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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services




DATE: **JUN 04 2012** OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER FILE: 

IN RE: Petitioner:   
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,

  
Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be rejected.

The petitioner is a laundry and dry cleaning services company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a tailor. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL) on behalf of the beneficiary. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage at the time the priority date was established and continuing to the present. The director also noted that the beneficiary and the petitioner's signature line of Form I-140 reflect the same name. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. The AAO's *de novo* authority is well recognized by the federal courts. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The Form I-140 petition filed electronically and received by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on October 24, 2008 identifies [REDACTED] as the petitioner. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2) requires that the petitioner sign the petition. Part 8 of the Form I-140, requiring the petitioner's signature, lists [REDACTED] the instant beneficiary, and not an employee or officer of [REDACTED]. The regulations do not permit any individual who is not the petitioner to sign Form I-140.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(c) provides:

*Filing petition.* Any United States employer desiring and intending to employ an alien may file a petition for classification of the alien under section 203(b)(1)(B), 203(b)(1)(C), 203(b)(2), or 203(b)(3) of the Act. An alien, or any person in the alien's behalf, may file a petition for classification under section 203(b)(1)(A) or 203(b)(4) of the Act (as it relates to special immigrants under section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act).

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<sup>1</sup> On appeal, counsel submits a copy of a new Form I-140 endorsed on March 31, 2009 by [REDACTED] in his capacity as President of the petitioner. However, a petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to USCIS requirements. *See Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm. 1988). A petitioner must establish the elements for the approval of the petition at the time of filing. *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(12).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2) provides:

*Signature.* An applicant or petitioner must sign his or her application or petition. However, a parent or legal guardian may sign for a person who is less than 14 years old. A legal guardian may sign for a mentally incompetent person. By signing the application or petition, the applicant or petitioner, or parent or guardian certifies under penalty of perjury that the application or petition, and all evidence submitted with it, either at the time of filing or thereafter, is true and correct. Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, an acceptable signature on an application or petition that is being filed with the [USCIS] is one that is either handwritten or, for applications or petitions filed electronically as permitted by the instructions to the form, in electronic format.

An earlier version of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(d), as in effect in 1991, provided, in pertinent part:

Before the petition may be accepted and considered properly filed, the petitioner *or authorized representative* shall sign the visa petition (under penalty of perjury) in the block provided on the form. (Emphasis added.)

The filing requirements for employment-based immigrant petitions are now found at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a). The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a)(1) provides that such petitions must be accepted for processing under the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 103. As stated above, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2) provides that the petitioner must sign the petition and does not include the “or authorized representative” language that previously applied to Forms I-140 until 1991. Had legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, intended to continue to allow authorized representatives to sign Form I-140 petitions, the language expressly allowing them to do so would not have been removed.

There is no regulatory provision that waives the signature requirement for a petitioning U.S. employer. The petition has not been properly filed because the petitioning U.S. employer, [REDACTED] did not sign the petition. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(i), an application or petition which is not properly signed shall be rejected as improperly filed, and no receipt date can be assigned to an improperly filed petition. While the Service Center did not reject the petition, the AAO is not bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service center. *Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS*, 2000 WL 282785 at 3 (E.D. La.), *aff'd*, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 534 U.S. 819 (2001).

USCIS and legacy INS have required that an authorized employee of the U.S. petitioning employer must sign the Form I-140 petition on behalf of the petitioning employer since 1991 when legacy INS removed the “or authorized representative” language. The employer’s signature serves as certification under penalty of perjury that the petition and all evidence submitted with it, either at the time of filing or thereafter, is true and correct.

The signature line on the Form I-140 for the petitioner provides that the petitioner is certifying, “under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that this petition and the evidence submitted with it are all true and correct.” To be valid, 28 U.S.C. § 1746 requires that declarations be “subscribed” by the declarant “as true under penalty of perjury.” *Id.* In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, which governs liability for perjury under federal law, mandates that: “Whoever in any declaration under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true is guilty of perjury.” 18 U.S.C. § 1621.

The probative force of a declaration subscribed under penalty of perjury derives from the signature of the declarant; one may not sign a declaration “for” another. Without the petitioner’s actual signature as declarant, the declaration is completely robbed of any evidentiary force. *See In re Rivera*, 342 B.R. 435, 459 (D. N.J. 2006); *Blumberg v. Gates*, No. CV 00-05607, 2003 WL 22002739 (C.D.Cal.) (not selected for publication).

The AAO notes that the integrity of the immigration process depends on the actual employer signing the official immigration forms under penalty of perjury.


The petition has not been properly filed by a United States employer. Therefore, we must reject the appeal.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> On appeal, the petitioner also submits its 2008 income statement, its 2008 bank statements, and Form 1099 issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary in 2008 to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage. The Form 1099 demonstrates that the beneficiary was paid \$7,800 in 2008, or less than the proffered wage. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. An audit is conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards to obtain a reasonable assurance that the financial statements of the business are free of material misstatements. The unaudited financial statements that counsel submitted with the petition are not persuasive evidence. The accountant’s report that accompanied those financial statements makes clear that they were produced pursuant to a compilation rather than an audit. As the accountant’s report also makes clear, financial statements produced pursuant to a compilation are the representations of management compiled into standard form. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel’s reliance on the balance in the petitioner’s bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner’s ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material “in appropriate cases,” the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage.

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**ORDER:** The appeal is rejected.