

(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

DATE: **SEP 06 2012** OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]  
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Perry Rhew".

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center (the director), and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a full service restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a foreign food and specialty cook. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition or that the petitioner was the successor-in-interest to the company which filed Form ETA 750. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's April 24, 2009 denial, the first issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 4, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$13.00 per hour (\$27,040 per year based on forty hours per week). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of experience in the job offered.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

On appeal, counsel submits a brief; a copy of the April 24, 2009 denial notice; a copy of Form ETA 750; a copy of Form I-797, Receipt Notice for the filing of Form I-140 by [REDACTED] for the beneficiary; copies of sections of the United States Code and the Immigration and Nationality Act pertaining to the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21); and a copy of a United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Interoffice Memorandum dated May 12, 2005, issued by Associate Director for Operations William R. Yates, entitled Interim Guidance for Processing Form I-140 Employment-Based Immigrant Petitions and Form I-485 and H-1B Petitions Affected by the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21) (Public Law 106-313).

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner left blank the block in Part 5 in which it was supposed to indicate the date upon which it was established. In the same section, the petitioner claimed currently to employ 40 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B,<sup>2</sup> signed by the beneficiary on March 26, 2001, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director erred in his determination of the petitioner's ability to pay. Counsel asserts that the petitioner did pay the beneficiary the wage "during all the years of employment." Additionally, counsel asserts that the director failed to consider "the effect of the visa portability provisions of Section 204(j) and 212(a)(5)(A)(IV) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act or INA) on the visa portability rights of the petitioner and beneficiary."

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful

---

<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

<sup>2</sup> Form ETA 750 was not filed by the petitioner but was filed by [REDACTED]. This issue will be addressed in the second part of this decision. Also, "Salvadorean" is the spelling which is used both on Form ETA 750 and the petition ([REDACTED]) which had been filed by this entity.

permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, USCIS electronic records show that the petitioner filed at least two other I-140 petitions which have been pending during the time period relevant to the instant petition.<sup>3</sup> Where, as here, a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. at 144-145 (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and Form ETA 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, on appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner paid the beneficiary "the wage during all the years of employment." However, the petitioner provided no documentary evidence of having ever employed or paid the beneficiary any wages.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.

---

\_\_\_\_\_ was filed on May 7, 2009 and approved on February 2, 2010. The priority date conferred by the approval of this petition is October 14, 2004. The beneficiary of this employment-based visa petition has not yet obtained lawful permanent residence. \_\_\_\_\_ was filed on August 17, 2007 and denied on April 2, 2009.

Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on February 19, 2009 with the issuance by the director of the request for evidence (RFE). In its initial petition submission, as evidence of its ability to pay, the petitioner submitted a copy of its U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation (Form 1120S) for 2006 only. The director issued an RFE, requesting among other items, the petitioner's federal income tax return for 2007, a return which should have been available at that time. The petitioner failed to respond to the director's request.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states that the director may request additional evidence in appropriate cases. Although specifically and clearly requested by the director, the petitioner declined to provide copies of its 2007 tax return. The 2007 tax return would have demonstrated the amount of taxable income the petitioner reported to the IRS and further reveal its ability to pay the proffered wage for that year. The petitioner's failure to submit these documents cannot be excused. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14).

Because, the petitioner failed to respond to the director's February 19, 2009 RFE, the petitioner's income tax return for 2006 is the most recent return in the record. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006, as shown in the table below.

- For 2001, the petitioner provided no regulatory prescribed evidence of net income.<sup>4</sup>
- In 2002,<sup>5</sup> the Form 1120S stated net income<sup>6</sup> of \$9,697.00.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$22,745.00.
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated a net loss of \$16,678.00.
- For 2005, the petitioner provided no regulatory prescribed evidence of net income.
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$49,336.00.
- For 2007, the petitioner provided no regulatory prescribed evidence of net income.

Because the petitioner had one other I-140 petition which was pending during the period affecting the instant petition, the petitioner must demonstrate the ability to pay the beneficiaries of both petitions from the priority date of each petition until each beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.<sup>7</sup> *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. at 144-145. The petitioner provided no evidence of

---

<sup>4</sup> The record of proceeding does not contain the petitioner's federal income tax returns for 2001 or 2005. Further, the director did not request these documents.

<sup>5</sup> The federal income tax returns for 2002, 2003 and 2004 were not submitted with the instant I-140 petition. These documents are, however, contained in the record of proceeding, having been submitted by the petitioner with a previous I-140 [REDACTED] which it also filed on behalf of the beneficiary and which was also denied.

<sup>6</sup> Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003), line 17e (2004-2005) and line 18 (2006-2011) of Schedule K. *See* Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed July 23, 2012) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders' shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional income, deductions and other adjustments shown on its Schedule K for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006, the petitioner's net income is found on Schedule K of its tax returns for those years.

<sup>7</sup> The petitioner must demonstrate the ability to pay the beneficiary of the instant petition alone from

the proffered wage in the other petition, or evidence that it employed and paid the proffered wage to the other beneficiary.

Therefore, for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage. For 2001, 2005 and 2007, the petitioner did not demonstrate sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage because it did not provide any regulatory prescribed evidence of its net income. Although the petitioner's net income in 2006 was greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner did not demonstrate sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiaries of the two pending petitions.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>8</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006, as shown in the table below.

- For 2001, the petitioner provided no regulatory prescribed evidence of its net current assets.
- In 2002, the Form 1120S, Schedule L stated net current liabilities of \$106,453.00.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S, Schedule L stated net current liabilities of \$118,972.00.
- In 2004, the Form 1120S, Schedule L stated net current liabilities of \$139,306.00.
- For 2005, the petitioner provided no regulatory prescribed evidence of its net current assets.
- In 2006, the Form 1120S, Schedule L stated net current liabilities of \$148,563.00.
- For 2007, the petitioner provided no regulatory prescribed evidence of its net current assets.

Therefore, for the years 2001, 2005 and 2007 the petitioner did not demonstrate sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage because it submitted no regulatory prescribed evidence of its net current assets. For 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage to one beneficiary.

---

2001 through 2003. However, since the priority date of [REDACTED] is October 14, 2004, and that beneficiary has not yet obtained lawful permanent residence, the petitioner must demonstrate the ability to pay the instant beneficiary and the beneficiary of [REDACTED] from 2004 onward.

<sup>8</sup>According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts, “the decision of the Nebraska Service Center Director was based on speculative ascertations [sic] as the ability of the Petitioner to pay the proffered wage to the Beneficiary when it did in fact pay the wage to this Beneficiary during all the years of employment.”

Notwithstanding counsel’s assertion, the petitioner provided no documentary evidence, either in its initial petition submission or on appeal, demonstrating that it ever employed or paid the beneficiary any wages.

Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm’r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg’l Comm’r 1972)).

Further, the assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980); *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983).

Counsel’s assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner’s business activities in its determination of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg’l Comm’r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner’s prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner’s clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner’s determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner’s sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner’s financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner’s net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner’s business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner’s reputation within its industry, whether the

beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, at the time the petition was filed, the petitioner claims to have been operating for six years. However, the record of proceeding contains financial documentation for only four of those years. During those years, gross sales, officer compensation and payroll all remained consistent. However, the petitioner did not demonstrate the historical growth of its business, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry or whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

As set forth in the director's April 24, 2009 denial, the second issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner, on Form I-140, and the company which filed Form ETA 750 are one and the same or whether the petitioner is the successor-in-interest to the company which filed Form ETA 750.

With its initial petition submission, the petitioner supplied Form ETA 750 which was certified for [REDACTED]. The petitioner supplied no explanation for the fact that the petitioner's name on Form I-140 and the employer's name on Form ETA 750 were different and no evidence of a transfer of ownership, merger or other transaction which might have created a successor-in-interest. Therefore, in his RFE, the director requested that the petitioner supply evidence demonstrating that the petitioner, [REDACTED] was the successor-in-interest to [REDACTED] to include a contract, formal written agreement, Bill of Sale, Articles of Incorporation or the like.

The petitioner did not respond to the director's request.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the director denied the petition finding that the petitioner did not demonstrate that [REDACTED] is the successor-in-interest to [REDACTED].

8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(i) states, in pertinent part:

*Labor certification or evidence that alien qualifies for Labor Market Information Pilot Program. Every petition under this classification must be accompanied by an individual labor certification from the Department of Labor...*

20 C.F.R. § 656.10 states, in pertinent part:

---

<sup>9</sup> The petitioner's failure to submit these documents cannot be excused. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14).

(a) *Filing of applications.* A request for a labor certification on behalf of any alien who is required by the Act to be a beneficiary of a labor certification in order to obtain permanent resident status in the United States may be filed as follows:

(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (a)(2), (3), and (4) of this section, an employer seeking a labor certification must file under this section and §656.17.

20 C.F.R. § 656.17 states:

(a) *Filing applications.* (1) Except as otherwise provided by §§656.15, 656.16, and 656.18, an employer who desires to apply for a labor certification on behalf of an alien must file a completed Department of Labor *Application for Permanent Employment Certification* form (ETA Form 9089). The application must be filed with an ETA application processing center. Incomplete applications will be denied. Applications filed and certified electronically must, upon receipt of the labor certification, be signed immediately by the employer in order to be valid. Applications submitted by mail must contain the original signature of the employer, alien, attorney, and/or agent when they are received by the application processing center. DHS will not process petitions unless they are supported by an original certified ETA Form 9089 that has been signed by the employer, alien, attorney and/or agent.

20 C.F.R. § 656.30 states, in pertinent part:

(c) *Scope of validity.* For certifications resulting from applications filed under this part or 20 CFR part 656 in effect prior to March 28, 2005, the following applies:

(1) A permanent labor certification for a Schedule A occupation or shepherders is valid only for the occupation set forth on the *Application for Alien Employment Certification* (Form ETA 750) or the *Application for Permanent Employment Certification* (Form ETA 9089) and only for the alien named on the original application, unless a substitution was approved prior to July 16, 2007. The certification is valid throughout the United States unless the certification contains a geographic limitation.

(2) A permanent labor certification involving a specific job offer is valid only for the particular job opportunity, the alien named on the original application (unless a substitution was approved prior to July 16, 2007), and the area of intended employment stated on the *Application for Alien Employment Certification* (Form ETA 750) or the *Application for Permanent Employment Certification* (Form ETA 9089).

The petitioner in this case, [REDACTED] filed the instant I-140, attempting to utilize a labor certification which was certified for another employer, namely [REDACTED]. However, a labor certification is only valid for the alien named on the labor certification and only for the specific job opportunity identified on the labor certification. Therefore, in this case, the ETA Form 750 was valid only for the beneficiary and only for the position of foreign food /specialty cook at [REDACTED].

In order to demonstrate that the labor certification in this instance is valid, the petitioner must demonstrate that it is the same entity as the entity identified on Form ETA 750. Since the evidence in the record of proceeding shows that these two entities are separate, the petitioner must demonstrate a successorship-in-interest, evidence of which was requested by the director.

On appeal, however, counsel asserts:

On April 4, 2001, the Beneficiary was the beneficiary of Application for Labor Certification filed by her perspective [sic] employer, [REDACTED] which certification was issued by the Department of Labor on July 31, 2002, with a wage rate of \$13.00 per hour (\$27,040 per year). On October 1, 2002, [REDACTED] filed Form I-140 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, naming [the beneficiary] as beneficiary, [REDACTED]. On that same date [the beneficiary] applied for Adjustment of Status as Beneficiary of such Immigrant Petition. [REDACTED]

On May 2, 2003, more than 180 days past the October 2, 2002 filing dates for the I-140 and I-485, the USCIS denied the I-140 Application [sic].

In December 2002, [the beneficiary] left her employment with [REDACTED] and became employed by the instant petitioner, [REDACTED] as an international cook at the same pay and working conditions as [REDACTED].

In denying the original I-140 application [sic] of [REDACTED] the USCIS raised no issues other than the employer's ability to pay the proffered wage even though the employer had already paid such wages to [the beneficiary] during her employment.<sup>10</sup>

Furthermore, the USCIS did not take into account the visa portability provisions of Act Section 204(j) and 212(a)(5)(A)(IV) [sic].

At the time AC21 went into effect, legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulations provided that an alien worker could not apply for permanent resident status by filing a Form I-485, application to adjust status, until he or she obtained the approval of the underlying Form I-140 immigrant visa petition. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2)(i) (2000). Therefore, the process under section 106(c) of AC21 at the time of enactment was as follows: first, an alien obtains an approved employment-based immigrant visa petition; second, the alien files an application to adjust status; and third, if the adjustment application was not processed within 180 days, the underlying immigrant visa petition remained valid even if the alien changed employers or positions, provided the new job was in the same or similar occupational classification.

---

<sup>10</sup> The record of proceeding contains no evidence of wages paid by [REDACTED] to the beneficiary.

The available legislative history does not shed light on Congress' intent in specifically enacting section 106(c) of AC21. While the legislative history for AC21 discusses Congressional concerns regarding the nation's economic competitiveness, the shortage of skilled technology workers, U.S. job training, and the cap on the number of nonimmigrant H-1B workers, the legislative history does not specifically mention section 106(c) or any concerns regarding backlogs in adjustment of status applications. The legislative history briefly mentions "inordinate delays in labor certification and INS visa processing" in reference to provisions relating to the extension of an H-1B nonimmigrant alien's period of stay. See S. Rep. 106-260, 2000 WL 622763 at \*10, \*23 (April 11, 2000). In the 2001 Report On The Activities Of The Committee On The Judiciary, the House Judiciary Committee summarized the effects of AC21 on immigrant visa petitions: "[I]f an employer's immigrant visa petition for an alien worker has been filed and remains unadjudicated for at least 180 days, the petition shall remain valid with respect to a new job if the alien changes jobs or employers if the new job is in the same or a similar occupational classification as the job for which the petition was filed." H.R. Rep. 106-1048, 2001 WL 67919 (January 2, 2001). Notably, this report further confuses the question of Congressional intent since the report clearly refers to "immigrant visa petitions" and not the "application for adjustment of status" that appears in the final statute. Even if more specific references were available, the legislative history behind AC21 would not provide guidance in the current matter since, as previously noted, an approved employment-based immigrant visa was required to file for adjustment of status at the time Congress enacted AC21.

Counsel asserts on appeal that the petition is still "approvable" due to the terms of the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21). The AAO does not agree that the terms of AC21 make it so that the instant *immigrant petition* can be approved despite the fact that the petitioner has not demonstrated its eligibility. As noted above, AC21 allows an *application for adjustment of status*<sup>11</sup> to be approved despite the fact that the initial job offer is no longer valid. The language of AC21 states that the I-140 "shall remain valid" with respect to a new job offer for purposes of the beneficiary's application for adjustment of status despite the fact that he or she no longer intends to work for the petitioning entity provided (1) the application for adjustment of status based upon the initial visa petition must have been pending for more than 180 days and (2) the new job offer the new employer must be for a "same or similar" job. A plain reading of the phrase "will

---

<sup>11</sup> The AAO notes that after the enactment of AC21, USCIS altered its regulations to provide for the concurrent filing of immigrant visa petitions and applications for adjustment of status. This created a possible scenario wherein after an alien's adjustment application had been pending for 180 days, the alien could receive and accept a job offer from a new employer, potentially rendering him or her eligible for AC21 portability, prior to the adjudication of his or her underlying visa petition. A USCIS memorandum signed by William Yates, May 12, 2005, provides that if the initial petition is determined "approvable", then the adjustment application may be adjudicated under the terms of AC21. See *Interim Guidance for Processing Form I-140 Employment-Based Immigrant Petitions and Form I-485 and H-1B Petitions Affected by the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (AC21) (Public Law 106-313)* at 3. This memorandum was superseded by *Matter of Al Wazzan*, 25 I&N Dec. 359 (AAO 2010), which determined that the petition must have been valid to begin with if it is to remain valid with respect to a new job.

remain valid" suggests that the petition must be valid *prior* to any consideration of whether or not the adjustment application was pending more than 180 days and/or the new position is same or similar. In other words, it is not possible for a petition to remain valid if it is not valid currently. The AAO would not consider a petition wherein the initial petitioner has not demonstrated its eligibility to be a valid petition for purposes of section 106(c) of AC21. This position is supported by the fact that when AC21 was enacted, USCIS regulations required that the underlying I-140 was approved prior to the beneficiary filing for adjustment of status. When AC21 was enacted, the only time that an application for adjustment of status could have been pending for 180 days was when it was filed based on an approved immigrant petition. Therefore, the only possible meaning for the term "remains valid" was that the underlying petition was approved and would not be invalidated by the fact that the job offer was no longer a valid offer. *See Matter of Al Wazzan*, 25 I&N Dec. 359 (AAO 2010).

With respect to section 204(j) and section 212(a)(5)(A)(iv) of the Act, the operative language states that the petition or labor certification "shall remain valid" with respect to a new job if the individual changes jobs or employers. The term "valid" is not defined by the statute, nor does the congressional record provide any guidance as to its meaning. *See* S. Rep. 106-260; *see also* H.R. Rep. 106-1048. Critical to the pertinent provisions of AC21, the labor certification and petition must be "valid" to begin with if it is to "*remain* valid with respect to a new job." Section 204(j) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j) (emphasis added).

Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. *Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport*, 495 U.S. 552 (1990). We are expected to give the words used in the statute their ordinary meaning. *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Furthermore, we are to construe the language in question in harmony with the thrust of related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996).

With regard to the overall design of the nation's immigration laws, section 204 of the Act provides the basic statutory framework for the granting of immigrant status. Section 204(a)(1)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(F), provides that "[a]ny employer desiring and intending to employ within the United States an alien entitled to classification under section . . . 203(b)(3) . . . of this title may file a petition with the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] for such classification." (Emphasis added.)

Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), governs USCIS's authority to approve an immigrant visa petition before immigrant status is granted:

After an investigation of the facts in each case . . . the Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] shall, if he determines that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien in behalf of whom the petition is made is . . . eligible for preference under subsection (a) or (b) of section 203, approve the petition

and forward one copy thereof to the Department of State. The Secretary of State shall then authorize the consular officer concerned to grant the preference status.

Statute and regulations allow adjustment only where the alien has an approved petition for immigrant classification. Section 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g)(1), (2).<sup>12</sup>

Pursuant to the statutory framework for the granting of immigrant status, any United States employer desiring and intending to employ an alien “entitled” to immigrant classification under the Act “may file” a petition for classification. Section 204(a)(1)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(F). However, section 204(b) of the Act mandates that USCIS approve that petition only after investigating the facts in each case, determining that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien is eligible for the requested classification. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). Hence, Congress specifically granted USCIS the sole authority to approve an immigrant visa petition; an alien may not adjust status or be granted immigrant status by the Department of State until USCIS approves the petition.

Therefore, to be considered “valid” in harmony with the portability provisions of AC21 and with the statute as a whole, an immigrant visa petition must have been filed for an alien that is entitled to the requested classification and that petition must have been approved by USCIS pursuant to the agency’s authority under the Act. *See generally* section 204 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154. A petition is not validated merely through the act of filing the petition with USCIS or through the passage of 180 days.

The portability provisions of AC21 cannot be interpreted as allowing the adjustment of status of an alien based on an unapproved visa petition when section 245(a) of the Act explicitly requires an approved petition (or eligibility for an immediately available immigrant visa) in order to grant adjustment of status. To construe section 204(j) of the Act in that manner would violate the “elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.” *Dept. of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc.*, 510 U.S. 332, 340 (1994).

We will not construe section 204(j) of the Act in a manner that would allow ineligible aliens to gain immigrant status simply by filing visa petitions and adjustment applications, thereby increasing USCIS backlogs, in the hopes that the application might remain adjudicated for 180 days.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> We note that the Act contains at least one provision that does apply to pending petitions; in that instance, Congress specifically used the word “pending.” *See* section 101(a)(15)(V) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(V) (establishing a nonimmigrant visa for aliens with family-based petitions that have been pending three years or more).

<sup>13</sup> Moreover, every federal circuit court of appeals that has discussed the portability provision of section 204(j) of the Act has done so only in the context of deciding an immigration judge’s jurisdiction to determine the continuing validity of an approved visa petition when adjudicating an alien’s application for adjustment of status in removal proceedings. *Sung v. Keisler*, 2007 WL 3052778 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. Oct. 22, 2007); *Matovski v. Gonzales*, 492 F.3d 722 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. Jun. 15, 2007); *Perez-Vargas v. Gonzales*, 478 F.3d

The enactment of the job flexibility provision at section 204(j) of the Act did not repeal or modify sections 204(b) and 245(a) of the Act, which require USCIS to approve an immigrant visa petition prior to granting adjustment of status.

Therefore, the provisions of AC21 do not permit the approval of the instant I-140 when eligibility has not been established.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.

---

191 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007). In *Sung*, the court quoted section 204(j) of the Act and explained that the provision only addresses when “an *approved* immigration petition will remain valid for the purpose of an application of adjustment of status.” *Sung*, 2007 WL 3052778 at \*1 (emphasis added). *Accord Matovski*, 492 F.3d at 735 (discussing portability as applied to an alien who had a “previously approved I-140 Petition for Alien Worker”); *Perez-Vargas*, 478 F.3d at 193 (stating that “[s]ection 204(j) . . . provides relief to the alien who changes jobs after his visa petition has been approved”). Hence, the requisite approval of the underlying visa petition is explicit in each of these decisions.