


(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090





U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



DATE: FEB 12 2013

OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER


FILE: 

IN RE: Petitioner: 

Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center (director), and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a S/W development/systems integration business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a network administrator. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's January 21, 2011 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

As a threshold issue, we find that the instant I-140 petition is not supported by a valid labor certification. The labor certification is evidence of an individual alien's admissibility under section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act, which provides:

In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.11 states the following:

Substitution or change to the identity of an alien beneficiary on any application for permanent labor certification, whether filed under this part or 20 CFR part 656 in effect prior to March 28, 2005, and on any resulting certification, is prohibited for any request to substitute submitted after July 16, 2007.

Additionally, the regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(c)(2) provides:

A permanent labor certification involving a specific job offer is valid only for the particular job opportunity, the alien named on the original application (unless a substitution was approved prior to July 16, 2007), and the area of intended employment stated on the *Application for Alien Employment Certification* (Form ETA 750) or the *Application for Permanent Employment Certification* (Form ETA 9089).

The Act does not provide for the substitution of aliens in the permanent labor certification process. DOL's regulation became effective July 16, 2007 and prohibits the substitution of alien beneficiaries on permanent labor certification applications and resulting certifications, as well as prohibiting the sale, barter, or purchase of permanent labor certifications and applications. The rule continues the Department's efforts to construct a deliberate, coordinated fraud reduction and prevention framework within the permanent labor certification program. *See* 72 Fed. Reg. 27904 (May 17, 2007).

As the instant petition was filed after July 16, 2007, the petitioner is not able to substitute the beneficiary. The petition was, therefore, filed without a valid certified labor certification pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(i) and must be denied.

Guidance on this issue can be found in a memorandum dated June 1, 2007, from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director, Domestic Operations, USCIS, regarding labor certification validity and substitution (Neufeld Memorandum).¹ *See* Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate

¹ The AAO is bound by the Act, agency regulations, precedent decisions of the agency and published decisions from the circuit court of appeals from whatever circuit that the action arose. *See N.L.R.B. v. Ashkenazy Property Management Corp.*, 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987) (administrative agencies are not free to refuse to follow precedent in cases originating within the circuit); *R.L. Inv. Ltd. Partners v. INS*, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (D. Haw. 2000), *aff'd*, 273 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished agency decisions and agency legal memoranda are not binding under the APA, even when they are published in private publications or widely circulated). Even USCIS internal memoranda do not establish judicially enforceable rights. *See Loa-Herrera v. Trominski*, 231 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 2000) (An agency's internal guidelines "neither confer upon [plaintiffs] substantive rights nor provide procedures upon which [they] may rely.") *See also* Stephen R. Viña, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Memorandum, to the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims regarding "Questions on Internal Policy Memoranda issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service," dated February 3, 2006. The memorandum addresses, "the specific questions you raised regarding the legal effect of internal policy memoranda issued by the former Immigration and

Director, Domestic Operations Interim Guidance Regarding the Impact of the Department of Labor's (DOL) final rule, *Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States; Reducing the Incentives and Opportunities for Fraud and Abuse and Enhancing Program Integrity*, on Determining Labor Certification Validity and the Prohibition of Labor Certification Substitution Requests. HQ70/6.2 ADO7-20, June 1, 2007.

We note that in the instant case, the petitioner originally filed Form I-140 with a valid labor certification and request to substitute the beneficiary on June 4, 2007 (prior filing). The prior filing was denied and the labor certification was not invalidated. The petitioner then refiled Form I-140 on June 1, 2009 (instant petition) with a then expired labor certification and request to substitute the beneficiary.

The regulations at 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(c)(2) clearly state that the labor certification is valid only for the specific job opportunity, job location and alien named in the original application, unless a substitution has been *approved* prior to July 16, 2007.

In the instant petition, the substitution was not approved before the deadline. The Neufeld Memorandum does not create an exception to allow the substitution of the beneficiary into an approved labor certification after July 16, 2007. The petition for the beneficiary was, therefore, filed without a valid certified labor certification pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(i) and must be denied.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Naturalization Service (INS) on current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) practices.” The memo states that, “policy memoranda fall under the general category of nonlegislative rules and are, by definition, legally nonbinding because they are designed to ‘inform rather than control.’” CRS at p.3 citing to *American Trucking Ass’n v. ICC*, 659 F.2d 452, 462 (5th Cir. 1981). See also *Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n*, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974), “A general statement of policy . . . does not establish a binding norm. It is not finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed. The agency cannot apply or rely upon a general statement of policy as law because a general statement of policy announces what the agency seeks to establish as policy.” The memo notes that “policy memoranda come in a variety of forms, including guidelines, manuals, memoranda, bulletins, opinion letters, and press releases. Legislative rules, on the other hand, have the force of law and are legally binding upon an agency and the public. Legislative rules are the product of an exercise of delegated legislative power.” *Id.* at 3, citing to Robert A. Anthony, *Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like – Should Federal Agencies Use them to Bind the Public?*, 41 Duke L.J. 1311 (1992).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on April 12, 2006. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$41,000 per year. The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires a bachelor's degree in computer science, engineering, business administration, math plus 24 months of experience in the proffered position or in the alternate occupation of programmer analyst, systems analyst or engineer in the IT field.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.²

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1995 and to employ three workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on May 9, 2009, the beneficiary claims to have worked for the petitioner since February 2003.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

² The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner demonstrated that it paid the beneficiary less than the proffered wage from 2006 to 2010. Thus, the petitioner must demonstrate that it can pay the difference between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage. The petitioner has submitted the following Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms W-2:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Wages Paid</u>	<u>Difference between the proffered wage and wages paid</u>
2006	\$20,870.56	\$20,129.44
2007	\$26,623.60	\$14,376.40
2008	\$40,800	\$200
2009	No W-2 submitted ³	\$41,000
2010	\$50,151.25	Paid over the prevailing wage

Therefore, for the year 2010, the petitioner has established its ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the

³ On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary was not employed by the petitioner in 2009 and therefore no Form W-2 is submitted for that year. However, the record contains three pay stubs issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary in 2009 indicating that the beneficiary was in fact working for the petitioner. We cannot consider any wages paid to the beneficiary in 2009 as evidence of ability to pay until such time as the petitioner resolves and rebuts the inconsistencies surrounding the beneficiary's employment in that year. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on November 3, 2010 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence (RFE). As of that date, the petitioner's 2010 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2009 is the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income, as shown in the table below.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Net income⁴</u>	<u>Difference between the proffered wage and wages paid</u>
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⁴ Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S.

2006	\$25,219	\$20,129.44
2007	\$(43,442)	\$14,376.40
2008	No return submitted ⁵	\$200
2009	\$14,483	\$41,000

Therefore, for the years 2007 and 2009, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner’s net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner’s current assets and current liabilities.⁶ A corporation’s year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation’s end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner’s tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets, as shown in the table below.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Net current assets</u>	<u>Difference between the proffered wage and wages paid</u>
2007	\$(4,110)	\$14,376.40
2009	\$12,120	\$41,000

Therefore, for the years 2007 and 2009, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 18 (2006-2011) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed January 28, 2013) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders’ shares of the corporation’s income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional income, credits, deductions, and/or other adjustments shown on its Schedule K for 2006 to 2009, the petitioner’s net income is found on Schedule K of its tax return tax returns.

⁵ The RFE from the director stated that based on submitted quarterly tax returns, the petitioner had shown the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage in 2008. We note that IRS Form 941, quarterly tax return only reflects wages paid and does not provide information about the petitioner’s net income or net current assets. The IRS Form 941 submitted by the petitioner for the 4th quarter of 2008 confirms that the petitioner paid the beneficiary a total of \$40,800 in 2008. This is \$200 less than the proffered wage; however, based the totality of circumstances analysis, we find that the petitioner did have the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage in 2008.

⁶ According to *Barron’s Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), “current assets” consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. “Current liabilities” are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

Therefore, from the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that we should also consider funds paid to the beneficiary as expense reimbursement, uncollected debts, and loan repayment in our ability to pay analysis. Counsel states that the petitioner had reimbursed the beneficiary \$35,885 for expenses in 2007 and had therefore paid him more than was reflected on the IRS Form W-2 in 2007. Reimbursement expenses and the cost of employee benefits are a cost of doing business. The money used to pay these expenses does not represent funds available to pay the salaries of employees. Furthermore, the record contains a letter dated August 6, 2007 in which the petitioner states the beneficiary will be paid a salary of \$41,000 annually and that "in addition, he is paid food, rental, transportation, and medical, dental expenses." The amount the beneficiary was reimbursed for expenses in 2007 cannot be added to the amount reflected on the Form W-2 because it is clear that the expenses were to be paid *in addition* to his annual salary.

Counsel also asserts that the petitioner had uncollected debts in the amount of \$18,290.33 in 2007 and \$15,010 in 2009, and submits evidence that the petitioner has taken steps to collect the amounts due through legal means. Counsel asserts that these amounts should be considered for ability to pay because they represent an uncharacteristic expense. We do not consider a repeating bill collection problem to be an uncharacteristic occurrence like that noted in *Sonegawa*. Furthermore, the uncollected bills represent a cost of doing business and do not represent funds available to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel further states on appeal that the petitioner repaid a loan to its owner in 2009. Counsel asserts that repayment of this loan could have been delayed if the funds were needed to be used to pay the proffered wage. However, as the record does not contain evidence of the terms of the loan or a statement from the shareholders who made the loan, we do not find evidence that the loan repayment could have been delayed and the funds diverted to pay the proffered wage. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the

petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner's gross income, net income, and wages and salaries paid decreased over the time period in question. Additionally, there are no other factors present in the record such as reputation, uncharacteristic expenditures or losses, replacement of employees or intent to forego compensation, which would indicate that the financial condition of the petitioner should be given less weight. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.