

(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

DATE: **MAY 07 2013** OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(ii)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,


Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The employment-based immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The matter will be remanded to the director.

The petitioner is a provider of healthcare services. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a therapy director. The petitioner seeks to classify the beneficiary pursuant to section 203(b)(3)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3) as a professional worker. In his decision, the director determined that the proffered position is a Schedule A occupation pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.5(a) and therefore, an ETA Form 9089 certified by the Department of Labor (DOL) is not necessary. The director determined that the petitioner failed to submit the required initial evidence pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.15.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

The director determined that the instant petition is for a Schedule A occupation. A Schedule A occupation is an occupation codified at 20 C.F.R. § 656.5(a) for which the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has determined that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified and available and that the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers will not be adversely affected by the employment of aliens in such occupations. The current list of Schedule A occupations includes professional nurses and physical therapists. *Id.*

Petitions for Schedule A occupations do not require the petitioner to test the labor market and obtain a certified ETA Form 9089 from the DOL prior to filing the petition with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Instead, the petition is filed directly with USCIS with a duplicate uncertified ETA Form 9089. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.5(a)(2) and (1)(3)(i); *see also* 20 C.F.R. § 656.15.

On appeal, counsel states that it was proper for the petitioner to obtain labor certification from the DOL as the petition was for a therapy director and not a physical therapist. The director assumed that the proffered position was a Schedule A position and therefore, did not require a labor certification. The AAO agrees that the proffered position is for a therapy director and not for a physical therapist and therefore, the position requires a labor certification. As the petition is accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the DOL, the petition was properly filed.

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

While the petitioner has overcome the director's basis for denial, the petition is not approvable. We will remand the petition for the director's consideration of the following additional issues: Whether the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage, and whether the beneficiary possesses the required five years of experience in the offered position of therapy director and a valid Illinois physical therapy license.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS first examines whether the petitioner has paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year from the priority date. If the petitioner has not paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year, USCIS will next examine whether the petitioner had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the difference between the wage paid, if any, and the proffered wage.² If the petitioner's net income or net current assets is not sufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may also consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In the instant case, the petitioner did not employ the beneficiary. Further, the petitioner failed to establish that factors similar to *Sonogawa* existed in the instant case, which would permit a conclusion that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage despite its shortfalls in wages paid to the beneficiary, net income and net current assets.

Accordingly, after considering the totality of the circumstances, the petitioner has also failed to establish its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary since the priority date.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

² *See River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983); and *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011).

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position requires a bachelor's degree in physical therapy, an Illinois physical therapist's license, and five years of experience in the proffered position. Experience in an alternate occupation is not acceptable. On the labor certification, the beneficiary claims to qualify for the offered position based on experience as a physical therapist with various employers but lists no experience in the offered position of therapy director.

The beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience must be supported by letters from employers giving the name, address, and title of the employer, and a description of the beneficiary's experience. The record contains no work experience letters for the beneficiary from the employers listed on the labor certification. As noted above, the beneficiary did not list any experience as a therapy director and the labor certification states that experience in an alternate occupation is not acceptable. In *Matter of Leung*, 16 I&N Dec. 2530 (BIA 1976), the Board's dicta notes that the beneficiary's experience, without such fact certified by DOL on the beneficiary's Form ETA 750B, lessens the credibility of the evidence and facts asserted.

Finally, the record contains a photocopy of an Illinois physical therapist's license for the beneficiary that expired on September 30, 2012. There is no evidence in the record of proceeding that the beneficiary currently holds a valid Illinois physical therapist's license.

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required experience set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

Therefore, the AAO will withdraw the decision and remand the case to the director to request and consider evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, such as federal tax returns, audited financial statements, or annual reports, and evidence that the beneficiary has five years of work experience as a therapy director and a valid Illinois physical therapist's license as required by the labor certification. Upon receipt of all the evidence, the director will review the entire record and enter a new decision.

ORDER: The director's decision is withdrawn; however, the petition is currently unapprovable for the reasons discussed above, and therefore the AAO may not approve the petition at this time. Because the petition is not approvable, the petition is remanded to the director of for issuance of a new, detailed decision.