



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

(b)(6)

DATE: JUN 21 2013

OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]  
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Director, Texas Service Center (director), denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition and a subsequent motion to reopen and motion to reconsider. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is an import/export and wholesale distributor of garments and apparel. It seeks to permanently employ the beneficiary in the United States as an accountant. The petitioner requests classification of the beneficiary as a skilled worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A).

The petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification (labor certification), certified by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The priority date of the petition, which is the date the DOL accepted the labor certification for processing, is March 11, 2002.<sup>1</sup> See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

The director's decision denying the petition concludes that the beneficiary did not possess a bachelor's degree as required by the terms of the labor certification and for classification as a skilled worker. The director subsequently reaffirmed this decision on April 18, 2012 in response to counsel's motion to reopen and reconsider.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>2</sup>

At the outset, it is important to discuss the respective roles of the DOL and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the employment-based immigrant visa process. As noted above, the

---

<sup>1</sup> The petitioner filed a previous Form I-140 (Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker) on January 12, 2007, accompanied by the instant Form ETA 750 but seeking a second preference visa classification. This petition was denied. The petitioner filed another Form I-140 on February 8, 2008 for the beneficiary accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification (the revised labor certification format authorized by DOL regulations concerning labor certifications that went into effect on March 28, 2005). The priority date shown on the ETA Form 9089 is November 14, 2007. That Form I-140 was approved on July 16, 2012 as a skilled worker classification under section 203(b)(3)(A)(i).

<sup>2</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

labor certification in this matter is certified by the DOL. The DOL's role in this process is set forth at section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act, which provides:

Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to the DOL, or the regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether the position and the alien are qualified for a specific immigrant classification. This fact has not gone unnoticed by federal circuit courts:

There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14).<sup>3</sup> *Id.* at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)(14) determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.

Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history, and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)(14). If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of "matching" them with those of corresponding United States workers so that it will then be "in a position to meet the requirement of the law," namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

*Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the Ninth Circuit stated:

---

<sup>3</sup> Based on revisions to the Act, the current citation is section 212(a)(5)(A).

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL's role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS's decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

*K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from the DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor . . . pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the [Act] is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating:

The Department of Labor (DOL) must certify that insufficient domestic workers are available to perform the job and that the alien's performance of the job will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed domestic workers. *Id.* § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INS then makes its own determination of the alien's entitlement to sixth preference status. *Id.* § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). *See generally K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 9th Cir.1983).

The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.

*Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).

Therefore, it is the DOL's responsibility to determine whether there are qualified U.S. workers available to perform the offered position, and whether the employment of the beneficiary will adversely affect similarly employed U.S. workers. It is the responsibility of USCIS to determine if the beneficiary qualifies for the offered position, and whether the offered position and beneficiary are eligible for the requested employment-based immigrant visa classification.

In the instant case, the petitioner requests classification of the beneficiary as a skilled worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A).<sup>4</sup>

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(2).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(B) states:

If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the [labor certification]. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The beneficiary must meet all of the requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification by the priority date of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971).

The determination of whether a petition may be approved for a skilled worker is based on the requirements of the job offered as set forth on the labor certification. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(4). The labor certification must require at least two years of training and/or experience. Relevant post-secondary education may be considered as training. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(2). Accordingly, a petition for a skilled worker must establish that the job offer portion of the labor certification requires at least two years of training and/or experience, and the beneficiary meets all of the requirements of the offered position as set forth on the labor certification.

In evaluating the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position, USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by regulation, USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary's qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret

---

<sup>4</sup> Employment-based immigrant visa petitions are filed on Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker. The petitioner indicates the requested classification by checking a box on the Form I-140. After reviewing the minimum requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification and the standard requirements of the occupational classification assigned to the offered position by the DOL, the AAO will consider the petition skilled worker category as requested by the petitioner.

the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to “examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer.” *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS’s interpretation of the job’s requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve “reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification].” *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification or otherwise attempt to divine the employer’s intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position has the following minimum requirements:

EDUCATION

Grade School: 10

High School: 2 years.

College: 4 years.

College Degree Required: Bachelors Degree

Major Field of Study: Accounting

TRAINING: None Required.

EXPERIENCE: Five years in the related occupation of Accountant

OTHER SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: Good Communication Skills

As set forth above, the terms of the labor certification for the job of Accountant require that the applicant to have attended four years of college culminating in a Bachelor’s degree in Accounting plus five years in the related occupation of accountant. No equivalencies to this degree are stated and no alternatives to the field of study are allowed.

As indicated in the record, the beneficiary possesses a three-year Bachelor of Commerce (Honours Course) from the [REDACTED] received in 1983. The beneficiary also possesses a [REDACTED]

received in 1985 following the passage of the Final Examination in November 1984.

The petitioner has submitted the following credentials evaluations to the record:

1. An “Expanded Academic Equivalency Evaluation,” dated January 3, 2012, from [REDACTED], signed by [REDACTED] determines that the combination of the beneficiary’s three-year Bachelor of Commerce degree and the beneficiary’s Associate Membership in [REDACTED] represents the equivalent of a U.S. Bachelor of Science degree in Accounting. [REDACTED] cites three sources for this conclusion including the Electronic Database for Global Education (EDGE) created by the American Association of Collegiate

Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO).<sup>5</sup> [REDACTED] specifically states, however, that, "The Associate Membership Degree awarded by the [REDACTED] does not bear the designation 'bachelor.'"

2. An evaluation signed by [REDACTED] Ph.D., F.R.M., Professor at [REDACTED] dated January 4, 2012 has also been submitted.<sup>6</sup> He similarly concludes that the beneficiary's three-year Bachelor of Commerce and Associate Membership in [REDACTED] is the equivalent of a four-year U.S. Bachelor of Science in Accounting.

USCIS may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinions statements submitted as expert testimony. However, where an opinion is not in accord with other information or is in any way questionable, USCIS is not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. *Matter of Caron International*, 19 I&N Dec. 791 (Comm. 1988). In this case, the AAO does not find that the credentials' evaluations are probative in determining whether the beneficiary's qualifications satisfy the terms of the labor certification. The labor certification does not specify any equivalency and requires four years of college culminating in a Bachelor's degree in Accounting. The beneficiary's credentials represent three years of university study plus a professional qualification deemed by the evaluators to be the equivalent of a bachelor's degree.<sup>7</sup>

We note the decision in *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006).<sup>8</sup> In that case, the labor certification specified an educational requirement of four years of

---

<sup>5</sup> According to EDGE, a three-year Bachelor of Commerce degree from India is comparable to three years of university study in the United States. EDGE states that the passage of a final examination and award of an Associate Membership in [REDACTED] is comparable to a bachelor's degree.

<sup>6</sup> This private evaluation is on [REDACTED] letterhead, however there is no indication that it is officially endorsed by the university.

<sup>7</sup> The DOL has provided the following field guidance: "When an equivalent degree or alternative work experience is acceptable, the employer must specifically state on the [labor certification] as well as throughout all phases of recruitment exactly what will be considered equivalent or alternative in order to qualify for the job." See Memo. from Anna C. Hall, Acting Regl. Adminstr., U.S. Dep't. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, to SESA and JTPA Adminstrs., U.S. Dep't. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, Interpretation of "Equivalent Degree," 2 (June 13, 1994). The DOL's certification of job requirements stating that "a certain amount and kind of experience is the equivalent of a college degree does in no way bind [USCIS] to accept the employer's definition." See Ltr. From Paul R. Nelson, Certifying Officer, U.S. Dept. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, to Lynda Won-Chung, Esq., Jackson & Hertogs (March 9, 1993). The DOL has also stated that "[w]hen the term equivalent is used in conjunction with a degree, we understand to mean the employer is willing to accept an equivalent foreign degree." See Ltr. From Paul R. Nelson, Certifying Officer, U.S. Dept. of Labor's Empl. & Training Administration, to Joseph Thomas, INS (October 27, 1992). To our knowledge, these field guidance memoranda have not been rescinded.

<sup>8</sup> *Snapnames* arose in a different jurisdiction than the instant matter. In contrast to the broad precedential authority of the case law of a United States circuit court, the AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of a United States district court in matters arising within the same

college and a “B.S. or foreign equivalent.” The district court determined that “B.S. or foreign equivalent” relates solely to the alien’s educational background, precluding consideration of the alien’s combined education and work experience. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at \*11-13. Additionally, the court determined that the word “equivalent” in the employer’s educational requirements was ambiguous and that in the context of skilled worker petitions (where there is no statutory educational requirement), deference must be given to the employer’s intent. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at \*14.<sup>9</sup> In addition, the court in *Snapnames.com, Inc.* recognized that even though the labor certification may be prepared with the alien in mind, USCIS has an independent role in determining whether the alien meets the labor certification requirements. *Id.* at \*7. Thus, the court concluded that where the plain language of those requirements does not support the petitioner’s asserted intent, USCIS “does not err in applying the requirements as written.” *Id.* See also *Maramjaya v. USCIS, Civ. Act No. 06-2158* (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2008)(upholding USCIS interpretation that the term “bachelor’s or equivalent” on the labor certification necessitated a single four-year degree).

In the instant case, unlike the labor certifications referred to above in *Snapnames.com, Inc.* and *Grace Korean*, as well as in *Maramjaya*, the required education on the labor certification in this proceeding is clearly and unambiguously stated on the labor certification and does not include the language “or equivalent” or any other alternatives to a four-year bachelor’s degree. Form ETA 750 states only, “4 [years of college],[&] Bachelors Degree [in] Accounting.” The Form ETA 750 does not state any equivalent anywhere on the Form, or on any approved addendum. USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). See also, *Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981). It is additionally noted that the AAO case submitted on appeal by counsel sustained its appeal based on the specific circumstances surrounding the beneficiary’s field of study not whether the beneficiary actually possessed the degree required. The other AAO case involved a labor certification that permitted a bachelors or equivalent, unlike the instant case. Moreover, as noted by the director,

---

district. See *Matter of K-S-*, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). Although the reasoning underlying a district judge’s decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the AAO, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. *Id.* at 719.

<sup>9</sup> In *Grace Korean United Methodist Church v. Michael Chertoff*, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Or. 2005), the court concluded that USCIS “does not have the authority or expertise to impose its strained definition of ‘B.A. or equivalent’ on that term as set forth in the labor certification.” However, the court in *Grace Korean* makes no attempt to distinguish its holding from the federal circuit court decisions cited above. Instead, as legal support for its determination, the court cites to *Tovar v. U.S. Postal Service*, 3 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)(the U.S. Postal Service has no expertise or special competence in immigration matters). *Id.* at 1179. *Tovar* is easily distinguishable from the present matter since USCIS, through the authority delegated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, is charged by statute with the enforcement of the United States immigration laws. See section 103(a) of the Act.

while 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of USCIS are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions, unlike the AAO decisions cited, must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a).

The petitioner's actual minimum requirements could have been clarified or changed before the Form ETA 750 was certified by the Department of Labor. The requirements as certified do not state or allow for any equivalent to a bachelor's degree. Since that was not done, the director's decision to deny the petition is affirmed.

Based on the evidence submitted, the AAO concurs with the director that the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses a Bachelor's degree in Accounting as required by the terms of the labor certification. The certified labor certification requirements do not allow for any equivalent to a bachelor's degree based on any alternate combination of education and/or experience. Therefore, the beneficiary is not eligible for the visa classification sought. He does not qualify for the preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3) of the Act. *See also Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971). The beneficiary does not qualify for classification as a skilled worker under section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.