

identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy


U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY

B6



Date: **JAN 13 2012**

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE:

IN RE:


Petitioner:



Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a laser cutting company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a Sales Engineer (Mechanical). As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the beneficiary did not possess the required education for the offered position as set forth in the ETA Form 9089. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's May 21, 2009 denial, the primary issue in this case is whether the beneficiary possessed the required education for the offered position as set forth in the ETA Form 9089. However, the AAO has identified an additional ineligibility which will be discussed *infra*. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), also provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

Intent and Desire to Employ the Beneficiary

As a threshold matter, the petition may not be approved because the petitioner is not a U.S. employer intending and desiring to employ the beneficiary. Only a U.S. employer intending and desiring to employ the beneficiary may file a Form I-140 seeking classification under section 203(b)(3) of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(c).

The petitioner in this matter is [REDACTED] a limited liability partnership. As noted in the Form I-140 and tax returns in the record, the petitioner's federal employer identification number (FEIN) is [REDACTED]. This is the same entity which filed the ETA Form 9089 on December 29, 2005.

On November 9, 2011, the AAO notified the petitioner of evidence outside of the record which indicates that the petitioner withdrew its license to do business in Wisconsin on February 1, 2007. The AAO further noted that the petition was filed by the petitioning LLP over four months after its withdrawal. Accordingly, it appeared that the LLP's job offer no longer existed at the time the petition was filed and that the petitioner had no intent and desire to employ the beneficiary.

In response to the AAO's November 9, 2011 notice, counsel claims that the petitioner changed its corporate structure to become a limited liability company in February 2007 and that this LLC is a successor-in-interest to the petitioning LLP. Counsel further claims that it was an "inadvertent error" to list the LLP as the petitioner and that it would "offend fundamental fairness" to refuse to consider the LLC as the proper petitioner in this matter even though the restructuring occurred months prior to the filing of the petition by the LLP.

Upon review, the AAO disagrees with counsel and will deny the petition for this additional reason. As noted above, the petitioner is an LLP having FEIN [REDACTED]. An "employer" is defined in part as a business entity having an FEIN and a location within the United States to which U.S. workers may be referred for employment, and which proposes to employ the beneficiary full-time in the United States. 20 C.F.R. § 656.30. Only such an employer may file and maintain a Form I-140 petition seeking classification of a beneficiary under section 203(b)(3) of the Act.

In this matter, counsel concedes that the petitioning LLP withdrew its license to do business in Wisconsin over four months before filing the instant petition. Although counsel claims that an LLC became a successor-in-interest to the petitioning LLP and now has rights under the Form I-140 filed in July 2007, this transaction occurred months prior to the filing of the instant petition. The petitioning LLP chose to file the petition in July 2007 – after it had transferred some or all of its business interests to a third party LLC – and must now establish its eligibility for the benefit sought. A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requirements. *See Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm'r 1988).

Counsel asserts that the LLC should have been the petitioner in this matter, that the listing of the LLP as the petitioner was an "inadvertent error," and that to disallow the substitution of the LLP would offend fundamental fairness. The record, however, does not support counsel's claims. As noted above, the Form I-140 lists both the name ([REDACTED]) and the FEIN of the LLP. Counsel referred to the petitioner as an LLP in her accompanying letter dated July 30, 2007. The petitioning LLP used letterhead describing it as an "LLP" on June 21, 2007, and [REDACTED] signed the letter as "managing partner." Accordingly, contrary to counsel's claim, the decision to list the LLP as the petitioner appears to have been intentional. There is no evidence that these were typographical errors of a technical nature.

Accordingly, as the petitioner is not – and was not at the time the petition was filed -- a U.S. employer desiring and intending to employ the beneficiary, the petition must be denied for this

additional reason. The petitioning LLP does not maintain a location to which U.S. workers may be referred for employment and does not intend and desire to employ the beneficiary.

Beneficiary's Qualifications for the Job Offered

The petitioner must demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its labor certification application, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977). Here, the labor certification application was accepted on December 29, 2005.

The proffered position's requirements are found on ETA Form 9089 Part H. This section of the application for alien labor certification, "Job Opportunity Information," describes the terms and conditions of the job offered. It is important that the ETA Form 9089 be read as a whole. The instructions for the ETA Form 9089, Part H, provide:

Minimum Education, Training, and Experience Required to Perform the Job Duties. Do not duplicate the time requirements. For example, time required in training should not also be listed in education or experience. Indicate whether months or years are required. Do not include restrictive requirements which are not actual business necessities for performance on the job and which would limit consideration of otherwise qualified U.S. workers.

Here, Part H shows that the position requires a bachelor's degree, or foreign educational equivalent, in Mechanical Engineering Technology. The beneficiary must also possess a sheet metal course certificate. No alternate combination of education and experience was permitted in Part H, Item 8.

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, USCIS must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. USCIS will not accept a degree equivalency or an unrelated degree when a labor certification plainly and expressly requires a candidate with a specific degree. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

At sections J, K and L of the ETA Form 9089, the beneficiary set forth his credentials and then signed his name under a declaration that the contents of the form are true and correct under the penalty of perjury. On the section of the labor certification eliciting information of the beneficiary's education, he represented that he has a bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering Technology from Southern Sydney Institute.

The record contains the following evidence of the beneficiary's education: certificate of successful completion of the Sheet Metal Trade Course from the Department of Technical and Further Education, New South Wales, Australia; certificate and transcripts of successful completion of a Mechanical Engineering program from the same department and the Southern Sydney Institute; and a certificate of successful completion of the Stainless Steel Specialist Course from the Australian Stainless Steel Development Association.

The record also contains an expert opinion letter evaluating the beneficiary's education and experience, prepared by [REDACTED]. This letter states that the combination of the beneficiary's "one-year of academic studies" and "eleven years and nine months of employment experience/training" is equivalent to a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering Technology from an accredited U.S. college or university. There is no evidence that the beneficiary has earned a U.S. bachelor's degree from a college or university or a single-source foreign degree equivalent from a foreign college or university. Instead, it is claimed that the beneficiary has a combination of education and experience that, when considered together, represents an equivalency to a U.S. bachelor's degree.

Because of the requirements of the proffered position and the DOL's standard occupational requirements for the classified position of sales engineer, the proffered position is for a professional, but might also be considered under the skilled worker category.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(ii)(C) states the following:

If the petition is for a professional, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien holds a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and by evidence that the alien is a member of the professions. Evidence of a baccalaureate degree shall be in the form of an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study. To show that the alien is a member of the professions, the petitioner must submit evidence that the minimum of a baccalaureate degree is required for entry into the occupation.

The above regulation uses a singular description of foreign equivalent degree. Thus, the plain meaning of the regulatory language concerning the professional classification sets forth the requirement that a beneficiary must produce one degree that is determined to be the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree in order to be qualified as a professional for third preference visa category purposes.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 204(5)(1)(3)(ii)(B) states the following:

If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or

meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The above regulation requires that the alien meet the requirements of the labor certification.

Because the petition's proffered position qualifies for consideration under both the professional and skilled worker categories, the AAO will apply the regulatory requirements from both provisions to the facts of the case at hand, beginning with the professional category.

Initially, however, we will provide an explanation of the general process of procuring an employment-based immigrant visa and the roles and respective authority of both agencies involved.

As noted above, the Form ETA 9089 in this matter is certified by the DOL. Thus, at the outset, it is useful to discuss the DOL's role in this process. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to the DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether the position and the alien are qualified for a specific immigrant classification. This fact has not gone unnoticed by Federal Circuit Courts:

There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14).¹ *Id.* at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)(14) determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.

¹ Based on revisions to the Act, the current citation is section 212(a)(5)(A) as set forth above.

* * *

Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history, and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)(14). If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of "matching" them with those of corresponding United States workers so that it will then be "in a position to meet the requirement of the law," namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the Ninth circuit stated:

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL's role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS's decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from the DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor ... pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the ... [Act] ... is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating:

The Department of Labor (DOL) must certify that insufficient domestic workers are available to perform the job and that the alien's performance of the job will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed domestic workers. *Id.* § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INS then makes its own determination of the alien's entitlement to sixth preference status. *Id.* § 204(b),

8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). See generally *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 9th Cir.1983).

The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.

Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).

Therefore, it is the DOL's responsibility to certify the terms of the labor certification, but it is the responsibility of USCIS to determine if the petition and the alien beneficiary are eligible for the classification sought. For classification as a member of the professions, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) requires that the alien had a U.S. baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and be a member of the professions. Additionally, the regulation requires the submission of "an official *college or university* record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study." (Emphasis added.)

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now USCIS or the Service), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor's degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree: "[B]oth the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree.*" 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (November 29, 1991)(emphasis added).

Moreover, it is significant that both the statute, section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, and relevant regulations use the word "degree" in relation to professionals. A statute should be construed under the assumption that Congress intended it to have purpose and meaningful effect. *Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana*, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); *Sutton v. United States*, 819 F.2d. 1289m 1295 (5th Cir. 1987). It can be presumed that Congress' narrow requirement in of a "degree" for members of the professions is deliberate. Significantly, in another context, Congress has broadly referenced "the possession of a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, university, school, or other institution of learning." Section 203(b)(2)(C) (relating to aliens of exceptional ability). Thus, the requirement at section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) that an eligible alien both have a baccalaureate "degree" and be a member of the professions reveals that a member of the professions must have a *degree* and that a diploma or certificate from an institution of learning other than a college or university is a potentially similar but distinct type of credential. Thus, even if we did not require "a" degree that is the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree, we would not consider education earned at an institution other than a college or university.

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree. Where the

analysis of the beneficiary's credentials relies on work experience alone or a combination of multiple lesser degrees, the result is the "equivalent" of a bachelor's degree rather than a single-source "foreign equivalent degree." In order to have experience and education equating to a bachelor's degree under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the "foreign equivalent degree" to a United States baccalaureate degree.

The petitioner in this matter relies on the beneficiary's combined education and work experience to reach the "equivalent" of a degree, which is not a bachelor's degree based on a single degree in the required field listed on the certified labor certification. In addition, the beneficiary's course completion certificates cannot be considered by this office because it is education earned at an institution other than a college or university.

Because the beneficiary does not have a "United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree," from a college or university in the required field of study listed on the certified labor certification, the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act as he does not have the minimum level of education required for the equivalent of a bachelor's degree.

We are cognizant of the decision in *Grace Korean United Methodist Church v. Michael Chertoff*, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Or. 2005), which finds that USCIS "does not have the authority or expertise to impose its strained definition of 'B.A. or equivalent' on that term as set forth in the labor certification." Although the reasoning underlying a district judge's decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the AAO, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. See *Matter of K-S-*, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). The court in *Grace Korean* makes no attempt to distinguish its holding from the Circuit Court decisions cited above. Instead, as legal support for its determination, the court cited to a case holding that the United States Postal Service has no expertise or special competence in immigration matters. *Grace Korean United Methodist Church*, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (citing *Tovar v. U.S. Postal Service*, 3 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)). On its face, *Tovar* is easily distinguishable from the present matter since USCIS, through the authority delegated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, is charged by statute with the enforcement of the United States immigration laws and not with the delivery of mail. See section 103(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).

Additionally, we also note the decision in *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006). In that case, the labor certification application specified an educational requirement of four years of college and a 'B.S. or foreign equivalent.' The district court determined that 'B.S. or foreign equivalent' relates solely to the alien's educational background, precluding consideration of the alien's combined education and work experience. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *11-13. Additionally, the court determined that the word 'equivalent' in the employer's educational requirements was ambiguous and that in the context of skilled worker petitions (where there is no statutory educational requirement), deference must be given to the employer's intent. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *14. However, in professional and advanced degree professional cases, where the beneficiary is statutorily required to hold a baccalaureate degree, the

USCIS properly concluded that a single foreign degree or its equivalent is required. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *17, 19.

In the instant case, unlike the labor certification in *Snapnames.com, Inc.*, the petitioner's intent regarding educational equivalence is clearly stated on the Form ETA 9089 and does not include alternatives to a four-year bachelor's degree. Moreover, the petitioner submitted the recruitment materials which all state that the proffered position requires a "Bachelor's Degree or equivalent." The court in *Snapnames.com, Inc.* recognized that even though the labor certification may be prepared with the alien in mind, USCIS has an independent role in determining whether the alien meets the labor certification requirements. *Id.* at *7. Thus, the court concluded that where the plain language of those requirements does not support the petitioner's asserted intent, USCIS "does not err in applying the requirements as written." *Id.* See also *Maramjaya v. USCIS*, Civ. Act No. 06-2158 (RCL) (D.C. Cir. March 26, 2008)(upholding an interpretation that a "bachelor's or equivalent" requirement necessitated a single four-year degree). In this matter, the Form ETA 9089 does not specify an equivalency to the requirement of a bachelor's degree.²

² The labor certification does not state that lesser credentials, such as those possessed by the beneficiary, might be acceptable. The DOL has provided the following field guidance for interpreting labor certification requirements: when the labor certification states that a "bachelor's degree in computer science" is required, and the beneficiary has a four-year bachelor's degree in computer science from the University of Florence, "there is no requirement that the employer include 'or equivalent' after the degree requirement" on the Form ETA 750 or in its advertisement and recruitment efforts. See Memo. from Anna C. Hall, Acting Regl. Adminstr., U.S. Dep't. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, to SESA and JTPA Adminstrs., U.S. Dep't. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, Interpretation of "Equivalent Degree," 2 (June 13, 1994). Further, where the Form ETA 750 indicates that a "U.S. bachelor's degree or the equivalent" may qualify an applicant for a position, where no specific terms are set out on the Form ETA 750 or in the employer's recruitment efforts to define the term "equivalent," "we understand ['equivalent'] to mean the employer is willing to accept an equivalent foreign degree."

(October 27, 1992). Where the Form ETA 750 states that work experience or a certain combination of lesser diplomas or degrees may be substituted for a bachelor's degree, "the employer must specifically state on the ETA 750, Part A as well as throughout all phases of recruitment exactly what will be considered equivalent or alternative [to the degree] in order to qualify for the job." See Memo. from Anna C. Hall, Acting Regl. Adminstr., U.S. Dep't. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, to SESA and JTPA Adminstrs., U.S. Dep't. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, Interpretation of "Equivalent Degree," 2 (June 13, 1994). State Workforce Agencies should "request the employer provide the specifics of what is meant when the word 'equivalent' is used."

(March 9, 1993). Finally, the DOL's certification of job requirements stating that "a certain amount and kind of experience is the equivalent of a college degree does in no way bind [USCIS] to accept the employer's definition." *Id.* To our knowledge, the field guidance memoranda referred to here have not been rescinded.

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by professional regulation, USCIS must examine “the language of the labor certification job requirements” in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary’s qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to “examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer.” *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS’s interpretation of the job’s requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve “reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification application form].” *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification that the DOL has formally issued or otherwise attempt to divine the employer’s intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

Further, the employer’s subjective intent may not be dispositive of the meaning of the actual minimum requirements of the proffered position. *Maramjaya v. USCIS*, Civ. Act. No. 06-2158, 14 n. 7. Thus, USCIS agrees that the best evidence of the petitioner’s intent concerning the actual minimum educational requirements of the proffered position is evidence of how it expressed those requirements to the DOL during the labor certification process and not afterwards to USCIS. The timing of such evidence is needed to ensure inflation of those requirements is not occurring in an effort to fit the beneficiary’s credentials into requirements that do not seem on their face to include what the beneficiary has.

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, USCIS must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. USCIS will not accept a degree equivalency or an unrelated degree when a labor certification plainly and expressly requires a candidate with a specific degree. In evaluating the beneficiary’s qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

The ETA Form 9089 does not provide that the minimum academic requirements of a bachelor’s degree, or foreign educational equivalent, in Mechanical Engineering Technology might be met through some other formula other than that explicitly stated on the ETA Form 9089. The copies of the notice(s) of Internet and newspaper advertisements, provided by the petitioner also fail to advise any otherwise qualified U.S. workers that the educational requirements for the job may be met through a quantitatively lesser degree or defined equivalency. Thus, the alien does not qualify as a skilled worker as he does not meet the terms of the labor certification as explicitly expressed or as extrapolated from the evidence of its intent about those requirements during the labor certification process.

The beneficiary does not have a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree, and, thus, does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.