



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)

DATE: AUG 22 2014

OFFICE: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,


Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition. Counsel for the petitioner filed a combined motion to reopen and motion to reconsider. The director dismissed the combined motion. The matter is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The petitioner submitted a Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) to the California Service Center. On the Form I-129 visa petition, the petitioner describes itself as a software design, development and information technology services company established in 2003. In order to employ the beneficiary in what it designates as a "software developer/build and release engineer" position, the petitioner seeks to classify him as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

In the Form I-129 petition, the petitioner stated that it wishes to employ the beneficiary on a full-time basis. In the letter of support, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary will serve as a software developer for its client, [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] Wisconsin.¹ In the Form I-129 petition and Labor Condition Application (LCA), the petitioner indicated the beneficiary's places of employment in [REDACTED] Wisconsin [REDACTED] nonmetropolitan area) and [REDACTED] Illinois [REDACTED] IL Metropolitan Statistical Area).² The petitioner did not request other worksites and did not submit an itinerary. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B) (requiring an itinerary for services performed in more than one location).

The director found the initial evidence insufficient to establish eligibility for the benefit sought, and issued a request for evidence (RFE). The director outlined the evidence to be submitted. Counsel responded to the RFE with a brief and additional evidence. In the response, counsel indicated that the beneficiary was no longer working on the project or at the locations specified in the original petition. Counsel stated the following:

Please note that at the time the Petitioner filed the H-1B petition, Beneficiary was working on the [REDACTED] project for [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] WI. . . . Petitioner has since *reassigned* Beneficiary to another project for another

¹ It must be noted for the record that the petitioner mistakenly and repeatedly referenced the beneficiary in the letter in the feminine pronoun case. The record provides no explanation for this inconsistency. Thus, we must question the accuracy of the letter and whether the information provided is correctly attributed to this particular position and beneficiary.

² With certain limited exceptions, the applicable U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) regulations define the term "place of employment" as the worksite or physical location where the work actually is performed by the H-1B nonimmigrant. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 655.715. The Office of Management and Budget established Metropolitan Statistical Areas to provide nationally consistent geographic delineations for collecting, tabulating and publishing statistics. *See* 44 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(3); 31 U.S.C. § 1104(d); Exec. Order No. 10,253, 16 Fed. Reg. 5605 (June 11, 1951); 75 Fed. Reg. 37,246, 37,246-252 (2010) (discussing and defining, *inter alia*, Metropolitan Statistical Areas).

End-Client – [REDACTED]

With the response, counsel submitted a new LCA that provided a new worksite – in [REDACTED] Wisconsin [REDACTED] WI Metropolitan Statistical Area) – as the beneficiary's place of employment. The worksite is located in a metropolitan statistical area differing from the worksites listed on the original petition.³

The director reviewed the response and concluded that the change in the place of employment of the beneficiary constituted a material change to the terms and conditions of the beneficiary's employment as specified in the original petition. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E), the petitioner was required to file an amended Form I-129 reflecting the change, and to which the new LCA corresponded. The petitioner failed to file an amended petition and, the director denied the petition. Thereafter, counsel filed a combined motion to reopen and motion to reconsider. The director dismissed the combined motion. Counsel submitted an appeal of this decision.

II. PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD

On appeal, counsel references the preponderance of the evidence standard. We note that with respect to the preponderance of the evidence standard, *Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-376 (AAO 2010), states in pertinent part the following:

Except where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.

* * *

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case.

* * *

Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "more likely than not" or "probably" true, the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *INS v. Cardoza-Foncesca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)

³ We observe that [REDACTED] Wisconsin is approximately 100 miles from [REDACTED] Wisconsin.

(discussing "more likely than not" as a greater than 50% chance of an occurrence taking place). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Thus, in accordance with this standard, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) examines each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard does not relieve the petitioner from satisfying the basic evidentiary requirements set by regulation. The standard of proof should not be confused with the burden of proof. Specifically, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing eligibility for the benefit sought. A petitioner must establish that it is eligible for the requested benefit at the time of filing the petition. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *see e.g., Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). As will be discussed, in the instant case, that burden has not been met.

III. THE LCA AND H-1B VISA PETITION PROCESS

In pertinent part, the Act defines an H-1B nonimmigrant worker as:

[A]n alien . . . who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(1) . . . who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) . . . and with respect to whom *the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the [Secretary of Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary [of Labor] an application under section 212(n)(1) . . .*

Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act (emphasis added).⁴

In turn, section 212(n)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A), requires an employer to pay an H-1B worker the higher of either the prevailing wage for the occupational classification in the "area of employment" or the actual wage paid by the employer to other employees with similar experience and qualifications who are performing the same services.⁵ *See* 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a); *Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc.*, 417 F.3d 418, 422 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2005); *Michal Vojtisek-Lom &*

⁴ In accordance with section 1517 of title XV of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, any reference to the Attorney General in a provision of the Act describing functions which were transferred from the Attorney General or other U.S. Department of Justice official to U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by the HSA "shall be deemed to refer to the Secretary" of Homeland Security. *See* 6 U.S.C. § 557 (2003) (codifying HSA, tit. XV, § 1517); 6 U.S.C. § 542 note; 8 U.S.C. § 1551 note.

⁵ The prevailing wage may be determined based on the arithmetic mean of the wages of workers similarly employed in the area of intended employment. 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a)(2)(ii).

Adm'r Wage & Hour Div. v. Clean Air Tech. Int'l, Inc., No. 07-97, 2009 WL 2371236, at *8 (Dep't of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. July 30, 2009).

Implemented through the LCA certification process, section 212(n)(1) is intended to protect U.S. workers' wages by eliminating economic incentives or advantages in hiring temporary foreign workers. *See, e.g.*, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,110, 80,110-111, 80,202 (2000). The LCA currently requires petitioners to describe, *inter alia*, the number of workers sought, the pertinent visa classification for such workers, their job title and occupational classification, the prevailing wage, the actual rate of pay, and the place(s) of employment.

To promote the U.S. worker protection goals of a statutory and regulatory scheme that allocates responsibilities sequentially between the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a prospective employer must file an LCA and receive certification from DOL before an H-1B petition may be submitted to USCIS. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(b)(2).⁶ If an employer does not submit the LCA to USCIS in support of a new or amended H-1B petition, the process is incomplete and the LCA is not certified to the Secretary of Homeland Security. *See* section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(b); *see also* 56 Fed. Reg. 37,175, 37,177 (1991); 57 Fed. Reg. 1316, 1318 (1992) (discussing filing sequence).

In the event of a material change to the terms and conditions of employment specified in the original petition, the petitioner must file an amended or new petition with USCIS with a corresponding LCA. Specifically, the pertinent regulation requires:

The petitioner shall file an amended or new petition, with fee, with the Service Center where the original petition was filed to reflect any material changes in the terms and conditions of employment or training or the alien's eligibility as specified in the original approved petition. An amended or new H-1C, H-1B, H-2A, or H-2B petition must be accompanied by a current or new Department of Labor determination. *In the case of an H-1B petition, this requirement includes a new labor condition application.*

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E) (emphasis added). Furthermore, petitioners must "immediately notify the Service of any changes in the terms and conditions of employment of a beneficiary which may affect eligibility" for H-1B status and, if they will continue to employ the beneficiary, file an amended petition. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(11)(i)(A).

A change in the place of employment of a beneficiary to a geographical area requiring a

⁶ Upon receiving DOL's certification, the prospective employer then submits the certified LCA to USCIS with an H-1B petition on behalf of a specific worker. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A), (2)(i)(E), (4)(iii)(B)(1). DOL reviews LCAs "for completeness and obvious inaccuracies," and will certify the LCA absent a determination that the application is incomplete or obviously inaccurate. Section 212(n)(1)(G)(ii) of the Act. In contrast, USCIS must determine whether the attestations and content of an LCA correspond to and support the H-1B visa petition, including the specific place of employment. 20 C.F.R. § 655.705(b); *see generally* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B).

corresponding LCA be certified to DHS with respect to that beneficiary may affect eligibility for H-1B status and is, therefore, a material change for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E) and (11)(i)(A).⁷ When there is a material change in the terms and conditions of employment, the petitioner must file an amended or new H-1B petition with the corresponding LCA. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E).

IV. ANALYSIS

In this matter, the petitioner claimed in both the Form I-129 and the certified LCA that the beneficiary's places of employment were located in [REDACTED] Wisconsin ([REDACTED] nonmetropolitan area) and [REDACTED] Illinois ([REDACTED] IL Metropolitan Statistical Area). In response to the director's RFE, counsel indicated the beneficiary's places of employment as [REDACTED] Wisconsin ([REDACTED] WI Metropolitan Statistical Area) and [REDACTED] Illinois ([REDACTED] IL Metropolitan Statistical Area).⁸ No other locations were provided.

A change in the terms and conditions of employment of a beneficiary which may affect eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(H) of the Act is a material change. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E); *see*

⁷ This interpretation of the regulations clarifies but does not depart from the agency's past policy pronouncements that "the mere transfer of the beneficiary to another work site, in the same occupation, does not require the filing of an amended petition provided the initial petitioner remains the alien's employer and, provided further, the supporting labor condition application remains valid." *See, e.g.,* Memorandum from T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Exec. Assoc. Comm'r, Office of Programs, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Amended H-1B Petitions 1-2 (Aug. 22, 1996), 73 *Interpreter Releases* No. 35, 1222, 1231-32 (Sept. 16, 1996); *see also* 63 Fed. Reg. 30,419, 30,420 (1998) (stating in pertinent part that the "proposed regulation would not relieve the petitioner of its responsibility to file an amended petition when required, for example, when the beneficiary's transfer to a new work site necessitates the filing of a new labor condition application"). To the extent any previous agency statements may be construed as contrary to this decision, *see, e.g.,* Letter from Efren Hernandez III, Dir., Bus. and Trade Branch, USCIS to Lynn Shotwell, Am. Council on Int'l Pers., Inc. (Oct. 23, 2003), those statements are hereby superseded. We need not decide here whether, for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E), there may be material changes in terms and conditions of employment that do not affect the alien's eligibility for H-1B status but nonetheless require the filing of an amended or new petition.

⁸ The record here indicates that the new place of employment was not a short-term placement. *See generally* 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.715, 655.735. We observe that on appeal, counsel claims that the new place of employment is a short-term placement. However, we note that in the December 14, 2011 letter, submitted in response to the RFE, counsel stated that "[the beneficiary] will continue to work at [REDACTED] on an ongoing long term project with future extensions." No explanation for the variance was provided by counsel.

Further, we observe that counsel stated on appeal that the beneficiary was transferred to the new location in [REDACTED] Wisconsin on November 8, 2011. According to the itinerary, submitted in response to the RFE, the beneficiary will remain at this location until July 14, 2014. Thus, we do not find, that the new work location falls under a "non-worksites" location as described at 20 C.F.R. § 655.715 or a short-term placement or assignment as described at 20 C.F.R. § 655.735.

also id. § 214.2(h)(11)(i)(A) (requiring that a petitioner file an amended petition to notify USCIS of any material changes affecting eligibility of continued employment).⁹

Because section 212(n) of the Act ties the prevailing wage to the "area of employment," a change in the beneficiary's place of employment to a geographical area not covered in the original LCA would be material for both the LCA and the Form I-129 visa petition, as such a change may affect eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(H) of the Act. *See, e.g.,* 20 C.F.R. § 655.735(f). If, for example, the prevailing wage is higher at the new place of employment, the beneficiary's eligibility for continued employment in H-1B status will depend on whether his or her wage for the work performed at the new location will be sufficient. As such, for an LCA to be effective and correspond to an H-1B petition, it must specify the beneficiary's place(s) of employment.¹⁰

Having materially changed the beneficiary's authorized place of employment to a geographical area not covered by the original LCA, the petitioner was required to immediately notify USCIS and file an amended or new H-1B petition, along with a corresponding LCA certified by DOL, with both documents indicating the relevant change.¹¹ 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E), (h)(11)(i)(A). By failing to file an amended petition with a new LCA, or by attempting to submit a preexisting LCA that has never been certified to USCIS with respect to a specific worker, a petitioner may impede efforts to verify wages and working conditions. Full compliance with the LCA and H-1B petition process, including adhering to the proper sequence of submissions to DOL and USCIS, is critical to the U.S. worker protection scheme established in the Act and necessary for H-1B visa petition approval.

V. BEYOND THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION

Specialty Occupation

Finally, beyond the decision of the director, the petition must be denied due to the petitioner's failure to establish that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation in accordance with the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions. As recognized in *Defensor v. Meissner*, it is necessary for the end-client to provide sufficient information regarding the proposed job duties to be performed at its location(s) in order to properly ascertain the minimum educational requirements necessary to perform those duties. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000). In

¹⁰ A change in the beneficiary's place of employment may impact other eligibility criteria, as well. For example, at the time of filing, the petitioner must have complied with the DOL posting requirements at 20 C.F.R. § 655.734. Additionally, if the beneficiary will be performing services in more than one location, the petitioner must submit an itinerary with the petition listing the dates and locations. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(B); *see also id.* § 103.2(b)(1).

¹¹ Here the petitioner submitted a new LCA certified for the beneficiary's places of employment in [REDACTED] WI and [REDACTED] IL in response to the RFE. This LCA was not previously certified to USCIS with respect to the beneficiary and, therefore, it had to be submitted to USCIS as part of an amended or new petition before the beneficiary would be permitted to begin working in those places of employment. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E).

other words, as the employees in that case would provide services to the end-client and not to the petitioning staffing company, the petitioner-provided job duties and alleged requirements to perform those duties were irrelevant to a specialty occupation determination. *See id.*

Here, the record of proceeding is devoid of sufficient information from the end-client, [REDACTED] regarding the job duties to be performed by the beneficiary for that company. The petitioner's failure to establish the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the beneficiary, therefore, precludes a finding that the proffered position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4.

Accordingly, as the petitioner has not established that it has satisfied any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), it cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. Therefore, the petition must be denied for this additional reason.

VI. CONCLUSION

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by us even if the service center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Moreover, when we deny a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it shows that we abused our discretion with respect to all of our enumerated grounds. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683.

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision.¹² In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

¹² As the identified grounds for denial of the petition are dispositive of the petitioner's eligibility, we need not address any additional issues in the record of proceeding.