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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



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


FILE:  Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: MAR 17 2011

IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other Worker pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)


ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,



Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the preference visa petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The petition will be remanded to the director in accordance with the following.

The petitioner is a residential care home facility. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a personal and home care aide (██████████). As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a labor certification application approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the labor certification did not support the visa category that the petitioner requested. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's September 30, 2008 denial, the issue in this case is whether the petition was filed under the correct category as the labor certification requires three years of experience in the position offered, or three months in a related occupation, however, the petition was filed as one for an "other worker" instead of for a "skilled worker." On appeal, we have identified additional issues: whether the petitioner submitted evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage and whether the beneficiary had the requisite experience as of the priority date.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor (requiring less than two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

Here, the Form I-140 was filed on July 17, 2007. On Part 2.g. of the Form I-140, the petitioner indicated that it was filing the petition for an other worker.

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(i) provides in pertinent part:

(4) Differentiating between skilled and other workers. The determination of whether a worker is a skilled or other worker will be based on the requirements of training and/or experience placed on the job by the prospective employer, as certified by the Department of Labor.

In this case, the labor certification requires three years of experience in the position offered or three months experience in a related occupation. The petitioner requested the other worker classification on the Form I-140, which requires less than two years of experience. In his decision, the director noted that the Form ETA 750 requires three years of experience in the job offered, which does not support the unskilled or other worker classification. There is no provision in statute or regulation that compels United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to readjudicate a petition under a different visa classification in response to a petitioner's request to change it, once the decision has been rendered. On appeal, the petitioner stated that it amended the labor certification to require only three months of experience in the job offered. USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

The labor certification as submitted requires three years of experience in the job offered or three months experience in a related occupation. On appeal, counsel submitted a copy of the certified labor certification and circled the experience block, claiming that it amended the experience to three months. The labor certification, however, reads three years in the job offered or three months in a related occupation. Nothing shows that DOL amended the experience in the job offered to three months. The labor certification contains job requirements that are in conflict. To qualify based on the job offered, the individual would need three years of experience (which could only be filed as a skilled worker). To qualify based on the related occupation, the individual would need three months of experience (the unskilled classification). While this appears to have been certified in error, USCIS must read the terms as stated. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981). In viewing the minimum requirements, the labor certification would state qualification based on three months in the alternate occupation, or as an other worker. Therefore, the petitioner filed under the proper category.

As the director did not address the petitioner's ability to pay or the beneficiary's experience, we will remand the petition to the director to allow the petitioner an opportunity to address those issues. With regard to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on March 29, 2002. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$16,994 per year.

The evidence in the record of proceeding does not establish how the petitioner's business is formed as the record does not contain the petitioner's tax returns.² On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2000 and to currently employ two workers. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on March 25, 2002, the beneficiary did not state that he had ever worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to

² 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1) requires: "An applicant or petitioner must establish eligibility for a requested immigration benefit. An application or petition form must be completed as applicable and filed with any initial evidence required by regulation or by the instructions on the form."

or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner submitted no evidence that it ever employed or paid any wages to the beneficiary.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts, 558 F.3d at 116. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F.Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).

The petitioner submitted no regulatory evidence of its ability to pay pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).³ Without that evidence, we are unable to determine that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner’s business activities in its determination of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner’s prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner’s clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner’s determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner’s sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner’s financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner’s net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner’s business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner’s reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage.

On remand, the petitioner must submit evidence regarding its ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date onward in accordance with the regulations.

³ The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8) states the following:

If there is evidence of ineligibility in the record, an application or petition shall be denied on that basis notwithstanding any lack of required initial evidence [I]n other instances where there is no evidence of ineligibility, and initial evidence or eligibility information is missing or the Service finds that the evidence submitted either does not fully establish eligibility for the requested benefit or raises underlying questions regarding eligibility, the Service shall request the missing *initial evidence*, and may request additional evidence

Regarding the beneficiary's qualifications for the position, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii) specifies that:

(A) *General.* Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received.

The Form ETA 750 requires three years of experience before the March 29, 2002 priority date as a direct care staff member or three months experience in an unnamed alternate related occupation. The petitioner submitted no letters as required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii) to document the beneficiary's experience. As a result, we are unable to conclude that the beneficiary had three years of full-time direct care experience or three months in a related occupation at the time the labor certification was certified by the DOL.

As the petition was denied solely based on filing under the wrong category and the petitioner's ability to pay and the beneficiary's experience have not been addressed, the petition will be remanded to the director to allow the petitioner an opportunity to address these issues. If the director requests any additional evidence considered pertinent, the petitioner may be provided a reasonable period of time to be determined by the director to submit a response. In that event, upon receipt of all the evidence, the director will review the entire record and enter a new decision.

ORDER: The director's decision is withdrawn; however, the petition is currently unapprovable for the reasons discussed above, and therefore the AAO may not approve the petition at this time. Because the petition is not approvable, the petition is remanded to the director for issuance of a new, detailed decision.