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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: **NOV 01 2010**

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$585, but will increase to \$630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the \$630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,


Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the nonimmigrant visa petition. The matter is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

The petitioner is a software application design and development company that seeks to temporarily employ the beneficiary as a programmer analyst and extend the beneficiary's classification as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation (H-1B status) pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The requested extension would place the beneficiary beyond the six-year limit imposed by section 214(g)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4).

The director denied the petition because the petitioner had not demonstrated eligibility to extend the validity of the beneficiary's petition and period of stay in the H-1B classification beyond the maximum six-year period of stay in the United States. On appeal, counsel contends that the director erroneously denied the petition.

In general, section 214(g)(4) of the Act provides that "[t]he period of authorized admission [of an H-1B nonimmigrant] may not exceed 6 years." However, the amended "American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act" (AC21) removes the six-year limitation on the authorized period of stay in H-1B status for certain aliens whose labor certification applications or employment-based immigrant petitions remain undecided due to lengthy adjudication delays and broadens the class of H-1B nonimmigrants who may avail themselves of this provision.

Section 106 of AC21, as amended by sections 11030(A)(a) and (b) of the "Twenty-First Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act" (DOJ21), reads as follows:

- (a) EXEMPTION FROM LIMITATION – The limitation contained in section 214(g)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4)) with respect to the duration of authorized stay shall not apply to any nonimmigrant alien previously issued a visa or otherwise provided nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(B) of such Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(B)), if 365 days or more have elapsed since the filing of any of the following:
 - (1) Any application for labor certification under section 212(a)(5)(A) of such Act (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)), in a case in which certification is required or used by the alien to obtain status under section 203(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)).
 - (2) A petition described in section 204(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. § 1154(b)) to accord the alien a status under section 203(b) of such Act.
- (b) EXTENSION OF H-1B WORKER STATUS – The Attorney General shall extend the stay of an alien who qualifies for an exemption under subsection (a) in one year increments until such time as a final decision is made –

- (1) to deny the application described in subsection (a)(1), or, in a case in which such application is granted, to deny a petition described in subsection (a)(2) filed on behalf of the alien pursuant to such grant;
- (2) to deny the petition described in subsection (a)(2); or
- (3) to grant or deny the alien's application for an immigrant visa or for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

The record of proceeding before the AAO includes (1) Form I-129 and supporting documentation for a seventh year extension, filed on June 3, 2009; (2) the notice of decision, dated June 9, 2009; and (3) Form I-290B and counsel's appeal brief.

The record indicates that the beneficiary has been in the United States in H-1B classification since November 23, 2002. On June 3, 2009, the petitioner applied for a one-year extension of H-1B status for the beneficiary, valid from May 29, 2009 until May 29, 2010, which would have placed the beneficiary beyond his six-year limit. The petitioner submitted evidence demonstrating that an Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, Form I-140 (SRC 09 800 07097) was filed with the Texas Service Center on behalf of the beneficiary on December 19, 2008.

In denying the petition, the director noted that while the I-140 petition was pending at the time of filing, it had not been pending for more than 365 days prior to the filing of extension request. The director further noted that, while the pending I-140 petition was actually the second immigrant petition based on the original labor certification, a new clock started for both documents upon the filing of the second petition.

On appeal, counsel contends that the beneficiary is qualified for a 7th year extension because the pending I-140 petition is based on a labor certification that has been pending for more that 365 days. Counsel concludes that the director's denial was erroneous, and submits a brief and additional evidence in support of this contention.

The record indicates that the beneficiary's former employer, [REDACTED] filed a Form ETA-750 with the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) on behalf of the beneficiary on March 23, 2005. The form was certified, and a Form I-140 petition based on this labor certification was filed by [REDACTED] on July 27, 2007 [REDACTED]. That petition was denied on July 17, 2008, and a subsequent motion to reopen, filed on August 20, 2008, was dismissed on November 4, 2008.

The record further indicates that, subsequent to the denial of the above-referenced petition, [REDACTED] and the petitioner merged with a company identified as [REDACTED] effective October 1, 2008. According to the Articles of Merger submitted into the record, it was determined that the name of the new company would be that of the petitioner. The petitioner, as successor-in-interest of [REDACTED] subsequently filed an I-140 petition on December 19, 2008 [REDACTED] on behalf of the beneficiary based on the original labor certification used by [REDACTED]. The petitioner concludes, therefore, that since the labor

certification upon which the pending I-140 was based had been pending for more than 365 days at the time of filing the instant petition, the beneficiary is eligible for a 7th year extension.

The AAO disagrees.

The AAO acknowledges that, in the absence of fraud, a labor certification remains valid indefinitely for the purpose of filing a future I-140 petition by the same sponsoring employer or its successor-in-interest on behalf of the same beneficiary if it is filed with an I-140 petition within its 180 validity period. According to the DOL Perm Fraud rule, as set out at 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(b)(2), labor certifications approved prior to July 16, 2007 must have been filed in support of an I-140 petition within 180 calendar days after the effective date of the DOL final rule (July 16, 2007) in order to be valid. The labor certification in this matter was filed on March 23, 2005. Therefore, an I-140 petition based on this labor certification must have been filed by January 12, 2008. Since [REDACTED] filed an I-140 application based on this labor certification on July 27, 2007, the validity of the labor certification is not at question.

However, the basis for the petitioner's claim in this matter is flawed. The petitioner contends that since the labor certification in this matter was pending for more than 365 days prior to the filing of the instant petition, the beneficiary is qualified for a 7th year extension. Section 106(b)(1) of AC21, as amended, specifically indicates that the one-year extension of stay should not be granted once a final decision is made to deny the I-140 immigrant petition that was filed pursuant to the granted labor certification. The Form I-140 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker that was filed on the beneficiary's behalf by Primetech was denied on July 17, 2008, and the petitioner's motion to reopen of that denial was dismissed on November 4, 2008. Since the I-140 was denied based on the approved labor certification filed on March 23, 2005, the petitioner may not use that labor certification for the current H-1B extension petition. Neither the plain language of the statute nor the pertinent legislative history indicate that Congress intended to permit an alien beneficiary to have his or her stay indefinitely extended in a temporary, nonimmigrant classification based on a prior, approved labor certification once the I-140 petition filed using that labor certification is denied. To otherwise permit a petitioner to thereafter repeatedly file I-140 petition(s), whether frivolous or not, based on that same labor certification in order to permit the indefinite extension of stay in a temporary H-1B nonimmigrant status of the alien beneficiary would be demonstrably at odds with the Act as a whole, with regard to immigrant versus nonimmigrant classification, as well as with the plain language of Section 106 of AC21, as amended.¹

¹ It is further noted that at the time the petition was filed in this matter the alien beneficiary was ineligible for an extension of "stay" in H-1B status pursuant to §§ 106(a) and (b) of AC21, as amended, for the additional reason that he was not physically present in the United States in a "nonimmigrant" status. In general, according to the text of section 106(b) of AC21, aliens may have their "stay" extended in the United States in one-year increments pursuant to an exemption under section 106(a) of AC21. While it is recognized that the title of section 106(b) of AC21 reads "Extension of H-1B Worker Status," in this situation, however, where the title uses the word "[s]tatus" and the text uses the word "stay," the text of the statute prevails. The title of a statutory section is not controlling, and where it is contrary to the text of the statute, the text is controlling. *Immig. and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr*, 533 U.S. 289, 308-309 (2001).

Be that as it may, the petitioner, as successor-in-interest to [REDACTED] has provided a receipt notice for a second I-140 filing based on the above-referenced labor certification which was received by USCIS on December 19, 2008. Thus, while the Form I-140 was pending at the time this current petition for H-1B extension was filed on June 3, 2009, the Form I-140 was not pending for more than 365 days. Rather, the Form I-140 was pending for less than six months when the current H-1B extension petition was filed. Therefore, the beneficiary does not meet the requirement that (1) 365 days or more have passed since the filing of any application for labor certification (Form ETA 750) that is required or used by the alien to obtain status as an employment based immigrant; or (2) 365 days or more have passed since the filing of the employment based immigrant petition (Form I-140). See § 106(a) of AC21, as amended by § 11030A(a) of DOJ21; see generally Memorandum from William R. Yates, Associate Director for Operations, Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, *Interim Guidance for Processing Form I-140 Employment-Based Immigrant Petitions and Form I-485 and H-1B Petitions Affected by American Competitiveness in the Twenty First Century Act of 2000 (AC21)(Public Law 106-313)*. HQPRD 70/6.2.8-P (May 12, 2005). Accordingly, the AAO shall not disturb the director's denial of the petition.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that it meets the regulatory definition of an intending United States employer. § 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Specifically, the AAO must determine whether the petitioner has established that it will have "an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii)(2).

Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, defines an H-1B nonimmigrant as an alien:

(i) who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation described in section 1184(i)(1) . . ., who meets the requirements of the occupation specified in section 1184(i)(2) . . ., and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines . . . that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary an application under 1182(n)(1).

"United States employer" is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows:

United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other association, or organization in the United States which:

- (1) Engages a person to work within the United States;
- (2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and

- (3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number.

The record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner or any of its clients will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary.

Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations, it is noted that "employee," "employed," "employment," and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-1B visa classification even though these terms are used repeatedly in both the Act and the regulations, including within the definition of "United States employer" at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act indicates that an alien coming to the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation will have an "intending employer" who will file a labor condition application with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 212(n)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1). The intending employer is described as offering full-time or part-time "employment" to the H-1B "employee." Sections 212(n)(1)(A)(i) and 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(n)(1)(A)(i) and 1182(n)(2)(C)(vii). Further, the regulations indicate that "United States employers" must file Form I-129 in order to classify aliens as H-1B temporary "employees." 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(1) and 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A). Finally, the definition of "United States employer" indicates in its second prong that the petitioner must have an "employer-employee relationship" with the "employees under this part," i.e., the H-1B beneficiary, and that this relationship be evidenced by the employer's ability to "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "United States employer"). Accordingly, neither the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) nor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has defined the terms "employee," "employed," "employment," or "employer-employee relationship" by regulation for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, even though the law describes H-1B beneficiaries as being "employees" who must have an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer."² Therefore, for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, these terms are undefined.

The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." *Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden*, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "*Darden*") (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). That definition is as follows:

² Under 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(2)(i)(F), it is possible for an "agent" who will not be the actual "employer" of a beneficiary to file an H petition on behalf of the actual employer and the alien. While an employment agency may petition for the H-1B visa, the ultimate end-user of the alien's services is the "true employer" for H-1B visa purposes, since the end-user will "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work" of the beneficiary "at the root level." *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387-388 (5th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, despite the intermediary position of the employment agency, the ultimate employer must still satisfy the requirements of the statute and regulations: "To interpret the regulations any other way would lead to an absurd result." *Id.* at 388.

“In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.”

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324 (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. at 751-752); see also *Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958); *Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells*, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (hereinafter "*Clackamas*"). As the common-law test contains “no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.” *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting *NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America*, 390 U.S. at 258 (1968)).³

³ While the *Darden* court considered only the definition of "employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and did not address the definition of "employer," courts have generally refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the traditional common law definition." See, e.g., *Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd.*, 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), *aff'd*, 27 F.3d 800 (2nd Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994). However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).

The regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to employ persons in the United States, and to have an "employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an "employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements, thus indicating that the regulations do not indicate an intent to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition." Therefore, in the absence of an intent to impose broader definitions by either Congress or USCIS, the "conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine," and the *Darden* construction test, apply to the terms "employee," "employer-employee relationship," "employed," and "employment" as used in

Therefore, in considering whether or not one is an "employee" in an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS will focus on the common-law touchstone of control. *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450. Factors indicating that a worker is an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly delineated in both the *Darden* and *Clackamas* decisions. 503 U.S. at 323-324; *see also Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *cf. New Compliance Manual*, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1), (EEOC 2006) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the *Darden* decision); *see also Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 388 (determining that hospitals, as the recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the true "employers" of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the actual petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries).

It is important to note that the factors listed in *Darden* and *Clackamas* are not exhaustive and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *New Compliance Manual* at § 2-III(A)(1).

Likewise, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the worker is an employee. *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, as was true in applying common-law rules to the independent-contractor-versus-employee issue confronted in *Darden*, the answer to whether a shareholder-director is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship . . . with no one factor being decisive.'" *Id.* at 451 (quoting *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324).

Applying the *Darden* and *Clackamas* tests to this matter, the petitioner has not established that it or any of its clients will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee."

section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). That being said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term "employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.*, section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

The petitioner claimed, in its letter of support dated May 22, 2009, that it “delivers business and technology solutions to a wide range of Fortune 500 companies, multinationals, and successful small and medium enterprises around the globe.” It further indicated that it has branch offices in India, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Singapore, Malaysia, and Bahrain. However, the record contains no evidence, such as contracts and/or work orders between the petitioner and end clients, to support the petitioner’s claimed business structure.

To qualify as a United States employer, all three criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) must be met. The Form I-129 submitted by the petitioner indicates that the petitioner has an Internal Revenue Service Tax Identification Number. While the petitioner’s letter of support indicates its intent to engage the beneficiary to work in the United States, no specific agreement of contract was submitted demonstrating an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary, or between the petitioner and end clients for the services of the beneficiary. Therefore, the documentation submitted by the petitioner is insufficient to establish that an employer-employee relationship exists or will exist between the petitioner and the beneficiary.

The petitioner did not submit any document which outlined in detail the nature and scope of the beneficiary’s employment. Therefore, the key element in this matter, which is who exercises ultimate control over the beneficiary, has not been substantiated.

The petitioner indicates that, based on its expansive client base across the globe, it will assign personnel to various client projects as needed. However, no evidence establishing who will oversee and direct the work of the beneficiary, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, where will the work be located, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the alien beneficiary is assigned, has been submitted. Therefore, the AAO cannot make a determination as to who will be the beneficiary’s employer. Without full disclosure of all of the relevant factors, the AAO is unable to find that the requisite employer-employee relationship will exist between the petitioner and the beneficiary.

The evidence, therefore, is insufficient to establish that the petitioner qualifies as a United States employer, as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Merely claiming in its support letter that the petitioner exercises complete control over the beneficiary, without evidence supporting the claim, does not establish eligibility in this matter. The evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner would act as the beneficiary’s employer in that it will hire, pay, fire, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiary.

Based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it or any of its clients will be a “United States employer” having an “employer-employee relationship” with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary “employee.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

Likewise, the petitioner is not an agent as defined by the regulations. The definition of agent at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(F) provides for two types of agents: (1) “an agent performing the function of an employer”; and (2) “a company in the business as an agent involving multiple employers as the representative of both the employers and the beneficiary.” Absent documentation such as work orders or contracts between the ultimate

end clients and the beneficiary, the petitioner cannot be considered an agent in this matter. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

It must also be noted that for purposes of the H-1B adjudication, the issue of bona fide employment is viewed within the context of whether the petitioner has offered the beneficiary a position that is determined to be a specialty occupation. Therefore, of greater importance to this proceeding, although not addressed by the director, is whether the petitioner has provided sufficient evidence to establish that the services to be performed by the beneficiary are those of a specialty occupation.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii):

Specialty occupation means an occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or

- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 387. To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) consistently interprets the term “degree” in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such professions. These occupations all require a baccalaureate degree in the specific specialty as a minimum for entry into the occupation and fairly represent the types of professions that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

In addressing whether the proffered position is a specialty occupation, the record is devoid of any documentary evidence as to where and for whom the beneficiary would be performing his services, and whether his services would be that of a programmer analyst.⁴

⁴ It is noted that, even if the proffered position were established as being that of a programmer analyst, a review of the U.S. Department of Labor’s *Occupational Outlook Handbook* (hereinafter the *Handbook*) does not indicate that such a position qualifies as a specialty occupation in that the *Handbook* does not state a normal minimum requirement of a U.S. bachelor’s or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent for entry into the occupation of programmer analyst. *See* Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, 2010-11 Edition, “Computer Systems Analysts,” <<http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos287.htm>> and “Computer Software Engineers and Computer Programmers,” <<http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos303.htm>> (accessed October 25, 2010). As such, absent evidence that the position of programmer analyst qualifies as a specialty occupation under one of the alternative criteria

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv) provides that “[a]n H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation shall be accompanied by [d]ocumentation . . . or any other required evidence sufficient to establish . . . that the services the beneficiary is to perform are in a specialty occupation.” Moreover, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv)(A)(I) specifically lists contracts as one of the types of evidence that may be required to establish that the services to be performed by the beneficiary will be in a specialty occupation.

As discussed above, the petitioner claimed in its May 22, 2009 letter that it “delivers business and technology solutions to a wide range of Fortune 500 companies, multinationals, and successful small and medium enterprises around the globe,” and that it has branch offices around the world. With regard to the beneficiary, the petitioner stated that he will be supervised by a project manager and will perform duties such as reviewing proposals, resolving data processing problems, and training end users on established programs. Other than this letter, however, the petitioner provided no details regarding the project(s) upon which the beneficiary would work, the location(s) of such projects, and/or the duration of his assignment(s) and the exact nature of his duties.

The petitioner, as a software development company, is engaged in an industry that typically outsources its personnel to client sites to work on particular projects. However, the record is devoid of evidence regarding the nature of the beneficiary’s day to day duties. Without evidence of contracts, work orders, or statements of work describing the duties the beneficiary would perform and for whom, the petitioner fails to establish that the duties that the beneficiary would perform are those of a specialty occupation. Providing a generic job description that speculates what the beneficiary may or may not do at each worksite is insufficient. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

In support of this analysis, USCIS routinely cites *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, in which an examination of the ultimate employment of the beneficiary was deemed necessary to determine whether the position constitutes a specialty occupation. The petitioner in *Defensor*, Vintage Health Resources (Vintage), was a medical contract service agency that brought foreign nurses into the United States and located jobs for them at hospitals as registered nurses. The court in *Defensor* found that Vintage had “token degree requirements,” to “mask the fact that nursing in general is not a specialty occupation.” *Id.* at 387.

The court in *Defensor* held that for the purpose of determining whether a proffered position is a specialty occupation, the petitioner acting as an employment contractor is merely a “token employer,” while the entity for which the services are to be performed is the “more relevant employer.” *Id.* at 388. The *Defensor* court recognized that evidence of the client companies’ job requirements is critical where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. The *Defensor* court held that the legacy Immigration and

available under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), the instant petition could not be approved for this additional reason.

Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. *Id.* In *Defensor*, the court found that that evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical if the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. *Id.*

In this matter, it is unclear whether the petitioner will be an employer or will act as an employment contractor. Since the record is devoid of evidence such as a credible offer of employment and/or work orders or employment contracts between the petitioner and its clients, it is impossible to conclude for whom the beneficiary will ultimately provide services and exactly what those services would entail. The AAO, therefore, cannot analyze whether the beneficiary's duties at each worksite would require at least a baccalaureate degree or the equivalent in a specific specialty, as required for classification as a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the proposed position qualifies as a specialty occupation under any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) or that the beneficiary would be coming temporarily to the United States to perform the duties of a specialty occupation as that term is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a *de novo* basis). For the reasons set forth above, even if a bona fide offer of employment was found to exist, the petitioner has failed to supplement the record with sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary would be performing the duties of a specialty occupation, and the petition cannot be approved for this additional reason.

The appeal will be dismissed and the petition denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.