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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
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Washington, DC 20529-2090  
**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

**PUBLIC COPY**

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Date: **JAN 11 2012** Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER File:

IN RE: Petitioner:   
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



**INSTRUCTIONS:**

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center and now is before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a fine catering and retail company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cook. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's May 6, 2008 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. In addition, on appeal, we have identified an additional issue of whether the beneficiary has the experience required by the labor certification.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have all the education, training, and

experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's priority date. See *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 20, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$18.89 per hour (\$39,291 per year).<sup>1</sup> The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of experience in the position offered as a cook.<sup>2</sup>

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>3</sup>

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner stated that it was established in 1989<sup>4</sup> and currently employs "9+"<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The ETA 750 states that overtime would be remunerated at the rate of \$25.33 per hour, but does not indicate that any overtime is required.

<sup>2</sup> The petitioner filed a second Form I-140 to sponsor the beneficiary as a cook. That Form I-140, filed April 30, 2010, was accompanied by an ETA Form 9089 which states that the position requires only one year of experience and offers a wage of \$11.58 per hour. In any further filings, the petitioner should explain this discrepancy. It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

<sup>3</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

<sup>4</sup> The Form ETA 750 was filed by what appears to be a different entity than the petitioner. The original employer stated on Form ETA 750 is [REDACTED] with an address of [REDACTED]. The Form I-140 was filed by the petitioner named [REDACTED], address of [REDACTED]. No explanation was given as to the difference in names between the employer listed on the Form ETA 750 and the Form I-140. In the letter dated January 15, 2007, the petitioner stated that [REDACTED] is a "subsidiary company" that was "spun off" in January 2006. New York state corporate records show that there are a number of separately structured corporations beginning with the name [REDACTED]. See [http://appext9.dos.ny.gov/corp\\_public/CORPSEARCH.SELECT\\_ENTITY](http://appext9.dos.ny.gov/corp_public/CORPSEARCH.SELECT_ENTITY) (accessed January 10, 2012). Whether [REDACTED] operates under the same tax identification number as the petitioner, or is a successor-in-interest to the entity on the certified labor certification is unclear. The petitioner must resolve this issue in any further filings. "It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice." *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

USCIS has not issued regulations governing immigrant visa petitions filed by a successor-in-interest employer. Instead, such matters are adjudicated in accordance with *Matter of Dial Auto Repair Shop, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 481 (Comm'r 1981) ("*Matter of Dial Auto*") a binding, legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) decision that was designated as a precedent by the Commissioner in 1986. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions are binding on all immigration officers in the administration of the Act.

The facts of the precedent decision, *Matter of Dial Auto*, are instructive in this matter. *Matter of Dial Auto* involved a petition filed by Dial Auto Repair Shop, Inc. on behalf of an alien beneficiary for the position of automotive technician. The beneficiary's former employer, Elvira Auto Body, filed the underlying labor certification. On the petition, Dial Auto claimed to be a successor-in-interest to Elvira Auto Body. The part of the Commissioner's decision relating to the successor-in-interest issue follows:

Additionally, the representations made by the petitioner concerning the relationship between Elvira Auto Body and itself are issues which have not been resolved. In order to determine whether the petitioner was a true successor to Elvira Auto Body, counsel was instructed on appeal to fully explain the manner by which the petitioner took over the business of Elvira Auto Body and to provide the Service with a copy of the contract or agreement between the two entities; however, no response was submitted. If the *petitioner's claim of having assumed all of Elvira Auto Body's rights, duties, obligations, etc.*, is found to be untrue, then grounds would exist for invalidation of the labor certification under 20 C.F.R. § 656.30 (1987). Conversely, if the claim is found to be true, and it is determined that an actual successorship exists, the petition could be approved if eligibility is otherwise shown, including ability of the predecessor enterprise to have paid the certified wage at the time of filing.

19 I&N Dec. at 482-3 (emphasis added).

The Commissioner's decision, however, does not require a successor-in-interest to establish that it assumed all rights, duties, and obligations. Instead, in *Matter of Dial Auto*, the petitioner specifically represented that it had assumed all of the original employer's rights, duties, and obligations, but failed to submit requested evidence to establish that this claim was, in fact, true. The Commissioner stated that if the petitioner's claim was untrue, the INS could invalidate the underlying labor certification for fraud or willful misrepresentation. For this reason the Commissioner said: "if the claim is found to be true, *and* it is determined that an actual successorship exists, the petition could be approved . . ." *Id.* (emphasis added).

The Commissioner clearly considered the petitioner's claim that it had assumed all of the original employer's rights, duties, and obligations to be a separate inquiry from whether or not the petitioner is a successor-in-interest. The Commissioner was most interested in receiving a full explanation as

to the “manner by which the petitioner took over the business” and seeing a copy of “the contract or agreement between the two entities” in order to verify the petitioner’s claims. *Id.*

Accordingly, *Matter of Dial Auto* does not stand for the proposition that a valid successor relationship may only be established through the assumption of “all” or a totality of a predecessor entity’s rights, duties, and obligations. Instead, the generally accepted definition of a successor-in-interest is broader: “One who follows another in ownership or control of property. A successor in interest retains the same rights as the original owner, with no change in substance.” *Black’s Law Dictionary* 1570 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “successor in interest”).

With respect to corporations, a successor is generally created when one corporation is vested with the rights and obligations of an earlier corporation through amalgamation, consolidation, or other assumption of interests. *Id.* at 1569 (defining “successor”). When considering other business organizations, such as partnerships or sole proprietorships, even a partial change in ownership may require the petitioner to establish that it is a true successor-in-interest to the employer identified in the labor certification application.

The merger or consolidation of a business organization into another will give rise to a successor-in-interest relationship because the assets and obligations are transferred by operation of law. However, a mere transfer of assets, even one that takes up a predecessor’s business activities, does not necessarily create a successor-in-interest. See *Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co.*, 496 F.3d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2007). An asset transaction occurs when one business organization sells property – such as real estate, machinery, or intellectual property - to another business organization. The purchase of assets from a predecessor will only result in a successor-in-interest relationship if the parties agree to the transfer and assumption of the essential rights and obligations of the predecessor necessary to carry on the business in the same manner with regard to the assets sold. See generally 19 Am. Jur. 2d *Corporations* § 2170 (2010).

Considering *Matter of Dial Auto* and the generally accepted definition of successor-in-interest, a petitioner may establish a valid successor relationship for immigration purposes if it satisfies three conditions. First, the petitioning successor must fully describe and document the transaction transferring ownership of all, or a relevant part of, the beneficiary’s predecessor employer. Second, the petitioning successor must demonstrate that the job opportunity is the same as originally offered on the labor certification. Third, the petitioning successor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is eligible for the immigrant visa in all respects.

Evidence of transfer of ownership must show that the successor not only purchased assets from the predecessor, but also the essential rights and obligations of the predecessor necessary to carry on the business. To ensure that the job opportunity remains the same as originally certified, the successor must continue to operate the same type of business as the predecessor, in the same metropolitan statistical area and the essential business functions must remain substantially the same as before the ownership transfer. See *Matter of Dial Auto*, 19 I&N Dec. at 482.

workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on the calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on March 24, 2001, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.<sup>6</sup>

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner submitted no evidence with the instant petition that it employed or paid the beneficiary any wages.<sup>7</sup>

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In order to establish eligibility for the immigrant visa in all respects, the petitioner must support its claim with all necessary evidence, including evidence of ability to pay. The petitioner must prove that is the same entity or a successor-in-interest to the employer on the Form ETA 750. In addition, the petitioner must establish the successor's ability to pay the proffered wage in accordance from the date of any transfer of ownership forward. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2); *see also Matter of Dial Auto*, 19 I&N Dec. at 482.

<sup>5</sup> The petitioner submitted an employee wage listing with another filing that showed 14 employees on its payroll in 2010.

<sup>6</sup> On Form G-325 filed with the beneficiary's I-485 Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, the beneficiary stated that he has been employed with the petitioner since June 2001. On ETA Form 9089 submitted with the second Form I-140 filed on the beneficiary's behalf, the beneficiary states that he has been employed with the petitioner since October 2005. As noted above, it is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

<sup>7</sup> In connection with a second Form I-140 filed for the beneficiary by the petitioner on April 30, 2010, it submitted a 2009 Form W-2 stating that it paid the beneficiary \$24,662 in that year. That amount is less than the proffered wage listed on the present petition, and on the supporting Form ETA 750. The petitioner also submitted pay stubs for 2010 showing that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$11,116.80 through June 18, 2010. That amount is also less than the proffered wage in

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial*, 696 F. Supp. at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

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the instant case for that period. The petitioner did not submit any other evidence of pay to the beneficiary.

*River Street Donuts*, 558 F.3d at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F.Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed with the receipt by the director of the petitioner’s response to the Request for Evidence on March 24, 2008. As of that date, the most current tax return that should have been available was the petitioner’s 2006 federal tax return.<sup>8</sup> The petitioner submitted the following Forms 1120S:

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated net income<sup>9</sup> of -\$758.<sup>10</sup>
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$328.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$613.
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$2,618.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$4,100.
- The petitioner did not submit a Form 1120S for 2006.

The petitioner’s net income is insufficient to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage for the instant beneficiary in any year. In addition, the petitioner has filed other Immigrant Petitions for Alien Worker (Form I-140) for at least two more workers with unknown proffered wages. The other priority dates are March 14, 2001 and April 25, 2001. Nothing indicates that these workers have adjusted to permanent residence. Therefore, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg’l Comm’r 1977) (petitioner must establish

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<sup>8</sup> Whether the petitioner’s 2007 tax return was available at this time is unclear. The petitioner did not submit this return in response to the request for evidence or on appeal.

<sup>9</sup> Where an S corporation’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003), line 17e (2004-2005), or line 18 (2006) of Schedule K. *See Instructions for Form 1120S*, 2008, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed November 3, 2009) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholder’s shares of the corporation’s income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional adjustments shown on its Schedule K for all of the years, the petitioner’s net income is found on Schedule K.

<sup>10</sup> Additionally, as noted above, the petitioner must establish that it is the same entity or a successor entity to that company listed on the labor certification to establish that it may use the taxes submitted to show the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage.

ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and ETA Form 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>11</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's Forms 1120S stated the following net current assets:

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$182,425.
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$244,500.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$225,429.
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$206,292.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$192,006.
- The petitioner did not submit a Form 1120S for 2006.

As the tax returns reflect negative net current assets, the petitioner cannot demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage for the beneficiary or for the other sponsored workers in any of the years at issue.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, its net income, or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel states that the director's decision was "incorrect," that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage continuing to the present, and that a brief would be submitted within thirty days. To date, no brief has been received. Therefore, the decision will be issued on the record as it currently stands.

The petitioner submitted its bank statements for January and February 2001, every month in 2002, and January through June 2003. Counsel's reliance on the balance in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this

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<sup>11</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

regulation allows additional material “in appropriate cases,” the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner’s bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return(s), such as the petitioner’s taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered in determining the petitioner’s net current assets.<sup>12</sup>

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner’s business activities in its determination of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner’s prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner’s clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner’s determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner’s sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner’s financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner’s net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner’s business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner’s reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner had negative or minimal net income and negative net current assets in every year, which were insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage to the instant beneficiary as well as the other sponsored workers. The petitioner stated in a letter that the losses reflected on the tax returns from 2001 to 2005 were due to the launch of a new product and expenses commensurate with that launch, which it later “spun off” to a different entity.

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<sup>12</sup> Additionally, based on the bank statements submitted, the amount of cash the petitioner lists as of December 30, 2001 significantly conflicts with the end of year cash listed on the petitioner’s 2001 tax return. The reason for this discrepancy is unclear. “It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice.” *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592.

First, these losses related to five years and would not represent a short term loss. Second, the petitioner did not submit tax returns for any year after 2005 to exhibit any change, or increase in the petitioner's net income, or net current assets following the "spin off." Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)). The petitioner submitted no evidence as to its reputation or any evidence showing that one year was off or otherwise not representative of the petitioner's overall financial picture to liken its situation to *Sonegawa*. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Additionally, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary had the experience required by the terms of the labor certification. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis). USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's priority date. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii) specifies that:

(A) General. Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received.

(B) *Skilled workers*. If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The Form ETA 750 requires two years of experience before the April 20, 2001 priority date as a cook. On the Form ETA 750B, the beneficiary stated that he was self-employed as a cook from 1999 to the date of signing, March 24, 2001, and worked for [REDACTED] as a cook from July 1996 to December 1998. The petitioner submitted a handwritten letter dated March 29, 2001 from [REDACTED] signed by [REDACTED] stating that the beneficiary worked as a cook from July 1996 to December 1998. The petitioner also submitted a sworn letter from [REDACTED]

stating that the beneficiary was employed at [REDACTED] from July 1997 to December 1998 as a cook. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. The second set of dates on the sworn letter indicates that the beneficiary has less than the two years of required experience and conflicts with the dates listed on Form ETA 750 and stated in the handwritten letter. As a result, we are unable to conclude that the beneficiary had the required two years of experience as of the priority date. The petitioner must resolve this inconsistency in any further filings.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.