




U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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FILE: WAC 08 148 51760 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: **DEC 02 2009**

IN RE: Petitioner:   
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).



Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the service center director and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

On the Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, the petitioner states that it provides information technology services, that it was established in 2004, that it employs 11 persons, and that it had a gross annual income of \$1,693,450. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as a “technical consultant” from October 1, 2008 to August 31, 2011. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

On August 21, 2008, the director denied the petition, determining that the petitioner failed to establish that: (1) it meets the regulatory definition of an intending United States employer at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii); (2) it meets the definition of “agent” at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(F); or (3) it submitted a valid labor condition application (LCA) for all locations. The director concluded that the petitioner had not shown that the beneficiary is coming to the United States to perform a specialty occupation.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submits a brief and documentation in support of the appeal and contends that the director’s decision is erroneous.

The record includes: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation filed with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on April 14, 2008; (2) the director’s request for evidence (RFE); (3) the petitioner’s response to the director’s RFE; (4) the director’s denial decision; and, (5) the Form I-290B and counsel’s brief and documentation submitted in support of the appeal. The AAO reviewed the record in its entirety before issuing its decision.

In an attachment appended to the Form I-129 petition, the petitioner indicated the beneficiary would be a “technical consultant” and that she would be responsible for “providing professional computer consulting services in the form of systems analysis, design and development, systems integration and/or testing consulting.” The petitioner provided an overview of the beneficiary’s duties and responsibilities as follows:

- Understand each customer’s Web development and production requirements and goals
- Understand, assess and propose solutions for resolving customer questions and issues
- Design and implement solutions with the Content Management System product suites
- Design and implement workflows to support customer business requirements
- Help the customer transition to their new Enterprise Content Management system and provide knowledge transfer and mentoring

- Build and deliver presentations and solution demonstrations
- Responsibility for the build, delivery and management of proof of concept and pilot projects
- Work with Project Manager to ensure successful product rollout
- Work with customer to provide a solution to the customer's problem(s)  
Provide customers and prospects with service, support, problem solving and escalation
- Training customers on the solution delivered.

The director found the initial evidence insufficient to establish eligibility for the benefit sought, and issued an RFE on June 26, 2008. In the request, among other things, the director: asked that the petitioner submit copies of signed contracts between the petitioner and the beneficiary; requested that the petitioner submit a complete itinerary of services or engagements that specifies the dates of each service or engagement, the names and addresses of the actual employers, and the names and addresses of the establishment, venues, or locations where the services will be performed for the period of time requested; requested that the petitioner submit copies of signed contractual agreements, statements of work, work orders, service agreements, and letters between the petitioner and the authorized officials of the ultimate end-client companies where the work will actually be performed that specifically lists the beneficiary by name on the contracts and provides a detailed description of the duties the beneficiary will perform; and requested copies of the petitioner's state and federal quarterly wage reports. The director noted that the evidence must show specialty occupation work for the beneficiary with the actual end-client company where the work will ultimately be performed.

In a response dated July 30, 2008, counsel for the petitioner stated that the petitioner's "employees work as sub-contractors, providing network planning and consulting services to various vendors throughout the US." Counsel noted that the petitioner has "established agreements with [REDACTED] and that a contract laying out the specific terms of the beneficiary's employment was enclosed. The record includes customer reorder forms that include the petitioner and [REDACTED] names and references a December 27, 2005 contract between the two entities. The record does not include the December 27, 2005 contract. The record also includes statements of work describing the activities as "ECM Support" and the services as "Support and maintain all ECM Environment" and "Support all custom ECM implementations and customizations." The statements of work do not list the beneficiary or other individuals by name. The record further includes the employment agreement between the petitioner and the beneficiary dated March 4, 2008.

As noted above, the director denied the petition on August 21, 2008. The director noted that the record did not include the contract between the petitioner and the third party. The director found that the petitioner subcontracts workers with a variety of computer skills to other companies that need computer programming services. The director concluded that, without evidence of contracts the petitioner had not met its burden of proof demonstrating that it would be the beneficiary's employer. The director also found that without contracts for the beneficiary's services, the petitioner had not shown that the beneficiary would be coming to the United States to perform work in a specialty

occupation. The director found that the petitioner had not established that it is the beneficiary's employer or that it met the definition of United States employer or agent. Moreover, the director determined that without an itinerary or documentation establishing the validity of the submitted contracts, the director could not determine the beneficiary's actual work location; thus, the submitted LCA could not be determined valid.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner meets the requirements of a United States employer and that USCIS had previously determined that the petitioner is a legitimate employer and submits copies of H-1B approval notices in support of this claim. Counsel acknowledges that the petitioner is a consulting firm and asserts that the petitioner employs individuals to provide consulting services for the petitioner's clients at their work site. Counsel contends that the "contracts" previously submitted show that there is work to be performed.

The AAO finds that the primary issue in this matter is whether the petitioner has established that it is offering a specialty occupation position to the beneficiary. Thus, the AAO affirms but will not discuss the director's decision on the issues of whether an employer-employee relationship exists and the validity of the LCA, because the petition is not approvable on the crucial issue of failure to establish that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. The AAO also observes that the crux of the failure to establish eligibility for this benefit is not whether the petitioner has established that it has an ongoing business with clients, but whether the proffered position has been sufficiently described by the company that is utilizing the beneficiary's services to establish the position as a specialty occupation. In that regard, the AAO will examine the various descriptions of the proffered employment in an effort to ascertain the beneficiary's actual duties and whether those duties comprise the duties of a specialty occupation. For purposes of the H-1B adjudication, the issue of *bona fide* employment is viewed within the context of whether the petitioner has offered the beneficiary a position that is determined to be a specialty occupation.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

An occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific

specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Thus, it is clear that Congress intended this visa classification only for aliens who are to be employed in an occupation that requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge that is conveyed by at least a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty.

Consistent with section 214(i)(1) of the Act, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) states that a specialty occupation means an occupation “which [1] requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which [2] requires the attainment of a bachelor’s degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.”

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R.

§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000). To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), USCIS consistently interprets the term “degree” in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such professions. These occupations all require a baccalaureate degree in the specific specialty as a minimum for entry into the occupation and fairly represent the types of professions that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category. To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not simply rely on a position’s title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity’s business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, to determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv) provides that “[a]n H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation shall be accompanied by [d]ocumentation . . . or any other required evidence sufficient to establish . . . that the services the beneficiary is to perform are in a specialty occupation.” Moreover, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv)(A)(1) specifically lists contracts as one of the types of evidence that may be required to establish that the services to be performed by the beneficiary will be in a specialty occupation.

The petitioner’s initial evidence submitted in support of the petition provided an overview of the duties of a “technical consultant.” In response to the director’s RFE, the petitioner provided statements of work that did not list the beneficiary and further did not provide detailed information regarding the actual duties that would be performed pursuant to the statements of work.

The AAO acknowledges the petitioner’s initial assertion that the position of a technical consultant requires a bachelor’s of science degree in computer science, electrical, electronic, telecommunications engineering or an equivalent degree; however, an assertion without the underlying description of actual duties and evidence from the actual user of the beneficiary’s services of the proposed duties is insufficient. General statements and vague descriptions of an occupation do not establish that a specific proffered position is a specialty occupation. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The only information in the record regarding the beneficiary’s duties is the outline initially provided. This outline is insufficient to establish the beneficiary’s actual duties as they relate to the proposed project(s) and to establish that those duties comprise the duties of a specialty occupation. The

description is broadly stated and vague regarding details of the level of support and actual actions that the beneficiary will be expected to perform. The petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that the general outline of duties set out in its description would require a degree beyond that of an associate degree and/or certifications in a particular programming language.

The record is without the underlying evidence of the actual work to be performed or other evidence to support the petitioner's claim that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. As the record in this matter does not include a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's actual duties and the specific duties that the beneficiary will perform as they relate to the petitioner's client's project(s) the beneficiary will work on for the duration of the requested employment period, the petition must be denied. To establish that a specific position in the computer field is a specialty occupation, the petitioner must provide evidence of the nature of the employing organization, the particular projects planned, a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's duties from the ultimate end user of the beneficiary's services, and evidence that the duties described require the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge attained through a baccalaureate program in a specific discipline. In this matter, the petitioner has failed to provide such evidence. Without evidence of work orders or statements of work identifying the beneficiary and describing the specific duties the petitioner and/or the end use company requires the beneficiary to perform, USCIS is unable to discern the nature of the position and whether the position indeed requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge attained through a baccalaureate program. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. Without a meaningful job description, the petitioner may not establish any of the alternate criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

In support of this analysis, USCIS routinely cites *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000), in which an examination of the ultimate employment of the beneficiary was deemed necessary to determine whether the position constitutes a specialty occupation. The petitioner in *Defensor*, Vintage Health Resources (Vintage), was a medical contract service agency that brought foreign nurses into the United States and located jobs for them at hospitals as registered nurses. The court in *Defensor* found that Vintage had "token degree requirements," to "mask the fact that nursing in general is not a specialty occupation." *Id.* at 387.

The court in *Defensor* held that for the purpose of determining whether a proffered position is a specialty occupation, the petitioner acting as an employment contractor is merely a "token employer," while the entity for which the services are to be performed is the "more relevant employer." *Id.* at 388. The *Defensor* court recognized that evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. The *Defensor* court held that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. *Id.*

Without the underlying statements of work that comprehensively describe the work to which the beneficiary will be assigned and describe the beneficiary's actual duties as those duties relate to the petitioner's client's specific projects, the AAO is unable to analyze whether the beneficiary's duties require at least a baccalaureate degree or the equivalent in a specific specialty, as required for classification as a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the position meets any of the requirements for a specialty occupation set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) or that the beneficiary would be coming temporarily to the United States to perform the duties of a specialty occupation as that term is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reason. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.