


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
U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



DATE: **SEP 06 2012**

OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE:



IN RE:


Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is an auto repair and sales company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an automotive mechanic. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's February 25, 2009 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$18.43 per hour (\$38,334.40 per year based on forty hours per week). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires four years of experience in the job offered as an automotive mechanic.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1996, to have a gross annual income of \$498,287, and to currently employ three workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on the calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, originally signed by the beneficiary on April 27, 2001 and again on September 26, 2006, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner submitted the beneficiary's Form W-2 for 2008, indicating that the beneficiary was compensated \$10,200 by the petitioner. In a statement dated January 7, 2009, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary began working for the petitioner on September 22, 2008. The petitioner also submitted copies of three checks issued to the beneficiary, dated November 21, 2008, December 5, 2008, and December 19, 2008. Each check was issued for \$1,480. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date in 2001 or subsequently.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, or Line 24 of the Form 1120-A, U.S. Corporation Short-Form Income Tax Return. The record before the director closed on January 21, 2009 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner’s submissions in response to the director’s request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner’s 2008 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner’s income tax return for 2007 is the most recent return available. The petitioner’s tax returns demonstrate its net income as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120-A stated net income of -\$1,102.
- In 2002, the Form 1120-A stated net income of -\$1,475.
- In 2003, page 1 of Form 1120-A was not submitted.
- In 2004, page 1 of Form 1120-A was not submitted.
- In 2005, the Form 1120-A stated net income of -\$488.
- In 2006, the Form 1120-A stated net income of -\$3,513.
- In 2007, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$932.

Therefore, for the years 2001 through 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner’s net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner’s current assets and current liabilities.² A corporation’s year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18.³ If the total of a corporation’s end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

²According to *Barron’s Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), “current assets” consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. “Current liabilities” are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

³In the instant petition, the petitioner submitted Form 1120-A, U.S. Corporation Short-Form Income Tax Return, for the years 2001 through 2006. Therefore, year-end current assets are shown on Page 2, Part III, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 13, 14, and 16.

(b)(6)

The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120-A stated net current assets of \$404.
- In 2002, the Form 1120-A stated net current assets of \$49.
- In 2003, page 2 of Form 1120-A was incomplete and did not include current liabilities.
- In 2004, page 2 of Form 1120-A was not submitted.
- In 2005, the Form 1120-A stated net current assets of \$2,198.
- In 2006, the Form 1120-A stated net current assets of \$2,350.
- In 2007, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$2,400.

Therefore, for the years 2001 through 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

In a statement dated January 20, 2009, counsel references an Interoffice Memorandum dated May 4, 2004 entitled "Determination of Ability to Pay." See Interoffice Memo. from William R. Yates, Associate Director of Operations, USCIS, to Service Center Directors and other USCIS officials, *Determination of Ability to Pay under 8 CFR 204.5(g)(2)*, at 2, (May 4, 2004). Specifically, counsel states:

...the Beneficiary has been employed by the Petitioner from September 22, 2008 through the present... Please note, the Petitioner has paid the Beneficiary a total of \$10,200 in wages for his labor in 2008, which was only 3 months and 9 days (14 weeks) from when he started his employment (9/22/2008) to the end of the year... With a total of \$10,200 in wages paid over a period of 14 weeks with several federal holidays, the Petitioner has paid on average \$729 per week to the Beneficiary in 2008. With 52 weeks in a calendar year, the expected yearly salary at the above rate totals \$37,886. The Petitioner is already paying very near (only \$448 less) the proffered wage... Based on last year's wages paid to the Beneficiary, the Petitioner is more than capable of paying the proffered wage... This credible, verifiable evidence that the Petitioner not only is employing the Beneficiary but also has paid and currently is paying nearly the proffered wage warrants a positive determination by the Service.

Counsel urges USCIS to consider the wage rate paid since September 2008 as satisfying that particular method of demonstrating a petitioning entity's ability to pay.⁴

⁴ Counsel indicates that the petitioner is currently paying the beneficiary nearly the proffered wage,

Counsel appears to be highlighting the fact that the 2004 Yates Memo makes a distinction between past and current salaries, and that Mr. Yates used the conjunction “or” in the context of evidence that the petitioner has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage. The Yates’ Memorandum relied upon by counsel provides guidance to adjudicators to review a record of proceeding and make a positive determination of a petitioning entity’s ability to pay if, in the context of the beneficiary’s employment, “[t]he record contains credible verifiable evidence that the petitioner is not only employing the beneficiary but also has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage.”

The AAO consistently adjudicates appeals in accordance with the Yates Memorandum. However, counsel’s interpretation of the language in that memorandum is overly broad and does not comport with the plain language of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) set forth in the memorandum as authority for the policy guidance therein. The regulation requires that a petitioning entity demonstrate its *continuing* ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. If USCIS and the AAO were to interpret and apply the Yates Memorandum as counsel urges, then in this particular factual context, the clear language in the regulation would be usurped by an interoffice guidance memorandum without binding legal effect. The petitioner must demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which in this case is April 30, 2001. Thus, the petitioner must show its ability to pay the proffered wage not only in 2008, when counsel claims it actually began paying very near the proffered wage rate, but it must also show its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage in 2001 through 2007. Demonstrating that the petitioner is paying the proffered wage in a specific year may suffice to show the petitioner’s ability to pay for that year, but the petitioner must still demonstrate its ability to pay for the rest of the pertinent period of time.

In the statement dated January 20, 2009, counsel also states, “Further, the Petitioner regularly pays wages to sub-contractors averaging \$32,456 yearly. Please see ‘Other Deduction Statement’ for years 2001 through 2006, previously submitted to the Service.” The record does not, however, name these workers, state their wages, verify their full-time employment, or provide evidence that the petitioner has replaced or will replace them with the beneficiary. In general, wages already paid to others are not available to prove the ability to pay the wage proffered to the beneficiary at the priority date of the petition and continuing to the present.

The petitioner submitted bank statements from 2002 through 2007. Counsel’s reliance on the balance in the petitioner’s bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner’s ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material “in appropriate cases,” the

as evidenced by the beneficiary’s 2008 Form W-2, and that it began paying the beneficiary close to the proffered wage in September 2008. The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage *beginning on the priority date*, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL, and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent resident status. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return(s), such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L or Page 2, Part III that was considered in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

The petitioner submitted the company's unaudited 2006 Financial Statement and Accountant's Report. Counsel's reliance on unaudited financial records is misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant's report accompanying these statements, the AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner also submitted a statement from [REDACTED] President and Owner of [REDACTED] dated August 14, 2007, indicating that the petitioner employs three workers and has the ability to pay the proffered wage. In general, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) requires annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. That further provides: "In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director *may* accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage." (Emphasis added.) In the instant case, the petitioner does not employ 100 or more workers.

On appeal, counsel submitted a brief stating that the petitioner has established the ability to pay the proffered wage based on the evidence previously provided. No additional evidence was submitted. Counsel states, "The officer failed to consider all schedules, tax returns and documents in order to establish [REDACTED] ability to pay the prevailing wage. Further, the first page of two separate tax returns, 2003 and 2004, were not considered. Further, corporate assets were not considered in determining the ability to pay." The AAO notes that the record does not contain Page 1 of Form 1120-A for 2003 and 2004. In addition, the copy of Page 2 of Form 1120-A for 2003 is incomplete and does not include the petitioner's current liabilities. Page 2 of Form 1120-A was not included for 2004. In the director's February 25, 2009 decision, it was specifically stated that the 2003 and 2004 tax returns did not include the first page. Counsel failed to address this issue on appeal and did not submit additional evidence.

In the brief, counsel asserts that the bank statements, 2006 financial statement, and the petitioner's August 14, 2007 statement also establish the petitioner's ability to pay. As discussed above, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. Further, on appeal, counsel failed to

submit evidence to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax returns. In addition, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited.

It is noted that the instant case arose in the seventh circuit. Therefore, in this case, the AAO is bound by precedent decisions of the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit. *See N.L.R.B. v. Ashkenazy Property Management Corp.*, 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987) (administrative agencies are not free to refuse to follow precedent in cases originating within the circuit).

Counsel cites to the seventh circuit court of appeals precedent decision of *Construction and Design Co. v. USCIS*, 563 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2009). In that case, the seventh circuit directly addressed the method used by USCIS in determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The employer in *Construction and Design* was a small construction company which was organized as a Subchapter S corporation. The employer sought to employ the beneficiary at a salary of over \$50,000 per year.⁵ The beneficiary had been working for the employer as an independent contractor and was paid less than the proffered wage.⁶ The court noted that, according to the employer's tax returns and balance sheet, its net income and net assets were close to zero.⁷ The court also noted that the owner of the corporation received officer compensation of approximately \$40,000.⁸

In considering the employer's ability to pay the proffered wage, the court stated that if an employer "has enough cash flow, either existing or anticipated, to be able to pay the salary of a new employee along with its other expenses, it can "afford" that salary unless there is some reason, which might or might not be revealed by its balance sheet or other accounting records, why it would be an improvident expenditure."⁹

The court then turned to an examination of the USCIS method for determining an employer's ability to pay the proffered wage. The court noted that USCIS "looks at a firm's income tax returns and balance sheet first."¹⁰ The court, recognizing that the employer bears the burden of proof, went on to state that if the petitioner's tax returns do not establish its ability to pay the proffered wage the petitioner "has to prove by other evidence its ability to pay the alien's salary."¹¹ The court found that the employer had failed to establish that it had sufficient resources to pay the proffered wage "plus employment taxes (plus employee benefits, if any)."¹²

⁵ 563 F.3d at 595.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Id.* at 596.

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.*

Thus, the court in *Construction and Design* concurred with existing USCIS procedure in determining an employer's ability to pay the proffered wage. This method, which is described in detail below, involves (1) a determination of whether a petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage; (2) where the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during the relevant period, an examination of the net income figure and net current assets reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax returns; and (3) an examination of the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business pursuant to *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

Further, the court in *Construction and Design* noted that the "proffered wage" actually understates the cost to the employer in hiring an employee, as the employer must pay the salary "plus employment taxes (plus employee benefits, if any)." Therefore, pursuant to the decision in *Construction and Design*, the petitioner in the instant case must establish that it has the ability to pay the proffered wage plus compensation expenses for the employee which may include legally required benefits (social security, Medicare, federal and state unemployment insurance, and worker's compensation), employer costs for providing insurance benefits (life, health, disability), paid leave benefits (vacations, holidays, sick and personal leave), retirement and savings (defined benefit and defined contribution), and supplemental pay (overtime and premium, shift differentials, and nonproduction bonuses). The costs of such benefits are significant.

In the instant case, the petitioner has not demonstrated that it employed the beneficiary as an independent contractor, as in *Construction and Design*. Therefore, the facts of that case can be distinguished from *Construction and Design*.

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe; movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls

outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner has been in business since 1996 and employs three workers. The petitioner's net income was negative in 2001, 2002, 2005, and 2006. The tax returns for 2001 through 2007 failed to demonstrate the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage through net income or net current assets. Additionally, while the petitioner submitted evidence that the beneficiary was paid "close to" the proffered wage from September through December of 2008, the petitioner failed to establish a history of having the ability to pay in the preceding years. No evidence of the historical growth of the petitioner's business or of the petitioner's reputation within its industry was submitted. Counsel also failed to provide evidence of any factors that may have impacted the petitioner during the relevant years. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Beyond the decision of the director,¹³ the petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm'r 1986). *See also, Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position requires four years of experience in the job offered as an automotive mechanic. On the labor certification, the beneficiary claims to qualify for the offered position based on the following experience:

¹³ An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

- As an Automotive Mechanic with [REDACTED] from September 1990 to February 1994.
- As an Automotive Mechanic with [REDACTED] from January 1996 to September 1998.
- As an Automotive Mechanic with [REDACTED] from September 1999 and continuing at least until the date the form was last signed, on September 26, 2006.

No other experience is listed.

The beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience must be supported by letters from employers giving the name, address, and title of the employer, and a description of the beneficiary's experience. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A). The record contains an undated experience letter from [REDACTED] written by [REDACTED]. The letter indicates that the beneficiary worked for the company as a motor vehicles mechanic with a specialty in diesel engines. However, the letter does not list the beneficiary's job duties and does not indicate the position of the author.

The record also contains an experience letter dated August 17, 1997 from [REDACTED]. The letter states that the beneficiary worked for the company as an automotive mechanic beginning in January 1996 and continuing at least until the letter was written on August 17, 1997. Counsel states that the [REDACTED] is no longer in business and that they have been unable to obtain an updated letter. A statement dated January 6, 2009 was submitted by the beneficiary, stating that he worked for [REDACTED] from January 1996 until September 1998. However, only the beneficiary's Forms 1099 for 1996 and 1997 were submitted from [REDACTED]. The beneficiary's letter is self-serving and does not provide independent, objective evidence of his prior work experience. See *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988) (states that the petitioner must resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent, objective evidence). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)).

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required experience set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.