


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
FILE: WAC 07 151 50781 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

Date: JUN 03 2008

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

for *Michael T. Kelly*
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The director of the service center denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

The petitioner is a securities and investment consulting firm that seeks to employ the beneficiary as an associate research analyst. The petitioner, therefore, endeavors to extend the classification of the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The petitioner denied the petition on July 5, 2007, on the ground that the petitioner failed to provide a certified Labor Condition Application (LCA) for the correct worksite. The director noted that the LCA indicated the work location as New York, New York, while the Form I-129 stated the work location as Southfield, Minnesota.

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's denial letter; and (3) the Form I-290B and supporting documentation. The AAO reviewed the record in its entirety before reaching its decision.

The issue is whether the petitioner obtained a certified LCA prior to filing the instant petition.

The petition was received at the service center on April 24, 2007, with a certified LCA for a work location in New York, New York. However, the Form I-129 indicated the beneficiary's work location as Southfield, Minnesota. The LCA filed with the H-1B petition was for employment dates from October 1, 2007 until September 30, 2010.

The director denied the petition on the ground that the petitioner failed to provide an LCA for the worksite indicated on the Form I-129. As such, on appeal, the petitioner submitted a new certified LCA from October 1, 2007 until September 30, 2010, with the correct work location of Southfield, Minnesota. The new LCA was certified on July 16, 2007, three months after the instant petition was filed.

On appeal, counsel for the petitioner states that counsel made a clerical error on the initial LCA filed with the instant petition. Counsel also notes that, "there is no prejudice caused as a result of the error" as the "period of employment had not yet begun at the time of the filing of the petition."

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(1) stipulates the following:

Before filing a petition for H-1B classification in a specialty occupation, the petitioner shall obtain a certification from the Department of Labor that it has filed a labor condition application in the occupational specialty in which the alien(s) will be employed.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(B)(1) states that, when filing an H-1B petition, the petitioner must submit with the petition "[a] certification from the Secretary of Labor that the petitioner has filed a labor condition application with the Secretary." Thus, in order for a petition to be approvable, the LCA

must have been certified before the H-1B petition was filed. The submission of an LCA certified subsequent to the filing of the petition satisfies neither 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(1) nor 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(B)(1). CIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(12).

As noted above, the petitioner filed the instant petition with an LCA certified for the employment dates of October 1, 2007 until September 30, 2010; however, the LCA listed an incorrect work location. After the director's denial, the petitioner subsequently submitted a certified LCA for the correct work location as indicated on the Form I-129, with the same employment dates. Since the correct LCA was certified in July 2007, nearly three months after the instant petition was filed, the petitioner did not procure a certified LCA for the correct worksite prior to filing the H-1B petition. There is no provision in the regulations for discretionary relief from the LCA requirements.

The petitioner's failure to procure a certified LCA for the correct worksite prior to filing the H-1B petition precludes its approval, and the AAO will not disturb the director's denial of the petition.

Beyond the decision of the director, the record, as presently constituted, does not demonstrate that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) defines the term "specialty occupation" as one that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

An occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its

particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;

- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) interprets the term “degree” in the above criteria to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position.

The petitioner states that it is seeking to employ the beneficiary to fill the position of associate research analyst. On the Form I-129, the petitioner described the proposed duties as “consult employer & client re: finance & securities.”

In determining whether a proposed position qualifies as a specialty occupation, CIS looks beyond the title of the position and determines, from a review of the duties of the position and any supporting evidence, whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty, as the minimum for entry into the occupation as required by the Act.

The petitioner’s job description is so generic, so nonspecific that it precludes the AAO from determining precisely what tasks the beneficiary would perform for the petitioner on a daily basis. For example, although the petitioner has stated that the beneficiary would be responsible for consulting employers and clients regarding finance and securities, it offers no indication of what applications of a body of highly specialized knowledge in a related specialty would be required of the beneficiary in completing such an examination and analysis. Without this type of description, the AAO is unable to determine whether the responsibilities of the proffered position would require the beneficiary to hold the minimum of a baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent to perform them. Accordingly, it finds the record does not establish that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation under the first criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) – a baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position.

The AAO now turns to a consideration of whether the petitioner, unable to establish its proposed position as a specialty occupation under the first criterion set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(iii)(A), may qualify it under one of the three remaining criteria: a degree requirement is the norm within the petitioner’s industry or the position is so complex or unique that it may be performed only by an individual with a degree; the petitioner normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or the duties of the position are so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to perform them is usually associated with a baccalaureate or higher degree.

The petitioner did not submit sufficient documentation to evidence that the proposed position qualifies as a specialty occupation under either prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2).

The first prong of this regulation requires a showing that a specific degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations. The petitioner has failed to submit any evidence to the record that would serve as proof that the petitioner's degree requirement for the proffered position is common to its industry in parallel positions among similar organizations. Accordingly, the petitioner did not establish that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation under the first prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2).

The AAO also concludes that the record does not establish that the proposed position is a specialty occupation under the second prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2), which requires a demonstration that the position is so complex or unique that it can only be performed by an individual with a degree. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established its position as a specialty occupation under the second prong of the second criterion.

The petitioner has not established that the proposed position qualifies as a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3), which requires a showing that the petitioner normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position. To determine a petitioner's ability to meet this criterion, the AAO normally reviews the petitioner's past employment practices, as well as the histories, including names and dates of employment, of those employees with degrees who previously held the position, and copies of those employees' diplomas. Upon review of the record, the petitioner did not present any documentation of its past employment practices. In the instant case, the petitioner has submitted no evidence regarding its past recruiting and hiring practices with regard to the proffered position or other similarly situated employees. Accordingly, the evidence of record has not established the proffered position as a specialty occupation under the third criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). The petitioner here specifying a degree requirement for the proffered position is not evidence of its normal recruiting and hiring practices.

Further, while the petitioner states that a degree is required, the petitioner's creation of a position with a perfunctory bachelor's degree requirement will not mask the fact that the position is not a specialty occupation. CIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *Cf. Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000). The critical element is not the title of the position or an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation as required by the Act. To interpret the regulations in any other way would lead to absurd results: if CIS were limited to reviewing a petitioner's self-imposed employment requirements, then any alien with a bachelor's degree could be brought into the United States to perform a menial, non-professional, or an otherwise non-specialty occupation, so long as the employer required all such employees to have baccalaureate or higher degrees. *See id.* at 388.

The fourth criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) requires that a petitioner establish that the nature of the specific duties of the position is so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to perform them is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree. In the instant case, the

petitioner has not submitted evidence to establish the requirement under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the AAO has determined that the record fails to establish that the beneficiary would be performing services in a specialty occupation, as defined in section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1).

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis).

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.