



U.S. Citizenship
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JUL 12 2007

FILE: WAC 04 260 51811 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date:

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.


Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The director of the service center denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

The petitioner is a software development and consultancy business that seeks to employ the beneficiary as a programmer/analyst. The petitioner, therefore, endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The director denied the petition based on his determination that the record failed to establish the proffered position as a specialty occupation.

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's request for evidence; (3) the petitioner's response to the director's request; (4) the director's denial letter; and (5) the Form I-290B, with the petitioner's brief. The AAO reviewed the record in its entirety before reaching its decision.

The issue before the AAO is whether the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. To meet its burden of proof in this regard, the petitioner must establish that the job it is offering to the beneficiary meets the following statutory and regulatory requirements.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

An occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;

- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) interprets the term “degree” in the above criteria to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position.

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, CIS does not simply rely on a position’s title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity’s business operations, are factors to be considered. CIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *Cf. Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000). The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer’s self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

The petitioner seeks the beneficiary’s services as a programmer/analyst. Evidence of the beneficiary’s duties includes: the Form I-129; the petitioner’s September 10, 2004 letter in support of the petition; and the petitioner’s January 19, 2005 response to the director’s request for evidence. As stated by the petitioner, the proposed duties are as follows:

As a Programmer/Analyst the beneficiary’s responsibilities will cover Consulting which includes working with the business teams to understand the requirements and provide appropriate solution through SAP configuration and developments, lead a team of consultants and give training in the software package. He will also be responsible for effort estimation of the module, allocating the task among consultants, tracking the module deliverables against the time line, leading the discussions, sort out differences, finalize requirements etc. Apart from this he will also provide technical/functional expertise to fellow consultants on critical configuration/implementation issues/problems.

In his denial, the director found that the record contains no written contract between the petitioner and the beneficiary describing the job duties and terms of employment. The director found further that although the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary would work on software development in Fremont, California, the actual address of the work location is not specified. The director also found that the record contains no

comprehensive description of the beneficiary's proposed duties from an authorized representative of the petitioner's client where the beneficiary will ultimately perform the proposed duties.

On appeal, the petitioner's president states, in part, that the petitioner is the actual employer of the beneficiary. The petitioner submits the following pertinent evidence: a written contract between the petitioner and the beneficiary; a "Business Tax Certificate" and a lease for the petitioner's Fremont, California office; an itinerary for the beneficiary; and a letter from the CEO of Concord Solutions, LLC, one of the businesses included in the beneficiary's itinerary.

The petitioner was put on notice of required evidence and given a reasonable opportunity to provide it for the record before the visa petition was adjudicated. In his November 16, 2004 Request for Evidence (RFE), the director specifically requested an itinerary of definite employment for the beneficiary, and the contractual agreements between the petitioner and the beneficiary. The petitioner's president failed to submit the requested evidence, asserting in his January 19, 2005 letter, in part, that the information pertaining to an itinerary did not pertain to the petitioner and the beneficiary, and now submits it on appeal. However, the AAO will not consider this evidence for any purpose. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Obaighena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988). The appeal will be adjudicated based on the record of proceeding before the director.

Upon review of the record, the petitioner has established none of the four criteria outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). Therefore, the proffered position is not a specialty occupation.

The AAO turns first to the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1) and (2): a baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is the normal minimum requirement for entry into the particular position; a degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations; or a particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree. Factors often considered by CIS when determining these criteria include: whether the *Handbook* reports that the industry requires a degree; whether the industry's professional association has made a degree a minimum entry requirement; and whether letters or affidavits from firms or individuals in the industry attest that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed individuals." *See Shanti, Inc. v. Reno*, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 (D. Minn. 1999)(quoting *Hird/Blaker Corp. v. Sava*, 712 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).

The AAO routinely consults the *Handbook* for its information about the duties and educational requirements of particular occupations. The AAO does not concur with the petitioner that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. Although a review of the Computer Systems Analysts (programmer-analysts) training requirements in the *Handbook*, 2006-07 edition, reflects that a programmer-analyst may qualify as a specialty occupation, the evidence of record provides only a broad overview of the proposed duties. Moreover, the record contains unexplained inconsistencies. Information on the petition that was signed by the petitioner's president on September 10, 2004, reflects that the petitioner has 14 employees. The petitioner's quarterly tax return for the quarter ended on September 30, 2004, however, reflects that the petitioner had only six employees in September 2004. Further, a portion of the petitioner's brief clearly applies to a different beneficiary, as on page 2 of the brief, the petitioner's president names the beneficiary as Pazhayanoor Raman

Balakrishnan. The record contains no explanation for these discrepancies. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988).

Furthermore, the evidence of record establishes that the petitioner is an employment contractor in that the petitioner will place the beneficiary at multiple work locations to perform services established by contractual agreements for third-party companies. The petitioner, however, has provided no contracts, work orders or statements of work describing the duties the beneficiary would perform for its clients and, therefore, has not established the proffered position as a specialty occupation. The court in *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000) held that for the purpose of determining whether a proffered position is a specialty occupation, the petitioner acting as an employment contractor is merely a "token employer," while the entity for which the services are to be performed is the "more relevant employer." The *Defensor* court recognized that evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. The court held that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. As the record does not contain any documentation that establishes the specific duties the beneficiary would perform under contract for the petitioner's clients, the AAO cannot analyze whether these duties would require at least a baccalaureate degree or the equivalent in a specific specialty, as required for classification as a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the proposed position qualifies as a specialty occupation under any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(A) or that the beneficiary would be coming temporarily to the United States to perform the duties of a specialty occupation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(B)(1).

The record does not include any evidence regarding parallel positions in the petitioner's industry. The record also does not include any evidence from firms, individuals, or professional associations regarding an industry standard, or documentation to support the complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position. The petitioner, therefore, has not established the criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1) or (2).

The AAO now turns to the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3) – the employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position. As the record does not contain sufficient evidence of the petitioner's past hiring practices, the petitioner has not met its burden of proof in this regard. The evidence of record does not establish this criterion.

Finally, the AAO turns to the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4) – the nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree. To the extent that they are depicted in the record, the duties do not appear so specialized and complex as to require the highly specialized knowledge associated with a baccalaureate or higher degree, or its equivalent, in a specific specialty. In addition, as discussed herein, the

record is incomplete and contains unresolved inconsistencies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988).

In view of the foregoing, the evidence does not establish that the proffered position is a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4).

As related in the discussion above, the petitioner has failed to establish that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the AAO shall not disturb the director's denial of the petition.

Beyond the decision of the director, the Labor Condition Application (LCA) filed by the petitioner is not valid. The LCA lists the work location as Fremont, California. The letter of support filed with petition indicates that the beneficiary will work both on-site and off-site. When the beneficiary is off site at the petitioner's clients' premises in Dallas, Texas and Dayton, Ohio, he will not be working within the geographical area covered by the LCA. To the extent that beneficiary will provide services to petitioner's clients in Dallas, Texas and Dayton, Ohio, the work would not be covered by the Fremont, California location on the LCA. For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.