U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

(b)(6)

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

DATE: SEP 2 6 2014 OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to § 203(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at http://www.uscis.gov/forms for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements.** *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center (the director) and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is an automotive repair business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a mechanic pursuant to section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A).[1] As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's May 13, 2010 denial, an issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. We conduct appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). We consider all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.[2]

Ability to Pay

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

> *Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL.

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[1] Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

[2] The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764, 766 (BIA 1988).

See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 160 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on October 20, 2005. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is $24,690.00 per year. The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires 24 months of experience in the proffered position.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2002 and to currently employ three (3) workers. The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612, 614-15 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River St. Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111, 118 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873, 880 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Rest. Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Haw. Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532, 537 (N.D. Tex. 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

> The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.
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> We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River St. Donuts, 558 F.3d at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang,* 719 F. Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.[3] A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the

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[3] Current assets consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. Current liabilities are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). Joel G. Siegel & Jae K. Shim, *Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 118 (3d ed., Barron's Educ. Series 2000).

proffered wage using those net current assets. In the instant case, Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements and a 2005 Form 1099-Misc, Miscellaneous Income issued to the beneficiary reflect that the petitioner paid the beneficiary partial wages from the priority date in 2005 through 2009. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income and end-of-year net current assets for 2005 through 2008.

Tax Year	Net Income	Calculation of Net Current Assets	Wages Paid	Balance Due to Instant Beneficiary
2005	$8,600.00	-$9,078.00	$14,000.00	$10,690.00
2006	$21,445.00	$18,600.00	$11,000.00	$13,690.00
2007	-$16,834.00	-$1,376.00	$19,750.00	$4,940.00
2008	-$16,889.00	-$9,294.00	$12,950.00	$11,740.00
2009	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN	$23,750.00	$940.00

For the year 2006 the petitioner's net income was greater than the difference between the actual wages paid and the proffered wage. However, in 2005, 2007 and 2008, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the difference between the actual wages paid and the proffered wage. The record of proceeding does not include the petitioner's 2009 tax return and lacks sufficient information to determine the petitioners ability to pay the proffered wage in that year.[4]

Additionally, according to USCIS records, the petitioner has filed five (5) other Form I-140 immigrant petitions on behalf of other beneficiaries. Accordingly, the petitioner must establish that it has had the continuing ability to pay the combined proffered wages to each beneficiary from the priority date of the instant petition. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977). Even though USCIS records reflect that all of the other Form I-140 immigrant petitions were denied, the petitioner must establish that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wages to each beneficiary for these years in which the corresponding Form I-140 immigrant petitions were pending until the date on which each was denied or the beneficiary obtained lawful permanent residence. The evidence in the record does not document the priority date, proffered wage or wages paid to each beneficiary, or whether any of the other beneficiaries have obtained lawful permanent residence. Thus, it is also concluded that the petitioner has not established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary and the proffered wages to the beneficiaries of its other petitions.

Therefore, from the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

[4] In any future filings the petitioner should submit its tax returns for 2009 through 2013.

On appeal counsel asserts that the difference between the actual wages paid and the proffered wage is insignificant and that the beneficiary generates sufficient income to cover this difference. In support of this assertion, counsel submits a June 7, 2010 letter from the petitioner stating that it has been in business for a long period of time and, even though it has had uncharacteristically unprofitable years, the evidence demonstrates a pattern of sustainable financial solvency. The petitioner states that the beneficiary's employment has increased the company's income and to date increases its income. However, against the projection of future earnings, *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977), states:

> I do not feel, nor do I believe the Congress intended, that the petitioner, who admittedly could not pay the offered wage at the time the petition was filed, should subsequently become eligible to have the petition approved under a new set of facts hinged upon probability and projections, even beyond the information presented on appeal.

A petitioner must establish its ability to pay from the time of the priority date, which in this matter is October 20, 2005. A petition cannot be approved at a future date after eligibility is established under a new set of facts. *Matter of Katigbak,* 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm'r 1971). In this instance, the petitioner has not established its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date.

Counsel contends that the petitioner's bank statements clearly establish that it has sufficient money to pay the proffered wage. Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return(s), such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered above in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

Counsel contends that the president of the petitioner has net assets in excess of $1 million and is willing and able to pay the difference between the actual wages paid and the proffered wages. In support of this assertion counsel submits a letter from the president's accountant stating that he has significant financial assets to fund the petitioner, including paying the proffered wages. However, the personal assets of an officer or owner of a corporation are not relevant to a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Sonegawa,* 12 I&N Dec. at 614-15. The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about $100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

On appeal, counsel contends that the petitioner has been in business for many years, had uncharacteristic business losses and has continued to grow throughout the years. However, nothing in the record describes or explains these uncharacteristic losses. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)). Counsel cites non-precedent AAO decisions to support his assertion that the petitioner's average gross income of $300,000.00 and payment of more than an average of $250,000.00 in salaries demonstrate a pattern of financial solvency. However, the cases to which counsel cites are non-precedent. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of USCIS are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a). In the instant case, the historical growth of the petitioner's business as reflected in gross receipts is moderate and inconsistent with its growth of approximately 30% from 2005 to 2006 and loss of 10% from 2007 to 2008. There is no evidence of the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses from which it has since recovered, or of the petitioner's reputation within its industry. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage to the instant beneficiary or the beneficiaries of its other Form I-140 immigrant petitions.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Beneficiary Qualifications

Beyond the decision of the director,[5] the petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House,* 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak,* 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant,* 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Madany* v. *Smith,* 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.* v. *Landon,* 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc.* v. *Coomey,* 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position requires 24 months of experience in the proffered position. On the labor certification, the beneficiary claims to qualify for the offered position based on experience as a mechanic for Ecuador, from February 1, 1997 until November 1, 2000.

The beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience must be supported by letters from employers giving the name, address, and title of the employer, and a description of the beneficiary's experience. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A). The record contains an April 20, 2004 work letter from workshop coordinator, on letterhead, indicating that the beneficiary was employed as an automotive mechanic from February 1997 until November 2000. However, the letter does not provide the address of the employer or state whether the job was full-time. Further, the original letter appears to have been altered.[6]

The record also contains certificate dated March 3, 2010 from career educator, on letterhead, stating that the beneficiary performed training in the for a period of three years, from February 1997 until November 2000. However, the letter does not state

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[5] An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

[6] The petitioner filed a previous petition for the instant beneficiary based upon the same labor certification [In an October 27, 2006 Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) the director (Nebraska Service Center) noted that the date in the letter appears altered. The petitioner failed to respond to this notice and the petition was denied. The failure of the petitioner to respond to the director's NOID and address the apparently altered date casts doubt on the beneficiary's actual experience and this remains an unresolved inconsistency. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988).

that the experience was full-time. The letter is inconsistent with the labor certification and previous employment letter as it indicates that the beneficiary was not employed by but rather received training. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Furthermore, according to the website, the university provides automotive mechanical engineering studies as part of its academic program. *See* www.ups.edu.ec/en/estudia (accessed September 17, 2014). The record also contains the beneficiary's *Bachiller*[7] in automechanics conferred in 1997 by and a certificate issued to the beneficiary by conferring the title of Basic Technician in Specialized Auto Mechanics on May 26, 1999 for completing the first year of automotive engineering implementation career studies.

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required experience set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

***Bona Fide* Job Opportunity**

Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 626.20(c)(8) and 656.3, the petitioner has the burden when asked to show that a valid employment relationship exists, that a *bona fide* job opportunity is available to U.S. workers. *See Matter of Amger Corp.*, 87-INA-545 (BALCA 1987). A relationship invalidating a *bona fide* job offer may arise where the beneficiary is related to the petitioner by "blood" or it may "be financial, by marriage, or through friendship." *See Matter of Sunmart 374*, 00-INA-93 (BALCA May 15, 2000). Where the petitioner is owned by the person applying for a position, it is not a *bona fide* offer. *See Bulk Farms, Inc. v. Martin*, 963 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1992) (denied labor certification application for president, sole shareholder and chief cheese maker even where no person qualified for position applied).

There is evidence of a lack of a *bona fide* job offer in the instant case. Corporate Records for the petitioner, reflect that the beneficiary's cousin, is the president and sole shareholder of the petitioning company. The quarterly wage reports and Forms W-2 for the petitioner reflect that all three of the petitioner's employees at the time of filing were related to each other and that two non-related employees were only added in 2007 and 2009. Under 20 C.F.R. § 626.20(c)(8) and §656.3, the petitioner has the burden when asked to show that a valid employment relationship exists, that a *bona fide* job opportunity is available to U.S. workers. *See Matter of Amger Corp.*, 87-INA-545 (BALCA 1987). A relationship invalidating a *bona fide* job offer may arise where the beneficiary is related to the petitioner by "blood" or it may "be financial, by marriage, or through friendship." *See Matter of Sunmart 374*, 00-INA-93 (BALCA May 15, 2000).

The ETA Form 9089 specifically asks in Section C.9: " Is the employer a closely held corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship in which the alien has an ownership interest, or is there a familial relationship between the owners, stockholders, partners, corporate officers, incorporators, and the

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[7] Equivalent to completion of a vocational senior High School in the United States. *See* www.aacrao.org/About-AACRAO.aspx (accessed September 18, 2014).

alien?" If the petitioner's owner or corporate officer is related to the beneficiary, the petitioner should have indicated, "yes" to this question.

The PERM regulation specifically addresses this issue at 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(l) that states in pertinent part:

> (l) Alien influence and control over job opportunity. If the employer is a closely held corporation or partnership in which the alien has an ownership interest, or if there is a familial relationship between the stockholders, corporate officers, incorporators, or partners, and the alien, or if the alien is one of a small number of employees, the employer in the event of an audit must be able to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide job opportunity, i.e., the job is available to all U.S. workers, and must provide to the Certifying Officer, the following supporting documentation:
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> (1) A copy of the articles of incorporation, partnership agreement, business license or similar documents that establish the business entity;
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> (2) A list of all corporate/company officers and shareholders/partners of the corporation/firm/business, their titles and positions in the business' structure, and a description of the relationships to each other and to the alien beneficiary;
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> (3) The financial history of the corporation/company/partnership, including the total investment in the business entity and the amount of investment of each officer, incorporator/partner and the alien beneficiary; and
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> (4) The name of the business' official with primary responsibility for interviewing and hiring applicants for positions within the organization and the name(s) of the business' official(s) having control or influence over hiring decisions involving the position for which labor certification is sought.
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> (5) If the alien is one of 10 or fewer employees, the employer must document any family relationship between the employees and the alien.

As the petitioner failed to check the appropriate box on the ETA Form 9089, the DOL was not given an opportunity to audit and assess the nature of the familial relationship and the extent of the alien's influence and control over the job opportunity. While not a basis for this decision, in any future filings, the petitioner must demonstrate that there is a *bona fide* job opportunity that was open to all U.S. workers, including demonstrating the beneficiary's influence and control over the job opportunity pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(l).

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.