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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
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Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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DATE: **JUL 01 2011** OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:   
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker Pursuant to § 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:  
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,  
  
Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained. The petition will be approved.

The petitioner is a nursery school. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a teacher's aide. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage, and denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's May 4, 2009 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 9089 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on March 24, 2008. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$17,490 per year. The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires a high school education and three months experience in the job offered. The evidence in the record establishes that the beneficiary satisfied the educational and work experience requirements stated on the ETA Form 9089.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.

The petitioner is a nonprofit organization. The petitioner indicated on Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, that the organization was established on September 21, 1984, and employs 12 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 30. The ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on June 3, 2008, states that the beneficiary had been employed by the petitioner since February 1, 2007. The ETA Form 9089 also states that the beneficiary had worked as a [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] in North Middle Village, New York, from January 15, 2006, through December 15, 2006.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the evidence in the record establishes that the petitioner paid the beneficiary as follows:

- \$14,351.98 in 2008
- \$17,805.67 in 2009
- \$17,687.80 in 2010

Since the proffered wage is \$17,490 per year, the petitioner has established its ability to pay the proffered wage in 2009 and 2010. However, since the petitioner did not pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2008, the petitioner must establish that it could pay the \$3,138.02 difference between the wage paid to the beneficiary in 2008 and the proffered wage.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure

reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

In the instant case, the petitioner's IRS Forms 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, indicate the following revenue in excess of its expenses:

- \$8,607 in the 2007 tax year (July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2008).<sup>1</sup>
- \$18,435 in the 2008 tax year (July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009).
- \$13,967 in the 2009 tax year (July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010).

The petitioner's 2007 and 2008 tax returns are based on fiscal years that, taken together, encompass the 2008 calendar year. The tax returns for both fiscal years indicate that the petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the \$3,138.02 difference between the wage paid to the beneficiary in the 2008 calendar year and the proffered wage. Therefore, based on an examination of the wages paid to the beneficiary and the petitioner's net income, it is concluded that the petitioner had established its ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is sustained. The petition is approved.

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<sup>1</sup> The director's decision incorrectly states that the petitioner had a \$8,607 loss for the 2007 tax year. The petitioner's 2007 tax return states that it had excess revenue of \$8,607.