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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090




**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**



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DATE: **APR 09 2012**


OFFICE: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

FILE: 

IN RE: Petitioner: 

PETITION: Petition for Immigrant Abused Spouse Pursuant to Section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,


Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director (the director) denied the immigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner seeks immigrant classification under section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), as an alien battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a United States citizen.

The director denied the petition on the basis of his determination that the petitioner failed to demonstrate the existence of a qualifying relationship with a citizen of the United States and her corresponding eligibility for immediate relative classification on the basis of such a relationship because the petition was filed more than two years after she and her former spouse divorced. On appeal, counsel submits a brief.

Applicable Law

Section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act provides that an alien who is the spouse of a United States citizen may self-petition for immigrant classification if the alien demonstrates that he or she entered into the marriage with the United States citizen spouse in good faith and that during the marriage, the alien or a child of the alien was battered or subjected to extreme cruelty perpetrated by the alien's spouse. In addition, the alien must show that he or she is eligible to be classified as an immediate relative under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Act, resided with the abusive spouse, and is a person of good moral character. Section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II).

An individual who is no longer married to a citizen of the United States remains eligible to self-petition under these provisions if he or she is an alien: "who was a bona fide spouse of a United States citizen within the past 2 years and . . . who demonstrates a connection between the legal termination of the marriage within the past 2 years and battering or extreme cruelty by the United States citizen spouse. . . ." Section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa).

Section 204(a)(1)(J) of the Act, states, in pertinent part, the following:

In acting on petitions filed under clause (iii) or (iv) of subparagraph (A) . . . , or in making determinations under subparagraphs (C) and (D), the [Secretary of Homeland Security] shall consider any credible evidence relevant to the petition. The determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security].

The eligibility requirements are explained further at 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1), which states, in pertinent part, the following:

- (i) *Basic eligibility requirements.* A spouse may file a self-petition under section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) . . . of the Act for his or her classification as an immediate relative . . . if he or she:

* * *

- (B) Is eligible for immigrant classification under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) . . . of the Act based on that relationship [to the U.S. citizen spouse].

The evidentiary standard and guidelines for a self-petition filed under section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act are explained further at 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2), which states, in pertinent part, the following:

Evidence for a spousal self-petition –

- (i) *General.* Self-petitioners are encouraged to submit primary evidence whenever possible. The Service will consider, however, any credible evidence relevant to the petition. The determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Service.

Pertinent Facts and Procedural History

The petitioner is a citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States in 1994. She married C-R-¹ a citizen of the United States, on February 18, 2001, and they divorced on December 3, 2007. The petitioner filed the instant Form I-360 on June 29, 2010. After considering the evidence of record, the director denied the petition on June 2, 2011.

The AAO reviews these matters on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). Upon review of the entire record, we find that the petitioner has failed to overcome the director's grounds for denying this petition.

Qualifying Relationship and Corresponding Eligibility for Immediate Relative Classification

As indicated, the instant petition was filed more than two years after the petitioner and C-R- divorced. The petitioner is consequently ineligible for immigrant classification under section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC) of the Act based on her relationship with C-R-.

Counsel argues on appeal that the two-year post-divorce filing deadline is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling. However, he cites no binding authority in support of his argument. Although counsel cites *Moreno-Gutierrez v. Napolitano*, 794 F.Supp.2d 1207 (D. Colo. 2011), that decision is not precedential, as the AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of United States district courts, even in matters arising within the same district. *See Matter of K-S-*, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). The other cases counsel cites do not directly address the matter at issue on appeal. Instead, they address the purposes of statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, and

¹ Name withheld to protect individual's identity.

equitable tolling, and the Congressional intent behind enactment of the self-petitioning provisions of the Act. None of those issues are in dispute here.

Although courts have found certain filing deadlines to be statutes of limitations subject to equitable tolling in the context of removal or deportation, the petitioner cites no binding case finding visa petition filing deadlines subject to equitable tolling. *Compare Albillo-DeLeon v. Gonzalez*, 410 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (time limit for filing motions to reopen under NACARA is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling) *with Balam-Chuc v. Mukasey*, 547 F.3d 1044, 1048-50 (9th Cir. 2008) (deadline for filing a visa petition to qualify under section 245(i) of the Act is a statute of repose not subject to equitable tolling). The two-year, post-divorce filing period of section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC) of the Act is a statute of repose not subject to equitable tolling, and we lack the authority to waive this statutory deadline.²

The petitioner has therefore failed to overcome the director's grounds for denial of this petition. As she failed to file the petition within two years of the legal termination of her marriage to C-R-, the petitioner has not demonstrated the qualifying relationship and corresponding eligibility for immediate relative classification, as required by subsections 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa) and (cc) of the Act.

In these proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish her eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). She has not met her burden and the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

² Even if the deadline were found to be a statute of limitations, the petitioner would still have to show that she exercised due diligence in pursuit of her claim. *See Pace v. DiGuglielmo*, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); *Albillo-DeLeon v. Gonzalez*, 410 F.3d at 1100. Counsel argues on appeal that the two-year post-divorce filing deadline should be tolled because the petitioner was the victim of ineffective assistance by her prior counsel. Because the two-year filing deadline is not subject to equitable tolling, we do not reach the issues of whether the petitioner has met the requirements for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as specified in *Matter of Lozada*, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988); or, as present counsel claims in the alternative, whether her prior counsel's actions were nonetheless egregious enough to warrant equitable tolling.