


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
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Washington, DC 20529-2090





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
B6

Date: **MAY 24 2011** Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER FILE: 


IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to
Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)


ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the preference visa petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner operates a storage business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a storage supervisor. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a labor certification application (Form ETA 750) approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that the petition requires at least two years of training or experience and, therefore, that the beneficiary cannot be found qualified for classification as a skilled worker. The director denied the petition on May 31, 2008.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143 at 145 (AAO's *de novo* authority is well-recognized.).

For the reasons set forth below, the AAO concurs with the director's decision and further notes that the petition was not eligible for approval because the petitioner failed to establish its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

Here, the Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker was filed on August 16, 2007. On Part 5 of the Form I-140, the petitioner claims that it was established in 1992 and currently employs four workers. On Part 2.e. of the Form I-140, the petitioner indicated that it was filing the petition for a professional or a skilled worker.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new

evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹ On appeal, counsel submits an amended Form I-140 designating Part 2.g. as the selected visa classification as any other worker (requiring less than two years of training or experience). On appeal, the petitioner, through counsel, asserts that a typographical error was made on Form I-140 and that the petitioner intended to check Part 2.g. indicating that it was filing the petition for an unskilled worker.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(i) provides in pertinent part:

(4) Differentiating between skilled and other workers. The determination of whether a worker is a skilled or other worker will be based on the requirements of training and/or experience placed on the job by the prospective employer, as certified by the Department of Labor.

In this case, the labor certification indicates that there are no education, training or experience requirements for the proffered position. However, the petitioner requested the skilled worker classification on the Form I-140. There is no provision in statute or regulation that compels United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to readjudicate a petition under a different visa classification in response to a petitioner's request to change it, once the decision has been rendered. A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to USCIS requirements. *See Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm. 1988).

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petition requires at least two years of training or experience such that the beneficiary may be found qualified for classification as a skilled worker.

Relevant to the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

¹The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

The petitioner must demonstrate that it has the continuing financial ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within DOL's employment system. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d); *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on April 30, 2001, which establishes the priority date.² The proffered wage is stated as \$29.75 per hour, which amounts to \$61,880 per year. Part B of the Form ETA 750, signed by the beneficiary on April 26, 2001, indicates that the petitioner has employed the beneficiary from June 1999 until the present (date of signing). It is noted that the petitioner submitted no evidence of payment of wages to the beneficiary.³

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the overall circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In support of its ability to pay the proffered wage of \$61,880 per year, the petitioner provided copies of its 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return(s), as well as incomplete copies of its 2005 and 2006 Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation. The petitioner's returns reflect that its fiscal year is a standard calendar year. It elected to become an S corporation on January 1, 2005.

² If the petition is approved, the priority date is also used in conjunction with the Visa Bulletin issued by the Department of State to determine when a beneficiary can apply for adjustment of status or for an immigrant visa abroad. Thus, the importance of reviewing the *bona fides* of a job opportunity as of the priority date, including a prospective U.S. employer's ability to pay the proffered wage is clear.

³It is also noted that the record contains a Form G-325A, Biographic Information form submitted in connection with the beneficiary's Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. The beneficiary signed the form on August 6, 2007. The form asks for all employment for the last five years. The beneficiary listed no employment.

Year	2001	2002	2003
Net Income ⁴	\$ 7,198	\$ 11,537	\$ 10,515
Current Assets	\$ 123,714	\$ 144,353	\$ 65,872
Current Liabilities	\$ 204,391	\$ 232,513	\$144,444
Net Current Assets	-\$ 80,677	-\$ 88,160	-\$ 78,572

Year	2004	2005	2006
Net Income	\$ 4,803	unknown	unknown
Current Assets	\$ 81,076	\$ 88,113	\$190,274
Current Liabilities	\$ 152,552	\$ 166,886	\$229,113
Net Current Assets	-\$ 71,476	-\$ 78,773	-\$ 38,839

As indicated in the table above, besides net income and as an alternative method of reviewing a petitioner's ability to pay a proposed wage, USCIS will examine a petitioner's net current

⁴The petitioner was a C corporation from 2001 through 2004. For the purpose of this review of the petitioner's Form 1120 corporate tax returns, the petitioner's net income is found on line 28 (taxable income before net operating loss deduction and special deductions). USCIS uses a corporate petitioner's taxable income before the net operating loss deduction as a basis to evaluate its ability to pay the proffered wage in the year of filing the tax return because it represents the net total after consideration of both the petitioner's total income (including gross profit and gross receipts or sales), as well as the expenses and other deductions taken on line(s) 12 through 27 of page 1 of the corporate tax return. Because corporate petitioners may claim a loss in a year other than the year in which it was incurred as a net operating loss, USCIS examines a petitioner's taxable income before the net operating loss deduction in order to determine whether the petitioner had sufficient taxable income in the year of filing the tax return to pay the proffered wage.

For 2005 and 2006, the petitioner filed its taxes as an S corporation. Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. Where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 17e (2005) or line 18 (2006) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed March 22, 2007)(indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholder's shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). Here, the petitioner's net income can not be determined because it failed to submit complete copies of its tax returns for 2005 and 2006. Page 3 has been omitted in both returns.

assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁵ It represents a measure of liquidity during a given period and a possible resource out of which the proffered wage may be paid for that period. In this case, the corporate petitioner's year-end current assets and current liabilities are shown on Schedule L of its federal tax returns. Current assets are shown on line(s) 1 through 6 of Schedule L and current liabilities are shown on line(s) 16 through 18. If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the corporate petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets.⁶

The petitioner also submitted copies of its bank statements for December 31, 2003 for [REDACTED] statements covering the period from January 30, 2004 to September 30, 2004 (acct. [REDACTED]), the year 2005 (acct. [REDACTED]), and the year 2006 (acct. [REDACTED]).

It is noted that bank statements do not overcome the evidence reflected on the petitioner's tax returns. Bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise provides an inaccurate financial portrait of the petitioner. Bank statements generally show only a portion of a petitioner's financial status and do not reflect other current liabilities and encumbrances that may affect a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage as set forth on an audited financial statement or Schedule L of a corporate tax return. Cash assets should also be shown on the corresponding federal tax return as part of the listing of current assets on Schedule L. As such, they are already balanced against current liabilities and included in the calculation of a petitioner's net current assets for a given period. Here, it is noted that no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements, which correlate to the periods covered by the tax returns, somehow show additional available funds that would not be reflected on the corresponding tax return such as cash, reflected on line 1 of Schedule L.

The petitioner has not established its continuing financial ability to pay the proffered wage of \$61,880 per year. It is noted that if a petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. To the extent that the petitioner may have paid the beneficiary less than the proffered wage,

⁵ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

⁶ A petitioner's total assets and total liabilities are not considered in this calculation because they include assets and liabilities that, (in most cases) have a life of more than one year and would also include assets that would not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage.

those amounts will be considered. If the difference between the amount of wages paid and the proffered wage can be covered by the petitioner's net income or net current assets for a given period, then the petitioner's ability to pay the full proffered wage for that period will also be demonstrated. As noted above, the record contains no evidence of any wages paid to the beneficiary.

In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date of April 30, 2001.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or

the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

According to the 2001 tax return, which covered the priority date of April 30, 2001, the petitioner reported net income of \$7,198, which is insufficient to pay the \$61,880 proffered wage. Similarly, the petitioner's net current assets of -\$80,677 were also far less than the certified wage and can not establish the ability to pay.

In 2002, the petitioner's net income of \$11,537 as shown on its 2002 tax return could not cover the proffered wage or demonstrate the ability to pay. Neither could the -\$88,160 in net current assets provide sufficient funds to pay the beneficiary's proffered wage. The ability to pay was not demonstrated in this year.

In 2003, neither the petitioner's reported net income of \$10,515, nor its -\$78,572 in net current assets were sufficient to cover the proffered salary or establish the petitioner's ability to pay during this year.

In 2004, neither the petitioner's net income of \$4,803 nor its net current assets of -\$71,476 was sufficient to pay the certified wage of \$61,880 or demonstrate the ability to pay.

In 2005 and 2006, because the tax returns were both missing page 3 which contains the remaining page of Schedule K, the petitioner's net income can not be determined in either year. Further, neither its net current assets of -\$78,773 in 2005, nor the -\$38,839 in net current assets in 2006 was enough to cover the proffered salary or demonstrate the ability to pay during either of those years. Further, it is noted that the petitioner submitted no financial documentation covering 2007.

Matter of Sonogawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967), is sometimes applicable where other factors such as the expectations of increasing business and profits overcome evidence of small profits. That case, however relates to petitions filed during uncharacteristically unprofitable or difficult years within a framework of profitable or successful years. During the year in which the petition was filed, the *Sonogawa* petitioner changed business locations,

and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and a period of time when business could not be conducted. The Regional Commissioner determined that the prospects for a resumption of successful operations were well established. He noted that the petitioner was a well-known fashion designer who had been featured in *Time* and *Look*. Her clients included movie actresses, society matrons and Miss Universe. The petitioner had lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation, historical growth and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

As the record currently stands in this case, it is noted that the petitioner's six tax returns failed to reflect sufficient net income or net current assets to cover the proffered wage in any year. Further, it may not be concluded that such analogous factual circumstances to *Sonegawa* are present in this case that would overcome the evidence reflected in the tax returns. See *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Unlike the *Sonegawa* petitioner, the instant petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence demonstrating that uncharacteristic losses, factors of outstanding reputation or other circumstances that prevailed in *Sonegawa* are present in this matter. The AAO can not conclude that the petitioner has established that it has had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Based on a review of the underlying record and the evidence submitted on appeal, it may not be concluded that the labor certification provided supports the approval of the petition for a skilled worker visa classification originally sought by the petitioner. Additionally, there was insufficient evidence to establish that the petitioner has had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage. The petition will be denied for these reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.