


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



B6

DATE: Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE:



FEB 09 2012

IN RE: Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker Pursuant to § 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is an adult residential care home. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a residential care assistant. As required by statute, the Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Parts A & B, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (USDOL). The director determined the petitioner had not established it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The director determined the petitioner had failed to submit all of the documents required to be forwarded with its initial submission.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the USDOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 as certified by the USDOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 that was accepted for processing on April 27, 2001 shows the proffered wage as \$1,900 per month which equates to \$22,800 per year and that the position requires six months experience in the job offered and six months training as a direct care provider.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

The petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, it claims it was established in 1990 and to employ 30 workers when the Form I-140 was filed. The petitioner's IRS Forms 1120S, U.S.

Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, reflect it operates on a calendar year basis. On the Form ETA 750, Part B, statement of qualifications of alien, signed by the beneficiary on April 24, 2001, she stated she had not been employed by the petitioner.

A certified labor certification establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until a beneficiary obtains lawful permanent resident status. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

USCIS first examines whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary from the priority date onwards. A finding that the petitioner employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage is *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay. In this matter, the petitioner submitted IRS Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, as evidence of wages paid to the beneficiary by the petitioner from 2002 through 2010 as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Wages Paid</u>
2001	none
2002	\$11,386.26
2003	\$24,674.39
2004	\$21,433.08
2005	\$26,867.63
2006	\$32,442.98
2007	\$25,666.31
2008	\$31,030.61
2009	\$30,912.30
2010	\$30,614.31

In this case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage of \$22,800 per year during 2001, 2002 and 2004.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing*

Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. *supra*, at 1084, the court held that USCIS had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The tax returns submitted by the petitioner for 2001 through 2003 and 2007 through 2010 are for [REDACTED] under Employer Identification Number [REDACTED]. However, the tax returns submitted for 2004 through 2007 are for [REDACTED] c. under [REDACTED]. The petitioner in this matter is [REDACTED]. Accordingly, the tax returns for [REDACTED] may not be considered in evaluating the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations

cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980).

nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage.”

Furthermore, the petitioner submitted incomplete copies of its tax returns. It only submitted the first pages. However, for an S corporation, Schedule K is needed to evaluate net income. See footnote 1 *infra*. The petitioner was specifically requested by the AAO in its October 27, 2011 Request for Evidence to submit “all pages” of its tax returns. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). Regardless, assuming the persuasiveness of the IRS Forms 1120S submitted by the petitioner, net income is shown in the table below: ¹

<u>Year</u>	<u>Net Income</u>
2001	\$34,124.36
2002	\$51,702.43
2003	\$687.11
2004	Not Submitted ²
2005	Not Submitted
2006	Not Submitted
2007	-\$816,926.65
2008	-\$693,136.61
2009	-\$460,291.11
2010	-\$395,083.59

Therefore, for 2004, even considering wages paid to the beneficiary, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage. In 2001 and 2002, it cannot be determined whether the petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the difference between wages paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage because the petitioner did not submit complete copies of its tax returns. See 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(14).

¹ Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003), line 17e (2004-2005), or line 18 (2006-2010) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf>.

² Even if the tax returns were considered, these returns show negative ordinary business income (line 21) in 2004, 2005 and 2006.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.³ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

As explained above, on October 27, 2011, AAO sent the petitioner a Request for Evidence giving the corporation a chance to submit qualifying financial information including copies of all pages of its IRS Federal Tax Forms for 2001 through 2010 to establish the company's ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage and to establish that the petitioner corporation has a continuity of operation. In its response received November 16, 2011, the petition only sent the first page of the requested tax returns. Therefore, the necessary Schedule L information necessary to compute the petitioner's net current assets was not provided by the petitioner precluding this alternative analysis.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the USDOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, the petitioner states its tax forms show the business generates enough income to pay the salaries of its employees.

The petitioner's assertion on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted that demonstrate the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the USDOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion

³According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In this case, the petitioner has not established an ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage through wages earned, net income or net current assets. The petitioner also has not established its historical growth, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, or its reputation within its industry. As indicated in its tax returns, the petitioner's net income has been negative amounts since 2007 reaching its low point in that year. Therefore, the AAO concludes that the petitioner has not demonstrated adequate financial strength through its net current income, net current assets, or any other means to demonstrate its ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. at 159; *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

The labor certification states that the offered position requires six months qualifying experience in the job offered and 6 months of training as a direct care provider. On the labor certification, the beneficiary claims to qualify for the offered position based on experience as a care provider for [REDACTED] from May 2000 until November 2000.

The beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience must be supported by letters from employers giving the name, address, and title of the employer, and a description of the beneficiary's experience. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(ii)(A). On appeal the petitioner forwards a copy of a "duty statement" signed by the beneficiary on October 1, 2000 indicating that she accepted the position of volunteer resident care assistant for [REDACTED] on that date. This document is of scant

evidentiary value because it does not document the number of months the beneficiary spent in this combination voluntary work and training program outlined in the statement. Additionally, the commencement date of the agreement conflicts with her claimed work experience on the Form ETA 750 because on October 1, 2000, the date she signed the agreement, she was shown as being employed by [REDACTED] in Richmond, California, working 40 hours per week. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1988). Finally, the record contains no letters confirming the beneficiary's experience prior to April 27, 2001, the priority date of the labor certification.

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required experience and training set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis). The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.