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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

**PUBLIC COPY**

[Redacted]

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FILE:

[Redacted]

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date:

JAN 26 2011

IN RE:

Petitioner:

[Redacted]

Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other Worker pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the preference visa petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a cabinet and door manufacturer. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cabinet and door assembler. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a labor certification application approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner did not submit the requisite evidence to show that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's April 8, 2009 denial, the issue in this case is whether the petitioner submitted evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage. On appeal, we have identified an additional issue of whether the beneficiary had the requisite experience as of the priority date.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

With regard to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$11.50 per hour (\$23,920 per year).

The evidence in the record shows that the petitioner is an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner stated it was established in 2000 and currently employs 10 workers. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on October 31, 2007, the beneficiary did not state that he had ever worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner submitted no evidence that it ever employed or paid any wages to the beneficiary.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d. 873, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.

Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d. at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts*, 558 F.3d at 116. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F.Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> On appeal, counsel stated that the petitioner's depreciation amounts should be considered. As stated by the court in *River Street Donuts*, "depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, . . . even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages." *River Street Donuts*, 558 F.3d at 116.

The record before the director closed on March 23, 2009 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submission in response to the Request for Evidence. As of that date, the most current tax return available was the petitioner's 2007 federal tax return. The petitioner submitted the following tax returns:

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated net income<sup>3</sup> of \$4,705.
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$20,852.<sup>4</sup>
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$51,088.
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$60,159.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$13,559.
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$5,118.
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$9,436.

Therefore, the petitioner demonstrated sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage in 2004 only. The petitioner's net income was insufficient to pay the proffered wage in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>5</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18.

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<sup>3</sup> Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003), line 17e (2004-2005), or line 18 (2006) of Schedule K. *See* Instructions for Form 1120S, 2008, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed November 3, 2009) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholder's shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional adjustments shown on its Schedule K for 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2007, the petitioner's net income is found on Schedule K for that year.

<sup>4</sup> The petitioner's 2002, 2005, and 2006 Forms 1120S are incomplete in that they do not include the entire Schedule K for those years. Although the partial Schedule Ks indicate additional adjustments, as they are not complete, in the absence of a full Schedule K, we have taken the net income stated on line 21 of page 1 for those years. The petitioner must submit complete Schedule K's in any further filings so that the petitioner's net income can be properly determined in these years.

<sup>5</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$21,344.
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$48,747.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$7,751.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S submitted was incomplete and did not include the Schedule L.
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$63,848.
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$105,503.

Negative net current assets are insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, the petitioner submitted a letter from [REDACTED] President of [REDACTED], which states that the petitioner's net income should be adjusted to account for depreciation and pension contribution expenses. As stated by the court in *River Street Donuts*, "depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, . . . even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages." *River Street Donuts*, 558 F.3d at 116. As a result, the petitioner's net income will not be adjusted to account for depreciation. Regarding the pension contribution expenses, [REDACTED] statement that a Defined Benefit plan was established in 2007 would not affect the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage from 2001 through 2006 even if it were shown that such contributions were not mandatory for the petitioner.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included [REDACTED] movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the

petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the tax returns in the record demonstrate negative net current assets in every year for which tax returns were submitted and minimal or negative net income for every year except for 2004. The petitioner submitted no evidence as to its reputation or any evidence showing that one year was off or otherwise not representative of the petitioner's overall financial picture; instead, the petitioner demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage in only one of the seven years examined. On appeal, counsel states that the petitioner made voluntary pension contributions in 2005 and 2006 that could have been decreased in order to meet its salary obligations. Counsel provided no evidence that these contributions were not required or otherwise represented available funds for the petitioner. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaighena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Additionally, as noted above, the petitioner failed to establish its ability to pay in 2001, 2002, or 2003, prior to any assertion related to pension contributions. A petitioner must establish the elements for the approval of the petition at the time of filing. A petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a future date after the petitioner becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). The petitioner must show its ability to pay the proffered wage from 2001 onward. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Beyond the director's decision, the petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary has the requisite experience for the position offered. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis). Regarding the beneficiary's qualifications for the position, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii) specifies that:

- (A) *General.* Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received.

The Form ETA 750 requires one year of experience as a cabinet and door assembler with the following specific job description:

Fits prefabricated wooden parts together. Trims and smooths parts to fit, using hand tools and sandpaper, inserts screws or dowels in predrilled holes, and fastens parts together with screwdriver, glue, and clamps. Installs hardware, such as hinges, catches, and knobs, on assembled cabinet. May cut baffle cloths and plastic screens to specified size and install them in cabinets using hand or machine cutters, screwdriver, and stapling gun. Marks locations of window and lock on door, using templates, and cuts openings in door, using electric router or power shears. Installs lock assembly and prefabricated window assembly in door, using hand tools. Marks positions of hinges on door, using template, and screws hinges to doors, using screwdriver. May attach metal and rubber weather stripping for exterior doors.

The petitioner submitted one letter from [REDACTED] property owner for [REDACTED] stating that the beneficiary worked from January 1986 to June 1988 as a cabinet and door assembler. The letter contains no information regarding the specific skills or experience gained by the beneficiary in the employment in accordance with the regulations. As a result, we are unable to conclude that the beneficiary had the one year of full-time experience as a cabinet and door assembler as contemplated by the terms of the labor certification at the time the labor certification was certified by the DOL. In any further filings, the petitioner should submit a letter that conforms with the regulation and states the beneficiary's job duties in the position.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.