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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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[redacted]

FILE: WAC 08 146 52708 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: DEC 0 3 2009

IN RE: Petitioner: [redacted]
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. § **103.5(a)(1)(i)**.

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director of the California Service Center denied the nonimmigrant visa petition, and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in the position of programmer analyst as an H-1B nonimmigrant in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The petitioner describes itself as a software consulting firm and indicates that it currently employs 55 persons.

The director denied the petition because the petitioner failed to establish that: (1) it meets the regulatory definition of an intending United States employer or agent as defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(F); (2) the proffered position is a specialty occupation; or (3) a valid Labor Condition Application (LCA) was submitted for all locations.

On appeal, the petitioner submits a brief and additional evidence, and contends that the director erroneously found that the petitioner would not be the beneficiary's employer.

When filing the I-129 petition, the petitioner averred in its March 31, 2008 letter of support that it is an integrated corporation offering a diverse range of products, solutions and services in systems, software, and infrastructure technology. It further claimed that it can provide the required "man power" and resources to allow clients to implement high quality technical solutions, and stated that it provides for "unresolved data processing needs with exceptionally qualified Computer Programmers such as [the beneficiary] on a temporary assignment to work on one of these particular projects." The petitioner concluded by stating that the beneficiary would work at the petitioner's office in Oak Brook, Illinois.

The director found the initial evidence insufficient to establish eligibility for the benefit sought, and issued a request for evidence (RFE) on July 24, 2008. In the request, the director asked the petitioner to submit evidence demonstrating who the actual employer of the beneficiary would be. The director requested documentation such as contractual agreements or work orders from the actual end-client firm where the beneficiary would work. Additionally, the director noted that if the petitioner was acting as an agent, documentation such as an itinerary and a letter discussing the conditions of the employment from the end-client firms must be submitted.

In a response dated September 3, 2008, the petitioner addressed the director's queries. The petitioner explained that the company was a "leading global provider of innovative information technology solutions to Fortune 500 companies and leading business enterprises in different sectors of the economy." It further claimed that the beneficiary would carry out his duties as a programmer analyst in the petitioner's home office in Oak Brook, Illinois and would be assigned to an in-house project called MAXPRO (Maxil Project Management System). The petitioner provided a brief overview of the project, claiming that the beneficiary would plan, design, develop and test computer programs while working on the project. In support of this contention, the petitioner submitted project documentation explaining the MAXPRO project.

In addition, the petitioner also submitted an employment agreement between the petitioner and the beneficiary dated March 15, 2008 which outlined the terms and conditions of the beneficiary's employment. The agreement provided an overview of the beneficiary's salary and benefits, but provided little information

regarding the specific nature of his role in the company. Instead, the agreement simply stated that the beneficiary would "be responsible for the fulfillment of various project tasks." Also submitted by the petitioner in response to the RFE were a large number of sub-contract agreements between clients and the petitioner, as well as letters from clients affirming that employees of Maxil are working onsite at their various offices. It is noted that none of these documents pertain to the beneficiary.

On October 1, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director found that the petitioner is a contractor that subcontracts workers with a variety of computer skills to other companies who need computer programming services. The director concluded that, because the petitioner was a contractor, it was required to submit the requested end contracts and itinerary and, without this documentation, the petitioner could not establish that it met the definition of United States employer or agent. The director also concluded that the evidence of record was insufficient to establish that the beneficiary's services would be used solely for in-house purposes.

The primary issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that it meets the regulatory definition of an intending United States employer. Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Specifically, the AAO must determine whether the petitioner has established that it will have "an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii)(*2*).

Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), defines H-1B nonimmigrants as an alien:

> (i) who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation described in section 1184(i)(1) . . ., who meets the requirements of the occupation specified in section 1184(i)(2) . . ., and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines . . . that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary an application under 1182(n)(1).

"United States employer" is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows:

> *United States employer* means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other association, or organization in the United States which:
>
> (1) Engages a person to work within the United States;
>
> (2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and
>
> (3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number.

Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director's decision. The record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner or its clients will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary.

Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations, it is noted that "employee," "employed," "employment," and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-1B visa classification even though these terms are used repeatedly in both the Act and the regulations, including within the definition of "United States employer" at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act indicates that an alien coming to the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation will have an "intending employer" who will file a labor condition application with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 212(n)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1). The intending employer is described as offering full-time or part-time "employment" to the H-1B "employee." Sections 212(n)(1)(A)(i) and 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(n)(1)(A)(i) and 1182(n)(2)(C)(vii). Further, the regulations indicate that "United States employers" must file Form I-129 in order to classify aliens as H-1B temporary "employees." 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(1) and 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A). Finally, the definition of "United States employer" indicates in its second prong that the petitioner must have an "employer-employee relationship" with the "employees under this part," i.e., the H-1B beneficiary, and that this relationship be evidenced by the employer's ability to "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "United States employer"). Accordingly, neither the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) nor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has defined the terms "employee," "employed," "employment," or "employer-employee relationship" by regulation for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, even though the law describes H-1B beneficiaries as being "employees" who must have an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer."[1] Therefore, for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, these terms are undefined.

The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." *Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden*, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "*Darden*") (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). That definition is as follows:

> In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign

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[1] Under 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(2)(i)(F), it is possible for an "agent" who will not be the actual "employer" of a beneficiary to file an H petition on behalf of the actual employer and the alien. While an employment agency may petition for the H-1B visa, the ultimate end-user of the alien's services is the "true employer" for H-1B visa purposes, since the end-user will "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work" of the beneficiary "at the root level." *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387-8 (5th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, despite the intermediary position of the employment agency, the ultimate employer must still satisfy the requirements of the statute and regulations: "To interpret the regulations any other way would lead to an absurd result." *Id.* at 388.

> additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324; *see also Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958); *Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells*, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (hereinafter "*Clackamas*"). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive." *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting *NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America*, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968).[2]

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[2] While the *Darden* court considered only the definition of "employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and did not address the definition of "employer," courts have generally refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the traditional common law definition." *See, e.g., Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd.*, 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), *aff'd*, 27 F.3d 800 (2nd Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994). However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. *See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).

The regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to employ persons in the United States, *and* to have an "employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an "employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements, thus indicating that the regulations do not indicate an intent to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition." Therefore, in the absence of an intent to impose broader definitions by either Congress or USCIS, the "conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine," and the *Darden* construction test, apply to the terms "employee," "employer-employee relationship," "employed," and "employment" as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). That being said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term "employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.*, section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

Therefore, in considering whether or not one is an "employee" in an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS will focus on the common-law touchstone of control. *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450. Factors indicating that a worker is an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly delineated in both the *Darden* and *Clackamas* decisions. 503 U.S. at 323-324; *see also Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *cf. New Compliance Manual*, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1), (EEOC 2006) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the *Darden* decision); *see also Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 388 (determining that hospitals, as the recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the true "employers" of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the actual petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries).

It is important to note that the factors listed in *Darden* and *Clackamas* are not exhaustive and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *New Compliance Manual* at § 2-III(A)(1).

Likewise, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the worker is an employee. *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, as was true in applying common-law rules to the independent-contractor-versus-employee issue confronted in *Darden*, the answer to whether a shareholder-director is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship . . . with no one factor being decisive.'" *Id.* at 451 (quoting *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324).

Applying the *Darden* and *Clackamas* tests to this matter, the petitioner has not established that it or any of its clients will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee."

On appeal, the petitioner contends that it is the beneficiary's employer, and claims that while the petitioner is in fact a consulting company, the beneficiary would only be working in-house during the course of his employment. The petitioner submits excerpts from the Project Management Institute (PMI) in support of the contention that MAXPRO is a legitimate in-house project. Upon review, however, the AAO is not convinced that the petitioner meets the definition of an employer or agent as contemplated by the regulations. The petitioner, however, contends that based on the documentary evidence submitted in the record, it has met its evidentiary burden.

To qualify as a United States employer, all three criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) must be met. As asserted by the petitioner on appeal, the Form I-129 and the petitioner's tax returns contained in the record indicate that the petitioner has an Internal Revenue Service Tax Identification Number. While the petitioner's

letter of support and the employment agreement between the petitioner and the beneficiary indicates its intent to engage the beneficiary to work in the United States, this documentation alone provides insufficient and somewhat conflicting information regarding the nature of the job offered and the location(s) where the services will be performed. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish that an employer-employee relationship exists or will exist.

Despite the director's specific request in the RFE that the petitioner provide contracts between the petitioner and the beneficiary, or between the petitioner and its end clients, the petitioner did not fully respond to the director's request. The regulations state that the petitioner shall submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. *See* 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(8) and (12). Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14).

The record reflects that the petitioner submitted several documents in support of its claim that it was an employer for purposes of the definition above. The petitioner submitted payroll and tax records demonstrating its payment of wages to employees, in addition to an employment agreement signed by the beneficiary on March 15, 2008. However, while the employment agreement provides a summary of the terms and conditions of the beneficiary's employment, it does not specifically outline the nature of the beneficiary's position for the entire validity period. It merely states that the beneficiary will work on "various project tasks."

This statement is problematic, since an itinerary for the beneficiary's period of stay included in the record indicates that in addition to working in-house, the beneficiary may also work on client sites as necessary. The record also indicates that many of the petitioner's other employees work onsite for clients throughout the United States. For example, in response to the RFE, the petitioner submitted letters from clients such as Northrop Grumman, Technisource, and Capital Group Companies affirming that it was receiving onsite consulting services from employees of the petitioner. In addition, a large number of contracts between the petitioner and clients, including but not limited to Katzen Technologies, ICONMA, LLC and SWCR, LLC were submitted, demonstrating that the petitioner routinely outsources personnel to client sites on an as-needed basis.

In addition, no specific details regarding the exact nature of the beneficiary's employment, or the duration of said employment, is provided. Although the petitioner relies on the documents discussed above as evidence that it is in fact a legitimate employer, the petitioner overlooks the fact that none of these documents pertain to the beneficiary, nor do any of these documents name the beneficiary as a contractor. Moreover, while project documentation for the MAXPRO project is submitted, there is no evidence specifically assigning the beneficiary to this project. Therefore, despite the petitioner's contentions in its March 31, 2008 and September 3, 2008 letters, the exact terms of the beneficiary's employment unclear. It remains unclear, for example, who will oversee and supervise the beneficiary's work, who will provide the computer(s), computer systems, and other tools necessary to perform the assigned duties, and who may assign and/or re-assign projects to the beneficiary. Since none of the documents submitted establish the exact terms and provisions of the beneficiary's employment, the evidence of record is insufficient to show that a valid employment

agreement or credible offer of employment existed or will exist between the petitioner and the beneficiary at the time the petition was filed.

The petitioner also failed to submit an employment contract which specifically outlined the exact nature of the beneficiary's claimed employment relationship with the petitioner. While the petitioner did submit an agreement signed by the petitioner, this agreement merely outlines the beneficiary's salary, benefits, and confidentiality provisions. Since the petitioner acknowledges that it is a consulting company that outsources personnel to client sites as necessary, and has not provided copies of contracts or agreements with these clients which name the beneficiary as a contractor and outline the nature of his services, it has not been established that the beneficiary will be "controlled" by the petitioner or that the beneficiary's employment could be terminated. Merely claiming that the beneficiary will work in-house, when the petitioner is clearly a consulting firm that as a standard practice outsources personnel, is not persuasive. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Therefore, based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it or any of its clients will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

When discussing whether the petitioner was an agent, the director stated that the definition of agent at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(F) provides for two types of agents: (1) "an agent performing the function of an employer"; and (2) "a company in the business as an agent involving multiple employers as the representative of both the employers and the beneficiary." The director found again that, absent documentation such as work orders or contracts between the ultimate end clients and the beneficiary, the petitioner could neither be considered an agent in this matter. As stated above, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165.

The second issue is whether the beneficiary will be employed in a specialty occupation.

It should be noted that for purposes of the H-1B adjudication, the issue of bona fide employment is viewed within the context of whether the petitioner has offered the beneficiary a position that is viewed as a specialty occupation. Of greater importance to this proceeding, therefore, is whether the petitioner has provided sufficient evidence to establish that the services to be performed by the beneficiary are those of a specialty occupation.

Section 214(i)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and

(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii):

> *Specialty occupation* means an occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in field of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must also meet one of the following criteria:

> *(1)* A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
>
> *(2)* The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
>
> *(3)* The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
>
> *(4)* The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 387. To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), USCIS consistently interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate

or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such professions. These occupations all require a baccalaureate degree in the specific specialty as a minimum for entry into the occupation and fairly represent the types of professions that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

In addressing whether the proffered position is a specialty occupation, the record contains insufficient evidence as to where and for whom the beneficiary would be performing his services, and whether his services would be that of a programmer analyst.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv) provides that "[a]n H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation shall be accompanied by [d]ocumentation . . . or any other required evidence sufficient to establish . . . that the services the beneficiary is to perform are in a specialty occupation." Moreover, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv)(A)*(1)* specifically lists contracts as one of the types of evidence that may be required to establish that the services to be performed by the beneficiary will be in a specialty occupation.

The petitioner's letter of support dated March 31, 2008 provided a vague overview of the beneficiary's proposed duties. Specifically, the petitioner stated:

> Programmer Analyst analyzes the client company's data processing requirements to determine the computer software which will best serve those needs, then designs a computer system using that software which then processes the client's data in the most timely and inexpensive manner, and implements the design by overseeing the installation of the necessary system software and its customization to the client's unique requirements.

The petitioner also provided a chart which presented the percentage of time the beneficiary would devote to each of his claimed duties:

25%	Analyses software requirements/user problems to determine feasibility of design within time and cost constraints. Formulate and define scope and objectives through research and fact-finding to develop or modify complex software programming applications or information systems.
5%	Consult with hardware engineers and other engineering staff to evaluate interface between hardware and software, and operational and performance requirements of overall system.
35%	Formulates and designs software system, using scientific analysis and mathematical models to predict and measure outcome and consequences of design. Includes preparation of functional specifications and designing of software programs. Builds detailed design specs. And programs for scientific, engineering, and business applications. Design data conversion software programs.

25%	Develops and directs software systems testing procedures, programming and documentation. Also includes testing units and computer software systems.
5%	Coordinates installation of software system.
5%	Consults with customer concerning maintenance of software system.

No independent documentation, such as agreements with end clients or contracts for the beneficiary to work on specific projects, was submitted. Noting that the petitioner was engaged in an industry that typically outsourced its personnel to client sites to work on particular projects, the director requested documentation such as contracts and work orders, documentation that would outline for whom the beneficiary would render services and what his duties would include at each worksite. Despite the director's specific request for these documents, the petitioner failed to comply. Instead, despite the specific claim in the position description that the beneficiary would "analyzes the client company's data processing requirements to determine the computer software which will best serve those needs," the petitioner maintained that the beneficiary would work solely in-house and not for a client offsite.

Upon review of the evidence, the AAO concurs with the director's findings. The petitioner's letter of support and employment agreement offered in support of the petition provide a generic summary of the duties of a programmer analyst. While the petitioner claims the beneficiary will work in-house, the contracts submitted in the record and the position description of a programmer analyst indicate that the petitioner generally outsources personnel to work at client sites on specific client-mandated projects.

Based on this evidence, it is clear that the beneficiary's duties could potentially vary widely based on the requirements of a client at any given time. Once again, this renders it necessary to examine the ultimate end clients of the petitioner to determine the exact nature and scope of the beneficiary's duties for each client, since it is logical to conclude that the services provided to one client may differ vastly from the services provided to another.

As discussed above, the record contains simply the letter of support and employment agreement, which provide no information regarding the end-clients and their requirements for the beneficiary. Without evidence of contracts, work orders, or statements of work describing the duties the beneficiary would perform and for whom, the petitioner fails to establish that the duties that the beneficiary would perform are those of a specialty occupation. Providing a generic job description that speculates what the beneficiary may or may not do at each worksite is insufficient. Moreover, providing such a generic job description, then contending that the beneficiary will not in fact work to design systems for clients but rather will only work in-house contradicts the basic nature of the petitioner's structure and its regular business operations. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

In support of this analysis, USCIS routinely cites *Defensor v. Meissner,* 201 F.3d 384, in which an examination of the ultimate employment of the beneficiary was deemed necessary to determine whether the

position constitutes a specialty occupation. The petitioner in *Defensor*, Vintage Health Resources (Vintage), was a medical contract service agency that brought foreign nurses into the United States and located jobs for them at hospitals as registered nurses. The court in *Defensor* found that Vintage had "token degree requirements," to "mask the fact that nursing in general is not a specialty occupation." *Id.* at 387.

The court in *Defensor* held that for the purpose of determining whether a proffered position is a specialty occupation, the petitioner acting as an employment contractor is merely a "token employer," while the entity for which the services are to be performed is the "more relevant employer." *Id.* at 388. The *Defensor* court recognized that evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. The *Defensor* court held that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. *Id.* In *Defensor,* the court found that evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical if the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. *Id.*

In this matter, it is unclear whether the petitioner will be an employer or will act as an employment contractor. The job description provided by the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary will be working on client projects and will be assigned to various clients' worksites as necessary. However, various statements by the petitioner in response to the RFE and again on appeal indicates that this is not the case, and that the beneficiary instead will work solely in-house on a petitioner project. Despite the director's specific request for documentation to establish the ultimate location(s) of the beneficiary's employment, the petitioner failed to comply with this request prior to the adjudication of the petition. Moreover, the petitioner's failure to provide specific documentation outlining the nature of the beneficiary's employment renders it impossible to conclude for whom the beneficiary will ultimately provide services and exactly what those services would entail. The AAO, therefore, cannot analyze whether the beneficiary's duties in-house or at each worksite would require at least a baccalaureate degree or the equivalent in a specific specialty, as required for classification as a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the proposed position qualifies as a specialty occupation under any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) or that the beneficiary would be coming temporarily to the United States to perform the duties of a specialty occupation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

For the reasons set forth above, even if the other stated grounds of ineligibility were overcome on appeal, the petitioner has failed to supplement the record with sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary would be performing the duties of a specialty occupation, and the petition cannot be approved for this reason.

The final issue is whether the petitioner submitted a valid LCA for all work locations, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B). The LCA lists Oak Brook, Illinois as the beneficiary's work location. In reviewing the petitioner's supporting documentation, however, the AAO finds that the actual work location(s) for the beneficiary cannot be determined with certainty. The March 31, 2008 letter of support indicates that the beneficiary will be tasked to develop software solutions for clients, and the September 3, 2008 response to the RFE and accompanying letters and contracts from clients indicate that at a minimum, the petitioner's clients are based throughout the United States and possibly globally. For example, a cursory review of some of the client letters and contracts indicate that the petitioner places staff throughout the United States, in locations

including but not limited to San Diego, California, Houston, Texas, and Syracuse, New York. Absent end-agreements with clients, the duration and location of work sites to which the beneficiary will be sent during the course of his employment cannot be determined. Even if the beneficiary were to work on the MAXPRO project for the petitioner at the home office, there is no evidence to negate a finding that the beneficiary would ultimately be outsourced to a client site as deemed necessary during the validity period such that another LCA for that work location would be required. Absent this evidence, the AAO cannot conclude that the LCA submitted is valid for all of the beneficiary's intended work locations. For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The director's decision is affirmed. The petition is denied.