



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)

DATE: JUL 25 2014

OFFICE: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition, and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

I. INTRODUCTION

On the Form I-129 visa petition, the petitioner describes itself as a 44-employee computer consulting and software development firm¹ established in 2004. In order to employ the beneficiary in what it designates as a full-time "Functional Analyst (M)" position at a salary of \$60,902 per year,² the petitioner seeks to classify her as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The director found the initial evidence insufficient to establish eligibility for the benefit sought, and issued an RFE on August 22, 2013.³ Within the RFE, the director requested specific documentation to establish, *inter alia*, that the petitioner will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary. The director denied the petition, concluding that the evidence of record failed to establish that the petitioner will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary.

The record of proceeding before us contains the following: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's request for additional evidence⁴ (RFE); (3) the petitioner's response to the RFE; (4) the director's letter denying the petition; and (5) the Form I-290B and supporting documentation.

¹ The petitioner provided a North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Code of 541511, "Custom Computer Programming Services." U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, North American Industry Classification System, 2012 NAICS Definition, "541511 Custom Computer Programming Services," <http://www.naics.com/naics-code-description/?code=541511> (last visited July 16, 2014).

² The Labor Condition Application (LCA) submitted by the petitioner in support of the petition was certified for use with a job prospect within the "Management Analysts" occupational classification, SOC (O*NET/OES) Code 13-1111, and a Level I (entry-level) prevailing wage rate, the lowest of the four assignable wage-levels.

³ The record indicates that the director resent the RFE on August 29, 2013.

⁴ On appeal, counsel, referring to a USCIS memorandum, states that it is "unacceptable to issue an RFE for a broad range of evidence – a 'broad brush' RFE – which overburdens customers, over-documents the file and wastes examination resources through the review of unnecessary, duplicative or irrelevant documents." We reviewed the director's RFE and find it appropriate. A service center director may issue an RFE for evidence that he or she may independently require to assist in adjudicating an H-1B petition, and his or her decision to approve a petition must be based upon consideration of all of the evidence as submitted by the petitioner, both initially and in response to any RFE that the director may issue. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)(i). The purpose of an RFE is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (8), and (12).

Upon review of the entire record of proceeding, we find that the evidence of record does not overcome the director's basis for denying this petition. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed, and the petition will be denied.

II. STANDARD OF PROOF

In the exercise of our administrative review in this matter, as in all matters that come within our purview, we follow the preponderance of the evidence standard as specified in the controlling precedent decision, *Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I&N Dec. 369 (AAO 2010), unless the law specifically provides that a different standard applies. In pertinent part, that decision states the following:

Except where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.

* * *

The "preponderance of the evidence" of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case.

* * *

Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "more likely than not" or "probably" true, the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *INS v. Cardoza-Foncesca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (discussing "more likely than not" as a greater than 50% chance of an occurrence taking place). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Id. at 375-76.

Again, we conduct our review of service center decisions on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d at 145. In doing so, we apply the preponderance of the evidence standard as outlined in *Matter of Chawathe*. Upon our review of the present matter pursuant to that standard, however, we find that the evidence in the record of proceeding does not support counsel's contentions that the evidence of record requires that the petition at issue be approved. Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard as stated in *Matter of Chawathe*, we find that the director's determination that

the evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner is a "United States employer" who will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary was correct. Upon our review of the entire record of proceeding, and with close attention and due regard to all of the evidence, separately and in the aggregate, submitted in support of this petition, we find that the evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner's claim of employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary is "more likely than not" or "probably" true. In other words, as the evidentiary analysis of this decision will reflect, the petitioner has not submitted relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads us to believe that the petitioner's claim that it is a "United States employer" who has an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary is "more likely than not" or "probably" true.

In similar fashion, as indicated by our supplemental finding made on appeal regarding the proffered position, the evidence of record also does not lead us to believe that the petitioner's claims that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation and that the petitioner has secured non-speculative employment for the beneficiary are "more likely than not" or "probably" true.

III. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

Based upon a complete review of the record of proceeding, we will note some findings that are material to the determination of the merits of this appeal.

A crucial aspect of this matter is whether the petitioner has adequately described the duties of the proffered position, such that USCIS may discern the nature of the position and whether the position indeed requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge attained through attainment of at least a baccalaureate degree in a specific discipline. In establishing a position as a specialty occupation, a petitioner must describe the specific duties and responsibilities to be performed by a beneficiary, demonstrate that a legitimate need for an employee exists, and substantiate that it has H-1B caliber work for the beneficiary for the period of employment requested in the petition. We find that the petitioner has failed to meet its burden in this regard.

While the petitioner has identified its proffered position as that of a Functional Analyst, the description of the beneficiary's duties, as provided by the petitioner, lacks the specificity and detail necessary to support the petitioner's contention that the position is a specialty occupation. While such a description may be appropriate when defining the range of duties that are performed within an occupation, such a generic description cannot be relied upon by the petitioner when discussing the duties attached to specific employment for H-1B approval as there is insufficient information regarding how the beneficiary's duties will be allocated during the requested validity period. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's overall day-to-day duties, for the entire period requested, would require at least a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty, or the equivalent, as required for classification as a specialty occupation. That is, in establishing a position as a specialty occupation, the description of the proffered position must include sufficient details to substantiate that the petitioner has H-1B caliber work for the beneficiary for the period of employment requested in the petition. In the instant case, the job description fails to communicate (1) the actual work that

the beneficiary would perform on a day-to-day basis; (2) the complexity, uniqueness and/or specialization of the tasks; and/or (3) the correlation between that work and a need for a particular level education of highly specialized knowledge in a specific specialty.

The abstract level of information provided about the proffered position and its constituent duties is exemplified by the petitioner's assertions that the beneficiary is "responsible for business requirement documentation," that she will "support the integration projects," and that she will "assist in functional analysis by collecting and analyzing data." These assertions fail to sufficiently define how these statements translate to specific duties and responsibilities. The phrase "responsible for business requirement documentation" does not delineate the actual work the beneficiary will perform, and the petitioner does not explain the beneficiary's specific role in the documentation of "business requirements." As so generally described, the statement does not illuminate the substantive application of knowledge involved or any particular educational attainment associated with such application. Nor does the petitioner specifically explain how she will "support" whatever "integration projects" she will work upon. The petitioner's statement that the beneficiary will "assist in functional analysis" is deficient because the degree to which she will "assist" is not explained. Nor does the petitioner identify whom she would be providing assistance. The end-client's description of the duties the beneficiary will perform is similarly deficient.

Furthermore, neither the petitioner nor the end-client provides any information with regard to the order of importance and/or frequency of occurrence with which the beneficiary will perform the functions and tasks. Thus, the petitioner failed to specify which tasks are major functions of the proffered position, and it did not establish the frequency with which each of the duties would be performed (e.g., regularly, periodically or at irregular intervals). As a result, the petitioner did not establish the primary and essential functions of the proffered position.

Accordingly, upon review of the record of proceeding, the AAO finds that the overall responsibilities for the proffered position contain insufficient information regarding the particular work, and associated educational requirements, into which the duties would manifest themselves in their daily performance. Furthermore, although the petitioner submitted general documentation regarding its services, the petitioner did not provide sufficient documentation to establish and substantiate the actual job duties and responsibilities of the proffered position. The petitioner failed to establish the beneficiary's specific role within its business operations.

Next, we note that in its November 7, 2013 letter, the end-client stated that it would utilize the services of the beneficiary "through an Independent Contractor Agreement with [the petitioner]." However, that agreement sets up an arrangement whereby the petitioner provides consultants to the end-client, who are then placed at third-party sites. The arrangement proposed in this petition, which will be discussed in further detail below, involves placing the beneficiary to work directly for the end-client, which is not contemplated by the agreement. Moreover, the agreement specifically sets forth the process by which work orders are to be issued so that the petitioner may provide personnel to the end-client. The record of proceeding contains no such work order, and consequently there appears to be no binding agreement between the petitioner and the end-client with regard to the services of the beneficiary.

Finally, the petitioner's failure on appeal to resolve, or even address, two credibility concerns raised by the director in her decision denying the petition undermines the overall credibility of this entire petition. First, we note the following passage from the director's decision:

[Y]ou have submitted a copy of the claimed [end-client's] lease agreement for the [redacted] location. This agreement is made between the landlord, [redacted] and [the petitioner], not [the end-client]. Your leasing of the claimed end-client's business premises leads USCIS to further question the veracity of your claim that the beneficiary will be engaged at the [end-client's] location.

As noted, neither counsel nor the petitioner addresses this finding.

Second, as indicated briefly above, the director stated the following with regard to [redacted] the product upon which the beneficiary would allegedly work:

USCIS has reviewed the [redacted] website . . . and it appears that [redacted] is a functional product, [and is] currently available. . . .

You have submitted no documentation, such as business plans, market analysis, project plans, schedule of deliverables, or development cost projections to establish that an updated version of [redacted] is under development; causing USCIS to review the remaining evidence more closely.

As was the case above, the petitioner does not address, let alone resolve, this credibility issue raised by the director.

IV. EMPLOYER – EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

We will now address the basis of the director's decision: whether the petitioner will have "an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-1B nonimmigrant in pertinent part as an alien:

subject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(1) . . . , who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) . . . , and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the [Secretary of Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary [of Labor] an application under section 212(n)(1)

"United States employer" is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows:

United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other association, or organization in the United States which:

- (1) Engages a person to work within the United States;
- (2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and
- (3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number.

As noted above, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner or any of its clients will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary.

Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), it is noted that the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-1B visa classification. Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act indicates that an alien coming to the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation will have an "intending employer" who will file a Labor Condition Application with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 212(n)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1) (2012). The intending employer is described as offering full-time or part-time "employment" to the H-1B "employee." Subsections 212(n)(1)(A)(i) and 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i), (2)(C)(vii) (2012). Further, the regulations indicate that "United States employers" must file a Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) in order to classify aliens as H-1B temporary "employees." 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(1), (2)(i)(A). Finally, the definition of "United States employer" indicates in its second prong that the petitioner must have an "employer-employee relationship" with the "employees under this part," i.e., the H-1B beneficiary, and that this relationship be evidenced by the employer's ability to "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "United States employer").

Neither the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") nor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") defined the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" by regulation for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, even though the regulation describes H-1B beneficiaries as being "employees" who must have an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer." *Id.* Therefore, for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, these terms are undefined.

The United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." *Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden*, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "*Darden*") (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated:

"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of

agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party."

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324 (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. at 751-752); see also *Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells*, 538 U.S. at 440 (hereinafter "*Clackamas*"). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive." *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting *NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America*, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).

In this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. See generally 136 Cong. Rec. S17106 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. H12358 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). On the contrary, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the regulations define the term "United States employer" to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition.⁵

⁵ While the *Darden* court considered only the definition of "employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and did not address the definition of "employer," courts have generally refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the traditional common law definition." See, e.g., *Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd.*, 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), *aff'd*, 27 F.3d 800 (2nd Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994).

However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 844-845 (1984).

The regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to employ persons in the United States, and to have an "employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an "employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the

Specifically, the regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to engage a person to work within the United States, and to have an "employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an "employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" combined with the agency's otherwise generally circular definition of United States employer in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition" or, more importantly, that construing these terms in this manner would thwart congressional design or lead to absurd results. *Cf. Darden*, 503 U.S. at 318-319.⁶

Therefore, in the absence of an express congressional intent to impose broader definitions, both the "conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine" and the *Darden* construction test apply to the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).⁷

Therefore, in considering whether or not one will be an "employee" in an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS must focus on the common-law touchstone of "control." *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450; *see also*

terms "employee," "employed," "employment" or "employer-employee relationship" indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition." Therefore, in the absence of an intent to impose broader definitions by either Congress or USCIS, the "conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine," and the *Darden* construction test, apply to the terms "employee," "employer-employee relationship," "employed," and "employment" as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). That being said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term "employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.*, section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

⁶ To the extent the regulations are ambiguous with regard to the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship," the agency's interpretation of these terms should be found to be controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." *Auer v. Robbins*, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citing *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 359, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 1850, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (quoting *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*, 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945))).

⁷ That said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term "employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.*, section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining a "United States employer" as one who "has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise *control* the work of any such employee" (emphasis added)).

The factors indicating that a worker is or will be an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly delineated in both the *Darden* and *Clackamas* decisions. *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324; *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 445; *see also* *Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 445; *see also* *New Compliance Manual*, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the *Darden* decision); *see also* *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (determining that hospitals, as the recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the "true employers" of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the actual petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries).

It is important to note, however, that the factors listed in *Darden* and *Clackamas* are not exhaustive and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties relevant to control may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *New Compliance Manual* at § 2-III(A)(1).

Furthermore, when examining the factors relevant to determining control, USCIS must assess and weigh each actual factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or change that factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. *See Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324. For example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the *right to* assign them, it is the *actual* source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, not who has the *right to* provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. *See id.* at 323.

Lastly, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the worker is an employee. *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, . . . the answer to whether [an individual] is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship . . . with no one factor being decisive.'" *Id.* at 451 (quoting *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324).

Applying the *Darden* and *Clackamas* tests to this matter, we find that the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." While such items such as wages, social security contributions, worker's compensation contributions, unemployment insurance contributions, federal and state income tax withholdings, and other benefits are relevant factors in determining who will control an alien beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, e.g., where

will the work be located, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, who will oversee and direct the work of the beneficiary, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the alien beneficiary is assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to make a determination as to who will be the beneficiary's employer.

The petitioner is required to submit written contracts between the petitioner and beneficiary, or if there is no written agreement, a summary of the terms of the oral agreement under which the beneficiary will be employed. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv) states, in pertinent part, the following:

- (A) General documentary requirements for H-1B classification in a specialty occupation. An H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation shall be accompanied by:

* * *

- (B) Copies of any written contracts between the petitioner and beneficiary, or a summary of the terms of the oral agreement under which the beneficiary will be employed, if there is no written contract.

Although the Employment Agreement executed between the petitioner and the beneficiary did not state the address at which the beneficiary would provide her services, it did provide for the possibility of sending her to work at the premises of one of the petitioner's clients. On the Form I-129 the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would work at the petitioner's place of business located at [REDACTED] Geneva, New York and offsite at [REDACTED], Edison, New Jersey, and the LCA was certified for employment at these addresses. The petitioner's March 28, 2013 letter of support indicated a similar arrangement.

In his September 23, 2013 letter, counsel explained that the petitioner's business model is to employ highly skilled software professionals, which it assigns to end-client locations through either direct contracts or through third-party contracts with vendors. As evidence of this business model, the record of proceeding contains a Contractor Agreement executed between the petitioner and [REDACTED], a company doing business as [REDACTED] (hereinafter "[REDACTED]"), which calls for the petitioner to provide personnel to [REDACTED] so that [REDACTED] may place such personnel with its clients. In other words, [REDACTED] would place those personnel at end-client locations.

To the contrary, the petitioner claims that this would not be the arrangement in the beneficiary's case, however. Instead, [REDACTED] would itself be the end-client; the beneficiary would provide her services to [REDACTED] directly, as a Functional Analyst. In its September 23, 2013 letter, the petitioner explained that it "fully anticipate[s] that she will continue to work at [REDACTED] location for the entire duration of her H-1B validity." The petitioner noted, however, that should the [REDACTED] assignment end prior to the expiration of the H-1B period of validity, the beneficiary would return to its premises where she would work directly for the petitioner "till such time as we may choose to assign her to a new project for a new client."

In its two letters dated September 9, 2013 and November 7, 2013, [REDACTED] claimed in very general terms that the beneficiary would work on its product "[REDACTED]," provided several job duties described in broad, bullet-pointed fashion, and repeatedly asserted that it would have no control over the beneficiary's employment. However, as indicated above, neither the petitioner nor [REDACTED] described the duties the beneficiary would perform in meaningful detail such that we are able to ascertain what she would actually be doing and, notably, did not specifically explain her role on the [REDACTED] project. Nor has the petitioner submitted evidence of any projects or other work for the beneficiary to perform should [REDACTED] project conclude prior to the end of the period of requested employment. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)).

Upon review, we find that the record of proceeding fails to demonstrate the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary. The multiple assertions of record regarding the petitioner's claimed control of the beneficiary's employment are acknowledged. Although [REDACTED] identifies the beneficiary's supervisor as an unnamed "Project Lead" employed by the petitioner, the location from which this individual would work is not clear. However, even if such information were provided, the generalized assertions of the petitioner and [REDACTED] with regard to the work that the beneficiary would perform still lack any degree of specificity, and they do not specifically discuss the degree of supervision, direction, or control she would receive.⁸ They are not sufficient to establish that the petitioner would supervise or otherwise control the work of the beneficiary. Likewise, the record contains little information regarding the [REDACTED] project upon which the beneficiary would allegedly work, and the petitioner opted not to respond to the stated concerns of the director regarding the project, which introduces credibility concerns.¹⁰ Nor does the record of proceeding contain an organizational chart or similar evidence to otherwise substantiate the petitioner's supervisory hierarchy, which would lend credence to the petitioner's claim of control over the beneficiary's employment.

We acknowledge the petitioner's assertion on appeal that it would review the beneficiary's work performance. However, the petitioner does provide any information as to the frequency of evaluations for this particular position; the appraisal criteria; how work and performance standards are established for this particular position; the methods for assessing and evaluating the beneficiary's performance; and the criteria for determining bonuses and salary adjustments for this particular position.

⁸ Based upon the wage-level designated by the petitioner on the LCA, the beneficiary would be closely supervised and her work would be closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy. Moreover, she will receive specific instructions on required tasks and expected results.

⁹ If [REDACTED] is a proprietary product of [REDACTED], it is unclear how it would be the *petitioner* who would be assigning the beneficiary's tasks on the project.

¹⁰ Again, it is not apparent that work to be performed on [REDACTED] even exists.

Nor does the employment agreement demonstrate the requisite control, as it only requires to beneficiary to submit "written reports" relating to her "performance" when the petitioner requests that she do so. However, it is unclear how the petitioner will be able to meaningfully evaluate the beneficiary's work performance based upon "written reports" prepared by the beneficiary herself. Nor is it clear how often she will prepare such reports.

For all of these reasons, the evidence of record does not demonstrate the requisite employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary. The beneficiary will not work at the petitioner's location and, absent evidence to the contrary, it also follows that the beneficiary will not use the tools and instrumentalities of the petitioner. While social security contributions, worker's compensation contributions, unemployment insurance contributions, federal and state income tax withholdings, and other benefits are still relevant factors¹¹ in determining who will control an alien beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, e.g., who will oversee and direct the work of the beneficiary, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, where will the work be located, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the alien beneficiary is assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to make a determination as to who will be the beneficiary's employer. Without full disclosure of all of the relevant factors, we are unable to find that the requisite employer-employee relationship will exist between the petitioner and the beneficiary.

The evidence of record, therefore, is insufficient to establish that the petitioner qualifies as a United States employer, as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Merely claiming in its letters that the petitioner exercises complete control over the beneficiary, without evidence supporting the claim, does not establish eligibility in this matter. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. The evidence of record does not establish who would substantially control the beneficiary in her day-to-day work, would determine the specifications and requirements of that work, and would gauge the quality of the beneficiary's performance and hence, ultimately, the beneficiary's acceptability for continued assignment.

Based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Thus, we agree with the director's decision that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary.

¹¹ The method of payment is one of several factors to be considered. Notably, in some instances, a petitioner's role is limited to invoicing and proper payment for the hours worked by a beneficiary. In such cases, with a petitioner's role limited to essentially the functions of a payroll administrator, a beneficiary is even paid, in the end, by the end-client. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 388. It is necessary to weigh and compare on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties in analyzing the facts of each individual case.

V. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION

Beyond the decision of the director, we find additionally that the proffered position is not a specialty occupation. Based upon a complete review of the record of proceeding, we find that the evidence fails to establish that the position as described constitutes a specialty occupation.

For an H-1B petition to be granted, the petitioner must provide sufficient evidence to establish that it will employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation position. To meet its burden of proof in this regard, the petitioner must establish that the employment it is offering to the beneficiary meets the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) states, in pertinent part, the following:

Specialty occupation means an occupation which [(1)] requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which [(2)] requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, a proposed position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that

knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as providing supplemental criteria that must be met in accordance with, and not as alternatives to, the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

As such and consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), USCIS consistently interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. *See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"). Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

The petitioner stated on the Form I-129 that the beneficiary would be employed in a functional analyst position. However, to determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not simply rely on a position's title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity's business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *See generally Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384. The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the evidence in the record of proceeding establishes that performance of the particular proffered position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

We note that, as recognized by the court in *Defensor, supra*, where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner, evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical. See *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 387-388. The court held that the former INS had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. *Id.* at 384. Such evidence must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate the type and educational level of highly specialized knowledge in a specific discipline that is necessary to perform that particular work.

As a preliminary matter and as recognized in *Defensor v. Meissner*, it is necessary for the end-client to provide sufficient information regarding the proposed job duties to be performed at its location(s) in order to properly ascertain the minimum educational requirements necessary to perform those duties. See *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 387-388. In other words, as the nurses in that case would provide services to the end-client hospitals and not to the petitioning staffing company, the petitioner-provided job duties and alleged requirements to perform those duties were irrelevant to a specialty occupation determination. See *id.*

As discussed earlier in this decision, the record of proceeding in this case is similarly devoid of information regarding the specific job duties to be performed by the beneficiary for [REDACTED] the end-client. Furthermore, as we also discussed above, the record does not make clear that a position even exists.¹² The petitioner's failure to submit evidence establishing the substantive nature of the

¹² It is noted that the petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1). A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm'r 1978). As such, eligibility for the benefit sought must be assessed and weighed based on the facts as they existed at the time the instant petition was filed and not based on what were merely speculative facts not then in existence.

The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1B program. A 1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows:

Historically, the Service has not granted H-1B classification on the basis of speculative, or undetermined, prospective employment. The H-1B classification is not intended as a vehicle for an alien to engage in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in temporary foreign workers to meet possible workforce needs arising from potential business expansions or the expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether an alien is properly classifiable as an H-1B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must first examine the duties of the position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). The Service must then determine whether the alien has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the case of speculative employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis and, therefore, is unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1B classification. Moreover, there is no assurance that the alien will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this country.

work to be performed by the beneficiary precludes a finding that the proffered position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4.¹³

Accordingly, as the petitioner has not established that it has satisfied any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), it cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. The appeal will be dismissed and the petition denied on this basis. Thus, even if it were determined that the petitioner had overcome the director's grounds for denying this petition (which it has not), the petition could still not be approved.

VI. CONCLUSION

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. As the grounds discussed above are dispositive of the petitioner's eligibility for the benefit sought in this matter, we will not address and will instead reserve our determination on the additional issues and deficiencies that we observe in the record of proceeding with regard to the approval of the H-1B petition.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by us even if the service center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal.

63 Fed. Reg. 30419, 30419 - 30420 (June 4, 1998). While the petitioner is certainly permitted to petition for H-1B classification on the basis of facts not in existence at the time the instant petition was filed, it must nonetheless file a new petition to have these facts considered in any eligibility determination requested, as the agency may not consider them in this proceeding pursuant to the law and legal precedent cited, *supra*.

¹³ It is noted that, even if the proffered position were established as being that of a management analyst, a review of the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL's) *Occupational Outlook Handbook* (the *Handbook*) does not indicate that, simply by virtue of its occupational classification, such a position qualifies as a specialty occupation in that the *Handbook* does not state a normal minimum requirement of a U.S. bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent for entry into the occupation of management analyst. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, 2014-15 ed., "Management Analysts," <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/business-and-financial/management-analysts.htm#tab-4> (last visited July 16, 2014). As such, absent evidence that the position of functional analyst satisfies one of the alternative criteria available under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), the instant petition could not be approved for this additional reason.

2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Moreover, when we deny a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it shows that we abused our discretion with respect to all of our enumerated grounds. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683.

In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.