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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090





U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services



DATE: **FEB 28 2013**

OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER FILE: 

IN RE: Petitioner:   
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



**INSTRUCTIONS:**

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg".

Ron Rosenberg  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a retail store. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a manager. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director also denied the petition for failure to submit requested evidence in response to the director's request for additional evidence (RFE) including evidence regarding the beneficiary's experience. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's March 11, 2010 denial, an issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$19.80 per hour (\$41,184 per year based on 40 hours per week). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years experience in the proffered position of manager.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2000 and to currently employ four workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on April 22, 2001, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner submitted Forms W-2 purportedly issued to the beneficiary for 2001 to 2008.

Research in all available databases reveals that the beneficiary's social security number (SSN) shown on all Forms W-2 belongs to another individual. Misuse of another individual's SSN is a violation of Federal law and may lead to fines and/or imprisonment and disregarding the work authorization provisions printed on your Social Security card may be a violation of Federal

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

immigration law. Violations of applicable law regarding Social Security Number fraud and misuse are serious crimes and will be subject to prosecution.

The following provisions of law deal directly with Social Security number fraud and misuse:

- **Social Security Act:** In December 1981, Congress passed a bill to amend the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981 to restore minimum benefits under the Social Security Act. In addition, the Act made it a felony to *...willfully, knowingly, and with intent to deceive the Commissioner of Social Security as to his true identity (or the true identity of any other person) furnishes or causes to be furnished false information to the Commissioner of Social Security with respect to any information required by the Commissioner of Social Security in connection with the establishment and maintenance of the records provided for in section 405(c)(2) of this title.*

Violators of this provision, Section 208(a)(6) of the Social Security Act, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. See the website at [http://www.ssa.gov/OP\\_Home/ssact/title02/0208.htm](http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title02/0208.htm) (accessed on April 26, 2011).

- **Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act:** In October 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (Public Law 105-318) to address the problem of identity theft. Specifically, the Act made it a Federal crime when anyone *...knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law.*

Violations of the Act are investigated by Federal investigative agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and prosecuted by the Department of Justice.

As the discrepancy in the beneficiary's SSN raises doubts about the actual recipient of the wages shown in the Forms W-2, the AAO will not accept the Forms W-2 as evidence of wages paid to the beneficiary. This discrepancy must be addressed with any further filings.

However, even if the Forms W-2 were accepted as wages paid to the beneficiary, from 2001 to 2008, the petitioner paid less than the proffered wage of \$41,184.00.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d

1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on February 1, 2010 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID). As of that date, the petitioner's 2009 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's 2008 tax return is the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2001 through 2008, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated net income<sup>2</sup> of \$19,630.00
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$23,646.00
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$19,562.00
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$14,640.00
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$13,845.00
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$18,479.00
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$19,777.00
- In 2008, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$26,884.00

Therefore, for the years 2001 through 2008, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>3</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2004 and 2005, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$24,186<sup>4</sup>
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$21,996
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$14,578

<sup>2</sup> Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003) line 17e (2004-2005) line 18 (2006-2011) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed February 5, 2013) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders' shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). In this case, the petitioner did not have additional income, credits, deductions, or other adjustments shown on its Schedule K for 2001 through 2008, therefore, the petitioner's net income is found on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S.

<sup>3</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

<sup>4</sup> The AAO notes that the director states that the net current assets for 2004 were \$14,578.00. This portion of the director's decision will be withdrawn.

- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$15,201
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$12,152
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$18,553
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$21,778
- In 2008, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$20,998

Therefore, for the years 2001 through 2008, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director erred in not combining the petitioner's net income, wages paid to the beneficiary, and net current assets to establish the ability to pay the proffered wage. Combining net income and net current assets is unacceptable because net income and net current assets are not, in the view of the AAO, cumulative. The AAO views net income and net current assets as two different methods of demonstrating the petitioner's ability to pay the wage--one retrospective and one prospective. Net income is retrospective in nature because it represents the sum of income remaining after all expenses were paid over the course of the previous tax year. Conversely, the net current assets figure is a prospective "snapshot" of the net total of petitioner's assets that will become cash within a relatively short period of time minus those expenses that will come due within that same period of time. Thus, the petitioner is expected to receive roughly one-twelfth of its net current assets during each month of the coming year. Given that net income is retrospective and net current assets are prospective in nature, the AAO does not agree with counsel that the two figures can be combined in a meaningful way to illustrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a single tax year. Moreover, combining the net income and net current assets could double-count certain figures, such as cash on hand and, in the case of a taxpayer who reports taxes pursuant to accrual convention, accounts receivable. Additionally, adding the wages paid to the beneficiary to calculate the petitioner's ability to pay is unacceptable. The wages paid to the beneficiary are subtracted from net income or net current assets because they are already paid. Adding them would double-count the amount already paid to the beneficiary. Therefore, counsel's method of combining net income, net current assets, and the wages already paid to the beneficiary is without merit.

Counsel further asserts that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business, including real property. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the

determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, USCIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel also contends that the director failed to consider the salaries and wages already paid to other employees as well as the compensation of officers. In support of this contention, on appeal, the petitioner submits unaudited financial summaries for [REDACTED] and for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner's Forms 1120S for 2004 and 2005.

The financial information of [REDACTED] a separate and distinct legal entity from the petitioner, will not be considered in the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

Additionally, counsel's reliance on unaudited financial records is misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant's report accompanying these statements, the AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Additionally, the wage and salary figures presented on the petitioner's unaudited financial statement do not correspond to the wage and salary figures on the petitioner's tax returns. The petitioner's unaudited financial statement shows that total wages paid in 2004 were \$107,523.18 and in 2005 were \$111,157.22. The petitioner's tax returns state total wages paid in 2004 were \$86,723 and in 2005 were \$90,357. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve the inconsistencies by independent objective evidence. Attempts to explain or reconcile the conflicting accounts, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Id.*

Counsel's assertion that wages and salaries paid to other employees should be considered in the ability to pay the proffered wage is likewise without merit. Wages and salaries already paid to employees are not available to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage. Furthermore, wages and salaries have already been calculated in the petitioner's net current income on its tax returns.

Counsel argues that the sole shareholder of the petitioner will forego his officer compensation to pay the proffered wage. However, the record of proceeding does not contain any proof that the sole

shareholder is willing to forego his officers compensation, that he can afford to do so, and that he actually received officer's compensation in the relevant years. Additionally, the assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner has not demonstrated sufficient net income or net assets to pay the proffered wage for any of the relevant years. The petitioner also failed to include any evidence of historical growth of the petitioner's business, the petitioner's reputation within the industry, or the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses. The AAO also notes that the petitioner failed to submit requested evidence in response to the director's NOID. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

As set forth in the director's March 11, 2010 denial, another issue in this case is whether or not the beneficiary has the required experience as stated on the ETA 750. The director determined that the

beneficiary had not submitted corroborating evidence in response to the director's NOID regarding the discrepancies in the beneficiary's work experience.

The beneficiary must meet all of the requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification by the priority date of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971).

In evaluating the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by regulation, USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary's qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to "examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer." *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve "reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification]." *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position has the following minimum requirements:

**EDUCATION**

Grade School: None

High School: None

College: None

College Degree Required: No

Major Field of Study: N/A

**TRAINING:** None Required

**EXPERIENCE:** Two (2) years in the job offered

**OTHER SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS:** Reading and understanding nutrient factors of various food packages and items to meet customer's specific orders and to maintain inventory. Must have knowledge of pricing, freight, storage times, spoilage and financing.

The labor certification also states that the beneficiary qualifies for the offered position based on

experience as a store manager with [REDACTED] in Skokie, Illinois from February 1996 until January 1998. The labor certification also states that the beneficiary has worked as a manager with the petitioner from January 1998 to the present time. The beneficiary signed the labor certification under a declaration that the contents are true and correct under penalty of perjury.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A) states:

Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

The record contains an experience letter from [REDACTED] President of [REDACTED] letterhead dated December 31, 2009 in which he states that the company employed the beneficiary as a store manager from January 1998 until January 2000. However, the dates in the letter are inconsistent with the dates listed on the ETA 750B. The beneficiary, on the ETA 750B, which he signed under penalty of perjury, states that he worked for [REDACTED] from February 1996 until January 1998. When asked to resolve this inconsistency by the director, the beneficiary submitted an unsworn statement dated January 30, 2010 in which he says that he was in a hurry to sign the ETA 750B and did not notice the "typographical error" with respect to the dates of employment. He states that he worked for [REDACTED] from January 1998 until January 2000 and that he has been working for the petitioner since January 2000.

The record also contains a letter dated April 28, 2009 and signed by [REDACTED] which states that the beneficiary worked for the petitioner as a manager for "at least two years" prior to the priority date of April 30, 2001. The letter does not provide the title of the signatory, the dates of employment, whether the beneficiary was employed full-time, or the beneficiary's duties. Additionally, this letter contradicts the experience letter from [REDACTED] and the beneficiary's statement that the beneficiary worked for [REDACTED] from January 1998 to January 2000. If the beneficiary worked for the petitioner "for at least two years" prior to April 30, 2001, then the beneficiary could not have worked for [REDACTED] from January 1998 to January 2000 as the timeframe overlaps. The discrepancies in the dates regarding the beneficiary's employment as listed on the ETA 750B, in the experience letters, and in the beneficiary's unsworn statement, cast serious doubt on the veracity of the statements made regarding the beneficiary's work experience. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve the inconsistencies by independent objective evidence. Attempts to explain or reconcile the conflicting accounts, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Id.*

On appeal, the petitioner does not address the discrepancies in the record regarding the beneficiary's experience, nor is any additional evidence submitted to corroborate the beneficiary's statement in the record of proceeding regarding his experience.

The AAO affirms the director's decision that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary met the minimum requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification as of the priority date. Therefore, the beneficiary does not qualify for classification as a professional or skilled worker under section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Act.

Beyond the decision of the director,<sup>5</sup> the record of proceeding contains additional discrepancies regarding the president of the petitioner's name and signature. The AAO notes that the petitioner's president is listed as ' [REDACTED] on the I-140; ' [REDACTED] on the experience letter; [REDACTED] on the ETA 750 submitted with the instant petition; ' [REDACTED] on the G-28 dated March 22, 2010; and [REDACTED] on the G-28 dated September 10, 2009. The president of the petitioner is listed as ' [REDACTED] on the petitioner's corporate paperwork filed with the Illinois Secretary of State.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the petitioner's president's signatures do not appear to be authentic. The petitioner's president's signatures are visibly different on the G-28s, the I-140, the experience letter, and the ETA-750. The signature on the I-140, particularly, is completely unlike any of the other signatures. It is unclear which of the petitioner's president's signatures, if any, is valid. If one or both are not the signature of the petitioner's president, it is also unclear who actually signed. There is no provision that would allow the petitioner to delegate his or her signature authority. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Id.*

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.

<sup>5</sup> An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

<sup>6</sup> *See* <http://www.ilsos.gov/corporatellc/CorporateLlcController> (accessed February 5, 2013).