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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

b2



DATE: **DEC 29 2011** OFFICE: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will remain denied.

The petitioner represented itself on the Form I-129 as an information systems development and consulting company with 25 employees. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as a market research analyst pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The director denied the petition on the basis of her determination that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation.

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains the following: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's request for additional evidence; (3) the petitioner's response to the director's request for additional evidence; (4) the director's denial letter; and (5) the Form I-290B and supporting documentation. The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). Upon review of the entire record, we find that the petitioner has failed to overcome the director's ground for denying this petition. Beyond the decision of the director, we find additionally that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the petition is supported by a certified labor condition application (LCA) which corresponds to it.

Counsel cites *Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-376 (AAO 2010) on appeal, notes correctly that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard applies to this matter, and asserts that under that standard the petitioner established clearly that its proposed position is a specialty occupation. With respect to the preponderance of the evidence standard, *Chawathe* states, in pertinent part:

Except where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.

* * *

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case.

* * *

Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "more likely than not" or "probably" true, the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *INS v. Cardoza-Foncesca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (discussing "more likely than not" as a greater than 50% chance of an occurrence taking place). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the

director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-376. In applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, we find, as stated above and set forth below, that the petitioner has failed to overcome the director's ground for denial of this petition.

The Proposed Position Does Not Qualify For Classification as a Specialty Occupation

The first issue before us on appeal is whether the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation. To meet its burden of proof in this regard, the petitioner must establish that the employment it is offering to the beneficiary meets the following statutory and regulatory requirements.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) defines the term "specialty occupation" as one that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

An occupation which requires [1] theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires [2] the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or

- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) consistently interprets the term “degree” in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

In the January 6, 2010 letter it submitted in response to the director’s request for additional evidence, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would spend between fifty and sixty percent of his time determining research methodologies, designing formats for the gathering of data, and examining and analyzing statistical data in order to forecast marketing trends; between twenty and thirty percent of his time researching market conditions in Ohio and nationwide in order to ascertain the market potential for the petitioner’s products and services; between twenty and thirty percent of his time gathering data on competitors and analyzing prices, sales, and methods of marketing; and between ten and twenty percent of his time collecting data on customer preferences and habits and preparing reports for management reflecting his research, analysis, and recommendations.

In making our determination whether the proposed position qualifies as a specialty occupation, we turn first to the criteria at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1) and (2): a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent is the normal minimum requirement for entry into the

particular position; and a degree requirement in a specific specialty is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or a particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree in a specific specialty. Factors considered by the AAO when determining these criteria include: whether the Department of Labor's *Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook)*, on which we routinely rely for the educational requirements of particular occupations, reports the industry requires a degree in a specific specialty; whether the industry's professional association has made a degree in a specific specialty a minimum entry requirement; and whether letters or affidavits from firms or individuals in the industry attest that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed individuals." *See Shanti, Inc. v. Reno*, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 (D. Minn. 1999) (quoting *Hird/Blaker Corp. v. Sava*, 712 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).

The petitioner contends that the duties of the proposed position align with those of a market research analyst, as the duties of that occupation are described in the *Handbook*. We agree. However, the *Handbook* does not indicate that entry into market research analyst positions normally requires at least a bachelor's degree, or its equivalent, in a specific specialty. *Handbook*, 2010-11 ed., available at <http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos013.htm> (last accessed December 15, 2011).

While the *Handbook* reports that a baccalaureate degree is the minimum educational requirement for many market and survey research jobs, it does not indicate that the degrees held by such workers must be *in a specific specialty* that is directly related to market research, as would be required for the occupational category to be recognized as a specialty occupation. *See id.* This is evident in the range of qualifying degrees indicated in the Significant Points section that introduces the *Handbook's* chapter "Market and Survey Researchers," which states the following: "Market and survey researchers can enter the occupation with a bachelor's degree, but those with a master's or Ph.D. in marketing or a social science should enjoy the best opportunities." *Id.*

That the *Handbook* does not indicate that market research analyst positions normally require at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty is also evident in the following discussion located in the "Training, Other Qualifications, and Advancement" section of its chapter "Market and Survey Researchers," which does not specify a particular major or academic concentration:

A bachelor's degree is the minimum educational requirement for many market and survey research jobs. However, a master's degree is usually required for more technical positions.

In addition to completing courses in business, marketing, and consumer behavior, prospective market and survey researchers should take social science courses, including economics, psychology, and sociology. Because of the importance of quantitative skills to market and survey researchers, courses in mathematics, statistics, sampling theory and survey design, and computer science are extremely helpful. Market and survey researchers often earn advanced degrees in business administration, marketing, statistics, communications, or other closely related disciplines.

Id. Because the *Handbook* indicates that entry into this field does not normally require a degree in a specific specialty, it does not support the proposed position as being a specialty occupation. While the *Handbook* reports that a baccalaureate degree is the minimum educational requirement for many positions, it does not indicate that the degrees held by such workers must be *in a specific specialty*, as would be required for the occupational category to be recognized as a specialty occupation.

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not rely simply upon a proposed position's title. The specific duties of the position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity's business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the beneficiary, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *See generally Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d at 384. The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree *in the specific specialty* as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

As the evidence of record does not establish that the particular position proposed here is one for which the normal minimum entry requirement is a baccalaureate or higher degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty closely related to the position's duties, the petitioner has not satisfied the first criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(I).

Nor do we find convincing counsel's citation to the Department of Labor's *Occupational Information Network (O*NET™ Online)*. *O*NET™ Online* is not particularly useful in determining whether a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is a requirement for a given position, as *O*NET™ Online*'s JobZone assignments make no mention of the specific field of study from which a degree must come. As was noted previously, USCIS interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. With regard to the Specialized Vocational Preparation (SVP) rating, we note that an SVP rating is meant to indicate only the total number of years of vocational preparation required for a particular position. It does not describe how those years are to be divided among training, formal education, and experience and it does not specify the particular type of degree, if any, that a position would require. Again, USCIS interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. For all of these reasons, the *O*NET™ Online* excerpt is of little evidentiary value to the issue presented on appeal.

We turn next to a consideration of whether the petitioner, unable to establish its proposed position as a specialty occupation under the first criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(iii)(A), may qualify it under one of the three remaining criteria: a degree requirement as the norm within the petitioner's industry or the position is so complex or unique that it may be performed only by an individual with a degree; the petitioner normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or the duties of the position are so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to perform them is usually associated with a baccalaureate or higher degree.

The petitioner has not satisfied the first of the two alternative prongs at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2). This prong alternatively requires a petitioner to establish that a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is common to the petitioner's industry in positions that are both: (1) parallel to the proposed position; and (2) located in organizations that are similar to the petitioner.

Again, in determining whether there is such a common degree requirement, factors often considered by USCIS include: whether the *Handbook* reports that the industry requires a degree; whether the industry's professional association has made a degree a minimum entry requirement; and whether letters or affidavits from firms or individuals in the industry attest that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed individuals." See *Shanti, Inc. v. Reno*, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 (quoting *Hird/Blaker Corp. v. Sava*, 712 F. Supp. at 1102).

As already discussed, the petitioner has not established that its proposed position is one for which the *Handbook* reports an industry-wide requirement for at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty. Nor has the petitioner submitted evidence that the industry's professional associations have made a degree in a specific specialty a minimum requirement for entry.

Finally, the petitioner's reliance upon the job vacancy advertisements is misplaced. First, it has not submitted any evidence to demonstrate that these advertisements are from companies "similar" to the petitioner. There is no evidence that the advertisers are similar to the petitioner in size, scope, and scale of operations, business efforts, and expenditures. Nor is there any evidence in the record as to how representative these advertisements are of the advertisers' usual recruiting and hiring practices. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Furthermore, although the companies that placed these particular advertisements do require at least a bachelor's degree, their advertisements establish, at best, that although a bachelor's degree is generally required, a bachelor's degree, or its equivalent, *in a specific specialty*, is not required.¹

¹ According to the *Handbook's* detailed statistics on market research analysts, there were approximately 249,800 persons employed as market research analysts in 2008. *Handbook* at <http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos013.htm> (last accessed December 15, 2011). Based on the size of this relevant study population, the petitioner fails to demonstrate what statistically valid inferences, if any, can be drawn from just thirty job postings with regard to determining the common educational requirements for entry into parallel positions in similar organizations. See generally Earl Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research* 186-228 (1995). Moreover, given that there is no indication that the advertisements were randomly selected, the validity of any such inferences could not be accurately determined even if the sampling unit were sufficiently large. See *id.* at 195-196 (explaining that "[r]andom selection is the key to [the] process [of probability sampling]" and that "random selection offers access to the body of probability theory, which provides the basis for estimates of population parameters and estimates of error").

As such, even if the job announcements supported the finding that the proposed position requires a bachelor's or higher degree *in a specific specialty* or its equivalent, it cannot be found that such a limited number of postings that appear to have been consciously selected could credibly refute the statistics-based

For all of these reasons, the petitioner has not satisfied the first alternative prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2).

We also conclude that the record does not establish that the proposed position is a specialty occupation under the second alternative prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2), which provides that “an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree.” The evidence of record does not refute the *Handbook’s* information to the effect that there is a spectrum of degrees acceptable for market research analyst positions, including degrees not in a specific specialty related to market research analysis. The record lacks sufficiently detailed information to distinguish the proposed position as unique from or more complex than market research analyst positions that can be performed by persons without a specialty degree or its equivalent.

We turn next to the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3), which requires that the petitioner demonstrate that it normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position. To determine a petitioner’s ability to meet the third criterion, we normally review the petitioner’s past employment practices, as well as the histories, including the names and dates of employment, of those employees with degrees who previously held the position, and copies of those employees’ diplomas.² However, the record lacks any such evidence.

The fourth criterion, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4), requires the petitioner to establish that the nature of its proposed position’s duties is so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to perform them is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specialty. As previously discussed, the *Handbook* indicates that a baccalaureate degree *in a specific specialty* is not a normal minimum entry requirement. The petitioner has failed to differentiate the duties of the proposed position from those performed by market research analysts who do not possess a degree from a specific specialty and, as such, has failed to indicate the specialization and complexity required by this criterion. As a result, the record fails to establish that the proposed position meets the specialized and complex threshold at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4).

findings of the *Handbook* published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics that such a position does not require at least a baccalaureate degree *in a specific specialty* for entry into the occupation in the United States.

² Even if a petitioner believes or otherwise asserts that a proposed position requires a degree, that opinion alone without corroborating evidence cannot establish the position as a specialty occupation. Were USCIS limited solely to reviewing a petitioner’s claimed self-imposed requirements, then any individual with a bachelor’s degree could be brought to the United States to perform any job so long as the employer artificially created a token degree requirement, whereby all individuals employed in a particular position possessed a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty or its equivalent. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d at 387. In other words, if a petitioner’s degree requirement is only symbolic and the proposed position does not in fact require such a specialty degree or its equivalent to perform its duties, the occupation would not meet the statutory or regulatory definition of a specialty occupation. *See* section 214(i)(1) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term “specialty occupation”). Here, the petitioner has failed to establish the referenced criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3) based on its normal hiring practices.

We are not persuaded by counsel's citation to *Unical Aviation, Inc. v. INS*, 248 F. Supp. 2d 931 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The material facts of the present proceeding are distinguishable from those in *Unical Aviation*. In contrast to the present proceedings, *Unical Aviation* involved: a position for which there was a companion position held by a person with an master's degree in business administration; a record of proceeding that included an organizational chart showing that all of the employees in the beneficiary's department held degrees; and "sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there [was] a requirement of specialized study for [the beneficiary's] position." None of those factors are present here. Furthermore, the court in *Unical Aviation* relied partly upon *Augat, Inc. v. Tabor*, 710 F.Supp. 1158 (D. Mass. 1989) for the proposition that the legacy INS had not used an absolute degree requirement in applying the "profession" standard at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32) for determining the merits of an 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) third-preference immigrant visa petition. However, the instant case involves a petition for nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, not a third-preference immigrant visa petition. As such, that standard is not relevant here.

The proposed position does not qualify for classification as a specialty occupation under any of the criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1)-(4), and this petition was properly denied.

The Petitioner Has Failed To Establish that the Petition is Supported by an LCA Which Corresponds to It

Beyond the decision of the director, we note that the certified LCA provided in support of the instant petition lists a Level I prevailing wage level for market research analysts in Columbus, Ohio. This indicates that the LCA, which is certified for an entry-level position, is at odds with the statements by counsel and the petitioner regarding the complexity of the duties to be performed by the beneficiary.

Given that the LCA submitted in support of the petition is for a Level I wage,³ it must therefore be concluded that either (1) the position is a low-level, entry position relative to other market research analysts; or that (2) the LCA does not correspond to the proposed petition.

While the DOL is the agency that certifies LCA applications before they are submitted to USCIS, DOL regulations note that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (i.e., its immigration benefits branch, USCIS) is the department responsible for determining whether the content of an

³ According to guidance regarding wage level determination issued by the DOL in 2009 entitled *Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance*, at page 7, Level I wage rates, which are labeled as "entry" rates, "are assigned to job offers for beginning level employees who have only a basic understanding of the occupation. These employees perform routine tasks that require limited, if any, exercise of judgment. The tasks provide experience and familiarization with the employer's methods, practices, and programs. The employees may perform higher level work for training and developmental purposes. These employees work under close supervision and receive specific instructions on required tasks and results expected. Their work is closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy. Statements that the job offer is for a research fellow, a worker in training, or an internship are indicators that a Level I wage should be considered."

LCA filed for a particular Form I-129 actually supports that petition. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 655.705(b), which states, in pertinent part, the following:

For H-1B visas . . . DHS accepts the employer's petition (DHS Form I-129) with the DOL certified LCA attached. *In doing so, the DHS determines whether the petition is supported by an LCA which corresponds with the petition*, whether the occupation named in the [LCA] is a specialty occupation or whether the individual is a fashion model of distinguished merit and ability, and whether the qualifications of the nonimmigrant meet the statutory requirements of H-1B visa classification.

(Italics added). The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 655.705(b) requires that USCIS ensure an LCA actually supports the H-1B petition filed on behalf of the beneficiary. Here, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the petition is supported by an LCA which corresponds to the petition, and the petition must be denied for this additional reason.

Conclusion

The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation. Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the petition is supported by an LCA which corresponds to the petition.⁴ Accordingly, the beneficiary is ineligible for nonimmigrant classification under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act and this petition must remain denied.

The petition will remain denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met and the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

⁴ An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d at 145 (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).