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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services




DATE: OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER  
**FEB 28 2013**

FILE: 

PETITIONER:  
BENEFICIARY: 

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg".

Ron Rosenberg  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** On July 19, 2002, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Vermont Service Center (VSC), received an Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, Form I-140, from the petitioner. The employment-based immigrant visa petition was initially approved on March 26, 2003. The Director, Texas Service Center (director), however, revoked the approval of the immigrant petition in a Notice of Revocation (NOR) issued on May 19, 2009 and the petitioner subsequently appealed the director's decision to revoke the petition's approval. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be remanded.

Section 205 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1155, provides that "[t]he Attorney General [now Secretary, Department of Homeland Security], may, at any time, for what [she] deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by [her] under section 204." The realization by the director that the petition was approved in error may be good and sufficient cause for revoking the approval. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 590 (BIA 1988).

The petitioner is a tailor shop. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an alteration tailor pursuant to section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(3)(A)(i).<sup>1</sup> As required by statute, the petition is submitted along with an approved Form ETA 750 labor certification. As stated earlier, this petition was approved on March 26, 2003 by the VSC, but that approval was revoked on May 19, 2009. The director determined that the petitioner failed to follow the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) recruitment procedures in connection with the approved labor certification application and that the documents submitted in response to the director's Notice of Intent to Revoke (NOIR) were in themselves a willful misrepresentation of material facts, constituting fraud. Accordingly, the director revoked the approval of the petition under the authority of 8 C.F.R. § 205.1.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner<sup>2</sup> contends that the director has improperly revoked the approval of the petition. Specifically, counsel asserts that the director did not have any good and sufficient cause as required by section 205 of the Act; 8 U.S.C. § 1155 to revoke the approval of the petition. Counsel argues that the petitioner did comply with the DOL recruitment requirements and that the beneficiary possessed the minimum requirements required on the ETA 750 prior to the filing of the labor certification application.

<sup>1</sup> Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Current counsel of record, [REDACTED] will be referred to as counsel throughout this decision. Previous counsel, [REDACTED] will be referred to by name. The AAO notes that [REDACTED] was suspended from the practice of law before the Immigration Courts, Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for a period of three years from March 1, 2012 to February 28, 2015.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>3</sup>

Although not raised by counsel, as a procedural matter, the AAO finds that 8 C.F.R. § 205.1 only applies to automatic revocation and is not the proper authority to be used to revoke the approval of the petition in this instant proceeding. Under 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(iii), a petition is automatically revoked if (A) the labor certification is invalidated pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656; (B) the petitioner or the beneficiary dies; (C) the petitioner withdraws the petition in writing; or (D) if the petitioner is no longer in business. Here, the labor certification has not been invalidated; neither the petitioner nor the beneficiary has died; the petitioner has not withdrawn the petition; nor has the petitioner gone out of business. Therefore, the approval of the petition cannot be automatically revoked. The director's erroneous citation of the applicable regulation is withdrawn. Nonetheless, as the director does have revocation authority under 8 C.F.R. § 205.2, the director's denial will be considered under that provision under the AAO's *de novo* review authority.

The threshold issue on appeal is whether the director adequately advised the petitioner of the basis for revocation of approval of the petition. As noted above, the Secretary of DHS has the authority to revoke the approval of any petition approved by her under section 204 for good and sufficient cause. *See* section 205 of the Act; 8 U.S.C. § 1155. This means that notice must be provided to the petitioner before a previously approved petition can be revoked. More specifically, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 205.2 reads:

(a) *General.* Any [USCIS] officer authorized to approve a petition under section 204 of the Act may revoke the approval of that petition **upon notice to the petitioner** on any ground other than those specified in § 205.1 when the necessity for the revocation comes to the attention of this [USCIS]. (emphasis added).

Further, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16) states:

(i) Derogatory information unknown to petitioner or applicant. If the decision will be adverse to the applicant or petitioner and is based on derogatory information considered by [USCIS] and of which the applicant or petitioner is unaware, he/she shall be advised of this fact and offered an opportunity to rebut the information and present information in his/her own behalf before the decision is rendered, except as provided in paragraphs (b)(16)(ii), (iii), and (iv) of this section. Any explanation, rebuttal, or information presented by or in behalf of the applicant or petitioner shall be included in the record of proceeding.

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<sup>3</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

Moreover, *Matter of Arias*, 19 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Estime*, 19 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 1987) provide that:

A notice of intention to revoke the approval of a visa petition is properly issued for "good and sufficient cause" when the evidence of record at the time of issuance, if unexplained and unrebutted, would warrant a denial of the visa petition based upon the petitioner's failure to meet his burden of proof. However, where a notice of intention to revoke is based upon an unsupported statement, revocation of the visa petition cannot be sustained.

Here, in the NOIR dated January 9, 2009, the director wrote:

The Service is in receipt of information revealing the existence of fraudulent information in the petitions with Alien Employment Certificates (ETA 750) and/or the work experience letters in a significant number of cases submitted to USCIS by counsel for the petitioner in the reviewed files.

The director advised the petitioner in the NOIR that the instant case might involve fraud. The director specifically asked the petitioner to submit additional evidence to demonstrate that it had complied with all of the DOL recruiting requirements. The director also asked the petitioner to submit an original letter reaffirming its intent to employ the beneficiary in the proffered job and evidence that the beneficiary met the minimum experience requirements.

The AAO finds that while the director appropriately reopened the approval of the petition by issuing the NOIR, the director's NOIR was deficient in that it did not specifically give the petitioner notice of the derogatory information specific to the current proceeding. In the NOIR, the director questioned the beneficiary's qualifications and indicated that the petitioner had not properly advertised for the position. The NOIR neither provided nor referred to specific evidence or information relating to the petitioner's failure to comply with DOL recruitment or to the beneficiary's lack of qualifications in the present case. The director did not state which recruitment procedures were defective. Without specifying or making available evidence specific to the petition in this case, the petitioner can have no meaningful opportunity to rebut or respond to that evidence. *See Ghaly v. INS*, 48 F.3d 1426, 1431 (7th Cir. 1995). Because of insufficient notice to the petitioner of derogatory information, the director's decision will be withdrawn.

Another issue raised on appeal is whether the director properly concluded that the petitioner did not comply with the recruitment procedures of the DOL. The director indicated that the petitioner did not conduct good faith recruitment and found that the petitioner had engaged in fraud or material misrepresentation with respect to the recruitment process. The AAO disagrees. The record does not show inconsistencies or anomalies in the recruitment process that would justify the issuance of a NOIR based on the criteria of *Matter of S & B-C-*, 9 I&N Dec. 436, 447 (A.G. 1961). Therefore, the director's conclusion that the petitioner did not comply with DOL requirements is withdrawn.

The AAO will next address the director's finding that the petitioner engaged in fraud and/or material misrepresentation. On appeal, counsel contends that the director's finding of fraud or willful misrepresentation against the petitioner was arbitrary and based on a USCIS investigation of other petitioners that had been represented by the same counsel, [REDACTED]

With regard to immigration fraud, the Act provides immigration officers with the authority to administer oaths, consider evidence, and further provides that any person who knowingly or willfully gives false evidence or swears to any false statement shall be guilty of perjury. Section 287(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(b). Additionally, the Secretary of DHS has delegated to USCIS the authority to investigate alleged civil and criminal violations of the immigration laws, including application fraud, make recommendations for prosecution, and take other "appropriate action." DHS Delegation Number 0150.1 at para. (2)(I).

The administrative findings in an immigration proceeding must include specific findings of fraud or material misrepresentation for any issue of fact that is material to eligibility for the requested immigration benefit. Within the adjudication of the visa petition, a finding of fraud or material misrepresentation will undermine the probative value of the evidence and lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592.

Outside of the basic adjudication of visa eligibility, there are many critical functions of DHS that hinge on a finding of fraud or material misrepresentation. For example, the Act provides that an alien is inadmissible to the United States if that alien seeks to procure, has sought to procure, or has procured a visa, admission, or other immigration benefits by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact. Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Additionally, the regulations state that the willful failure to provide full and truthful information requested by USCIS constitutes a failure to maintain nonimmigrant status. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(f). For these provisions to be effective, USCIS is required to enter a factual finding of fraud or material misrepresentation into the administrative record.<sup>4</sup>

Section 204(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part, that:

After an investigation of the facts in each case . . . the [Secretary of Homeland Security] shall, if he determines that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien . . . in behalf of whom the petition is made is an immediate relative specified in section 201(b)

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<sup>4</sup> It is important to note that, while it may present the opportunity to enter an administrative finding of fraud, the immigrant visa petition is not the appropriate forum for finding an alien inadmissible. See *Matter of O*, 8 I&N Dec. 295 (BIA 1959). Instead, the alien may be found inadmissible at a later date when he or she subsequently applies for admission into the United States or applies for adjustment of status to permanent resident status. See sections 212(a) and 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) and 1255(a). Nevertheless, the AAO and USCIS have the authority to enter a fraud finding, if during the course of adjudication, the record of proceedings discloses fraud or a material misrepresentation.

or is eligible for preference under subsection (a) or (b) of section 203, approve the petition . . . .

Pursuant to section 204(b) of the Act, USCIS has the authority to issue a determination regarding whether the facts stated in a petition filed pursuant to section 203(b) of the Act are true. Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act governs misrepresentation and states the following: "Misrepresentation. – (i) In general. – Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible."

The Attorney General has held that a misrepresentation made in connection with an application for a visa or other document, or with entry into the United States, is material if either:

- (1) the alien is excludable on the true facts, or (2) the misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien's eligibility and which might well have resulted in a proper determination that he be excluded.

*Matter of S & B-C-*, 9 I&N Dec. at 447. Accordingly, the materiality test has three parts. First, if the record shows that the alien is inadmissible on the true facts, then the misrepresentation is material. *Id.* at 448. If the foreign national would not be inadmissible on the true facts, then the second and third questions must be addressed. The second question is whether the misrepresentation shut off a line of inquiry relevant to the alien's admissibility. *Id.* Third, if the relevant line of inquiry has been cut off, then it must be determined whether the inquiry might have resulted in a proper determination that the foreign national should have been excluded. *Id.* at 449.

Furthermore, a finding of misrepresentation may lead to invalidation of the Form ETA 750. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 656.31(d) regarding labor certification applications involving fraud or willful misrepresentation:

Finding of fraud or willful misrepresentation. If as referenced in Sec. 656.30(d), a court, the DHS or the Department of State determines there was fraud or willful misrepresentation involving a labor certification application, the application will be considered to be invalidated, processing is terminated, a notice of the termination and the reason therefore is sent by the Certifying Officer to the employer, attorney/agent as appropriate.

Here, as noted above, the evidence of record currently does not support the director's finding that the petitioner failed to follow recruitment procedures. Similarly, there has been an insufficient development of the facts upon which the director can make a determination of fraud or willful misrepresentation in connection with the labor certification process based on the criteria of *Matter of S & B-C-*, 9 I&N Dec. at 447. Thus, the director's finding of fraud or misrepresentation is withdrawn. In summary, the AAO withdraws the director's conclusion that the petitioner failed to follow DOL recruitment requirements. The AAO also withdraws the petitioner's finding of fraud and material misrepresentation against the petitioner.

Nonetheless, the AAO finds that the approval of the petition may not be reinstated. On October 22, 2012, the AAO issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and Derogatory Information (NOID/NODI) advising the petitioner that:

According to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Corporations Division, website <http://corp.sec.state.ma.us/corp/corptest/corptestinput.asp>, (accessed on October 5, 2012), [the petitioner] was involuntarily dissolved on August 31, 1998... If [the petitioner] is no longer in business, then no *bona fide* job offer exists, and the petition and appeal are therefore moot. Even if the appeal could be otherwise sustained, the approval of the petition would be subject to automatic revocation due to the termination of [the petitioner's] business. See 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(iii)(D).

In response, counsel asserted that although true that the petitioner's organization was involuntarily dissolved on August 31, 1998, it was later revived on October 16, 2000. A copy of the status report from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Corporations Division was submitted. The record also contains the 1120S federal tax return for the petitioner for 2001. We note that the ETA 750 labor certification application was filed on April 30, 2001 and are persuaded that the petitioner was operational as of the priority date.

However, in the NOID/NODI, the AAO further noted:

If the petitioner has a successor-in-interest to the petition, you must submit evidence that establishes it. Considering *Matter of Dial Auto Repair Shop, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 481 (Comm'r 1986) ("*Matter of Dial Auto*") and the generally accepted definition of successor-in-interest, a petitioner may establish a valid successor relationship for immigration purposes if it satisfies three conditions. First, the successor must fully describe and document the transaction transferring ownership of all, or a relevant part of, the beneficiary's predecessor employer. Second, the successor must demonstrate that the job opportunity is the same as originally offered on the labor certification. Third, the successor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is eligible for the immigrant visa in all respects.

In response, counsel asserted that the petitioner has a successor-in-interest and submitted the following documents in support:

- Asset Purchase Agreement dated October 27, 2008 between the petitioner and [REDACTED]
- Waiver of Notice of Joint Special Meeting of the Shareholder and Director of [REDACTED] and Unanimous Written Consent of the Shareholder and Director of Corporate Vote, dated January 12, 2009; and
- Assignment of Rights to Asset Purchase Agreement Dated October 27, 2008 whereby [REDACTED] assigned, transferred, and set over to [REDACTED] all rights and

interests to the Asset Agreement executed on January 12, 2009, a Bill of Sale and Absolute Assignment.

In addition, counsel provided a letter dated November 11, 2012 from [REDACTED] the owner of [REDACTED] stating:

My company purchased [REDACTED] from [the petitioner] in January 2009. Since assuming ownership of [REDACTED] I have continued to carry out the same business functions as had been carried out by [the petitioner]; [REDACTED] continues to operate in the same location as a dry cleaning store that offers tailoring and alteration services. Upon assuming responsibility of the store, [the beneficiary] became my employee as an alteration tailor. The position of alteration tailor is still available to her and [REDACTED] is willing to succeed [the petitioner's] interest in sponsoring [the beneficiary] to that end.

The AAO is persuaded that [REDACTED] is the petitioning successor.<sup>5</sup> However, in the NOID/NODI, the AAO specifically advised that:

[I]n order to establish eligibility for the immigrant visa in all respects, the petitioner must support its claim with all necessary evidence, including evidence of ability to pay. The successor must prove the predecessor's ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and until the date of transfer of ownership to the successor. In addition, the petitioner must establish the successor's ability to pay the proffered wage in accordance from the date of transfer of ownership forward. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2); *Id.* In order to establish ability to pay, the petitioner must submit its annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements for each year from the

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<sup>5</sup> Counsel for the petitioning successor, [REDACTED] noted in the NOID/NODI response that as counsel for the beneficiary he did not receive a copy of the NOID/NODI "until such time as the beneficiary and petitioner made counsel aware of it, as a copy was not sent directly to counsel of record." [REDACTED] had previously submitted a Form G-28 Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney for [REDACTED] signed by [REDACTED] on June 2, 2009. However in June 2009, [REDACTED] had not established that it was a petitioning successor and thus had no standing on appeal. Moreover, counsel is incorrect in his contention that as counsel for the beneficiary he has standing in these proceedings. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii) states, in pertinent part:

(B) *Meaning of affected party.* For purposes of this section and sections 103.4 and 103.5 of this part, *affected party* (in addition to the Service) means the person or entity with legal standing in a proceeding. It does not include the beneficiary of a visa petition. An affected party may be represented by an attorney or representative in accordance with part 292 of this chapter.

priority date on 2001 to the present. *Id.*

With respect to the petitioner's ability to pay, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), in pertinent part, provides:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

In the instant case, the ETA 750 labor certification was accepted for processing on April 30, 2001. The rate of pay or the proffered wage specified on the ETA 750 is \$11.68 per hour or \$21,257.60 per year based on a 35 hour work week.<sup>6</sup>

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS first examines whether the petitioner has paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year from the priority date. If the petitioner has not paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year, USCIS will next examine whether the petitioner had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the difference between the wage paid, if any, and the proffered wage. If the petitioner's net income or net current assets is not sufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may also consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In the NOID/NODI response, counsel submitted the Internal Revenue Service Forms W-2 issued to the beneficiary as follows by the:

- Petitioner in 2001 for \$19,712 in wages;
- Petitioner in 2002 for \$20,609 in wages;
- Petitioner in 2003 for \$7,630 in wages;
- Petitioner in 2004 for \$20,377 in wages;
- Petitioner in 2005 for \$16,430 in wages;
- Petitioner in 2006 for \$22,665 in wages;
- Petitioner in 2007 for \$21,918 in wages;
- Petitioner in 2008 for \$22,649.50 in wages;
- Petitioning successor in 2009 for \$21,802.16 in wages;

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<sup>6</sup> The job offer must be for a permanent and full-time position. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.3; 656.10(c)(10). DOL precedent establishes that full-time means at least 35 hours or more per week. See Memo, Farmer, Admin. for Reg'l. Mngm't., Div. of Foreign Labor Certification, DOL Field Memo No. 48-94 (May 16, 1994).

- Petitioning successor in 2010 for \$20,953 in wages; and
- Petitioning successor in 2011 for \$22,080 in wages.

Thus the petitioner has established the ability to pay from 2006 to 2008 and the petitioning successor has established the ability to pay in 2009 and 2011. However for 2001 to 2005 and in 2010, the ability to pay has not been established.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010); *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

As noted above, the record contains a 2001 IRS Form 1120S tax return for the petitioner reflecting adjusted gross income<sup>7</sup> of \$8,443. Therefore, in 2001, the petitioner has established the ability to pay the difference between the proffered wage and the actual wages paid or \$1,545.60. At the time of the approval notice in March 2003, the petitioner's 2002 tax return was not yet due. Thus, the petitioner established the ability to pay as of the date of the initial approval and the director did not have good and sufficient cause to initiate revocation proceedings based on the petitioner's failure to establish the ability to pay.

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<sup>7</sup> Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003) *See Instructions for Form 1120S*, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed February 2013) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders' shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional income, credits, deductions, and / or other adjustments shown on its Schedule K for 2001, the petitioner's net income is found on Schedule K of its tax return.

<sup>7</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

The approval of the petition may not be reinstated, however, as the AAO finds that the record does not support the petitioner's contention that the beneficiary had the requisite work experience in the job offered before the priority date. Consistent with *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977), the petitioner must demonstrate, among other things, that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had all of the qualifications stated on the Form ETA 750 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the petition.

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, USCIS must ascertain whether the beneficiary is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). See also, *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

Here, as stated earlier, the Form ETA 750 was filed and accepted for processing by the DOL on April 30, 2001. The name of the job title or the position for which the petitioner seeks to hire is "alteration tailor." Under the job description, section 13 of the Form ETA 750, part A, the petitioner wrote, "alters & repairs clothing to fit customers: shorten / lengthen sleeves, pants, hems." Under section 14 of the Form ETA 750A the petitioner specifically required each applicant for this position to have a minimum of two years of work experience in the job offered.

On the Form ETA 750, part B, signed by the beneficiary on January 6, 2001, she represented that she worked at [REDACTED] In Brazil from August 1995 to September 1998 as an alteration tailor. The record includes an employment verification letter confirming that the beneficiary was employed at [REDACTED] as a tailor from August 1995 to September 1998. However, the letter does not include the name, address and title of the author and fails to describe the duties performed by the beneficiary during the time worked as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A).

In response to the NOIR, the petitioner submitted:

- A statement dated March 3, 2009 from the beneficiary confirming her prior experience;
- A letter dated February 26, 2009 from [REDACTED] a former co-worker of the beneficiary stating that he worked with her in 1997 and 1998 at [REDACTED]; and
- Evidence of the CNPJ<sup>8</sup> business registration for [REDACTED] indicating that the business was established on April 6, 1999.

<sup>8</sup> The CNPJ or Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Juridica is a unique number given to every business registered with the Brazilian authority. In Brazil, a company can hire employees, open bank accounts, buy and sell goods only if it has a CNPJ. The Department of State has determined that the

The AAO finds that the beneficiary's statement is self-serving and does not provide independent, objective evidence of her prior work experience. See *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)). Moreover, the letter from the beneficiary's co-worker is not acceptable evidence to establish the beneficiary's prior experience. Further, the co-worker did not testify to two full years of employment at [REDACTED] as he stated he worked with her from 1997 to 1998 and the letter of employment indicates she left the company in September 1998. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(1) and (1)(3)(ii)(A). Furthermore, the CNPJ evidence establishes that the beneficiary's employer in Brazil was not in business until 1999, casting doubt on any work experience from 1995 to 1998. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. at 591.

In conclusion, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary possessed the minimum experience requirements for the proffered position.

In view of the foregoing, the previous decision of the director will be withdrawn. The petition is remanded to the director for review and consideration of the additional issues that impact the petitioner's eligibility for the visa that were not initially identified by the director. The director may issue a new notice of intent to revoke approval of the petition and may request any additional evidence considered pertinent. Similarly, the petitioner may provide additional evidence within a reasonable period of time to be determined by the director. Upon receipt of all the evidence, the director may review the entire record and enter a new decision. If the new decision is contrary to the AAO's findings, it should be certified to the AAO for review.

**ORDER:** The director's decision to revoke the previously approved petition is withdrawn. The petition is remanded to the director for further action in accordance with the foregoing and entry of a new decision:

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CNPJ provides reliable verification with respect to the adjudication of employment-based petitions in comparing an individual's stated hire and working dates with a Brazilian-based company to that Brazilian company's registered creation date. The CNPJ database can be accessed online at <http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/>.