma] which is vocational in nature and is not appropriate for university transfer credit.

Accordingly, neither the petitioner nor any of evaluators claim that the beneficiary has earned a foreign degree equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree from a single source. The AEI and WEE evaluations conclude that the beneficiary has earned the equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree through a combination of degrees; however, these two evaluations are inconsistent with one another in that the AEI evaluation relies only on the two degrees from the University of Karachi while the WEE evaluation relies on these two degrees and the AMI diploma. The other two evaluations, WES and AACRAO, conclude that the beneficiary has not earned the equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree, even through a combination of degrees or diplomas.

The director denied the petition on May 15, 2008. After considering the AEI evaluation and a publication from the Association of International Educators, he determined that the beneficiary's education is not a single-source foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. bachelor's degree. The director noted that the ETA Form 9089 does not allow for a combination of educational experiences to be determined the equivalent of a baccalaureate degree. Rather, the ETA Form 9089 requires a bachelor's degree.

On appeal, with regard to the beneficiary's qualifying academic credentials, counsel submitted the [redacted] evaluations described above. Counsel argues that the beneficiary has earned the equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree through a combination of experience and education.

The occupational classification of the offered position is not one of the occupations statutorily defined as a profession at section 101(a)(32) of the Act, which states: "The term 'profession' shall include but not be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries."

Part F of the ETA Form 9089 indicates that the DOL assigned the occupational code of 25-2011 and title preschool teacher, to the proffered position. The DOL's occupational codes are assigned based on normalized occupational standards. The occupational classification of the offered position is determined by the DOL (or applicable State Workforce Agency) during the labor certification process, and the applicable occupational classification code is noted on the labor certification form. O\*NET is the current occupational classification system used by the DOL. Located online at <http://online.onetcenter.org>, O\*NET is described as "the nation's primary source of occupational information, providing comprehensive information on key attributes and characteristics of workers and occupations." O\*NET incorporates the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system, which is designed to cover all occupations in the United States.<sup>4</sup>

In the instant case, the DOL categorized the offered position under the SOC code 25-2011. The O\*NET online database states that this occupation falls within Job Zone Three.

According to the DOL, one or two years of training involving both on-the-job experience and informal training with experienced workers are needed for Job Zone 3 occupations. The DOL assigns a standard vocational preparation (SVP) of 6 to Job Zone 3 occupations, which means "[m]ost occupations in this zone require training in vocational schools, related on-the-job experience, or an associate's degree. Some may require a bachelor's degree." *See* <http://online.onetcenter.org/link/summary/25-2011.00> (accessed January 5, 2011). Additionally, the DOL states the following concerning the training and overall experience required for Job Zone 3 occupations:

Previous work-related skill, knowledge, or experience is required for these occupations. For example, an electrician must have completed three or four years of apprenticeship or several years of vocational training, and often must have passed a licensing exam, in order to perform the job.

*See id.* Because of the requirements of the proffered position and the DOL's standard occupational requirements, the proffered position is for a skilled worker, but might also be considered under the professional category.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) states the following:

If the petition is for a professional, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien holds a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and by evidence that the alien is a member of the professions. Evidence of a baccalaureate degree shall be in the form of an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study. To show that the alien is a member of the professions, the petitioner must

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<sup>4</sup>See <http://www.bls.gov/soc/socguide.htm>.

submit evidence that the minimum of a baccalaureate degree is required for entry into the occupation.

The above regulation uses a singular description of foreign equivalent degree. Thus, the plain meaning of the regulatory language concerning the professional classification sets forth the requirement that a beneficiary must produce one degree that is determined to be the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree in order to be qualified as a professional for third preference visa category purposes.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 204(5)(1)(3)(ii)(B) states the following:

If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The above regulation requires that the alien meet the requirements of the labor certification.

Because the petition's proffered position qualifies for consideration under both the professional and skilled worker categories, the AAO will apply the regulatory requirements from both provisions to the facts of the case at hand, beginning with the professional category.

Initially, however, we will provide an explanation of the general process of procuring an employment-based immigrant visa and the roles and respective authority of both agencies involved.

As noted above, the Form ETA 9089 in this matter is certified by the DOL. Thus, at the outset, it is useful to discuss the DOL's role in this process. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to the DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether the position

and the alien are qualified for a specific immigrant classification. This fact has not gone unnoticed by Federal Circuit Courts:

There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14).<sup>5</sup> *Id.* at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)(14) determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.

\* \* \*

Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history, and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)(14). If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of "matching" them with those of corresponding United States workers so that it will then be "in a position to meet the requirement of the law," namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

*Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the Ninth circuit stated:

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL's role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS's decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

*K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from the DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor ... pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the ... [Act] ... is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would

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<sup>5</sup> Based on revisions to the Act, the current citation is section 212(a)(5)(A) as set forth above.

adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating:

The Department of Labor (DOL) must certify that insufficient domestic workers are available to perform the job and that the alien's performance of the job will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed domestic workers. *Id.* § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INS then makes its own determination of the alien's entitlement to sixth preference status. *Id.* § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). *See generally K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 9th Cir.1983).

The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.

*Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1984).

Therefore, it is the DOL's responsibility to certify the terms of the labor certification, but it is the responsibility of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to determine if the petition and the alien beneficiary are eligible for the classification sought. For classification as a member of the professions, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) requires that the alien had a U.S. baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and be a member of the professions. Additionally, the regulation requires the submission of "an official *college or university* record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study." (Emphasis added.)

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now USCIS or the Service), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor's degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree: "[B]oth the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree.*" 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (November 29, 1991)(emphasis added).

Moreover, it is significant that both the statute, section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, and relevant regulations use the word "degree" in relation to professionals. A statute should be construed under

the assumption that Congress intended it to have purpose and meaningful effect. *Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana*, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); *Sutton v. United States*, 819 F.2d 1289m 1295 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987). It can be presumed that Congress' narrow requirement in of a "degree" for members of the professions is deliberate. Significantly, in another context, Congress has broadly referenced "the possession of a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, university, school, or other institution of learning." Section 203(b)(2)(C) (relating to aliens of exceptional ability). Thus, the requirement at section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) that an eligible alien both have a baccalaureate "degree" and be a member of the professions reveals that a member of the professions must have a *degree* and that a diploma or certificate from an institution of learning other than a college or university is a potentially similar but distinct type of credential. Thus, even if we did not require "a" degree that is the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree, we would not consider education earned at an institution other than a college or university.

The petitioner in this matter relies on the beneficiary's combined education and work experience to reach the "equivalent" of a degree, which is not a bachelor's degree based on a single degree in the required field listed on the certified labor certification.

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree. More specifically, a two- or three-year bachelor's degree will not be considered to be the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree. Where the analysis of the beneficiary's credentials relies on work experience alone or a combination of multiple lesser degrees, the result is the "equivalent" of a bachelor's degree rather than a single-source "foreign equivalent degree." In order to have experience and education equating to a bachelor's degree under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree.

Because the beneficiary does not have a "United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree," from a college or university in the required field of study listed on the certified labor certification, the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act as she does not have the minimum level of education required for the equivalent of a bachelor's degree.

We are cognizant of the recent decision in *Grace Korean United Methodist Church v. Michael Chertoff*, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Or. 2005), which finds that USCIS "does not have the authority or expertise to impose its strained definition of 'B.A. or equivalent' on that term as set forth in the labor certification." Although the reasoning underlying a district judge's decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the AAO, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. *Id.* at 719. The court in *Grace Korean* makes no attempt to distinguish its holding from the Circuit Court decisions cited above. Instead, as legal support for its determination, the court cited to a case holding that the United States Postal Service has no expertise or special competence in immigration matters. *Grace Korean United Methodist Church*, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (citing *Tovar v. U.S. Postal Service*, 3 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)). On its face, *Tovar* is

easily distinguishable from the present matter since USCIS, through the authority delegated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, is charged by statute with the enforcement of the United States immigration laws and not with the delivery of mail. See section 103(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).

Additionally, we also note the recent decision in *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006). In that case, the labor certification application specified an educational requirement of four years of college and a ‘B.S. or foreign equivalent.’ The district court determined that ‘B.S. or foreign equivalent’ relates solely to the alien’s educational background, precluding consideration of the alien’s combined education and work experience. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at \*11-13. Additionally, the court determined that the word ‘equivalent’ in the employer’s educational requirements was ambiguous and that in the context of skilled worker petitions (where there is no statutory educational requirement), deference must be given to the employer’s intent. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at \*14. However, in professional and advanced degree professional cases, where the beneficiary is statutorily required to hold a baccalaureate degree, the USCIS properly concluded that a single foreign degree or its equivalent is required. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at \*17, 19.

In the instant case, unlike the labor certification in *Snapnames.com, Inc.*, the petitioner’s intent regarding educational equivalence is clearly stated on the Form ETA 9089 and does not include alternatives to a four-year bachelor’s degree. The court in *Snapnames.com, Inc.* recognized that even though the labor certification may be prepared with the alien in mind, USCIS has an independent role in determining whether the alien meets the labor certification requirements. *Id.* at \*7. Thus, the court concluded that where the plain language of those requirements does not support the petitioner’s asserted intent, USCIS “does not err in applying the requirements as written.” *Id.* See also *Maramjaya v. USCIS*, Civ. Act No. 06-2158 (RCL) (D.C. Cir. March 26, 2008)(upholding an interpretation that a “bachelor’s or equivalent” requirement necessitated a single four-year degree). In this matter, the Form ETA 9089 does not specify an equivalency to the requirement of a U.S. bachelor’s degree.

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by professional regulation, USCIS must examine “the language of the labor certification job requirements” in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary’s qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to “examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer.” *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS’s interpretation of the job’s requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve “reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification application form].” *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification that the DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer’s intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

Further, the employer's subjective intent may not be dispositive of the meaning of the actual minimum requirements of the proffered position. *Maramjaya v. USCIS*, Civ. Act. No. 06-2158, 14 n. 7. Thus, USCIS agrees that the best evidence of the petitioner's intent concerning the actual minimum educational requirements of the proffered position is evidence of how it expressed those requirements to the DOL during the labor certification process and not afterwards to USCIS. The timing of such evidence is needed to ensure inflation of those requirements is not occurring in an effort to fit the beneficiary's credentials into requirements that do not seem on their face to include what the beneficiary has.

On September 24, 2010, the AAO issued a request for evidence to the petitioner. In this request, the AAO noted that there was no evidence in the record of proceeding that the beneficiary ever enrolled in classes beyond the academic studies at University of Karachi. The AAO also noted that the petitioner did not specify on the ETA Form 9089 that the minimum academic requirements of four years of college and a bachelor's degree might be met through a combination of lesser degrees and/or a quantifiable amount of work experience. The AAO stated that a Pakistani bachelor of arts degree is equivalent to two years of undergraduate study in the United States, that a Pakistani bachelor of education degree is equivalent to one year of education, and that the labor certification application, as certified, did not demonstrate that the petitioner would accept a combination of degrees that are individually less than a single-source U.S. bachelor's degree or its foreign equivalent and/or a quantifiable amount of work experience when the labor market test was conducted.

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, USCIS must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. USCIS will not accept a degree equivalency or an unrelated degree when a labor certification plainly and expressly requires a candidate with a specific degree. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986); *see also Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

In response to the request for evidence, counsel submits copies of advertising associated with the recruitment for the position in question. All of these advertisements indicate that a bachelor's degree in an education field is required for the position. None of the material submitted indicates, either expressly or implicitly, that a worker could meet the minimum qualifications for the position through a combination of degrees or work experience deemed "equivalent" to a U.S. bachelor's degree or a foreign equivalent degree.

The ETA Form 9089 does not provide that the minimum academic requirements of four years of college and a bachelor's degree in education might be met through three years of college or some other formula other than that explicitly stated on the ETA Form 9089. The copies of the notice(s) of Internet and newspaper advertisements, provided with the petitioner's response to the request for

evidence issued by this office, also fail to advise any otherwise qualified U.S. workers that the educational requirements for the job may be met through a quantitatively lesser degree or defined equivalency. Thus, the alien does not qualify as a skilled worker as she does not meet the terms of the labor certification as explicitly expressed or as extrapolated from the evidence of its intent about those requirements during the labor certification process.

The beneficiary does not have a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree, and, thus, does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Act.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on November 2, 2006. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$28,000.00 per year.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is a tax exempt corporation. The petitioner indicated on Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, at part 5, section 2 that the organization was established in December 1981 and employs 22 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year runs from August 1<sup>st</sup> to July 31<sup>st</sup> of each year. On the ETA Form 9089, that was signed by the beneficiary on January 22, 2007, the beneficiary indicated that she was employed by the petitioner beginning on August 1, 2005.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the

priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The record of proceeding contains copies of IRS Forms W-2 that were issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary for 2006, 2007, and 2008 as shown in the table below.

- In 2006, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$31,823.21.
- In 2007, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$29,958.18.
- In 2008, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$17,002.36.

Counsel indicates in her letter dated November 5, 2010 that the beneficiary ceased to be employed by the petitioner in 2008. Therefore, through the payment of wages to the beneficiary, the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage in 2006 and 2007, but has not established its ability to pay the proffered wage in 2008.

If, as in this case, the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, the petitioner showing that it paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 116. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on November 9, 2010, with the receipt by the AAO of the petitioner's submission of evidence in response to the AAO's request for evidence. The petitioner's tax returns, Form 990, line 19, demonstrate its excess (or deficit) for 2008 (August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2009) as shown in the table below.

- In 2008 (August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2009), the Form 990 stated revenue of -\$8,111.

Therefore, for the fiscal year 2008, the petitioner did not have sufficient net revenue to pay the difference between the proffered wage and any wages actually paid to the beneficiary during that period.

As an alternative means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the

petitioner's current assets and current liabilities. It is noted that the Form 990 does not permit a filer to identify its net current assets. In order to establish its net current assets in this case, the petitioner would have needed to have submitted audited balance sheets. However, the record is devoid of such evidence. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Although the petitioner submitted annual reports, these reports do not describe the petitioner's net current assets.

Accordingly, for the fiscal year 2008, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the difference between the proffered wage and wages actually paid to the beneficiary.

Therefore, from the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In this matter, the totality of the circumstances does not establish that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary is replacing a former employee whose primary duties were described in the ETA Form 9089, or that it entails outsourced services. The record does not establish that the petitioner had the

ability to pay the proffered wage in 2008 and no facts paralleling those in *Sonegawa* are present to a degree sufficient to establish that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage. Moreover, as noted in the AAO's Request for Evidence dated September 24, 2010, USCIS records indicate that your organization has filed another Form I-140 petition for another beneficiary [REDACTED]. If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending or approved simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore, that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Mater of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and ETA Form 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that totality of the circumstances demonstrate that it could pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003).

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.