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
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

D2



FILE: EAC 07 220 52343 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: SEP 21 2009

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

The petitioner is a software development, engineering, and consulting and company that seeks to employ the beneficiary as a “computer programmer/software engineer.” The petitioner, therefore, endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The director denied the petition on the basis of his determination that the petitioner had failed to establish that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation and that it had submitted a valid labor condition application (LCA).

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains the following: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director’s request for additional evidence; (3) the petitioner’s response to the director’s request; (4) the director’s denial letter; and (5) the Form I-290B and supporting documentation. The AAO reviewed the record in its entirety before issuing its decision.

As a preliminary matter, the AAO withdraws the director’s finding that “the petitioner could be trying to avoid paying the correct ACWIA fees for the numerous petitions filed,” as the current record of proceeding is insufficiently detailed to support such an assessment. Having made that determination, the AAO turns to the substantive issues raised by the director.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term “specialty occupation” as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) states, in pertinent part, the following:

Specialty occupation means an occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in field of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, a proposed position must meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), USCIS consistently interprets the term “degree” in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such professions. These occupations all require a baccalaureate degree in the specific specialty as a minimum for entry into the occupation and fairly represent the types of professions that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

In addressing whether the proffered position is a specialty occupation, the AAO agrees with the director's determination that the record is devoid of documentary evidence as to where and for whom the beneficiary would be performing his services, and therefore whether his services would actually be those of a programmer-analyst, and the petitioner's testimonial evidence is insufficient.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv) provides that "[a]n H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation shall be accompanied by [d]ocumentation . . . or any other required evidence sufficient to establish . . . that the services the beneficiary is to perform are in a specialty occupation." Moreover, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv)(A)(1) specifically lists contracts as one of the types of evidence that may be required to establish that the services to be performed by the beneficiary will be in a specialty occupation.

The petitioner filed the instant petition on July 24, 2007, and outlined the duties proposed for the beneficiary in its June 26, 2007 letter of support. According to the petitioner, the beneficiary would be responsible for performing the following tasks:

- Evaluating user requests for new or modified programs, compatibility with existing systems and computer capabilities;
- Consulting with users to identify current operating procedures and clarifying program objectives;
- Formulating plans;
- Submitting plans to users for approval;
- Preparing flow charts and diagrams to illustrate sequence of steps program must follow and to describe logical steps for coding and computer language;
- Entering codes and commands to run and test programs;
- Detecting and modifying syntax or logic errors; and
- Writing documentation to describe program development, logic, coding, and corrections;
- Assisting users in solving operating problems, providing technical assistance to the user group.

The petitioner stated that it expected for the beneficiary's projects to be executed at client locations in Miami, Florida and Tarrytown, New York.

In his December 17, 2007 request for additional evidence, the director requested, among other items, a detailed itinerary with the dates and locations of services to be performed, as well as a copy of the contract with the end user of the beneficiary's services which specifically mentions the beneficiary and the duties he will perform for that end user.

The petitioner responded to the director's request for additional evidence on January 28, 2008. In his January 11, 2008 letter, counsel stated that the end user of the beneficiary's services would be Siemens Medical Solutions Diagnostics (Siemens), located in Tarrytown, New York. Counsel stated that Siemens had secured the services of the beneficiary via a contract between

the petitioner and CDI Corporation (CDI), which allowed for the provision of personnel to CDI's clients. The petitioner also submitted a December 17, 2007 work order, which stated that the beneficiary had been working for Siemens since November 6, 2006, and that such work would continue through June 16, 2008, as well as a January 2, 2008 letter from Siemens, which also stated that the beneficiary had been working for it since November 6, 2006, and discussed the duties he had been performing.

As was noted previously, the instant petition was filed on July 24, 2007. The work order was issued on December 17, 2007, and the letter from Siemens was prepared on January 2, 2008. As such, neither of these documents existed at the time the petition was filed. The petitioner has failed to establish that when the petitioner filed the petition the petitioner had secured work for the beneficiary to perform during the requested period of employment. USCIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(12). A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). Moreover, as stated in *Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm. 1998), “[t]he AAO cannot consider facts that come into being only subsequently to the filing of the petition.”

Moreover, even if these two documents had been in existence at the time the petition was filed, they would still be deficient, as they do not indicate that the petitioner has secured work for the beneficiary to perform during the entire period of requested employment (October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2010).

Accordingly, the AAO finds that the record fails to contain substantive evidence about any particular project on which the beneficiary would work during the period of requested employment. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

In support of this analysis, USCIS routinely cites *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2000), in which an examination of the ultimate employment of the beneficiary was deemed necessary to determine whether the position constitutes a specialty occupation. The petitioner in *Defensor*, Vintage Health Resources (Vintage), was a medical contract service agency that brought foreign nurses into the United States and located jobs for them at hospitals as registered nurses. The court in *Defensor* found that Vintage had “token degree requirements,” to “mask the fact that nursing in general is not a specialty occupation.” *Id.* at 387.

The court in *Defensor* held that for the purpose of determining whether a proposed position is a specialty occupation, the petitioner acting as an employment contractor is merely a “token employer,” while the entity for which the services are to be performed is the “more relevant employer.” *Id.* at 388. The *Defensor* court recognized that evidence of the client companies' job

requirements is critical where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. The *Defensor* court held that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. *Id.* In *Defensor*, the court found that that evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical if the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. *Id.*

The petitioner's failure to establish the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the beneficiary precludes finding a specialty occupation under any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines: (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4.

Having made that determination, the AAO turns next to the second ground of the director's denial: that the petitioner failed to establish that it had submitted a valid LCA.¹ The AAO agrees. Absent sufficient documentation regarding the projects upon which the beneficiary would work, the AAO cannot conclude that the LCA submitted is valid for the beneficiary's intended work location. The director properly denied the petition on this ground.

As such, the AAO agrees with the director's determination that the petitioner has failed to establish that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation, or that the petitioner has submitted a valid LCA. Also, at a more basic level, as reflected in this decision's discussion of the evidentiary deficiencies, the record lacks evidence that when the petitioner filed the petition, the petitioner had secured work for the beneficiary to perform during the requested period of employment. Again, USCIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(12). A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). For this reason also, the appeal must be denied.

Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO finds that the petition may not be approved for an additional reason: the record of proceeding does not establish that the beneficiary is qualified to perform the duties of a specialty occupation.

¹ The AAO withdraws the director's statements regarding projects to be staffed by the petitioner in Kentucky and work to be performed by the beneficiary in Virginia, which were made in error.

The record indicates that the beneficiary earned a bachelor's degree in commerce in India in 2002. The petitioner submitted an evaluation from Foreign Credentials Evaluations, Inc. (FCE), prepared on April 1, 2005, which stated that the beneficiary's degree involved a three-year course of study. The FCE evaluator stated that the combination of the beneficiary's degree, combined with four years and eight months of work experience, are equivalent to a bachelor's degree in business administration, with a concentration in computer science, from an accredited institution of higher education in the United States. The FCE evaluator also opined that the two training certificates submitted by the beneficiary are equivalent to two years of study in the field of computer science.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C), to qualify to perform services in a specialty occupation, an alien must meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) Hold a United States baccalaureate or higher degree required by the specialty occupation from an accredited college or university;
- (2) Hold a foreign degree determined to be equivalent to a United States baccalaureate or higher degree required by the specialty occupation from an accredited college or university;
- (3) Hold an unrestricted state license, registration or certification which authorizes him or her to fully practice the specialty occupation and be immediately engaged in that specialty in the state of intended employment; or
- (4) Have education, specialized training, and/or progressively responsible experience that is equivalent to completion of a United States baccalaureate or higher degree in the specialty occupation, and have recognition of expertise in the specialty through progressively responsible positions directly related to the specialty.

The first criterion requires a demonstration that the beneficiary earned a baccalaureate or higher degree from a United States institution of higher education. The beneficiary did not earn a degree in the United States, so he does not qualify under this criterion.

Nor does the beneficiary qualify under the second criterion, which requires a demonstration that the beneficiary's foreign degree has been determined to be equivalent to a United States baccalaureate or higher degree required by the specialty occupation from an accredited college or university. While FCE did find that the combination of the beneficiary's degree in commerce and work experience are equivalent to a bachelor's degree in business administration, with a concentration in computer science, this evaluation does not satisfy 8 C.F.R. §

214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(2). In order to qualify under this criterion, the evaluation must be based solely upon the beneficiary's foreign degree.²

The record does not demonstrate, nor has the petitioner contended, that the beneficiary holds an unrestricted state license, registration or certification to practice the specialty occupation, so he does not qualify under the third criterion, either.

The fourth criterion, set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(4), requires a showing that the beneficiary's education, specialized training, and/or progressively responsible experience is equivalent to the completion of a United States baccalaureate or higher degree in the specialty occupation, and that the beneficiary also has recognition of that expertise in the specialty through progressively responsible positions directly related to the specialty. Thus, it is under this criterion that the petitioner must classify the beneficiary's combination of education and work experience. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D), equating a beneficiary's credentials to a United States baccalaureate or higher degree is determined by one or more of the following:

- (1) An evaluation from an official who has authority to grant college-level credit for training and/or experience in the specialty at an accredited

² FCE's determination that the two training certificates are equivalent to two years of study in computer science are not relevant for three reasons. First, the FCE evaluator stated only that these certificates "represent two years of study in Computer Science." She did not specify whether this statement referred to two years of study in a higher education setting. Second, the FCE evaluator specifically stated that it was the combination of the beneficiary's degree in commerce and work experience that equated to a bachelor's degree in business administration with a concentration in computer science. She did not indicate that these training certificates factored into that decision. Third, the AAO challenges the FCE evaluator's determination that these two training certificates are in fact equivalent to years of study in the field of computer science. As noted by the evaluator, the first certificate awarded the beneficiary the title of "GNIIT in Systems Management." As noted by the certificate, this certificate was awarded on the basis of the completion of two years of "instruction," and one year of "professional practice." However, given that the two years of instruction and one year of professional practice occurred at the same time the beneficiary was both earning his degree and gaining the work experience discussed in the evaluation, it is unclear to the AAO how this certificate indicates the attainment of any education or experience not already considered by the FCE evaluator when she assessed the beneficiary's degree and work experience. The second certificate states that the beneficiary has "successfully completed the certificate in Computer course of study and passed the two (2) months Course in Accounting Package [sic]." Again, this certificate was earned at the same time the beneficiary was both earning his degree and gaining the work experience discussed in the evaluation, and it is again unclear to the AAO how this certificate indicates the attainment of any education or experience not already considered by the FCE evaluator when she assessed the beneficiary's degree and work experience. For all of these reasons, the AAO will not consider FCE's determination that the two training certificates are equivalent to two years of study in computer science.

college or university which has a program for granting such credit based on an individual's training and/or work experience;

- (2) The results of recognized college-level equivalency examinations or special credit programs, such as the College Level Examination Program (CLEP), or Program on Noncollegiate Sponsored Instruction (PONSI);
- (3) An evaluation of education by a reliable credentials evaluation service which specializes in evaluating foreign educational credentials;
- (4) Evidence of certification or registration from a nationally-recognized professional association or society for the specialty that is known to grant certification or registration to persons in the occupational specialty who have achieved a certain level of competence in the specialty;
- (5) A determination by the Service that the equivalent of the degree required by the specialty occupation has been acquired through a combination of education, specialized training, and/or work experience in areas related to the specialty and that the alien has achieved recognition of expertise in the specialty occupation as a result of such training and experience.

The beneficiary does not qualify under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(1), as there has been no demonstration that the FCE evaluator who authored the aforementioned evaluation possesses the authority to grant college-level credit for training and/or experience in a computer-related field at an accredited college or university which has a program for granting such credit based on an individual's training and/or work experience in a computer-related field.

No evidence has been submitted to establish, nor has counsel contended, that the beneficiary satisfies 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(2), which requires that the beneficiary submit the results of recognized college-level equivalency examinations or special credit programs, such as the College Level Examination Program (CLEP), or Program on Noncollegiate Sponsored Instruction (PONSI).

Nor does the beneficiary satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(3). As was the case under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(2), the beneficiary is unqualified under this criterion because the FCE evaluation was not based upon education alone.

No evidence has been submitted to establish, nor has the petitioner contended, that the beneficiary satisfies 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(4), which requires that the beneficiary submit evidence of certification or registration from a nationally-recognized professional association or society for the specialty that is known to grant certification or registration to persons in the occupational specialty who have achieved a certain level of competence in the specialty.

Finally, the AAO turns to the fifth criterion. When USCIS determines an alien's qualifications pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5), three years of specialized training and/or work experience must be demonstrated for each year of college-level training the alien lacks. It must be clearly demonstrated that the alien's training and/or work experience included the theoretical and practical application of specialized knowledge required by the specialty occupation; that the alien's experience was gained while working with peers, supervisors, or subordinates who have a degree or its equivalent in the specialty occupation; and that the alien has recognition of expertise in the specialty evidenced by at least one type of documentation such as:

- (i) Recognition of expertise in the specialty occupation by at least two recognized authorities in the same specialty occupation³;
- (ii) Membership in a recognized foreign or United States association or society in the specialty occupation;
- (iii) Published material by or about the alien in professional publications, trade journals, books, or major newspapers;
- (iv) Licensure or registration to practice the specialty occupation in a foreign country; or
- (v) Achievements which a recognized authority has determined to be significant contributions to the field of the specialty occupation.

The evidence of record with regard to the beneficiary's previous work experience is insufficient to establish that this work experience included the theoretical and practical application of specialized knowledge required by the specialty; that it was gained while working with peers, supervisors, or subordinates who held a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in the field; and that he achieved recognition of expertise in the field as evidenced by at least one of the five types of documentation delineated in sections (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5).

Accordingly, the beneficiary does not qualify under any of the criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(1)(2)(3)(4), or (5), and therefore by extension does not qualify under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(4). The petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary qualifies to perform the duties of a specialty occupation. For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.

³ *Recognized authority* means a person or organization with expertise in a particular field, special skills or knowledge in that field, and the expertise to render the type of opinion requested. A recognized authority's opinion must state: (1) the writer's qualifications as an expert; (2) the writer's experience giving such opinions, citing specific instances where past opinions have been accepted as authoritative and by whom; (3) how the conclusions were reached; and (4) the basis for the conclusions supported by copies or citations of any research material used. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation or that the petitioner has submitted a valid LCA. Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO finds further that the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified to perform the duties of a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the AAO will not disturb the director's denial of the petition.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."). *See also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See e.g., Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989).

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.