




U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services


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DATE:

OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

FILE:




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
Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be rejected.

The petitioner is a wholesale jewelry business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a jeweler. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's March 18, 2011 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

The appeal was filed by [REDACTED] who submitted a Form G-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative stating that it was "certified and filed by internet" by the petitioner. [REDACTED] claimed to represent the petitioner as an attorney acting on an individual case basis at the request of the petitioner.

The regulation governing representation in filing immigration petitions and/or applications with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(3), which provides in pertinent part that:

(3) *Representation.* An applicant or petitioner may be represented by an attorney in the United States, as defined in § 1.1(f) of this chapter, by an attorney outside the United States as defined in § 292.1(a)(6) of this chapter, or by an accredited representative as defined in § 292.1(a)(4) of this chapter.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(f) states:

The term *attorney* means any person who is eligible to practice law in, and is a member in good standing of the bar of, the highest court of any State, possession, territory, or Commonwealth of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, and is not under any order suspending, enjoining, restraining, disbaring, or otherwise restricting him or her in the practice of law.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 292.1(a)(6) encompasses the following type of foreign attorneys:

*Attorneys outside the United States.* An attorney, other than one described in 8 C.F.R. 1.1(f), who is licensed to practice law and is in good standing in a court of general jurisdiction of the country in which he or she resides and who is engaged in such practice, may represent parties in matters before [the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)], provided that he or she represents persons only in matters outside the geographical confines of the United States as defined in section 101(a)(38) of the Act, and that the DHS official before whom he or she wishes to appear allows such representation as a matter of discretion.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 292.1(a)(4) defines an accredited representative as a person representing an organization described in 8 C.F.R. § 292.2 who has been accredited by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 292.2 describes the processes by which the BIA (1) recognizes an organization as authorized to provide accredited representatives, and (2) accredits a person as a representative of a recognized organization.

On February 28, 2013, this office issued a notice indicating that effective March 4, 2010, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 292.4(a) required that a new Form G-28 “must be filed with an appeal filed with the [AAO].” 8 C.F.R. § 292.4(a) further requires that the Form G-28 “must be properly completed and signed by the petitioner, applicant or respondent to authorize representation in order for the appearance to be recognized by DHS.” The record, however, does not contain a properly executed Form G-28, Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Accredited Representative, signed by both the petitioner and by an authorized official of the petitioning entity dated subsequent to the director’s decision and submitted to authorize counsel’s representation of the petitioner on appeal. As of the date of this decision, the AAO has not received a response to the request for a new Form G-28. Without a new, valid, and fully executed Form G-28, signed by an official of the petitioning entity, authorizing counsel to represent the petitioner, we cannot consider the appeal to have been properly filed. Therefore, we cannot consider [REDACTED] to be the petitioner’s attorney of record.

The appeal has not been filed by the petitioner, an authorized representative or any entity with legal standing in the proceeding, but rather by an unauthorized person. Therefore, the appeal has not been properly filed and must be rejected. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(2)(v)(A)(I).

Even if the AAO accepted the appeal, the appeal would be dismissed because the petitioner has failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on November 5, 2009. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$14.74 per hour (\$30,659.20 per year). The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires a high school education and 24 months of experience in the job offered. The job duties include creating jewelry from "gold, silver, platinum and precious or semiprecious stones."

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a sole proprietorship. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1980 and to currently employ 8 workers. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on November 2, 2010, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date in onwards.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

The petitioner is a sole proprietorship, a business in which one person operates the business in his or her personal capacity. Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (7th Ed. 1999). Unlike a corporation, a sole proprietorship does not exist as an entity apart from the individual owner. See *Matter of United Investment Group*, 19 I&N Dec. 248, 250 (Comm'r 1984). Therefore the sole proprietor's adjusted gross income, assets and personal liabilities are also considered as part of the petitioner's ability to pay. Sole proprietors report income and expenses from their businesses on their individual (Form 1040) federal tax return each year. The business-related income and expenses are reported on Schedule C and are carried forward to the first page of the tax return. Sole proprietors must show that they can cover their existing business expenses as well as pay the proffered wage out of their adjusted gross income or other available funds. In addition, sole proprietors must show that they can sustain themselves and their dependents. See *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983).

In *Ubeda*, 539 F. Supp. at 650, the court concluded that it was highly unlikely that a petitioner could support himself, his spouse and five dependents on a gross income of slightly more than \$20,000 where the beneficiary's proposed salary was \$6,000 or approximately thirty percent (30%) of the petitioner's gross income.

In the instant case, the sole proprietor did not submit his family's household expenses as requested by the director in the request for evidence dated January 31, 2011.<sup>2</sup> Failure to submit requested

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<sup>2</sup> In response to the director's RFE, counsel stated that his colleague, [REDACTED] was

evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14).

The record contains no complete tax returns for the sole proprietor and therefore, the AAO is unable to determine the sole proprietor's adjusted gross income. Although the record contains an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 2009 Form 1040 Schedule C for the sole proprietor, the information in the schedule C is not sufficient and a complete tax return is required in order to establish ability to pay. Further, net profit of the petitioning business is not considered to establish the ability to pay when the petitioner is a sole proprietor. USCIS considers adjusted gross income of a sole proprietor to determine whether he or she has established the ability to pay. Schedule C net profit (loss) is carried forward to page one of the IRS Form 1040; any adjustments to income of the sole proprietor are calculated in addition to the Schedule C net profit or loss to determine the petitioner's adjusted gross income and from this figure, the ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary. Further, although we cannot determine the petitioner's ability to pay without a tax return, annual report or audited financial statements as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), even if the AGI listed on page one of the IRS Form 1040 were sufficient to pay the proffered wage in 2009, the sole proprietor did not establish that he could sustain himself and his dependents.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner submitted "ample proof of its ability to pay the proffered wage." Counsel states that the petitioner's 2009 tax return is "annexed" to the Form I-140 and submitted on appeal. However, the record only contains the petitioner's 2009 Schedule C. Counsel also states that the tax return also includes some of the sole proprietor's living expenses. As the record does not contain any Form 1040 tax return of the sole proprietor, the sole proprietor has not established any personal household expenses. Counsel simply states that the petitioner's adjusted gross income in 2009, \$42,181, is sufficient to establish the petitioner's ability to pay. However, as noted above, when the petitioner is a sole proprietor, USCIS must consider whether the petitioner has sufficient funds to pay both his own household expenses and the proffered wage. As the petitioner has not submitted these expenses, we cannot determine whether the petitioner has the ability to pay, thus, the petition must be denied. Finally, counsel states that he will submit further evidence of the sole proprietor's ability to pay within 30 days. The AAO has not received any evidence from counsel or the petitioner as of this date. Therefore, the record is complete. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaighena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition

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assigned to this case but was unable to work in February 2011 due to her son's illness and requested an extension of time.

was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner has not established its historical growth since 1980, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, or its reputation within its industry. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). See *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position requires 24 months of experience in the proffered position. On the labor certification, the beneficiary claims to qualify for the offered position based on experience as a jeweler.

The beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience must be supported by letters from employers giving the name, address, and title of the employer, and a description of the beneficiary's experience. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A). The record contains a letter dated November 2, 2000 and signed by [REDACTED] stating that the beneficiary worked at [REDACTED] from February 1994 to February 1998 as a jeweler and made sample "jewelry articles following drawings and instructions."

The beneficiary's duties included "putting and shaping metal into specified form, utilizing torch, hammer, die and carving tools. Soldering pieces together and polishing surface with wooden mallet and files." Although [REDACTED] states that the beneficiary worked under his supervision, [REDACTED] does not provide his title in the letter. Further, the dates of employment listed in the letter are inconsistent with the ETA Form 9089 which lists the beneficiary's dates of employment as July 3, 1995 to August 3, 1998. The employment information in the letter is also inconsistent with the Form G-325A, Biographic Information signed by the beneficiary on June 24, 2003 indicating that he was self-employed from 1998 to the date that he signed the form. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's evidence may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

The labor certification also states that the offered position requires a high school diploma. The record of proceeding contains no evidence that the beneficiary obtained a high diploma. The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required education set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required experience set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. For this additional reason the petition may not be approved.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is rejected.