


identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services


PUBLIC COPY



B6

Date: **NOV 25 2011** Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

FILE:




IN RE: Petitioner:
 Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a foreign specialty cook. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's August 27, 2008 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on May 2, 2002. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$14.96 per hour (\$31,116.80 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of experience in the job offered.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition and in an accompanying letter, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1995, but does not list how many workers it currently employs. When looking at the tax returns from 2002 to 2007, the petitioner has a gross annual income ranging from \$544,775 in 2003 to \$758,310 in 2007. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is the calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on April 19, 2002, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date on May 2, 2002 to any time subsequently.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The record before the director closed on May 22, 2008 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner's 2007 federal income tax return was due, and was submitted by the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2007 is the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2002 to 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2002, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$887.
- In 2003, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$6,153.
- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$8,169.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$5,337.
- In 2006, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$20,225.
- In 2007, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$26,907.

Therefore, for the years 2002 to 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.² A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for the years 2002 to 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2002, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$35,941.
- In 2003, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$25,275.
- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$37,795.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$32,984.
- In 2006, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$27,763.
- In 2007, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$21,346.

²According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

For the years 2003, 2006 and 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel advocates combining the petitioner's net income with its net current assets to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. This approach is unacceptable because net income and net current assets are not, in the view of the AAO, cumulative. The AAO views net income and net current assets as two different methods of demonstrating the petitioner's ability to pay the wage--one retrospective and one prospective. Net income is retrospective in nature because it represents the sum of income remaining after all expenses were paid over the course of the previous tax year. Conversely, the net current assets figure is a prospective "snapshot" of the net total of petitioner's assets that will become cash within a relatively short period of time minus those expenses that will come due within that same period of time. Thus, the petitioner is expected to receive roughly one-twelfth of its net current assets during each month of the coming year. Given that net income is retrospective and net current assets are prospective in nature, the AAO does not agree with counsel that the two figures can be combined in a meaningful way to illustrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a single tax year. Moreover, combining the net income and net current assets could double-count certain figures, such as cash on hand and, in the case of a taxpayer who reports taxes pursuant to accrual convention, accounts receivable.

On appeal, counsel also argues that the difference between the petitioner's net income/net current assets and the proffered wage to the beneficiary could be paid from the discretionary compensation to officers. In support of this, counsel submitted a signed letter from [REDACTED] the two shareholders of the company who each control 50% of the company, both stating their intention to pay the beneficiary the balance of the proffered wage.³ The shareholders of a corporation have the authority to allocate expenses of the corporation for various legitimate business purposes, including for the purpose of reducing the corporation's taxable income. Compensation of officers is an expense category explicitly stated on the Form 1120 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. For this reason, the petitioner's figures for compensation of officers may be considered as additional financial resources of the petitioner, in addition to its figures for ordinary income.

The documentation presented here indicates that two people, [REDACTED], hold 100% percent of the company's stock. According to the petitioner's 2003, 2006 and 2007 IRS Forms 1120 Schedule E (Compensation of Officers), the corporation elected to pay the officers \$62,200 in 2003, \$52,000 in 2006 and \$62,400 in 2007, respectively. These figures are supported by both Hee Ja Lim's and Mun Sook Lim's W-2 Forms for 2003, 2006 and 2007, which were submitted

³ The shareholders do not say in the letter that they are willing to pay the difference in the proffered wage until the time the beneficiary becomes a lawful permanent resident of the United States.

for the record.⁴ We note here that the compensation received by the company's two owners during these three years varied only slightly and amounted to a fixed salary of approximately \$31,200 per year.⁵

Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage." In the present case, however, counsel is not suggesting that USCIS examine the personal assets of the petitioner's owners, but, rather, the financial flexibility that the employee-owners have in setting their salaries based on the profitability of their restaurant.

As previously noted, the stated net income in 2003, 2006 and 2007 was \$6,153, \$20,225 and \$26,907, respectively. The stated net current assets in those years were \$25,275, \$27,763 and \$21,346, respectively. The proffered wage in this case was \$31,116.80. The evidence of record does not indicate that either shareholder could give up any part of their officer's compensation, to pay the proffered wage of the cook. The fact that each shareholder received a relatively fixed salary from the business makes it less likely that they each could afford to give up a portion of it to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage until he obtains permanent residence. [REDACTED] and spouse earned a total of \$106,600 in 2003 with two dependents, \$52,000 in 2006 and \$59,800 in 2007. [REDACTED] and spouse together earned \$82,400 in 2003, \$52,000 in 2006 and \$55,900 in 2007 with three dependent children in every year. The record does not contain the personal expenses of each officer for the three years in issue. As such, the AAO is unable to determine whether it is realistic for the officers to forego the salary to pay the beneficiary's salary, and continue to support their families. The record also does not reflect that the business has a significant amount of extra cash to pay the proffered wage. For these reasons, the petitioner has not established that it can pay the proffered salary from the priority date until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent resident status.

In examining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, the fundamental focus of the USCIS' determination is whether the employer is making a realistic job offer and has the overall financial ability to satisfy the proffered wage. *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 145 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977). Accordingly, after a review of the petitioner's federal tax returns and all other relevant evidence, we conclude that the petitioner has not established that it had the ability to pay the salary offered as of the priority date of the petition and continuing to present.

⁴ There is a \$100 discrepancy between the officer's Forms W-2 which indicate that each received \$31,200 in 2003 and the IRS form 1120 for 2003 that indicates that each officer received \$31,100 in 2003.

⁵ Mun Lim's Form W-2 indicates that this officer received only \$20,800 in 2006. Except for 2006, both officers received the same fixed amount of either \$31,100 or \$31,200 in all of the years from 2002 to 2007.

Finally, counsel argues in his appeal brief that the AAO should use the petitioner's bank statements to show that the petitioner had additional liquid assets and thus the ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary. Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, as counsel correctly states, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax returns, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered below in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, counsel argues that *Sonogawa* applies to establish the petitioner's ability to pay under the totality of the circumstances. Counsel asserts that the petitioner should be given a favorable disposition due to the long duration of the petitioning company's existence and the continued employment and payment of workers. Counsel also argues that the petitioner has

maintained very high gross profits, including \$570,770 in 2002; \$544,775 in 2003; \$589,542 in 2004; 596,720 in 2005; \$741,311 in 2006 and \$758,310 in 2007. While the petitioner has enjoyed gross receipts of approximately \$500,000 to \$750,000 during these years, the petitioner's net income and net current assets are low. Further, the petitioner has not provided any information on the Form I-140 about how many people it employs. Salaries and wages not including compensation to officers have remained static: \$69,360 in 2003; \$84,920 in 2006; and \$71,500 in 2007. The officer's compensation has been steadily paid out as a modest salary of approximately \$31,200 each for the two shareholders. The petitioner has not shown unusual circumstances in any of those years causing the restaurant to earn less money than it would typically have made. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Beyond the directors' decision, the AAO also finds that the beneficiary lacks the qualifying work experience necessary for this position. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The petitioner must demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its labor certification application, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977). Here, the labor certification application was accepted on May 2, 2002.

As stated above, the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal. The relevant evidence in the record includes the beneficiary's employment letters. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the beneficiary's qualifications.

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for an employment based immigrant visa, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must examine whether the alien's credentials meet the requirements set forth in the labor certification. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. at 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

The required education, training, experience and special requirements for the offered position are set forth at Part A, Items 14 and 15, of Form ETA 750. In the instant case, the labor certification states that the position has the following minimum requirements:

Block 14:

Education: None
Experience: 2 years in the job offered.

Block 15: None

The beneficiary states that he has the requisite two years of experience in the job offered or related occupation as required on the Form ETA 750 by the petitioner. On the Form ETA 750B, the beneficiary lists the position in which he obtained the requisite experience:

1) Name and Address of Employer

Name of Job: Cook
Date Started – Date Left: 11/1997 – 12/2001
Kind of Business: Restaurant
No. of Hours Per Week: (Left Blank)
Describe in Detail the Duties Performed: Prepare, season and cook food according to oriental cooking techniques. Portion and garnish food. Prepare dishes such as Three Delights, Sweet and Sour Pork and Chow Fun.

2) Name and Address of Employer:

Name of Job: Cook
Date Started – Date Left: 06/1992 – 10/1997
Kind of Business: Restaurant
No. of Hours Per Week: (Left Blank)
Describe in Detail the Duties Performed: Prepare, season and cook food according to oriental cooking techniques. Portion and garnish food. Prepare dishes such as Three Delights, Sweet and Sour Pork and Chow Fun.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3) provides:

(ii) *Other documentation*—

(A) *General.* Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or

employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

(B) *Skilled workers.* If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

In the present case, the petitioner submitted an employment letter from [REDACTED] restaurant. This is the only employment letter in the record. As required by the statute, the letter names the beneficiary. The letter lists the name and address of the business, and it was sealed by the president of the company, [REDACTED], although not signed. The letter also contains the dates that the beneficiary worked for this restaurant. However, the letter lacks a description of the training received or the experience of the alien. Therefore, the record does not establish that the beneficiary meets the minimum requirements of the offered position as set forth in the labor certification. For this additional reason the petition must be denied.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.