

(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

DATE: **SEP 06 2012**

OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE:

Petitioner:
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center (the director), and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner provides information technology and management services to healthcare companies. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a technical writer. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and that the beneficiary did not have the educational requirements which are stipulated on ETA Form 750 which would qualify him for the proffered position. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's April 23, 2009 denial, the first issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and who are members of the professions.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified

by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 19, 2004. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$26.50 per hour (\$55,120 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires a Bachelor's degree in English, Communications, or a related field and two years of experience in the job offered.

We note that the case involves the substitution of a beneficiary on the labor certification. Substitution of beneficiaries was permitted by the DOL at the time of filing this petition. DOL had published an interim final rule, which limited the validity of an approved labor certification to the specific alien named on the labor certification application. *See* 56 Fed. Reg. 54925, 54930 (October 23, 1991). The interim final rule eliminated the practice of substitution. On December 1, 1994, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, acting under the mandate of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in *Kooritzky v. Reich*, 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994), issued an order invalidating the portion of the interim final rule, which eliminated substitution of labor certification beneficiaries. The *Kooritzky* decision effectively led 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.30(c)(1) and (2) to read the same as the regulations had read before November 22, 1991, and allow the substitution of a beneficiary. Following the *Kooritzky* decision, DOL processed substitution requests pursuant to a May 4, 1995 DOL Field Memorandum, which reinstated procedures in existence prior to the implementation of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90). DOL delegated responsibility for substituting labor certification beneficiaries to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) based on a Memorandum of Understanding, which was rescinded. *See* 72 Fed. Reg. 27904 (May 17, 2007) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 656). DOL's final rule became effective July 16, 2007, and prohibits the substitution of alien beneficiaries on permanent labor certification applications and resulting certifications which are filed after July 16, 2007. As the filing of the instant case falls on July 16, 2007, substitution will be allowed for the present petition.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

On appeal, counsel submits no brief and no additional evidence.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2001, to have a gross annual income of \$1.8 million, and currently to employ eight workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on June 10, 2007, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since May 2006.

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

On appeal, counsel simply states that the director erred in concluding that the petitioner was not able to pay the proffered wage because, counsel asserts, the petitioner provided ample evidence of its ability to pay with the initial petition submission. Counsel also asserts that the petitioner provided ample evidence to demonstrate that the beneficiary has a bachelor's degree which is equivalent to a bachelor's degree from an accredited university in the United States.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, USCIS electronic records show that the petitioner filed at least three other I-140 petitions² and several I-129 petitions³ which have been pending during the time period relevant to the instant petition. Where, as here, a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. at 144-145 (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and Form ETA 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the

² [REDACTED] was filed on March 8, 2006 and approved on April 28, 2006. The priority date conferred by the approval of the employment-based immigrant visa petition is December 14, 2005. The beneficiary of this immigrant visa petition obtained lawful permanent residence on August 7, 2008. [REDACTED] was filed on August 7, 2006 and approved on August 21, 2006. The priority date conferred by the approval of the employment-based immigrant visa petition is June 1, 2006. The beneficiary of this immigrant visa petition obtained lawful permanent residence on August 7, 2008. [REDACTED] was filed on March 22, 2006 but was denied on July 19, 2007.

³ Since 2003, the petitioner has filed 17 I-129 petitions for ten beneficiaries (some of these are extensions filed for the same individuals).

petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner provided copies of IRS Form W-2 which it issued to the beneficiary in 2006, 2007 and 2008. The beneficiary's IRS Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, for 2006, 2007 and 2008 shows compensation received from the petitioner, as shown in the table below.

- In 2006, the Form W-2 stated compensation of \$29,461.46.⁴
- In 2007, the Form W-2 stated compensation of \$43,499.88.
- In 2008, the Form W-2 stated compensation of \$56,115.26.

Thus, for 2008, the petitioner paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage. However, for 2006 and 2007 the petitioner paid the beneficiary a portion of the proffered wage but not the full proffered wage. Therefore, for 2006 and 2007 the petitioner must still demonstrate the ability to pay the difference between the wages already paid and the full proffered wage that difference being \$25,658.54 and \$11,620.12 respectively. Further, the petitioner must still demonstrate the ability to pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage for 2004 and 2005.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

⁴ IRS Form W-2 identifies voluntary adjustments for each year, wages being deducted from the beneficiary's regular wages under the heading *Inspretax*. The sum which appears in box 1 of IRS Form W-2 reflects the amount remaining after the voluntary adjustment. The sums above represent the wages paid prior to the voluntary adjustment.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The record before the director closed on March 6, 2009 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner’s submissions in response to the director’s request for evidence (RFE). As of that date, the petitioner’s 2008 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner’s income tax return for 2007 is the most recent return available. The petitioner’s tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$40,299.00.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$201,568.00.
- In 2006, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$10,992.00.
- In 2007, the Form 1120 stated a net loss of \$108,930.00.

USCIS records indicate that the petitioner has filed 21 petitions since the petitioner’s establishment in 2001, including 17 I-129 petitions, and four I-140 petitions. The petitioner would need to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage for each I-140 beneficiary from the priority date until the beneficiary obtains permanent residence. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Further, the petitioner would be obligated to pay each H-1B petition beneficiary the prevailing wage in accordance with

DOL regulations, and the labor condition application certified with each H-1B petition. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 655.715.

In the instant case, for 2004, the petitioner has not demonstrated sufficient net income to pay the beneficiary of the instant petition the full proffered wage, much less the beneficiaries of the I-129 petitions which bore validity dates during that year. For 2005, the petitioner demonstrated sufficient net income to pay the beneficiaries of the two I-140 petitions which were pending at the time, assuming that the wage proffered to the beneficiaries of the other I-140 petitions is the same as the proffered wage in this case. However, the petitioner has not demonstrated sufficient net income to pay the beneficiaries of the I-140 and six I-129 petitions the validity dates of which fall on that year. For 2006, the petitioner has not demonstrated the ability to pay the beneficiary the difference between the wages already paid and the full proffered wage, much less the beneficiaries of the other pending I-140 and I-129 petitions. For 2007, the petitioner has not demonstrated sufficient net income to pay one beneficiary the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁵ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, the Form 1120, Schedule L stated net current assets of \$3,656.00.
- In 2005, the Form 1120, Schedule L stated net current assets of \$32,829.00.
- In 2006, the Form 1120, Schedule L stated net current liabilities of \$45,150.00.
- In 2007, the Form 1120, Schedule L stated net current liabilities of \$88,381.00.

Therefore, for the years 2004 and 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage to one beneficiary. For 2006 and 2007, the petitioner reported net current liabilities and, therefore, could not pay even the difference between the wages paid to the beneficiary of the instant petition and the full proffered wage.

⁵According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets, with the exception of 2008.

On appeal, counsel provided no argument other than to make a general reference to the sufficiency of the evidence already supplied.

It should be noted that in its response to the director's RFE, counsel asserted that the director should have prorated the proffered wage for 2004, the year in which the priority date was established. The director did not address this assertion in his decision. We will not, however, consider 12 months of income towards an ability to pay a lesser period of the proffered wage any more than we would consider 24 months of income towards paying the annual proffered wage. While USCIS will prorate the proffered wage if the record contains evidence of net income or payment of the beneficiary's wages specifically covering the portion of the year that occurred after the priority date (and only that period), such as monthly income statements or pay stubs, the petitioner has not submitted such evidence.

Additionally, in his response to the director's RFE, counsel asserts that the director should consider the petitioner's bank statements which were provided as evidence of its ability to pay. In his decision, the director correctly noted that counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return(s), such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L which was considered above in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

Counsel's general assertion on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The

petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, at the time the instant petition was filed, the petitioner claims to have been operating for approximately six years. The record of proceeding contains financial documentation for four of those six years. Whereas in *Sonegawa*, the petitioner demonstrated 11 years of profitability prior to the year in which a shortfall was realized, in the instant situation, the petitioner has shown profitability in only three years and for two the profitability was marginal. The petitioner has not established the historical growth of its business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry or whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

As set forth in the director's April 23, 2009 denial, the second issue in this case is whether or not the beneficiary possesses the educational and experiential requirements which are set forth on ETA Form 750.

At the outset, it is important to discuss the respective roles of the DOL and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the employment-based immigrant visa process. As noted above, the labor certification in this matter is certified by the DOL. The DOL's role in this process is set forth at section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act, which provides:

Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time

of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to the DOL, or the regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether the position and the alien are qualified for a specific immigrant classification. This fact has not gone unnoticed by federal circuit courts:

There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14).⁶ *Id.* at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)(14) determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.

Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history, and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)(14). If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of "matching" them with those of corresponding United States workers so that it will then be "in a position to meet the requirement of the law," namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the Ninth Circuit stated:

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL's role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS's decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

⁶ Based on revisions to the Act, the current citation is section 212(a)(5)(A).

K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from the DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor . . . pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the [Act] is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating:

The Department of Labor (DOL) must certify that insufficient domestic workers are available to perform the job and that the alien's performance of the job will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed domestic workers. *Id.* § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INS then makes its own determination of the alien's entitlement to sixth preference status. *Id.* § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). *See generally K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 9th Cir.1983).

The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.

Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).

Therefore, it is the DOL's responsibility to determine whether there are qualified U.S. workers available to perform the offered position, and whether the employment of the beneficiary will adversely affect similarly employed U.S. workers. It is the responsibility of USCIS to determine if the beneficiary qualifies for the offered position, and whether the offered position and beneficiary are eligible for the requested employment-based immigrant visa classification.

In the instant case, the petitioner requests classification of the beneficiary as a professional or skilled worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A).⁷ The AAO will first consider whether the petition may be approved in the professional classification.

⁷ Employment-based immigrant visa petitions are filed on Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker. The petitioner indicates the requested classification by checking a box on the Form I-140. The Form I-140 version in effect when this petition was filed did not have separate boxes for the professional and skilled worker classifications. In the instant case, the petitioner selected Part 2, Box e of Form I-140 for a professional or skilled worker. The petitioner did not specify elsewhere in the

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), grants preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions. *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(2).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) states, in part:

If the petition is for a professional, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien holds a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and by evidence that the alien is a member of the professions. Evidence of a baccalaureate degree shall be in the form of an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study.

Section 101(a)(32) of the Act defines the term “profession” to include, but is not limited to, “architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries.” If the offered position is not statutorily defined as a profession, “the petitioner must submit evidence showing that the minimum of a baccalaureate degree is required for entry into the occupation.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C).

In addition, the job offer portion of the labor certification underlying a petition for a professional “must demonstrate that the job requires the minimum of a baccalaureate degree.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(i)

The beneficiary must also meet all of the requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification by the priority date of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing’s Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971).

Therefore, a petition for a professional must establish that the occupation of the offered position is listed as a profession at section 101(a)(32) of the Act or requires a bachelor’s degree as a minimum for entry; the beneficiary possesses a U.S. bachelor’s degree or foreign equivalent degree from a college or university; the job offer portion of the labor certification requires at least a bachelor’s degree or foreign equivalent degree; and the beneficiary meets all of the requirements of the labor certification.

It is noted that the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) uses a singular description of the degree required for classification as a professional. In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now USCIS or the

record of proceeding whether the petition should be considered under the skilled worker or professional classification. After reviewing the minimum requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification and the standard requirements of the occupational classification assigned to the offered position by the DOL, the AAO will consider the petition under both the professional and skilled worker categories.

Service), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor's degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree: "[B]oth the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree.*" 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (November 29, 1991) (emphasis added).

It is significant that both section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act and the relevant regulations use the word "degree" in relation to professionals. A statute should be construed under the assumption that Congress intended it to have purpose and meaningful effect. *Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana*, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); *Sutton v. United States*, 819 F.2d. 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1987). It can be presumed that Congress' requirement of a single "degree" for members of the professions is deliberate.

The regulation also requires the submission of "an official *college or university* record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study." 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) (emphasis added). In another context, Congress has broadly referenced "the possession of a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, university, school, or other institution of learning." Section 203(b)(2)(C) of the Act (relating to aliens of exceptional ability). However, for the professional category, it is clear that the degree must be from a college or university.

In *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006), the court held that, in professional and advanced degree professional cases, where the beneficiary is statutorily required to hold a baccalaureate degree, USCIS properly concluded that a single foreign degree or its equivalent is required. See also *Maramjaya v. USCIS*, Civ. Act No. 06-2158 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2008)(for professional classification, USCIS regulations require the beneficiary to possess a single four-year U.S. bachelor's degree or foreign equivalent degree).

Thus, the plain meaning of the Act and the regulations is that the beneficiary of a petition for a professional must possess a degree from a college or university that is at least a U.S. baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree.

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the beneficiary possesses a Bachelor of Arts degree from [REDACTED] completed in 1998.

The record contains a copy of the beneficiary's Bachelor of Arts (General) diploma and transcripts from [REDACTED] issued in 1998.

The record also contains an evaluation of the beneficiary's educational credentials prepared by Professor [REDACTED] Sc.D. for American Evaluation Institute. The evaluation states that "the education of [the beneficiary], based on certificates and transcripts is equivalent to a Regionally Accredited American Bachelor of Arts in English Degree."

In his evaluation, Professor [REDACTED] explains that a Bachelor's curriculum in the United States represents a degree "earned by the student for an equivalent of Four years educational program at the university level." Professor [REDACTED] then explains that the beneficiary "attended [REDACTED] from June, 1995 to April, 1998 and was awarded a Bachelor of Arts Degree in 1998." According to Professor [REDACTED] the beneficiary took courses in English, Grammer [sic] and Composition, English Literature, Advanced English, English Philology, Languages, Language Studies, and other related courses." Professor [REDACTED] notes that "as part of this degree program, [the beneficiary] completed extensive coursework in English."

Though Professor [REDACTED] explains that the beneficiary's "educational program is equivalent to a total of One Hundred and Twenty-Six Accredited American College or University credits" and that the beneficiary's degree equates to a "Regionally Accredited American Bachelor of Arts in English Degree," he does not explain his rationale for making such an assessment. At no time does Professor [REDACTED] identify a formula or set of formal criteria by which he compares or analyzes the coursework which the beneficiary completed with respect to how it corresponds with the coursework one would complete at an accredited institution of higher learning in the United States. Thus, Professor [REDACTED] provides no objective, measurable basis for his evaluation.

The petitioner also submitted evaluations from "Professor" [REDACTED] President of [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Chief Evaluator at [REDACTED] and "professor" at the [REDACTED]. According to this "university's" website, [REDACTED] (accessed on August 8, 2012), it awards degrees based on experience.

[REDACTED] enumerates the beneficiary's subjects by course and awards credits for each course, concluding that the beneficiary achieved 192 semester credit hours which, she states, represent a "variant of the traditional 'Carnegie Unit.'" [REDACTED] does not explain how she determined the individual course credit numbers, which vary from 12 to 13. In identifying the standards which she employs for preparing her evaluations, [REDACTED] indicates that she adheres to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) guidelines. She further indicates that for a more detailed explanation of the methodology used in the evaluation, we should "reference the

⁸ Professor [REDACTED] indicates he has an earned Master of Arts degree in History and an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from [REDACTED]. While Professor [REDACTED] claims that [REDACTED] was accredited at the time his degrees were awarded, there is no evidence that this institution is currently accredited by the government of [REDACTED].

⁹ [REDACTED] indicates that she holds a Master's degree from the [REDACTED].

expert opinion letter by Professor [REDACTED]. Therefore, we will address issues related to UNESCO guidelines in our discussion of Professor [REDACTED] evaluation.

Professor [REDACTED] goes on at length about Carnegie Units and Indian degrees in general, concluding that the beneficiary's three-year degree is equivalent to a U.S. baccalaureate but makes no attempt to assign credits for individual courses. Professor [REDACTED] credibility is seriously diminished as he misinterprets an article by Leo Sweeney and Ravi Kallur. Specifically, Professor [REDACTED] asserts that this article concludes that because the United States is willing to consider three-year degrees from Israel and the European Union, "Indian bachelor degree-holders should be provided the same opportunity to pursue graduate education in the U.S." While this is the conclusion of the article, the specific means by which Indian bachelor degree holders might pursue graduate education in the United States provided in the discussion portion of the article in no way suggests that Indian three-year degrees are, in general, comparable to a U.S. baccalaureate. Specifically, the article proposes accepting a first class honors three-year degree *following* a secondary degree from a Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) or Council for the Indian School Certificate Examination (CISCE) program *or* a three-year degree *plus* a post graduate diploma from an institution that is accredited or recognized by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) and/or the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE). The record contains no evidence that the beneficiary in this matter received his secondary degree from a CBSE or CISCE program. Further, the record contains no evidence indicating that the beneficiary was awarded a post graduate diploma. Thus, Professor [REDACTED] reliance on this article is unfounded.

Professor [REDACTED] reliance on *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 (D. Ore. Nov. 30, 2006) is equally misplaced. In that case, the alien not only had a credential beyond a three-year degree, the judge determined that even with that extra credential, membership in the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, the alien was only eligible as a skilled worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Act, and *not* as either a professional or an advanced degree professional pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Act. *Id.*

Ultimately, the record contains no evidence that the Carnegie Unit is a useful way to evaluate Indian degrees. Moreover, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the use of this system produces consistent results, as would be expected of a workable system.

The Carnegie Unit was adopted by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in the early 1900s as a measure of the amount of classroom time that a high school student studied a subject.¹⁰ For example, 120 hours of classroom time was determined to be equal to one "unit" of high school credit, and 14 "units" were deemed to constitute the minimum amount of classroom time equivalent to four years of high school.¹¹ This unit system was adopted at a time when high schools

¹⁰ The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching was founded in 1905 as an independent policy and research center whose motivation is "improving teaching and learning." See <http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/about-us/about-carnegie> (accessed August 8, 2012).

¹¹ <http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/faqs> (accessed August 8, 2012).

lacked uniformity in the courses they taught and the number of hours students spent in class. The Carnegie Unit does not apply to higher education.¹²

The record fails to provide peer-reviewed material confirming that assigning credits by lecture hour is applicable to the Indian tertiary education system. For example, if the ratio of classroom and outside study in the Indian system is different than the U.S. system, which presumes two hours of individual study time for each classroom hour, applying the U.S. credit system to Indian classroom hours would be meaningless. Robert A. Watkins, The University of Texas at Austin, "Assigning Undergraduate Transfer Credit: It's Only an Arithmetical Exercise" at 12, available at http://handouts.aacrao.org/am07/finished/F0345p_M_Donahue.pdf (accessed August 8, 2012), provides that the Indian system is not based on credits, but is exam based. *Id.* at 11. Thus, transfer credits from India are derived from the number of exams. *Id.* at 12. Specifically, this publication states that, in India, six exams at year's end multiplied by five equals 30 hours. *Id.*

Professor [REDACTED] also relies on an article he coauthored with [REDACTED]. The record contains no evidence that this article was published in a peer-reviewed publication or anywhere other than the Internet. The article includes British colleges that accept three-year degrees for admission to graduate school but concedes that "a number of other universities" would not accept three-year degrees for admission to graduate school. Similarly, the article lists some U.S. universities that accept three-year degrees for admission to graduate school but acknowledges that others do not. In fact, the article concedes:

None of the members of the National Association of Credential Evaluation Services (N.A.C.E.S.) who were approached were willing to grant equivalency to a bachelor's degree from a regionally accredited institution in the United States, although we heard anecdotally that one, World Education Services (W.E.S.) had been interested in doing so.

In this process, we encountered a number of the objections to equivalency that have already been discussed.

James Frey, Ed.D., President of Educational Credential Evaluators, Inc. (E.C.E.), commented thus,

"Contrary to your statement, a degree from a three-year "Bologna Process" bachelor's degree program in Europe will NOT be accepted as a degree by the majority of universities in the United States. Similarly, the majority do not accept a bachelor's

¹² See <http://www.suny.edu/facultysenate/TheCarnegieUnit.pdf> (accessed August 8, 2012).

degree from a three-year program in India or any other country except England. England is a unique situation because of the specialized nature of Form VI.”

* * *

International Education Consultants of Delaware, Inc., raise similar objections to those raised by E.C.E.,

“The Indian educational system, along with that of Canada and some other countries, generally adopted the UK-pattern 3-year degree. But the UK retained the important preliminary A level examinations. These examinations are used for advanced standing credit in the UK; we follow their lead, and use those examinations to constitute the an [sic] additional year of undergraduate study. The combination of these two entities is equivalent to a 4-year US Bachelor’s degree.

The Indian educational system dropped that advanced standing year. You enter a 3-year Indian degree program directly from Year 12 of your education. In the US, there are no degree programs entered from a stage lower than Year 12, and there are no 3-year degree programs. Without the additional advanced standing year, there’s no equivalency.

Finally, these materials do not examine whether those few U.S. institutions that may accept a three-year degree for graduate admission do so on the condition that the holder of a three-year degree complete extra credits.

Also in support of his evaluation, Professor [redacted] referenced the “Findings from the 2006 Council of Graduate Schools (CGS) International Graduate Admissions Survey.” He cites a portion of the report which indicates that “evaluating applications of prospective international students with three-year bachelor’s degrees has become a less controversial issue than previously reported. Between 2005 and 2006, the percentage of survey respondents who said that the three-year degree was ‘not an issue’ on their campuses rose from 41% to 56%.” However, page 7 of the actual report states, “less than one half of all campuses said that they would consider applications of students with these degrees.”¹³ If the three-year Indian baccalaureate were truly a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. baccalaureate, it can be expected that the vast majority of U.S. institutions would accept these degrees for graduate admission without provision.

Finally, Professor [redacted] relies on a UNESCO document, entitled “Recommendation on the Recognition of Studies and Qualifications” which was adopted by the General Conference of

¹³ http://www.epi.soe.vt.edu/perspectives/policy_news/pdf/InterGrad06.pdf (accessed August 8, 2012).

UNESCO in 1993. The relevant language relates to “recognition” of qualifications awarded in higher education. Among its relevant provisions, paragraph 1(e) defines recognition as follows:

“Recognition” of a foreign qualification in higher education means its acceptance by the competent authorities of the State concerned (whether they be governmental or nongovernmental) as entitling its holder to be considered under the same conditions as those holding a comparable qualification awarded in that State and deemed comparable, for the purposes of access to or further pursuit of higher education studies, participation in research, the practice of a profession, if this does not require the passing of examinations or further special preparation, or all the foregoing, according to the scope of the recognition.

The UNESCO recommendation relates to admission to graduate school and training programs and eligibility to practice in a profession. Nowhere does it suggest that a three-year degree must be deemed equivalent to a four-year degree for purposes of qualifying for inclusion in a class of individuals defined by statute and regulation as eligible for immigration benefits. More significantly, the recommendation does not define “comparable qualification.” At the heart of this matter is whether the beneficiary’s degree is, in fact, the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree. The UNESCO recommendation does not address this issue.

In fact, UNESCO’s publication, “The Handbook on Diplomas, Degrees and Other Certificates in Higher Education in Asia and the Pacific” 82 (2d ed. 2004) (accessed on August 8, 2012 at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001388/138853E.pdf>), provides:

Most of the universities and the institutions recognized by the UGC or by other authorized public agencies in India, are members of the Association of Commonwealth Universities. Besides, India is party to a few UNESCO conventions and there also exist a few bilateral agreements, protocols and conventions between India and a few countries on the recognition of degrees and diplomas awarded by the Indian universities. But many foreign universities adopt their own approach in finding out the equivalence of Indian degrees and diplomas and their recognition, just as Indian universities do in the case of foreign degrees and diplomas. The Association of Indian Universities plays an important role in this. *There are no agreements that necessarily bind India and other governments/universities to recognize, en masse, all the degrees/diplomas of all the universities either on a mutual basis or on a multilateral basis.* Of late, many foreign universities and institutions are entering into the higher education arena in the country. Methods of recognition of such institutions and the courses offered by them are under serious consideration of the government of India. The University Grants Commission (UGC), AICTE and the Association of Indian Universities (AIU) are developing criteria and mechanisms regarding the same.

Id. at 84. (Emphasis added.)

The evaluation from Professor [REDACTED] differs considerably from the evaluation of [REDACTED]. They each assign a different number of credits to the beneficiary's coursework and arrive at their conclusions through very different means, neither of which actually analyzes the specific coursework which the beneficiary undertook.

It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

The petitioner claims that the beneficiary's three-year bachelor's degree, on its own, is equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's degree. A three-year bachelor's degree will generally not be considered to be a "foreign equivalent degree" to a U.S. baccalaureate. *See Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. 244 (Reg. Comm. 1977). Where the analysis of the beneficiary's credentials relies on a combination of lesser degrees and/or work experience, the result is the "equivalent" of a bachelor's degree rather than a full U.S. baccalaureate or foreign equivalent degree required for classification as a professional.

The AAO has reviewed the Electronic Database for Global Education (EDGE) created by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO). According to its website, AACRAO is "a nonprofit, voluntary, professional association of more than 11,000 higher education admissions and registration professionals who represent more than 2,600 institutions and agencies in the United States and in over 40 countries around the world." *See* <http://www.aacrao.org/About-AACRAO.aspx>. Its mission "is to serve and advance higher education by providing leadership in academic and enrollment services." *Id.* EDGE is "a web-based resource for the evaluation of foreign educational credentials." *See* <http://edge.aacrao.org/info.php>. Authors for EDGE are not merely expressing their personal opinions. Rather, they must work with a publication consultant and a Council Liaison with AACRAO's National Council on the Evaluation of Foreign Educational Credentials.¹⁴ If placement recommendations are included, the Council Liaison works with the author to give feedback and the publication is subject to final review by the entire Council. *Id.* USCIS considers EDGE to be a reliable, peer-reviewed source of information about foreign credentials equivalencies.¹⁵

¹⁴ *See An Author's Guide to Creating AACRAO International Publications* available at http://www.aacrao.org/Libraries/Publications_Documents/GUIDE_TO_CREATING_INTERNATIONAL_PUBLICATIONS_1.sflb.ashx.

¹⁵ In *Confluence Intern., Inc. v. Holder*, 2009 WL 825793 (D.Minn. March 27, 2009), the court determined that the AAO provided a rational explanation for its reliance on information provided by AACRAO to support its decision. In *Tisco Group, Inc. v. Napolitano*, 2010 WL 3464314 (E.D.Mich. August 30, 2010), the court found that USCIS had properly weighed the evaluations submitted and the information obtained from EDGE to conclude that the alien's three-year foreign "baccalaureate" and foreign "Master's" degree were only comparable to a U.S. bachelor's degree.

According to EDGE, a three-year Bachelor of Arts/Commerce/Science degree from India is comparable to “two to three years of university study in the United States.”

Therefore, based on the conclusions of EDGE, the evidence in the record on appeal was not sufficient to establish that the beneficiary possesses the foreign equivalent of a U.S. bachelor’s degree in English or in any subject.

After reviewing all of the evidence in the record, it is concluded that the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary has a U.S. baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree from a college or university. The petitioner has failed to overcome the conclusions of EDGE with reliable, peer-reviewed information. Therefore, the beneficiary does not qualify for classification as a professional under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.

The AAO will also consider whether the petition may be approved in the skilled worker classification. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(2).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(B) states:

If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the [labor certification]. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The determination of whether a petition may be approved for a skilled worker is based on the requirements of the job offered as set forth on the labor certification. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(4). The labor certification must require at least two years of training and/or experience. Relevant post-secondary education may be considered as training. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(2).

Accordingly, a petition for a skilled worker must establish that the job offer portion of the labor certification requires at least two years of training and/or experience, and the beneficiary meets all of the requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification.

In *Sunshine Rehab Services, Inc.* 2010 WL 3325442 (E.D.Mich. August 20, 2010), the court upheld a USCIS determination that the alien’s three-year bachelor’s degree was not a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. bachelor’s degree. Specifically, the court concluded that USCIS was entitled to prefer the information in EDGE and did not abuse its discretion in reaching its conclusion. The court also noted that the labor certification itself required a degree and did not allow for the combination of education and experience.

In evaluating the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position, USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). See also *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by regulation, USCIS must examine “the language of the labor certification job requirements” in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary’s qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to “examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer.” *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS’s interpretation of the job’s requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve “reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification].” *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification or otherwise attempt to divine the employer’s intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position has the following minimum requirements:

EDUCATION

Grade School: Required.

High School: Required.

College: Required.

College Degree Required: Bachelor’s degree.

Major Field of Study: English, Comm., or related field.

TRAINING: None Required.

EXPERIENCE: Two years in the job offered.

OTHER SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: None.

As is discussed above, the beneficiary possesses a Bachelor of Arts (General) degree from [REDACTED] which is equivalent to “two to three years of university study in the United States.”

The labor certification does not permit a lesser degree, a combination of lesser degrees, and/or a quantifiable amount of work experience, such as that possessed by the beneficiary.¹⁶

¹⁶ The DOL has provided the following field guidance: “When an equivalent degree or alternative work experience is acceptable, the employer must specifically state on the [labor certification] as well as throughout all phases of recruitment exactly what will be considered equivalent or alternative in order to qualify for the job.” See Memo. from Anna C. Hall, Acting Regl. Adminstr., U.S. Dep’t.

The petitioner failed to establish that the terms of the labor certification are ambiguous and that the petitioner intended the labor certification to require less than a four-year U.S. bachelor's or foreign equivalent degree, as that intent was expressed during the labor certification process to the DOL and potentially qualified U.S. workers.

Therefore it is concluded that the terms of the labor certification require a four-year U.S. bachelor's degree in English, Communications or a related field or a foreign equivalent degree. The beneficiary does not possess such a degree. The petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary met the minimum educational requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the beneficiary does not qualify for classification as a skilled worker.¹⁷

We note the decision in *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006). In that case, the labor certification specified an educational requirement of four years of college and a "B.S. or foreign equivalent." The district court determined that "B.S. or foreign equivalent" relates solely to the alien's educational background, precluding consideration of the alien's combined education and work experience. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *11-13. Additionally, the court determined that the word "equivalent" in the employer's educational requirements was ambiguous and that in the context of skilled worker petitions (where there is no statutory educational requirement), deference must be given to the employer's intent. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *14.¹⁸ In

of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, to SESA and JTPA Adminstrs., U.S. Dep't. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, Interpretation of "Equivalent Degree," 2 (June 13, 1994). The DOL's certification of job requirements stating that "a certain amount and kind of experience is the equivalent of a college degree does in no way bind [USCIS] to accept the employer's definition." See Ltr. From Paul R. Nelson, Certifying Officer, U.S. Dept. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, to Lynda Won-Chung, Esq., Jackson & Hertogs (March 9, 1993). The DOL has also stated that "[w]hen the term equivalent is used in conjunction with a degree, we understand to mean the employer is willing to accept an equivalent foreign degree." See Ltr. From Paul R. Nelson, Certifying Officer, U.S. Dept. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, to Joseph Thomas, INS (October 27, 1992). To our knowledge, these field guidance memoranda have not been rescinded.

¹⁷ In addition, for classification as a professional, the beneficiary must also meet all of the requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). See *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977); see also *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971).

¹⁸ In *Grace Korean United Methodist Church v. Michael Chertoff*, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Or. 2005), the court concluded that USCIS "does not have the authority or expertise to impose its strained definition of 'B.A. or equivalent' on that term as set forth in the labor certification." However, the court in *Grace Korean* makes no attempt to distinguish its holding from the federal circuit court decisions cited above. Instead, as legal support for its determination, the court cites to *Tovar v. U.S. Postal Service*, 3 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)(the U.S. Postal Service has no expertise or special competence in immigration matters). *Id.* at 1179. *Tovar* is easily distinguishable from the present matter since USCIS, through the authority delegated by the Secretary of Homeland

addition, the court in *Snapnames.com, Inc.* recognized that even though the labor certification may be prepared with the alien in mind, USCIS has an independent role in determining whether the alien meets the labor certification requirements. *Id.* at *7. Thus, the court concluded that where the plain language of those requirements does not support the petitioner's asserted intent, USCIS "does not err in applying the requirements as written." *Id.* See also *Maramjaya v. USCIS*, Civ. Act No. 06-2158 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2008)(upholding USCIS interpretation that the term "bachelor's or equivalent" on the labor certification necessitated a single four-year degree).

In the instant case, unlike the labor certifications in *Snapnames.com, Inc.* and *Grace Korean*, the required education is clearly and unambiguously stated on the labor certification and does not include the language "or equivalent" or any other alternatives to a four-year bachelor's degree.

In summary, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary possessed a U.S. bachelor's degree or a foreign equivalent degree from a college or university as of the priority date. The petitioner also failed to establish that the beneficiary met the minimum educational requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification as of the priority date. Therefore, the beneficiary does not qualify for classification as a professional under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act or as a skilled worker under section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.