U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
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Washington, DC 20529-2090

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PUBLIC COPY

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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[redacted]

Date: JUN 0 6 2012 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER File: [redacted]

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary: [redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen with the field office or service center that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Elizabeth McCormack

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a mechanical consulting engineering firm. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a mechanical engineer pursuant to Section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A). As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date onwards. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's March 20, 2009 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), also provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

> *Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified

by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on July 14, 2004. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is $58,656 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires four years of college culminating in a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.[1]

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1984, to have a gross annual income of $1.4 million, and to currently employ 12 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is the same as the calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on March 9, 2007, the beneficiary claimed to have begun working for the petitioner in February 2003.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner submitted the following evidence of wages paid:

- The 2004 Form W-2 states that the petitioner paid the beneficiary $42,296.42.
- The 2005 Form W-2 states that the petitioner paid the beneficiary $46,125.14.

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[1] The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

- The 2006 Form W-2 states that the petitioner paid the beneficiary $48,904.74.
- The 2007 Form W-2 states that the petitioner paid the beneficiary $58,867.38.[2]
- The 2008 Form W-2 states that the petitioner paid the beneficiary $67,505.50.

The wages paid in 2007 and 2008 exceed the proffered wage, so the petitioner established its ability to pay the proffered wage in those years. As the amounts paid in 2004, 2005, and 2006 are less than the proffered wage, the petitioner must establish its ability to pay the difference between the actual wage paid and the proffered wage, which in 2004 was $16,360, in 2005 was $12,531, and in 2006 was $9,751.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before

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[2] The 2007 Form W-2 states that the beneficiary's wage for that year was $49,852.01, but contains a notation that $8,765.37 was deducted from the beneficiary's gross pay for a cafeteria plan and that $250 was deducted from the gross pay for a 401(k) contribution. Certain nontaxable benefits known as "cafeteria plans" will not be added to the wages actually reported to the beneficiary on IRS Form W-2. An employee's gross pay minus the cafeteria plan payments results in the compensation figures which appear on the Form W-2. *See* I.R.C.§ 125. "The wage offered is not based on commissions, bonuses or other incentives, unless the employer guarantees a prevailing wage paid on a weekly, bi-weekly or monthly basis that equals or exceeds the prevailing wage." *See* 20 C.F.R. § 656.20(c)(3).

In the instant petition, in evaluating the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, the beneficiary's gross pay amounts will be used, rather than the somewhat lower amounts of taxable compensation shown on the IRS Forms W-2 for the relevant years.

expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

> The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.
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> We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts, 558 F.3d at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F.Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The record before the director closed on February 27, 2009 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner's 2008 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2007 is the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2004 through 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net income of $0.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net income of $53,042.
- In 2006, the Form 1120 stated net income of -$110,229.
- In 2007, the Form 1120 stated net income of $49,463.

Therefore, for the years 2004 and 2006, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage. The net income in 2005 is sufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the difference between the actual wage paid and the proffered wage for that year.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.[3] A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2004 through 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of -$19,189.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of -$35,331.
- In 2006, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of -$19,511.
- In 2007, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of -$10,807.

Therefore, for the years 2004 through 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the difference between the actual wage paid and the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, the petitioner submitted an audited financial statement for 2004. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. In the Notes to Financial Statements, Note 1, Summary of Significant Accounting Policies, the accountant states that the financial statements have been prepared on the accrual basis of accounting. The petitioner's tax returns were prepared pursuant to the cash method of accounting, in which revenue is recognized when it is received, and expenses are recognized when they are paid. *See* http://www.irs.gov/publications/p538/ar02.html#d0e1136 (accessed May 25, 2012). This office would, in the alternative, have accepted tax returns prepared pursuant to accrual method of accounting, if those were the tax returns the petitioner had actually submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

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[3]According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

This office is not, however, persuaded by an analysis in which the petitioner, or anyone on its behalf, seeks to rely on tax returns or financial statements prepared pursuant to one method, but then seeks to shift revenue or expenses from one year to another as convenient to the petitioner's present purpose. If revenues are not recognized in a given year pursuant to the cash accounting method then the petitioner, whose taxes are prepared pursuant to cash rather than accrual, and who relies on its tax returns in order to show its ability to pay the proffered wage, may not use those revenues as evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage during that year. Similarly, if expenses are recognized in a given year, the petitioner may not shift those expenses to some other year in an effort to show its ability to pay the proffered wage pursuant to some hybrid of accrual and cash accounting.[4] The amounts shown on the petitioner's tax returns shall be considered as they were submitted to the IRS, not as amended pursuant to the accountant's adjustments.

On appeal, counsel asserts that as the priority date is July 14, 2004, the petitioner should not be required to show the ability to pay the proffered wage for an entire year, but should instead only need to show the ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date to the end of the year. We will not, however, consider 12 months of income towards an ability to pay a lesser period of the proffered wage any more than we would consider 24 months of income towards paying the annual proffered wage. While USCIS will prorate the proffered wage if the record contains evidence of net income or payment of the beneficiary's wages specifically covering the portion of the year that occurred after the priority date (and only that period), such as monthly income statements or pay stubs, the petitioner has not submitted such evidence.

Counsel also states that the petitioner's line of credit with Wells Fargo Bank should be considered. In calculating the ability to pay the proffered salary, USCIS will not augment the petitioner's net income or net current assets by adding in the petitioner's credit limits, bank lines, or lines of credit. A "bank line" or "line of credit" is a bank's unenforceable commitment to make loans to a particular borrower up to a specified maximum during a specified time period. A line of credit is not a contractual or legal obligation on the part of the bank. *See John Downes and Jordan Elliot Goodman, Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms* 45 (5th ed. 1998).

Since the line of credit is a "commitment to loan" and not an existent loan, the petitioner has not established that the unused funds from the line of credit are available at the time of filing the petition. As noted above, a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a future date after the petitioner becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *See Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm'r 1971). Moreover, the petitioner's existent loans will be reflected in the balance sheet provided in the tax returns or audited financial statement and will be fully considered in the evaluation of the petitioner's net current assets. Comparable to the limit on a credit card, the line of credit cannot be treated as cash or as a cash asset. However, if the petitioner wishes to rely on a line of credit as evidence of ability to pay, the petitioner must submit documentary evidence, such as a detailed business plan and audited cash flow statements, to

[4] Once a taxpayer has set up its accounting method and filed its first return, it must receive approval from the IRS before it changes from the cash method to an accrual method or vice versa. *See* http://www.irs.gov/publications/p538/ar02.html#d0e2874 (accessed May 25, 2012).

demonstrate that the line of credit will augment and not weaken its overall financial position. Finally, USCIS will give less weight to loans and debt as a means of paying salary since the debts will increase the petitioner's liabilities and will not improve its overall financial position. Although lines of credit and debt are an integral part of any business operation, USCIS must evaluate the overall financial position of a petitioner to determine whether the employer is making a realistic job offer and has the overall financial ability to satisfy the proffered wage. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonegawa,* 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about $100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner has continuously employed the beneficiary since 2004. The petitioner did not demonstrate the ability to pay the difference between the actual wage paid and the proffered wage in two of the four years considered. On appeal, the petitioner supplied an extensive client list, but no evidence about its reputation or standing in the community to liken its situation to the one presented in *Sonegawa*. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House,* 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak,* 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant,* 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm'r 1986). *See also, Madany* v. *Smith,* 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.* v. *Landon,* 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc.* v. *Coomey,* 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires four years of college resulting in a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering. On the Form ETA 750B, the beneficiary stated that he received a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Far Eastern University, Manila, Philippines. The corresponding degree and transcripts were submitted. Far Eastern University is accredited in nursing, liberal arts, and education. It is not accredited in engineering. *See* http://www4.aacrao.org/pierbooks/2000dir.pdf (accessed May 25, 2012).

According to the Electronic Database for Global Education (EDGE), a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering in the Philippines would be equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree but only when the degree is conferred by an accredited university.

The Immigration and Nationality Act is a federal statute with nationwide application. The regulations implementing the Act – including 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) defining "advanced degree" for the purposes of section 203(b)(2) of the Act, as well as 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(2) defining "professional" for the purposes of section 203(b)(3) of the Act – also have nationwide application. As defined in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2), an "advanced degree" includes "any **United States academic or professional degree** . . . above that of baccalaureate" (or a foreign equivalent degree), "[a] **United States baccalaureate degree**" (or a foreign equivalent degree) and five years of specialized experience (considered equivalent to a master's degree), and "a **United States doctorate**" (or a foreign equivalent degree). (Emphases added.) Similarly, "professional" is defined in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(2) as "a qualified alien who holds at least a **United States baccalaureate degree**" (or a foreign equivalent degree). (Emphasis added.) The repeated usage of the modifier "United States" to describe the different levels of (non-foreign) degrees makes clear the intention of the rulemakers that the regulations apply to degrees issued by U.S. educational institutions that are recognized and honored on a nationwide basis. The only way to assure nationwide recognition for its degrees is for the educational institution to secure accreditation by a regional accrediting agency approved by the DoEd and CHEA.

While the regulatory language of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(2) does not specifically state that a degree must come from an accredited college or university to qualify as a "baccalaureate degree," that requirement is implicit in the regulation. As stated by the U.S. Department of Education on its

website:

> The U.S. Department of Education does not accredit educational institutions and/or programs. However, the Secretary of Education is required by law to publish a list of nationally recognized accrediting agencies that the Secretary determines to be reliable authorities as to the quality of education or training provided by the institutions of higher education and the higher education programs they accredit. An agency seeking national recognition . . . must meet the Secretary's procedures and criteria for the recognition of accrediting agencies, as published in the *Federal Register* . . . . The Secretary . . . makes the final determination regarding recognition.
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> The United States has no . . . centralized authority exercising . . . control over postsecondary educational institutions in this country. . . . [I]n general, institutions of higher education are permitted to operate with considerable independence and autonomy. As a consequence, American educational institutions can vary widely in the character and quality of their programs.
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> . . . [T]he practice of accreditation arose in the United States as a means of conducting nongovernmental, peer evaluation of educational institutions and programs. Private educational associations of regional or national scope have adopted criteria reflecting the qualities of a sound educational program and have developed procedures for evaluating institutions or programs to determine whether or not they are operating at basic levels of quality.
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> . . . Accreditation of an institution or program by a recognized accrediting agency provides a reasonable assurance of quality and acceptance by employers of diplomas and degrees.

www.ed.gov/print/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation.html (accessed March 29, 2012).

A degree earned from a non-accredited United States institution would not qualify an applicant for the position, so a degree from a non-accredited foreign institution would also not constitute a "baccalaureate degree" as contemplated by the statute. The accreditation process ensures conformity with certain basic educational standards, so without such an accreditation, we cannot be confident that the applicant has the requisite training and knowledge required for the position. As the beneficiary's credentials were received from a non-accredited school in the Philippines, the AAO will not recognize that degree.

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required education set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the

benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.