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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



CI

FILE:



Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: JUN 02 2005

IN RE:

Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



PETITION: Petition for Special Immigrant Religious Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), as described at Section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Mari Johnson

S Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied this employment-based immigrant visa petition on June 24, 2004. The petition is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a church. It seeks to classify the beneficiary as a special immigrant religious worker pursuant to section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), to perform services as a religious educator and family counselor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary had been engaged continuously in a qualifying religious vocation or occupation for two full years immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional documentation.

Section 203(b)(4) of the Act provides classification to qualified special immigrant religious workers as described in section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C), which pertains to an immigrant who:

(i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of application for admission, has been a member of a religious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the United States;

(ii) seeks to enter the United States--

(I) solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of that religious denomination,

(II) before October 1, 2008, in order to work for the organization at the request of the organization in a professional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation, or

(III) before October 1, 2008, in order to work for the organization (or for a bona fide organization which is affiliated with the religious denomination and is exempt from taxation as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) at the request of the organization in a religious vocation or occupation; and

(iii) has been carrying on such vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for at least the 2-year period described in clause (i).

The issue on appeal is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary was continuously engaged in a qualifying vocation or occupation for two full years immediately preceding the filing of the visa petition.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(1) states, in pertinent part, that “[a]n alien, or any person in behalf of the alien, may file a Form I-360 visa petition for classification under section 203(b)(4) of the Act as a section 101(a)(27)(C) special immigrant religious worker. Such a petition may be filed by or for an alien, who (either abroad or in the United States) for at least the two years immediately preceding the filing of the petition has been a member of a religious denomination which has a bona fide nonprofit religious organization in the United

States.” The regulation indicates that the “religious workers must have been performing the vocation, professional work, or other work continuously (either abroad or in the United States) for at least the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition.”

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(3) states, in pertinent part, that each petition for a religious worker must be accompanied by:

(ii) A letter from an authorized official of the religious organization in the United States which (as applicable to the particular alien) establishes:

(A) That, immediately prior to the filing of the petition, the alien has the required two years of membership in the denomination and the required two years of experience in the religious vocation, professional religious work, or other religious work.

The petition was filed on August 12, 2003. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary was continuously working as a religious educator and family counselor throughout the two-year period immediately preceding that date.

In its July 23, 2003 letter accompanying the petition, the petitioner stated:

As a Religious Educator, [the beneficiary will facilitate the understanding of the meaning and application of Biblical passages . . . As a family counselor, she will provide spiritual, religious-based counseling for individual and family members of the church, as well as the community at large . . . Shortly after [she] arrived in the United States, [the beneficiary] began volunteering for us . . . Since January 2000, [she] has been teaching Bible study classes to children and providing spiritual counseling for our church.

The petitioner submitted no documentary evidence to substantiate the beneficiary’s work with the church. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The legislative history of the religious worker provision of the Immigration Act of 1990 states that a substantial amount of case law had developed on religious organizations and occupations, the implication being that Congress intended that this body of case law be employed in implementing the provision, with the addition of “a number of safeguards . . . to prevent abuse.” See H.R. Rep. No. 101-723, at 75 (1990).

The statute states at section 101(a)(27)(C)(iii) that the religious worker must have been carrying on the religious vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for the immediately preceding two years. Under former Schedule A (prior to the Immigration Act of 1990), a person seeking entry to perform duties for a religious organization was required to be engaged “principally” in such duties. “Principally” was defined as more than 50 percent of the person’s working time. Under prior law, a minister of religion was required to demonstrate that he/she had been “continuously” carrying on the vocation of minister for the two years

immediately preceding the time of application. The term “continuously” was interpreted to mean that one did not take up any other occupation or vocation. *Matter of B*, 3 I&N Dec. 162 (CO 1948).

Later decisions on religious workers conclude that, if the worker is to receive no salary for church work, the assumption is that he/she would be required to earn a living by obtaining other employment. *Matter of Bisulca*, 10 I&N Dec. 712 (Reg. Comm. 1963) and *Matter of Sinha*, 10 I&N Dec. 758 (Reg. Comm. 1963).

The term “continuously” also is discussed in a 1980 decision where the Board of Immigration Appeals determined that a minister of religion was not continuously carrying on the vocation of minister when he was a full-time student who was devoting only nine hours a week to religious duties. *Matter of Varughese*, 17 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 1980).

In line with these past decisions and the intent of Congress, it is clear, therefore, that to be continuously carrying on the religious work means to do so on a full-time basis. That the qualifying work should be paid employment, not volunteering, is inherent in those past decisions which hold that, if the religious worker is not paid, the assumption is that he/she is engaged in other, secular employment. The idea that a religious undertaking would be unsalaried is applicable only to those in a religious vocation who in accordance with their vocation live in a clearly unsalaried environment, the primary examples in the regulations being nuns, monks, and religious brothers and sisters. Clearly, therefore, the qualifying two years of religious work must be full-time and generally salaried. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the intent of Congress.

In the rare case where volunteer work might constitute prior qualifying experience, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary, while continuously and primarily engaged in the traditional religious occupation, was self-sufficient or that his or her financial well being was clearly maintained by means other than secular employment.

On appeal, counsel states that the beneficiary was fully supported by her husband during the qualifying two-year period. As evidence, counsel submitted an affidavit signed by the beneficiary and her husband, who state that he earns \$35,000 per year and has been the sole source of support for the family since their arrival in the United States. Counsel also submits a letter from Philadelphia Health Management Corporation, indicating that the company has employed the beneficiary’s husband since August 1999.¹ Counsel also submits copies of the husband’s Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003. The tax returns show that the husband filed as “head of household” and do not contain any information about the beneficiary, or provide evidence that her husband supported her in any way.

Additionally, on appeal, the petitioner submitted no documentary evidence, such as verified work schedules or similar documentation, to corroborate the beneficiary’s work with the petitioning organization. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165.

The evidence does not establish that the beneficiary has worked continuously in a qualifying occupation or vocation for two full years preceding the filing of the visa petition.

¹ We note that the first name of the beneficiary’s husband is misspelled in the letter, although it is spelled correctly on the Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, submitted. This raises the question as to whether the writer of the letter verified the information provided with official records.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that it is a bona fide nonprofit religious organization exempt from federal income tax as required by the statute and regulation.

The petitioner submitted a copy of a June 10, 1997 letter from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to the Christ Temple World Outreach Ministries, Inc. in Norristown, Pennsylvania. The letter indicated that the organization had been granted tax exempt-status under section 501(c)(3) as an organization described under sections 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The petitioner submitted no evidence to establish its relationship to the Norristown, Pennsylvania organization and submitted no evidence that it was covered under the exemption granted to that organization.

To meet the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(3)(i)(A), a copy of a letter of recognition of tax exemption issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is required. In the alternative, to meet the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(3)(i)(B), a petitioner may submit such documentation as is required by the IRS to establish eligibility for exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) of 1986 as it relates to religious organizations. This documentation includes, at a minimum, a completed IRS Form 1023, the Schedule A supplement, if applicable, and a copy of the organizing instrument of the organization, which contains a proper dissolution clause and which specifies the purposes of the organization.

Further guidance on the evidence needed to establish tax-exempt status as a religious organization pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(3)(i)(B) is set forth in a memorandum from [REDACTED], Associate Director of Operation for CIS, *Extension of the Special Immigrant Religious Worker Program and Clarification of Tax Exempt Status Requirements for Religious Organizations* (December 17, 2003). This evidence includes:

- (1) A properly completed IRS Form 1023,
- (2) A properly completed Schedule A supplement, if applicable,
- (3) A copy of the organizing instrument of the organization that contains the appropriate dissolution clause required by the IRS and that specifies the purposes of the organization, and
- (4) Brochures, calendars, flyers and other literature describing the religious purpose and nature of the activities of the organization.

The above list is consistent with the regulatory requirement at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(3)(i)(B), cited above. The memorandum specifically states that the above materials are, collectively, the "minimum" documentation that can establish "the religious nature and purpose of the organization." Thus, for example, a petitioner cannot meet this burden by submitting only its articles of incorporation. Also, obviously, it is not enough merely for the petitioner to *submit* the documents listed above. The *content* of those documents must establish the religious purpose of the organization.

The petitioner's evidence does not establish that it is a bona fide nonprofit tax-exempt organization. This deficiency constitutes an additional ground based on which the petition may not be approved.

Additionally, beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that the position qualifies as that of a religious worker.

According to the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(1), the alien must be coming to the United States at the request of the religious organization to work as a religious worker. To establish eligibility for special immigrant classification, the petitioner must establish that the specific position that it is offering qualifies as a religious occupation as defined in these proceedings. The statute is silent on what constitutes a "religious occupation" and the regulation states only that it is an activity relating to a traditional religious function. The regulation does not define the term "traditional religious function" and instead provides a brief list of examples. The list reveals that not all employees of a religious organization are considered to be engaged in a religious occupation for the purpose of special immigrant classification. The regulation states that positions such as cantor, missionary, or religious instructor are examples of qualifying religious occupations. Persons in such positions would reasonably be expected to perform services directly related to the creed and practice of the religion. The regulation reflects that nonqualifying positions are those whose duties are primarily administrative or secular in nature. The lists of qualifying and nonqualifying occupations derive from the legislative history. H.R. Rpt. 101-723, at 75 (Sept. 19, 1990).

Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) therefore interprets the term "traditional religious function" to require a demonstration that the duties of the position are directly related to the religious creed of the denomination, that the position is defined and recognized by the governing body of the denomination, and that the position is traditionally a permanent, full-time, salaried occupation within the denomination.

According to the petitioner, the beneficiary's duties will include "facilitat[ing] the understanding of the meaning and application of Biblical passages" and providing spiritual, religious-based counseling. The petitioner submits no evidence that this position is traditionally a full-time, compensated position within its denomination and no evidence that the position existed within the petitioning organization prior to the beneficiary assuming the duties.

On appeal, the beneficiary states that she works 35 to 40 hours in the position, teaching children and adults and providing counseling; however, the petitioner submits no evidence of this work. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165.

The record does not establish that the proffered position is that of a religious worker within the meaning of the statute and regulation. This deficiency constitutes an additional ground based on which the petition may not be approved.

Further beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that it has the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this

ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner indicates that it will pay the beneficiary an annual salary of \$24,500 plus health benefits. As evidence of its ability to pay this salary, the petitioner submitted a copy of its financial statements for 2001 and June 30, 2002, accompanied by an accountant's review report.

The above-cited regulation states that evidence of ability to pay "shall be" in the form of tax returns, audited financial statements, or annual reports. The petitioner is free to submit other kinds of documentation, but only in addition to, rather than in place of, the types of documentation required by the regulation. In this instance, the petitioner has not submitted any of the required types of primary evidence.

Accordingly, the evidence submitted is insufficient to establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage as of the filing date of the visa petition. For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.