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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE:



Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date:

MAR 03 2011

IN RE:


Petitioner:



Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker Pursuant to § 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Elizabeth McCormack

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be rejected as untimely filed.

In order to properly file an appeal, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(i) provides that the affected party must file the complete appeal within 30 days after service of the unfavorable decision. If the decision was mailed, the appeal must be filed within 33 days. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(b). The date of filing is not the date of mailing, but the date of actual receipt. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(i).

The record indicates that the director issued the decision on February 13, 2009. It is noted that the director properly gave notice to the petitioner that it had 33 days to file the appeal. The appeal was postmarked March 18, 2009 and received by the director on March 19, 2009, 34 days after the decision was issued. Accordingly, the appeal was untimely filed. The director erroneously annotated the appeal as timely and forwarded the matter to the AAO.

Neither the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) nor the pertinent regulations grant the AAO authority to extend the 33-day time limit for filing an appeal. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(v)(B)(2) states that, if an untimely appeal meets the requirements of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, the appeal must be treated as a motion, and a decision must be made on the merits of the case.

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proved in the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2). A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application of law or United States Citizenship and Immigration Services policy. A motion to reconsider a decision on an application or petition must, when filed, also establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the time of the initial decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). A motion that does not meet applicable requirements shall be dismissed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4).

Here, the untimely appeal does not meet the requirements of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider. Therefore, there is no requirement to treat the appeal as a motion under 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(v)(B)(2).

As the appeal was untimely filed and does not qualify as a motion, the appeal must be rejected.

Even were the AAO to adjudicate the appeal on the merits, the appeal would be dismissed.

The petitioner is a private home. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a landscaper/grounds keeper pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3). As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, which has been approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director

determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's February 13, 2009 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on November 28, 2007. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$8.71 per hour at 40 hours per week (\$18,116.80 per year). The ETA Form 9089 states that the position does not require any experience or training in the job offered.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a sole proprietorship. On the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2006 and to currently employ 1 worker. On the ETA Form 9089 the beneficiary claims to have been employed by the petitioner since January 1, 1996.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner submits copies of five cancelled checks dated November and December of 2007, and January 4, 2008. The checks were made out to the beneficiary in the amount of \$305.00 each. Although this is some evidence of wages paid to the beneficiary by the petitioner, it is insufficient to establish that the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary the proffered wage from the priority date onwards.

If, as in this case, the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is a sole proprietorship. A sole proprietorship is a business in which one person operates the business in his or her personal capacity. Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (7th Ed. 1999). Unlike a corporation, a sole

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proprietorship is not legally separate from its owner. Therefore, the sole proprietor's income, liquefiable assets, and personal liabilities are also considered as part of the petitioner's ability to pay. Sole proprietors report income and expenses from their businesses on their individual (Form 1040) federal tax return each year. The business-related income and expenses are reported on Schedule C and are carried forward to the first page of the tax return. Sole proprietors must show that they can cover their existing business expenses as well as pay the proffered wage. In addition, they must show that they can sustain themselves and their dependents. *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647, *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571.

In *Ubeda*, 539 F. Supp. at 650, the court concluded that it was highly unlikely that a petitioning entity structured as a sole proprietorship could support himself, his spouse and five dependents on a gross income of slightly more than \$20,000 where the beneficiary's proposed salary was \$6,000 or approximately thirty percent (30%) of the petitioner's gross income.

The proffered wage is \$18,116.80. The petitioner provided a copy of the IRS Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return for 2007 which is the relevant year in this matter. The return reflects the sole proprietor's adjusted gross income (AGI) in 2007 of (\$60,460.00).

The sole proprietor's AGI for 2007 is insufficient to establish her ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date.

As noted above, sole proprietors must show that they can sustain themselves and their dependents, if any, in addition to paying the proffered wage. *See Ubeda v. Palmer, supra*. The record shows the sole proprietor's income tax filing status is single with no dependents. The record contains a letter from the sole proprietor, in response to the director's request for evidence that indicates her monthly recurring expenses are \$20,000.00. Thus, she must establish sufficient income or assets to pay both the proffered wage and \$240,000.00 in annualized monthly expenses.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage, and that this can be evidenced through her stock portfolio, two trust accounts, and multiple properties. However, there are no independent records of the sole proprietor's stock portfolio or trust accounts sufficient to substantiate the petitioner's claims. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The record includes copies of tax assessments for five parcels of land owned by the sole proprietor. Counsel asserts that the value of the sole proprietor's real property should be considered in determining her ability to pay the proffered wage. Contrary to counsel's claim, real estate is not a readily liquefiable asset. Further, it is unlikely that the sole proprietor would sell such significant assets to pay the beneficiary's wage. It is speculative to claim that funds from the sale of real property would be available specifically to be used to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure*

Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Further, any funds which may be generated from the sale of any of the real property would only be available at some point in the future. A petitioner must establish its ability to pay from the date of the priority date, which in this case is November 28, 2007. A petition cannot be approved at a future date after eligibility is established under a new set of facts. *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971).

The petitioner asserts that she has ample financial resources to pay the proffered wage as reflected on her 2006 and 2007 tax returns, showing that she has a substantial stock brokerage account, multiple commercial residential rental properties, and a strong gross income from domestic and foreign investments. The petitioner submits statements of realized gains and losses from [REDACTED], one as an attachment to her 2007 income tax return, and the other record as an attachment to her 2006 income tax return, for the [REDACTED] number [REDACTED]. There are no corresponding statements indicating the terms of the trust or the amount of the trust principal and/or income. While the petitioner indicates that her adjusted gross income is low to avoid tax liability, and that her cash flow is not reflected on the tax return's AGI, courts have long recognized that the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage may be determined by reference to the petitioner's tax returns. See *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, at 1054.

Counsel asserts on appeal that the petitioner has donated an amount to charity greater than the beneficiary's proposed salary therefore, evidencing her ability to pay the proffered wage. Counsel also asserts that in addition to the beneficiary's salary, the petitioner pays his rent in the amount of \$700.00. However, without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter Of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

Counsel's assertions and the evidence presented on appeal do not outweigh the evidence of record that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States

and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In this matter, the totality of the circumstances does not establish that the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage. There are no facts paralleling those in *Sonegawa* that are present in the instant case to a degree sufficient to establish that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not submitted evidence establishing her business reputation or the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, or 2006. The petitioner has not submitted evidence establishing that the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or outsourced services. The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

While the appeal is untimely filed and must be rejected, even were the AAO to consider the petitioner's claim that she has the ability to pay the proffered wage, the petitioner has not established the ability to pay the proffered wage, and the appeal would nonetheless be dismissed.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden with respect to her ability to pay the proffered wage.

ORDER: The appeal is rejected.