


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals, MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
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FILE: WAC 08 142 50585 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: NOV 10 2009

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]  
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)


ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



**INSTRUCTIONS:**

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

  
Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Director, California Service Center, denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

On the Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, the petitioner states that it provides information technology services, that it was established in 2005, that it employs six persons, and that it had a gross annual income of \$600,000. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as a software engineer from October 1, 2008 to September 24, 2011. Accordingly, the petitioner endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

On August 26, 2008, the director denied the petition, determining that the petitioner failed to establish that: (1) it meets the regulatory definition of an intending United States employer at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii); (2) it meets the definition of “agent” at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(F); or (3) the proffered position is a specialty occupation.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submits a brief and previously provided documentation in support of the appeal, and contends that the director’s decision is erroneous.

The record includes: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation filed with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on April 14, 2008; (2) the director’s request for evidence (RFE); (3) the petitioner’s response to the director’s RFE; (4) the director’s denial decision; and, (5) the Form I-290B, counsel’s brief and documentation submitted in support of the appeal. The AAO reviewed the record in its entirety before issuing its decision.

When filing the Form I-129 petition, the petitioner averred in its March 30, 2008 letter appended to the petition that its primary services included: “IT Staff Augmentation, Business and IT Management Consulting, Application Support, Application Development, Web Services and Outsourcing Solutions.” The petitioner indicated that it needed a software engineer who would be responsible for “coordinating and directing custom program development and implementation, system analysis, design, testing and coding,” would “perform software development activities providing software solutions and designs, making development decisions, implementing products, coordinating post-implementation events such as testing,” and would “provide software support to our clients, which will include debugging and modifying software as per the needs of the client.” The petitioner further indicated that the beneficiary would spend: 30 percent of her time on the analysis of the user needs; 40 percent of her time on planning and coordinating design and development of the modification of applications to meet the client needs; 20 percent of her time testing and implementing the proposed modification and providing support if necessary; and 10 percent of her time on miscellaneous activities.

The petitioner asserted that the position of a software engineer is a professional position and requires the application of technology and principles that can only be gained through the attainment of at least a bachelor’s degree or its foreign equivalent in computer science, information systems, engineering, a related field, or related IT experience.

The director found the initial evidence insufficient to establish eligibility for the benefit sought, and issued an RFE on May 12, 2008. In the request, among other things, the director: asked that the petitioner submit copies of signed contracts between the petitioner and the beneficiary; requested that the petitioner submit a complete itinerary of services or engagements that specifies the dates of each service or engagement, the names and addresses of the actual employers, and the names and addresses of the establishment, venues, or locations where the services will be performed for the period of time requested; requested that the petitioner submit copies of signed contractual agreements, statements of work, work orders, service agreements, and letters between the petitioner and the authorized officials of the ultimate end-client companies where the work will actually be performed that specifically lists the beneficiary by name on the contracts and provides a detailed description of the duties the beneficiary will perform; and requested copies of the petitioner's state and federal quarterly wage reports. The director noted that the evidence must show specialty occupation work for the beneficiary with the actual end-client company where the work will ultimately be performed.

In a response dated June 20, 2008, counsel for the petitioner asserted that the beneficiary would not be contracted out to another employer but would work at the petitioner's headquarters in Fremont, California on an ongoing in-house project called Staff-IT. The record includes a business requirements specification that indicates the need to hire a computer programmer, programmer analyst, systems analyst, and functional analyst for the Staff-IT project. The record also includes a business plan that indicates the Staff-IT project would need one functional consultant and two programmers/technical analysts in the last quarter of 2008, would add two more programmers/technical analysts in the first quarter of 2009, and would add four more programmers/technical analysts and one tester in the second quarter of 2009 and that this would then constitute the number of planned resources for the remaining time on the project.

The petitioner also provided several contracts with third party companies to show that the petitioner is a viable business.

As noted above, the director denied the petition on August 26, 2008. The director noted the number of contracts the petitioner had provided but observed that the agreements did not include the beneficiary's name. The director noted that the petitioner had not provided a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's proposed duties from the company or organization where the beneficiary would ultimately perform services. The director determined that without such information the petitioner had not demonstrated that the proffered position met the statutory definition of specialty occupation. The director also concluded that the petitioner had not established that it qualified as an employer or agent.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner submitted evidence that the beneficiary will be working on the in-house project and not at a client site. Counsel referenced the previous information provided regarding the Staff-IT project and asserts that the petitioner needs the services of a software engineer to deal with its growing needs. Counsel avers that the Staff-IT project is a viable option for the petitioner.

The AAO finds that the paramount issue in this matter is whether the petitioner has established that it is offering a specialty occupation position to the beneficiary. While the AAO affirms the director's decision on the issue of whether an employer-employee relationship exists, we will not discuss this issue as the petition is not approvable on the crucial issue of failure to establish that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. The AAO also observes that the crux of the failure to establish eligibility for this benefit is not whether the petitioner has established that it has an ongoing business with numerous clients, but whether the proffered position has been sufficiently described by the company that is utilizing the beneficiary's services to establish the position as a specialty occupation. In that regard, the AAO will examine the various descriptions of the proffered employment in an effort to ascertain the beneficiary's actual duties and whether those duties comprise the duties of a specialty occupation.

For purposes of the H-1B adjudication, the issue of *bona fide* employment is viewed within the context of whether the petitioner has offered the beneficiary a position that is determined to be a specialty occupation.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

An occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Thus, it is clear that Congress intended this visa classification only for aliens who are to be employed in an occupation that requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge that is conveyed by at least a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty.

Consistent with section 214(i)(1) of the Act, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) states that a specialty occupation means an occupation "which [1] requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which [2] requires the

attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.”

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000). To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), USCIS consistently interprets the term “degree” in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such professions. These occupations all require a baccalaureate degree in the specific specialty as a minimum for entry into the occupation and fairly represent the types of professions that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category. To determine

whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not simply rely on a position's title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity's business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, to determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv) provides that “[a]n H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation shall be accompanied by [d]ocumentation . . . or any other required evidence sufficient to establish . . . that the services the beneficiary is to perform are in a specialty occupation.” Moreover, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv)(A)(1) specifically lists contracts as one of the types of evidence that may be required to establish that the services to be performed by the beneficiary will be in a specialty occupation.

The petitioner's initial evidence submitted in support of the petition provided an overview of a generic computer-related occupation. The petitioner's description of the proposed duties is so unspecific that it is not possible to determine whether the individual in the proffered position would be providing the services of a computer programmer, a computer analyst of some kind, a computer administrator, or of a software engineer. Moreover, upon review of the petitioner's business plan and business requirements specification for its proposed Staff-IT project, submitted in response to the director's RFE, the petitioner listed the resources for this project as a programmer, a programmer analyst, a system analyst, and a functional analyst. The petitioner's plans did not call for the services of a software engineer for the project. As the director found, the record does not include any of the underlying documentation necessary to establish the actual job duties that the beneficiary will provide to the petitioner or to its clients. The AAO acknowledges the petitioner's assertion that the proffered position requires a theoretical and practical application of highly specialized knowledge. However, an assertion without the underlying description of actual duties and evidence from the actual user of the beneficiary's services, even when the user is the petitioner, is insufficient. General statements and broad descriptions of a computer-related occupation do not establish that a specific proffered position is a specialty occupation. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The only information in the record regarding the beneficiary's actual duties is the outline provided in the petitioner's initial letter and again in response to the director's RFE and again on appeal. This outline of generic tasks is insufficient to establish that the beneficiary's actual duties as they relate to the proposed Staff-IT project comprise the duties of a specialty occupation. The description is broadly stated and vague regarding details of the level of support and actual actions that the beneficiary will be expected to perform. The petitioner's plans for the Staff-IT project, likewise, do not provide an understanding of what duties the beneficiary will perform and do not substantiate that any of the actual tasks would require a degree beyond that of a general degree and/or certification in one or more computer programs.

The AAO also notes that the education of a specific individual does not establish that the duties of his or her position comprise the duties of a specialty occupation; rather it is the actual detailed job description that must be analyzed to determine whether a position is a specialty occupation. In this regard, as the director observed, the critical element is not the title of the position or an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation as required by the Act. As the record does not include a detailed description of the beneficiary's actual duties for the petitioner or a client, as those duties relate specifically to a specific project, the petitioner has not established the proffered position is a specialty occupation.

Again, the record is without the underlying evidence of the actual work to be performed or other evidence to support the petitioner's claim that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. As the record in this matter does not include a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's actual duties and does not include a project that requires the beneficiary to perform those duties, the petition must be denied. To establish that a specific position in the computer field is a specialty occupation, the petitioner must provide evidence of the nature of the employing organization, the particular projects planned, a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's duties from the ultimate user of the beneficiary's services, and evidence that the duties described require the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge attained through a baccalaureate program in a specific discipline. In this matter, the petitioner has failed to provide such evidence. Without evidence of work orders or statements of work describing the specific duties the petitioner and/or the end use company requires the beneficiary to perform, USCIS is unable to discern the nature of the position and whether the position indeed requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge attained through a baccalaureate program. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. Without a meaningful job description, the petitioner may not establish any of the alternate criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

In support of this analysis, USCIS routinely cites *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000), in which an examination of the ultimate employment of the beneficiary was deemed necessary to determine whether the position constitutes a specialty occupation. The petitioner in *Defensor*, Vintage Health Resources (Vintage), was a medical contract service agency that brought foreign nurses into the United States and located jobs for them at hospitals as registered nurses. The court in *Defensor* found that Vintage had "token degree requirements," to "mask the fact that nursing in general is not a specialty occupation." *Id.* at 387.

The court in *Defensor* held that for the purpose of determining whether a proffered position is a specialty occupation, the petitioner acting as an employment contractor is merely a "token employer," while the entity for which the services are to be performed is the "more relevant employer." *Id.* at 388. The *Defensor* court recognized that evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. The *Defensor* court held that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably

interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. *Id.*

In this matter, the petitioner provides a generic description of broadly-stated computer-related tasks and contends that these tasks require at least a baccalaureate degree or the equivalent in a specific specialty, as required for classification as a specialty occupation. However, without more specificity in the description of duties and in the actual tasks the beneficiary would perform as those tasks relate to a particular project, the AAO is unable to conclude that the proffered position is that of a software engineer or of any specialty occupation. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the position meets any of the requirements for a specialty occupation set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) or that the beneficiary would be coming temporarily to the United States to perform the duties of a specialty occupation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(B)(1).

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reason. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.