




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)



Date: **JUN 01 2012** Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The director's decision will be withdrawn in part and affirmed in part.

The petitioner is a landscaping business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a maintenance mechanic. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the beneficiary obtained the required 24 months experience in the job offered prior to the priority date. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely, and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's March 27, 2009 denial, the issues in this case are: 1) whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence; and 2) whether the beneficiary had the required two years of full-time experience in the job offered as of the priority date as required in the labor certification.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment

Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$16.50 per hour (\$34,320 per year). The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires 24 months of experience in the job offered.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1986 and did not include its gross annual income or number of currently employed workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year begins on October 1st and ends on September 30th. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on January 22, 2006, the beneficiary claims to have worked for the petitioner from February 1, 1996, until the present. In addition, the AAO notes that the beneficiary's Forms W-2 in the record reflect the use of two different social security numbers, one of which has been associated with other individuals.²

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

² Misuse of another individual's SSN is a violation of Federal law and may lead to fines and/or imprisonment and disregarding the work authorization provisions printed on your Social Security card may be a violation of Federal immigration law. Violations of applicable law regarding Social Security Number fraud and misuse are serious crimes and will be subject to prosecution.

petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date. Forms W-2 were submitted indicating that the petitioner paid the beneficiary wages according to the table below.

- In 2004, the Form W-2 stated wages paid to the beneficiary of \$21,436.25.
- In 2005, the Form W-2 stated wages paid to the beneficiary of \$23,263.75.
- In 2006, the Form W-2 stated wages paid to the beneficiary of \$28,907.75.
- In 2007, the Form W-2 stated wages paid to the beneficiary of \$1,098.50.

Therefore, as the proffered wage was \$34,320.00 per year, the petitioner did not pay the beneficiary the proffered wage in any of the periods covered by the Forms W-2 but would be obligated to demonstrate its ability to pay the difference between wages it actually paid and the proffered wage as shown in the table below.

Year	Proffered Wage	Wages Paid	Balance
2001	\$34,320.00	\$0	\$34,320.00
2002	\$34,320.00	\$0	\$34,320.00
2003	\$34,320.00	\$0	\$34,320.00
2004	\$34,320.00	\$21,436.25	\$12,883.75
2005	\$34,320.00	\$23,263.75	\$11,056.25
2006	\$34,320.00	\$28,907.75	\$ 5,412.25
2007	\$34,320.00	\$1,098.50	\$33,221.50

In addition, the AAO notes that as the petitioner's fiscal year begins on October 1st and ends on September 30th, the April 30, 2001 priority date fell within the 2000 tax year beginning October 1, 2000 and ending on September 30, 2001, for which no copy of the Form 1120 was provided.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and

profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The record before the director closed on March 9, 2009, with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner's 2008 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2007 is the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$55,371.00.
- In 2002, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$10,534.00.

- In 2003, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$24,180.00.
- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net income of -\$147,175.00.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$64,840.00
- In 2006, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$26,824.00.
- In 2007, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$9,258.00.

Therefore, for the years 2001, 2005, and 2006, the petitioner did have sufficient net income to pay the balance of the proffered wage. The petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2007.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.³ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2001 through 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001 the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$230,287.00.
- In 2002 the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$195,403.00.
- In 2003 the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$190,211.00.
- In 2004 the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$46,839.00.
- In 2005 the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$68,905.00.
- In 2006 the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$2,843.00.
- In 2007 the Form 1120 stated net current assets of -\$70,529.00.

Therefore, for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, the petitioner did have sufficient net current assets to pay the balance of the proffered wage.

In addition, as previously noted the April 30, 2001 priority date falls within the reporting period covered by the 2000 tax return, and as no Form 1120 for 2000 was submitted, the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage on the priority date until September 30, 2001, must be demonstrated. In this regard, the AAO notes that the beginning-of-year net current assets on the Form 1120 for 2001 should correspond to the end-of-year figures in 2000. It is noted that the beginning-of-year net

³According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

current assets for 2001 were \$119,169. Therefore, it appears that the petitioner also had the ability to pay the proffered wage during the period beginning on the priority date and lasting until the 2001 fiscal year.

Therefore, from the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner has established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income, or net current assets for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. The petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income, or net current assets for 2007.

Counsel asserts in his brief accompanying the appeal that the total amount of gross income, the depreciation, and the amount of officer compensation demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date.

However, USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, gross receipts were consistently substantial reaching a high of \$5,272,774 in 2006. Although the evidence does not contain statements from the officers attesting to their willingness and ability to forego compensation in order to pay the beneficiary the balance of the proffered wage, officer compensation was substantial and was higher in years in which the gross receipts were higher. In 2007, the only year in which the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage was not established through wages paid, net income, or net current assets, officer compensation was \$323,078, while the remaining balance of the proffered wage was \$33,221,50.

According to the evidence in the file, the business was established in 1986 and incorporated in 1998, indicating that it has been operating for several years as has paid its two owners substantial profits during many of those years. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage. Thus, this portion of the director's decision is withdrawn.

The director also found that the beneficiary was not qualified for the position. The beneficiary must meet all of the requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification by the priority date of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971).

In evaluating the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position, USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by regulation, USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary's qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to "examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer." *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve "reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification]." *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position has the following minimum requirements:

- H.4. Education: None.
- H.5. Training: None required.
- H.6. Experience in the job offered: 24 months.
- H.7. Alternate field of study: None accepted.
- H.8. Alternate combination of education and experience: None accepted.
- H.9. Foreign educational equivalent: Accepted.
- H.10. Experience in an alternate occupation: None accepted.
- H.14. Specific skills or other requirements: None.

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The labor certification also states that the beneficiary qualifies for the offered position based on 27 months experience as a maintenance mechanic for [REDACTED] Mexico working 40 hours per week from January 2, 1993, until April 1, 1995. No other experience prior to employment with the petitioner is listed. The beneficiary signed the labor certification under a declaration that the contents are true and correct under penalty of perjury on January 22, 2006.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A) states:

Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

The record contains an experience letter from [REDACTED] owner of [REDACTED] Mexico, stating that the company employed the beneficiary as a mechanic from January 20, 1991, until April 20, 1994. However, the letter does not provide a description of the alien's skills or duties or the number of hours worked per week. In addition, the dates of employment do not match those listed on the ETA Form 9089.

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

On appeal, counsel asserts that the dates of employment provided on the experience letter are correct and corroborated on the original Form ETA 750 labor certification submitted and used to establish the priority date. Counsel asserts that the subsequently filed ETA Form 9089 which lists different dates of employment was filed electronically and that the difference in dates may be due to an input error.

The AAO notes that the copy of the Form ETA 750 submitted does not have an endorsement from the DOL, and that the ETA Form 9089 is the labor certification accepted and certified by the DOL as well as signed by the beneficiary on January 22, 2006, under a declaration that the contents of the form are true and correct under penalty of perjury.

The AAO affirms the director's decision that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary met the minimum requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification as of the priority date. Therefore, the beneficiary does not qualify for classification as a professional or skilled worker under section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Act.

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The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.