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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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Date: **MAY 23 2012**

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was withdrawn by the petitioner, [REDACTED], and thus denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center. A motion to reopen and reconsider the decision was subsequently filed by the appellant, [REDACTED]. The director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the motion because it was not filed by an affected party as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B). The director's decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be rejected pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(v)(A). The appeal will also be rejected because the acknowledgement of a withdrawal may not be appealed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(15).

The petitioner is a labor contractor. It sought to employ the beneficiary as a fitter. As required by statute, the petition was accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor (DOL). On June 9, 2008, the petitioner notified the director that it wished to withdraw the Form I-140 petition. The director acknowledged the receipt of the withdrawal request on February 3, 2009 and terminated all action on the petition.

A motion to reopen and reconsider the director's decision was filed on March 3, 2009 by counsel for the appellant. The director dismissed the motion, finding that appellant is not an "affected party" within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B).¹ Counsel appealed the denial of the motion, stating that the director erred in finding that appellant is not an "affected party" within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B).² Specifically, counsel states that appellant is an "affected party" because the beneficiary has "ported" to the appellant pursuant to the provisions of section 204(j) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j), as added by section 106(c) of the American Competitiveness in the Twenty First Century Act of 2000 (AC21).

¹ The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B) defines affected party in part as: "the person or entity with legal standing in a proceeding. It does not include the beneficiary of a visa petition."

² There is no evidence in the record to suggest, and counsel does not allege, that the appellant is a successor-in-interest to [REDACTED], the petitioner in these proceedings. A valid successor relationship may be established if the job opportunity is the same as originally offered on the labor certification; if the purported successor establishes eligibility in all respects, including the provision of evidence from the predecessor entity, such as evidence of the predecessor's ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date; and if the petition fully describes and documents the transfer and assumption of the ownership of the predecessor by the claimed successor. Evidence of transfer of ownership must show that the successor not only purchased the predecessor's assets but also that the successor acquired the essential rights and obligations of the predecessor necessary to carry on the business. The successor must continue to operate the same type of business as the predecessor, and the manner in which the business is controlled must remain substantially the same as it was before the ownership transfer. The successor must also establish its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage from the date of business transfer until the beneficiary adjusts status to lawful permanent resident. *Matter of Dial Auto Repair Shop, Inc.* 19 I&N Dec. 481 (Comm. 1981).

The AAO will address whether AC21 permits the new employer to have legal standing in this proceeding. To make this determination, the AAO must therefore discuss whether a new employer takes the place of an original petitioner in AC21 situations where the beneficiary's I-485 has been pending for 180 days or more.

As noted above, the initial petition was denied based on the petitioner's withdrawal of the petition. As the initial petition was denied, the beneficiary seeks portability based on an unapproved I-140 petition. No related statute or regulation would render the beneficiary portable under these facts.

The pertinent section of AC21, Section 106(c)(1), amended section 204 of the Act, codified at section 204(j) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j) provides:

Job Flexibility For Long Delayed Applicants For Adjustment Of Status To Permanent Residence. - A petition under subsection (a)(1)(D) [since redesignated section 204(a)(1)(F)] for an individual whose application for adjustment of status pursuant to section 245 has been filed and remained unadjudicated for 180 days or more shall remain valid with respect to a new job if the individual changes jobs or employers if the new job is in the same or a similar occupational classification as the job for which the petition was filed.

Section 212(a)(5)(A)(iv) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(iv), states further:

Long Delayed Adjustment Applicants- A certification made under clause (i) with respect to an individual whose petition is covered by section 204(j) shall remain valid with respect to a new job accepted by the individual after the individual changes jobs or employers if the new job is in the same or a similar occupational classification as the job for which the certification was issued.

Section 204(a)(1)(F) of the Act includes the immigrant classification for individuals holding baccalaureate degrees who are members of the professions and skilled workers under section 203(b)(3) of the Act, the classification sought in the petition.

Section 204(a)(1)(F) of the Act provides that: "Any employer desiring and intending to employ within the United States an alien entitled to classification under section 1153(b)(1)(B), 1153(b)(1)(C), 1153(b)(2), or 1153(b)(3) of this title may file a petition with the Attorney General for such classification."

Once an alien has an approved petition, section 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (2004), allows the beneficiary to adjust status to an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence:

The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States or the status of any other alien having an approved petition for classification under subparagraph (A)(iii), (A)(iv), (B)(ii), or (B)(iii) of section 204(a)(1) or may be adjusted by the [Secretary of Homeland Security], in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed.

An immigrant visa is immediately available to an alien seeking employment-based preference classification under section 203(b) of the Act (such as the beneficiary in this case) when the alien's visa petition has been approved and his or her priority date is current. 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g)(1), (2). Hence, adjustment of status may only be granted "by virtue of a valid visa petition approved in [the alien's] behalf." 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g)(2).

After enactment of the portability provisions of AC21, on July 31, 2002, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) published an interim rule allowing for the concurrent filing of Form I-140 petitions and Form I-485 applications, whereby an employer may file an employment-based immigrant visa petition and an application for adjustment of status for the alien beneficiary at the same time without the need to wait for an approved I-140 petition. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2)(B)(2004); *see also* 67 Fed. Reg. 49561 (July 31, 2002). The beneficiary in the instant matter filed his Form I-485 petition on August 17, 2007, but the petitioner filed the Form I-140 petition on June 8, 2007.

USCIS implemented concurrent filing as a convenience for aliens and their U.S. employers. Because section 204(j) of the Act applies only in adjustment proceedings, USCIS never suggested that concurrent filing would make the portability provision relevant to the adjudication of the underlying visa petition. Rather, the statute and regulations prescribe that aliens seeking employment-based preference classification must have an immigrant visa petition approved on their behalf before they are even eligible for adjustment of status. Section 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g)(1), (2).

Section 204(j) of the Act prescribes that "A petition . . . shall remain valid with respect to a new job if the individual changes jobs or employers." The term "valid" is not defined by the statute, nor does the congressional record provide any guidance as to its meaning. *See* S. Rep. 106-260, 2000 WL 622763 (Apr. 11, 2000); *see also* H.R. Rep. 106-1048, 2001 WL 67919 (Jan. 2, 2001). However, the statutory language and framework for granting immigrant status, along with recent decisions of three federal circuit courts of appeals, clearly show that the term "valid," as used in section 204(j) of the Act, refers to an approved visa petition.

Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. *Hughey v. U.S.*, 495 U.S. 411, 415 (1990). We are expected to give the words used in the statute their ordinary meaning. *I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (citing *I.N.S. v. Phinpathya*, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984)).

We must also construe the language in question in harmony with the thrust of related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). *See also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561, 573 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1996).

With regard to the overall design of the nation's immigration laws, section 204 of the Act provides the basic statutory framework for the granting of immigrant status. Section 204(a)(1)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(F), provides that "[a]ny employer desiring and intending to employ within the United States an alien entitled to classification under section . . . 203(b)(1)(B) . . . of this title may file a petition with the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] for such classification." (Emphasis added.)

Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), governs USCIS's authority to approve an immigrant visa petition before immigrant status is granted:

After an investigation of the facts in each case . . . the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] shall, if [she] determines that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien in behalf of whom the petition is made is . . . eligible for preference under subsection (a) or (b) of section 203, approve the petition and forward one copy thereof to the Department of State. The Secretary of State shall then authorize the consular officer concerned to grant the preference status.

Thus, the statute and regulations allow adjustment only where the alien has an approved petition for immigrant classification. Section 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g)(1), (2).³

Pursuant to the statutory framework for the granting of immigrant status, any United States employer desiring and intending to employ an alien "entitled" to immigrant classification under the Act "may file" a petition for classification. Section 204(a)(1)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(F). However, section 204(b) of the Act mandates that USCIS approve that petition only after investigating the facts in each case, determining that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien is eligible for the requested classification. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). Hence, Congress specifically granted USCIS the sole authority to approve an immigrant visa petition; an alien may not adjust status or be granted immigrant status by the Department of State until USCIS approves the petition.

Section 204(j) of the Act cannot be interpreted as allowing the adjustment of status of an alien based on an unapproved visa petition when section 245(a) of the Act explicitly requires an approved petition (or eligibility for an immediately available immigrant visa) in order to grant adjustment of status. To construe section 204(j) of the Act in that manner would violate the "elementary canon of

³ We note that the Act contains at least one provision that does apply to pending petitions; in that instance, Congress specifically used the word "pending." *See* Section 101(a)(15)(V) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(V) (establishing a nonimmigrant visa for aliens with family-based petitions that have been pending three years or more).

construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.” *Dept. of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc.*, 510 U.S. 332, 340 (1994).

Accordingly, it would subvert the statutory scheme of the U.S. immigration laws to find that a petition is valid when that petition was never approved or, even if it was approved, if it was filed on behalf of an alien that was never entitled to the requested immigrant classification. We will not construe section 204(j) of the Act in a manner that would allow ineligible aliens to gain immigrant status simply by filing visa petitions and adjustment applications, thereby increasing USCIS backlogs, in the hopes that the application might remain adjudicated for 180 days.

In *Herrera v. USCIS*, 571 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the government’s authority to revoke the approval of a Form I-140 petition under section 205 of the Act survived portability under section 204(j) of the Act. Citing a 2005 AAO decision, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that in order to remain valid under section 204(j) of the Act, the I-140 petition must have been valid from the start. The Ninth Circuit stated that if the plaintiff’s argument prevailed, an alien who exercised portability would be shielded from revocation, but an alien who remained with the petitioning employer would not share the same immunity. The Ninth Circuit noted that it was not the intent of Congress to grant extra benefits to those who changed jobs. Under the plaintiff’s interpretation, an applicant would have a very large incentive to change jobs in order to guarantee that the approval of an I-140 petition could not be revoked. *Id.*

Although section 204(j) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j), provides that an employment-based immigrant visa petition shall remain valid with respect to a new job if the beneficiary’s application for adjustment of status has been filed and remained adjudicated for 180 days, the petition must have been “valid” to begin with if it is to “remain valid with respect to a new job.” *Matter of Al Wazzan*, 25 I&N Dec. 359 (AAO 2010). To be considered valid in harmony with related provisions and with the statute as a whole, the petition must have been filed for an alien who is entitled to the requested classification and that petition must have been approved by a USCIS officer pursuant to his or her authority under the Act. An adjudicated immigrant visa petition is not made “valid” merely through the act of filing the petition with USCIS or through the passage of 180 days. *Id.*

In the case at hand, the I-140 petition was withdrawn by the petitioner. A withdrawal may not be retracted. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(6). The beneficiary would therefore not have a valid immigrant visa petition approved on his behalf to be eligible for adjustment of status. Section 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g)(1), (2).⁴

⁴ Even if the petitioner had not withdrawn the petition, we note that the priority date of the petition is September 8, 2005, and the petitioner was required to show an ability to pay the proffered wage of \$17.12 per hour (\$35,609.60 per year based on forty hours per week) for the instant beneficiary, as well as show the continued ability to pay all beneficiaries of all Forms I-140 it had filed. A review of USCIS records shows that the petitioner had filed over 190 petitions in 2005, thus at a minimum the petitioner would be required to show a continued ability to pay \$6,765,824 in wages to alien beneficiaries in 2005 alone. USCIS uses two predominant methods to determine a petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. First it will look at the petitioner’s net income as stated on its

The enactment of the portability provision at section 204(j) of the Act did not repeal or modify sections 204(b) and 245(a) of the Act, which require USCIS to approve an immigrant visa petition prior to granting adjustment of status. Accordingly, as this petition was denied, it cannot be deemed valid by improper invocation of section 204(j) of the Act.

Counsel has failed to show that the passage of AC21 granted any rights, much less benefits, to subsequent employers of aliens eligible for the job portability provisions of section 106(c). Based on a review of the statute and legislative history, the AAO must reject counsel's suggestion that the new employer, [REDACTED] has now become the petitioner, and an affected party, in these proceedings.

Furthermore, as noted above, there is no appeal from a USCIS acknowledgement of a withdrawal of a petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(15). The denial of the underlying motion may only be appealed to the AAO if the original decision was appealable. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(6). Accordingly, the appeal must be rejected for this additional reason.

ORDER: The appeal is rejected as improperly filed.

federal income tax returns, in this case Form 1120S. Here the petitioner showed net income of \$1,010,689 in 2005, or more than five million dollars below its committed wages. Alternatively USCIS will look at net current assets as stated on the petitioner's federal income tax returns. In 2005, the petitioner's net current assets were \$28,624. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage through an examination of its net income or net current assets.