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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services



DATE: **NOV 14 2013** OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:   
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the immigrant visa petition and the petitioner appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The AAO summarily dismissed the appeal because the petitioner failed to specifically address the reasons stated for denial or to provide any additional evidence. The petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the AAO's decision. The AAO dismissed the motion and affirmed the director's decision. The matter is now before the AAO on a motion to reconsider. The motion will be dismissed.

A motion to reconsider qualifies for consideration under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3) if the petitioner states the reasons for reconsideration supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application of law or policy and states further that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the time of the initial decision. In this instance, the motion does not meet these requirements.

The petitioner describes itself as a restaurant. It seeks to permanently employ the beneficiary in the United States as a cook supervisor. The petitioner requests classification of the beneficiary as a professional or skilled worker pursuant to section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A).<sup>1</sup>

The petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification (labor certification), certified by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The priority date of the petition, which is the date the DOL accepted the labor certification for processing, is September 24, 2002. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

The director's decision denying the petition concludes that the beneficiary did not possess the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage and that the beneficiary did not have the requisite qualifications for the position as of the priority date.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

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<sup>1</sup> Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), grants preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on September 24, 2002. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$17.19 per hour (\$35,755.20 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of experience in the job offered of cook supervisor.

The record indicates the petitioner is structured as a limited liability company (LLC) and filed its tax returns on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income.<sup>2</sup> On the petition, the petitioner stated it was established in 1999. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on April 25, 2001, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the

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<sup>2</sup> An LLC is an entity formed under state law by filing articles of organization. An LLC may be classified for federal income tax purposes as if it were a sole proprietorship, a partnership or a corporation. If the LLC has only one owner, it will automatically be treated as a sole proprietorship unless an election is made to be treated as a corporation. If the LLC has two or more owners, it will automatically be considered to be a partnership unless an election is made to be treated as a corporation. If the LLC does not elect its classification, a default classification of partnership (multi-member LLC) or disregarded entity (taxed as if it were a sole proprietorship) will apply. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3. The election referred to is made using IRS Form 8832, Entity Classification Election. In the instant case, the petitioner, a multi-member LLC, is considered to be a partnership for federal tax purposes.

petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner submitted Forms W-2 it issued to the beneficiary. We note that, on the instant petition filed on January 11, 2008, the petitioner did not list a Social Security Number (SSN) for the beneficiary. However, upon review of the Forms W-2 submitted, the beneficiary appears to have used at least three different SSN's.<sup>3</sup> Conflicting SSNs create unresolved inconsistencies and lead the AAO to consider whether the petitioner paid the beneficiary these wages. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Therefore, the AAO will not consider the beneficiary's Forms W-2 as persuasive evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

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<sup>3</sup> The beneficiary used one SSN on his 2003 Form W-2; another SSN on his 2004, 2005, 2007, and 2008 Forms W-2; and a third different SSN on his 2006 Form W-2.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts*, 558 F.3d at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F. Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).

In *K.C.P. Food*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

The petitioner's tax returns stated its net income for 2002 through 2007 as detailed in the table below.

- In 2002, the petitioner's IRS Form 1065 stated net income of -\$163,468.00.<sup>4</sup>
- In 2003, the petitioner's IRS Form 1065 stated net income of -\$40,161.00.
- In 2004, the petitioner's IRS Form 1065 stated net income of -\$42,052.00.
- For 2005, the petitioner has not submitted its IRS Form 1065.
- In 2006, the petitioner's IRS Form 1065 stated net income of \$31,954.00.
- In 2007, the petitioner's IRS Form 1065 stated net income of \$34,750.00.

Therefore, for the years 2002 through 2007, the petitioner did not establish that it had sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>5</sup> The petitioner's year-end

<sup>4</sup> For an LLC taxed as a partnership, where a partnership's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 22 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income.

<sup>5</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d) and include cash-on-hand, inventories, and receivables expected to be converted to cash within one year. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 15(d) through 17(d). If the total of the petitioner's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns stated its net current assets for 2002 through 2007 as detailed in the table below.

- In 2002, the petitioner's IRS Form 1065 stated net current assets of -\$86,480.00.
- In 2003, the petitioner's IRS Form 1065 stated net current assets of -\$107,534.00.
- In 2004, the petitioner's IRS Form 1065 stated net current assets of -\$130,848.00.
- For 2005, the petitioner has not submitted its IRS Form 1065.
- In 2006, the petitioner's IRS Form 1065 stated net current assets of -\$57,457.00.
- In 2007, the petitioner's IRS Form 1065 stated net current assets of -\$4,877.00.

Therefore, for the years 2002 through 2007, the petitioner did not establish that it had sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Thus, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

Counsel contends that the petitioner's financial decline was due to the events of September 11, 2001, but the record of proceeding does not contain information to substantiate this claim. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter Of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). A mere broad statement by counsel that, because of the nature of the petitioner's industry, the petitioner's business was impacted adversely by the events of September 11, 2001, cannot by itself, demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. Rather, such a general statement merely suggests, without supporting evidence, that the petitioner's financial status might have appeared stronger had it not been for the events of September 11, 2001. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)).<sup>6</sup>

The petitioner submitted an April 4, 2013 financial statement from CPA [REDACTED] regarding the petitioner's cash flows in 2002. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where

<sup>6</sup> We also note that the petitioner's tax returns suggest that it did not begin operating until September 25, 2001.

a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. An audit is conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards to obtain a reasonable assurance that the financial statements of the business are free of material misstatements. The unaudited financial statement that the petitioner submitted is not persuasive evidence. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. at 612. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000.00. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner claims on the petition to have started its operations in January of 1999. However, its tax records provide that the petitioner began operating on September 25, 2001. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. See *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592. The petitioner has not reported how many workers it employs. The petitioner claims that it can take advantage of special deductions because of the events of September 11, 2001. However, the record contains no independent objective evidence supporting this claim.<sup>7</sup> The record also lacks evidence of the petitioner's reputation within its industry or whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this

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<sup>7</sup> Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)).

individual case, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The director also found the beneficiary not qualified for the position. The beneficiary must meet all of the requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification by the priority date of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). See *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977); see also *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971).

In evaluating the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position, USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by regulation, USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary's qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to "examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer." *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve "reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification]." *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position has the following minimum requirements:

EDUCATION

Grade School: 8 years

High School: 4 years

TRAINING: None Required.

EXPERIENCE: Two (2) years in the job offered.

OTHER SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: None.

The labor certification states that the beneficiary qualifies for the offered position based on experience as a cook with [REDACTED] from February 1996 until November 1998. No other experience is listed. The beneficiary signed the labor certification under a declaration that the contents are true and correct under penalty of perjury.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A) states:

Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

The record contains an experience letter from [REDACTED] Manager Food and Drink, on [REDACTED] letterhead stating that the company employed the beneficiary as a cook from February 1996 until November 1998.

Upon review of the record at hand, the beneficiary has declared to USCIS under penalty of perjury, on July 24, 2007, that he arrived in the United States on April 28, 1998 near San Diego, California. The beneficiary also declared to USCIS that he has been employed continuously with the petitioner since May of 1998. The beneficiary's conflicting statements have therefore created doubt into the authenticity of the beneficiary's claimed work experience. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-592. Thus, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary qualifies for classification as a professional or skilled worker under section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Act.

The director also found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary possessed the education required in the labor certification as of the priority date. In reviewing the record at hand, including a statement from the beneficiary and a copy of the beneficiary's school transcript from Mexico, we find it more likely than not that the beneficiary completed high school prior to the priority date of the labor certification. Thus, this part of the director's finding is withdrawn. Notwithstanding, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage or that the beneficiary possessed the requisite experience for the position as of the priority date.

In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The motion to reconsider is dismissed. The decision of the AAO dated March 7, 2013 is affirmed. The petition is denied.