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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

DATE **SEP 04 2012** OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]  
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center (director), and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The petitioner is restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cook. As required by statute, ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL), accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely, and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

In his November 17, 2008 denial, the director identified the issue of whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. On appeal, this office has identified a second issue, whether or not the petitioner has established that the beneficiary possessed the minimum experience required to perform the offered position by the priority date.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

#### **Continuing Ability to Pay the Proffered Wage**

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the

<sup>1</sup>The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on December 15, 2006.<sup>2</sup> The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$14.82 per hour or \$30,825.60 per year. The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires three years of experience as a cook.

The record indicates the petitioner is structured as a limited liability company and filed its tax returns on IRS Form 1065.<sup>3</sup> On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1998 and to currently employ 10 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on May 24, 2007, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since November 11, 1998.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United

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<sup>2</sup>It is noted that the petitioner indicated on its ETA Form 9089 in Part A that it was seeking to use the priority date of April 27, 2001 of a purported previously filed Form ETA 750, but DOL issued the ETA Form 9089 with a priority date of December 15, 2006. The record does not contain a copy of a previously filed Form ETA 750.

<sup>3</sup>A limited liability company (LLC) is an entity formed under state law by filing articles of organization. An LLC may be classified for federal income tax purposes as if it were a sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation. If the LLC has only one owner, it will automatically be treated as a sole proprietorship unless an election is made to be treated as a corporation. If the LLC has two or more owners, it will automatically be considered to be a partnership unless an election is made to be treated as a corporation. If the LLC does not elect its classification, a default classification of partnership (multi-member LLC) or disregarded entity (taxed as if it were a sole proprietorship) will apply. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3. The election referred to is made using IRS Form 8832, Entity Classification Election. In the instant case, the petitioner, a multi-member LLC, is considered to be a partnership for federal tax purposes.

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not submit copies of any Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms W-2 or Forms 1099 that it issued the beneficiary in 2006 or thereafter. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage as of the priority date or thereafter.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that

depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a “real” expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on October 16, 2008 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner’s submissions in response to the director’s Notice of Intent to Deny. As of that date, the petitioner had submitted copies of its 2001 through 2006 federal income tax returns. On appeal the petitioner did not submit any additional tax returns for itself.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, as the priority date is December 15, 2006, the petitioner’s only relevant tax return in the record to be used in determining its net income and net current assets is 2006, which states its net income as detailed in the table below.

- In 2006, the petitioner’s Form 1065 stated net income of -\$14,452.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, for 2006, the petitioner did not establish that it had sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

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<sup>4</sup>The petitioner did submit personal tax returns for one of its members which are discussed below.

<sup>5</sup>For an LLC taxed as a partnership, where a partnership’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 22 of page one of the petitioner’s Form 1065, U.S. Partnership Income Tax Return. However, where a partnership has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income or additional credits, deductions, or other adjustments, net income is found on page 4 (before 2008) of IRS Form 1065 at line 1 of the Analysis of Net Income (Loss) of Schedule K. *See* Instructions for Form 1065, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1065.pdf> (accessed July 21, 2012) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all partners’ shares of the partnership’s income, deductions, credits, etc.). In the instant case, the petitioner’s Schedule K for 2006 has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions, and other adjustments and, therefore, its net income is found on line 1 of the Analysis of Net Income (Loss) of Schedule K of its 2006 tax return. It is noted the director incorrectly stated this amount as \$10,828.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>6</sup> A partnership's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d) and include cash-on-hand, inventories, and receivables expected to be converted to cash within one year. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 15(d) through 17(d). If the total of a partnership's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns stated its net current assets as detailed in the table below.

- In 2006, the petitioner's Form 1065 stated net current assets of -\$50,044.

Therefore, for 2006, the petitioner did not establish that it had sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Thus, from the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, its net income, or its net current assets.

On appeal, the petitioner asserts that one of the members<sup>7</sup> and his spouse had earned substantial income to be able to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage. As evidence, the petitioner submitted a copy of that member's personal income tax returns for the years 2002 through 2007. The petitioner is an LLC formed under New York law. An LLC, like a corporation, is a legal entity separate and distinct from its members. Because an LLC is a separate and distinct legal entity from its members, the assets of its members or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning LLC's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612

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<sup>6</sup>According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

<sup>7</sup>According to the Schedule K-1 accompanying the petitioner's 2006 tax return, the petitioner has two members, one with a 99 percent interest and the other with a 1 percent interest. Petitioner's assertion relates to the member with the majority interest.

(Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, as mentioned above, the petitioner submitted its tax returns for the years 2001 through 2006, which indicate a growth in sales, but as the record does not contain any of the petitioner's tax returns beyond 2006, it cannot not be determined if the petitioner has sustained that growth. There is no evidence of the petitioner's reputation throughout the industry. There is no evidence of any temporary and uncharacteristic disruption in its business activities. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

**Beneficiary Qualifications: Experience**

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). See *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm'r 1986). See also, *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position requires three years of experience as a cook. On the labor certification, the beneficiary claims to qualify for the offered position based on experience at the following employers.

1. As a cook with the petitioner from November 11, 1998 until May 24, 2007, working 54 hours per week.<sup>8</sup>
2. As a cook with [REDACTED] from November 3, 1997 until November 10, 1998, working 30 hours per week.
3. As a cook with [REDACTED] from January 5, 1997 until November 1, 1997, working 54 hours per week.
4. As a cook helper and a cook with [REDACTED] from September 10, 1994 until November 10, 1996.

The beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience must be supported by letters from employers giving the name, address, and title of the employer, and a description of the beneficiary's experience. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A) The record contains three experience letters.

1. A letter dated June 1, 2007 from the petitioner signed by [REDACTED] is President, on the petitioner's letterhead. The letterhead does not include the address of the petitioner. [REDACTED] lists the duties performed by the beneficiary which are similar to the duties outlined for the proffered position. The petitioner may not rely on experience gained with the petitioner in a job similar to the job offered for certification.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, none of the experience gained at the petitioner will be considered. It is further noted that the petitioner states in its appeal that the beneficiary has worked for the petitioner since 2001, which is inconsistent with the labor certification and the experience letter, both of which state the beneficiary has worked for the petitioner since November 1998.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>The labor certification at Part J, question 21 asks "Did the alien gain any of the qualifying experience with the employer in a position substantially comparable to the job opportunity requested?" which is marked "NA". As such it is not clear whether or not the petitioner is relying on the beneficiary's previous experience with the petitioner to qualify for the proffered position.

<sup>9</sup>This position is supported by the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA). See *Delitizer Corp. of Newton*, 88-INA-482, May 9, 1990 (BALCA) which states "where the required experience was gained by the alien while working for the employer in jobs other than the job offered, the employer must demonstrate that the job in which the alien gained experience was not similar to the job offered for certification. Some relevant considerations on the issue of similarity include the relative job duties and supervisory responsibilities, job requirements, the positions of the jobs in the employer's job hierarchy, whether and by whom the position has been filled previously, whether the position is newly created, the prior employment practices of the employer regarding the relative positions, the amount or percentage of time spent performing each job duty in each job, and the job salaries.

<sup>10</sup>It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent

2. An undated statement on plain paper from [REDACTED] stating the beneficiary worked as a cook at [REDACTED] from November 3, 1997 until December 10, 1998 and lists the beneficiary's duties. However, the statement does not list the address of the employer or the title of the writer, nor does it indicate whether the beneficiary's employment was full- or part-time. Additionally, the ending date of employment is inconsistent with the ending date listed on the labor certification.<sup>11</sup>
3. A letter dated February 16, 2007 on plain paper signed by [REDACTED] stating she is the owner of [REDACTED] and listing the address. The letter states that the beneficiary "whom since the year 1994 started to work as a kitchen helper, during the first six months of working at this restaurant of Mexican National Food and also International, and after that he worked as a cook until the year 1996." The letter does not give the exact dates of employment. Additionally, the letter does not list the beneficiary's duties, nor does it indicate whether the beneficiary's employment was full- or part-time.

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required experience set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.

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objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

<sup>11</sup>*See Matter of Ho*.