


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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Date: **JUL 28 2011** Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The director of the California Service Center denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

The petitioner claims to be an information technology development firm. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as a Programmer Analyst pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that: 1) the proffered position is a specialty occupation; 2) the petitioner qualifies as a U.S. employer or agent; 3) the petitioner submitted a Labor Condition Application (LCA) covering all employment locations; and 4) the petitioner is in compliance with the terms and conditions of employment.

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains: (1) Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's request for additional evidence (RFE) and the petitioner's response to the RFE; (3) the director's denial letter; and (4) Form I-290B, with counsel's brief and supporting materials. The AAO reviewed the record in its entirety before reaching its decision.

In the petition submitted on April 1, 2009, the petitioner stated it has 42 employees and a gross annual income of \$4.6 million. The petitioner indicated that it wished to employ the beneficiary as a Programmer Analyst from October 1, 2009 to September 15, 2012 at an asserted annual salary of \$60,000.

The petitioner's April 1, 2009 support letter states that the beneficiary will:

[b]e involved in the analysis, modification, design, and continued development and implementation of software and system components from the inception of projects *to completion for clients* of [the petitioner]. She will work to *meet clients' ongoing software needs* through systems analysis, integration, upgrading, and ongoing support. She will utilize her skills and academic background to review, design, and create new software products *to improve clients' existing system*, and coordinate the implementation of new software to ensure compatibility and cohesive response in the overall network. . . .

(Emphasis added.)

According to the support letter, the proffered duties can be broken down into the following responsibilities: :

- Software development cycle, including design, development, and unit testing (30% of the beneficiary's time);
- Requirement gathering, development of new reports, writing functional specifications and program specification, technical design, coding reviews and drafting detailed unit test plans (30% of the beneficiary's time);
- Running various reports and monitoring process scheduler, implementing password controls (10% of the beneficiary's time);

- Creating, planning, designing, and execution of test scenarios, test cases, test script procedures and debugging (15% of the beneficiary's time); and
- Working with the Quality Control team during integration testing and resolving any issues uncovered during the debugging process (15% of the beneficiary's time).

The petitioner states that the proffered duties will be performed at the petitioner's headquarters and that the proffered position requires at least a Bachelor's degree or the equivalent in Computer Science or a related field.

The petitioner submitted the beneficiary's foreign education documents along with an education evaluation, indicating that she has the equivalent of a U.S. Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering.

On May 26, 2009, the director issued an RFE stating, in part, that the evidence of record is not sufficient to demonstrate that a specialty occupation exists. The petitioner was advised to submit documentation clarifying the petitioner's relationship with the beneficiary, which could include an itinerary of definite employment, listing the names of the employers and locations where the beneficiary would provide services, as well as copies of its contractual agreements with its clients. The RFE specifically noted that "[t]he evidence should show specialty occupation work with the actual end-client company where the work will ultimately be performed. . . ." The director also requested information regarding the specific project on which the beneficiary would work if the duties are to be performed in-house as well as evidence regarding the petitioner's business.

Counsel for the petitioner responded that the beneficiary will work in-house at the petitioner's offices on a quality analyst project that is expected to last for three years.

Counsel's response to the RFE also includes an undated letter bearing the signature of the petitioner's president, which, notably, refers to the beneficiary both as a quality analyst and as a software engineer, neither of which is the proffered position's title. Further, the letter states a different set of duties than those specified in the support letter that the petitioner filed with the Form I-129. In contrast to and in conflict with the duties quoted earlier in this decision from the initial support letter, the undated letter submitted with the RFE states that the beneficiary will perform the following different duties:

- Trouble shooting, managing test director activities, and reporting test case execution results (40% of the time);
- Preparing test plans and guiding a team of testers (30% of the time);
- Creating, planning, designing and executing test scenarios, test cases, test script procedures, and debugging (15% of the time); and
- Work with the quality control team during integration testing and resolving any issues uncovered during the debugging process (15% of the time).

The RFE reply also includes the petitioner's offer letter to the beneficiary. It states that the petitioner is an information technology staffing and consulting firm, and tells the beneficiary "[y]our base salary for this position will be calculated based on your bill rate achieved at an 80-

20 consultant to company model and the benefits package that you choose. The expected rate of pay for your position is at the rate of \$60,000 per year and overtime pay.” Further, the offer letter states, “[y]ou will also receive [a] business development bonus based at a \$1000.00 per consultant hired into the company and/or placed on a client project for a term of 3 months or longer.”

The copy of the 2007 U.S. corporate Income Tax Return submitted by the petitioner indicates that it is in the business of providing computer consultants. The petitioner provided copies of contracts it has with its clients. However none of these contracts pertain to the specific project on which the beneficiary will allegedly work.

The director denied the petition on July 25, 2009.

Although counsel references the beneficiary by her correct name, it appears that counsel mistakenly submitted a brief that was based on a denial issued regarding another beneficiary. Counsel refers to documentation previously submitted regarding an REM-EDI software project on which the beneficiary would allegedly work. However, no documentation was submitted regarding an REM-EDI software project in support of this petition. Instead, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would work on quality control.

The AAO finds it appropriate at this point of the decision to state, as a finding sufficient in itself to dismiss this appeal, that the discrepancies and conflicts of information noted so far with regard to this petition fatally undermine the credibility of the petition. Accordingly, this lack of credibility is itself one separate and independent ground upon which the AAO will dismiss this appeal.

Nonetheless, the AAO will proceed to discuss why the position does not otherwise qualify as a specialty occupation based on the evidence of record.

To meet its burden of proof in this regard, the petitioner must establish that the employment it is offering to the beneficiary meets the following statutory and regulatory requirements.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) defines the term “specialty occupation” as one that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term “specialty occupation” is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

An occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not

limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position;
or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) consistently interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such

occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

To make its determination whether the employment described qualifies as a specialty occupation, the AAO turns to the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1) and (2): a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent is the normal minimum requirement for entry into the particular position; and a degree requirement in a specific specialty is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or a particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree in a specific specialty. Factors considered by the AAO when determining these criteria include: whether the Department of Labor's *Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook)*, on which the AAO routinely relies for the educational requirements of particular occupations, reports the industry requires a degree in a specific specialty; whether the industry's professional association has made a degree in a specific specialty a minimum entry requirement; and whether letters or affidavits from firms or individuals in the industry attest that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed individuals." See *Shanti, Inc. v. Reno*, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 (D. Minn. 1999) (quoting *Hird/Blaker Corp. v. Sava*, 712 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not simply rely on a position's title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity's business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. See generally *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384. The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

In this matter, the petitioner seeks the beneficiary's services as a Programmer Analyst. To the extent that the proposed duties are described in the record of proceeding, it is not evident that their actual performance would require the theoretical and practical application of at least a bachelor's degree level of a body of highly specialized knowledge in a specific specialty.

In this regard, the AAO finds that, regardless of the job title applied to them, the duties are described in terms of generic and generalized functions – for example, responsible for software development cycle, responsible for requirement gathering, and responsible for working with the Quality Control team - that convey neither the substantive nature of the work that the beneficiary would actually perform nor a need for a particular level of education, or educational equivalency, in a specific specialty in order to perform that work. Consequently, regardless of the job title ascribed to the proffered position, the record of proceeding lacks an evidentiary foundation that would satisfy any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). This overarching, fundamental deficiency is adequate reason in itself to dismiss this appeal.

The AAO further notes that even if the petitioner could demonstrate that the proffered position is that of a programmer analyst and that the beneficiary will work for the duration of the petition at the petitioner's offices,¹ the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the proffered position is a specialty occupation.

The Programmer Analyst occupational category is encompassed in two sections of the *Handbook* (2010-11 online edition) – “Computer Software Engineers and Computer Programmers” and “Computer Systems Analysts.”

The *Handbook* describes computer programmers as follows:

[C]omputer programmers write programs. After computer software engineers and systems analysts design software programs, the programmer converts that design into a logical series of instructions that the computer can follow (A section on computer systems analysts appears elsewhere in the Handbook.). The programmer codes these instructions in any of a number of programming languages, depending on the need. The most common languages are C++ and Python.

Computer programmers also update, repair, modify, and expand existing programs. Some, especially those working on large projects that involve many programmers, use computer-assisted software engineering (CASE) tools to automate much of the coding process. These tools enable a programmer to concentrate on writing the unique parts of a program. Programmers working on smaller projects often use “programmer environments,” applications that increase productivity by combining compiling, code walk-through, code generation, test data generation, and debugging functions. Programmers also use libraries of basic code that can be modified or customized for a specific application. This approach yields more reliable and consistent programs and increases programmers' productivity by eliminating some routine steps.

As software design has continued to advance, and some programming functions have become automated, programmers have begun to assume some of the responsibilities that were once performed only by software engineers. As a result, some computer programmers now assist software engineers in

¹ As stated in the petitioner's offer letter to the beneficiary, the beneficiary's salary is based on the consultancy billing rate. However, the petitioner has stated that the beneficiary will not work as a consultant, but instead will be employed at the petitioner's offices to work on an in-house project for the duration of the petition. Therefore, the evidence contradicts the petitioner's statement that the beneficiary will be employed in-house for the duration of the petition. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). This is another fundamental inconsistency that materially undermines the credibility of this petition.

identifying user needs and designing certain parts of computer programs, as well as other functions. . . .

* * *

[M]any programmers require a bachelor's degree, but a 2-year degree or certificate may be adequate for some positions. Some computer programmers hold a college degree in computer science, mathematics, or information systems, whereas others have taken special courses in computer programming to supplement their degree in a field such as accounting, finance, or another area of business. . . .

The *Handbook's* section on computer systems analysts reads, in pertinent part:

In some organizations, programmer-analysts design and update the software that runs a computer. They also create custom applications tailored to their organization's tasks. Because they are responsible for both programming and systems analysis, these workers must be proficient in both areas. (A separate section on computer software engineers and computer programmers appears elsewhere in the Handbook.) As this dual proficiency becomes more common, analysts are increasingly working with databases, object-oriented programming languages, client-server applications, and multimedia and Internet technology.

* * *

[W]hen hiring computer systems analysts, employers usually prefer applicants who have at least a bachelor's degree. For more technically complex jobs, people with graduate degrees are preferred. For jobs in a technical or scientific environment, employers often seek applicants who have at least a bachelor's degree in a technical field, such as computer science, information science, applied mathematics, engineering, or the physical sciences. For jobs in a business environment, employers often seek applicants with at least a bachelor's degree in a business-related field such as management information systems (MIS). Increasingly, employers are seeking individuals who have a master's degree in business administration (MBA) with a concentration in information systems.

Despite the preference for technical degrees, however, people who have degrees in other areas may find employment as systems analysts if they also have technical skills. Courses in computer science or related subjects combined with practical experience can qualify people for some jobs in the occupation. . . .

Therefore, the *Handbook's* information on educational requirements in the programmer analyst occupation indicates that a bachelor's or higher degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty

is not a normal minimum entry requirement for this occupational category. Rather, the occupation accommodates a wider spectrum of educational credentials.

As evident above, the information in the *Handbook* does not indicate that programmer analyst positions normally require at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty. While the *Handbook* indicates that a bachelor's degree level of education in a specific specialty may be preferred for particular positions, the generically described position duties here do not demonstrate a requirement for the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized computer-related knowledge.

As the *Handbook* indicates no specific degree requirement for employment as a programmer analyst, and as it is not self-evident that, as described in the record of proceeding, the proposed duties comprise a position for which the normal entry requirement would be at least a bachelor's degree, or its equivalent, in a specific specialty, the AAO concludes that the performance of the proffered position's duties does not require the beneficiary to hold a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty. Accordingly, the AAO finds that the petitioner has not established its proffered position as a specialty occupation under the requirements of the first criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

Next, the AAO finds that the petitioner has not satisfied the first of the two alternative prongs of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2). This prong alternatively requires a petitioner to establish that a bachelor's degree, in a specific specialty, is common to the petitioner's industry in positions that are both: (1) parallel to the proffered position; and (2) located in organizations that are similar to the petitioner.

In determining whether there is such a common degree requirement, factors often considered by USCIS include: whether the *Handbook* reports that the industry requires a degree; whether the industry's professional association has made a degree a minimum entry requirement; and whether letters or affidavits from firms or individuals in the industry attest that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed individuals." See *Shanti, Inc. v. Reno*, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 (D.Minn. 1999) (quoting *Hird/Blaker Corp. v. Sava*, 712 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).

As already discussed, the petitioner has not established that its proffered position is one for which the *Handbook* reports an industry-wide requirement for at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty.

The petitioner also failed to satisfy the second alternative prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2), which provides that "an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree." The evidence of record does not refute the *Handbook's* information to the effect that a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty is not normally required. Additionally, the record lacks sufficiently detailed information to distinguish the proffered position as unique from or more complex than programmer analyst positions that can be performed by persons without a specialty degree or its equivalent.

No evidence was provided that the petitioner has a prior history of recruiting and hiring for the proffered position only persons with at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty. Therefore, the petitioner has not satisfied the third criterion of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

The fourth criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) requires a petitioner to establish that the nature of its position's duties is so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to perform them is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty. The AAO here incorporates and augments its earlier comments regarding the petitioner's failure to describe the duties of the proffered position in other than non-specific, generalized, and generic terms. The AAO finds that the evidence in the record of proceeding does not establish that performance of the proposed duties necessitates a higher degree of knowledge than would normally be required of programmer analysts not equipped with at least a bachelor's degree, or its equivalent, in a specific specialty. The AAO, therefore, concludes that the proffered position has not been established as a specialty occupation under the requirements at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4).

For all of the reasons related in the preceding discussion, the petitioner has failed to establish that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation under the requirements at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

Next, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that it will be the beneficiary's employer or agent. Counsel for the petitioner argues that the petitioner is the actual employer.

Under the test of *Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden* (*Darden*), 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "*Darden*"), the United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." *Darden*, 503 U.S. 318 at 322-323 (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated:

"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party."

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324 (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. at 751-752); see also *Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells*, 538 U.S. at 440 (hereinafter "*Clackamas*"). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be

assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.” *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting *NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America*, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).²

Therefore, in considering whether or not one is an "employee" in an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS must focus on the common-law touchstone of "control." *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450; *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii)(2) (defining a "United States employer" as one who "has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise *control* the work of any such employee" (emphasis added)).

Factors indicating that a worker is or will be an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly

² While the *Darden* court considered only the definition of "employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and did not address the definition of "employer," courts have generally refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the traditional common law definition." *See, e.g., Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd.*, 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), *aff'd*, 27 F.3d 800 (2nd Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994). However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. *See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).

The regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to employ persons in the United States, *and* to have an "employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an "employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms "employee," "employed," "employment" or "employer-employee relationship" indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition." Therefore, in the absence of an intent to impose broader definitions by either Congress or USCIS, the "conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine," and the *Darden* construction test, apply to the terms "employee," "employer-employee relationship," "employed," and "employment" as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). That being said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term "employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.,* section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

delineated in both the *Darden* and *Clackamas* decisions. 503 U.S. at 323-324; *see also* *Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *cf. New Compliance Manual*, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1), (EEOC 2006) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the *Darden* decision).

It is important to note that the factors listed in *Darden* and *Clackamas* are not exhaustive and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *New Compliance Manual* at § 2-III(A)(1).³

Applying the *Darden* test to this matter, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." First, under *Defensor*, it was determined that hospitals, as the recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the "true employers" of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the actual petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 388.

The petitioner asserts that it will be the employer of the beneficiary. However, the documentation submitted when reviewed in its entirety does not support this conclusion. Although the petitioner argues that the beneficiary will be employed in-house, the evidence does not demonstrate that this will be the case. As discussed previously, the petitioner states in its offer letter to the beneficiary that the beneficiary's salary is based on the consultancy billing rate. Further, the petitioner's tax return states that it is in the business of providing consultants, not software development. Moreover, the initial job description provided in the petitioner's support letter stated that the beneficiary would work on projects for clients of the petitioner. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998)

³ It is noted that an employer-employee relationship hinges on the overarching right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. When examining the factors relevant to this inquiry, USCIS must assess and weigh the actual factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or change that factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. *See Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324. For example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the *right* to assign them, it is the *actual* source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, not who has the *right* to provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. *See id.* at 323.

(citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Therefore, it appears more likely than not that the beneficiary would not be working at the petitioner's offices on an in-house project for the duration of the petition.

Other than putting the beneficiary on its payroll and providing benefits, it is unclear what role the petitioner has in the beneficiary's assignment. No independent evidence was provided to indicate that the petitioner would control whether there is any work to be performed or that the petitioner would even oversee the beneficiary's work. Therefore, it must be concluded that it is likely that any other company to which the beneficiary may be contracted would oversee and control any work the beneficiary performs.

In view of the above, it appears that the beneficiary will not be an "employee" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the petitioner or even with a "United States employer" represented by the petitioner in an established agent relationship. It has not been established that the beneficiary will be "controlled" by the petitioner or that the termination of the beneficiary's employment is the ultimate decision of the petitioner. Moreover, given that the petitioner did not provide copies of client contracts, despite the evidence indicating that the beneficiary would work on client projects, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's work would be controlled in any substantial sense by the petitioner. Therefore, based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

The AAO therefore affirms the director's finding that the petitioner does not qualify as a United States employer, as it also failed to establish that it has sufficient work and resources for the beneficiary. Moreover, the petitioner has not provided sufficient documentation to establish that it is the entity with ultimate control over the beneficiary's work.

Next, the AAO also finds that the petitioner failed to establish that the LCA corresponds to the petition by encompassing all of the work locations and related wage requirements for the beneficiary's full employment period. For this additional reason, the petition cannot be approved.

In pertinent part, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(B) states:

The petitioner shall submit the following with an H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation: (1) A certification from the Secretary of Labor that the petitioner has filed a labor condition application

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1) states, in pertinent part:

An applicant or petitioner must establish that he or she is eligible for the requested benefit at the time of filing the application or petition. All required application or petition forms must be properly completed and filed with any initial evidence required by applicable regulations and/or the form's instructions.

In addition, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(1), states, as part of the general requirements for petitions involving a specialty occupation, that:

Before filing a petition for H-1B classification in a specialty occupation, the petitioner shall obtain a certification from the Department of Labor that it has filed a labor condition application in the occupational specialty in which the alien(s) will be employed.

Further, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(E), which states:

Amended or new petition. The petitioner shall file an amended or new petition, with fee, with the Service Center where the original petition was filed to reflect any material changes in the terms and conditions of employment or training or the alien's eligibility as specified in the original approved petition. An amended or new H-1C, H-1B, H-2A, or H-2B petition must be accompanied by a current or new Department of Labor determination. In the case of an H-1B petition, this requirement includes a new labor condition application.

It is self-evident that a change in the proffered wage is a material change in the terms and conditions of employment.⁴

⁴ To ascertain the intent of a petitioner, USCIS must look to the Form I-129 and the documents filed in support of the petition. It is only in this manner that the agency can determine the exact position offered, the location of employment, the proffered wage, et cetera. If a petitioner's intent changes with regard to a material term and condition of employment or the beneficiary's eligibility, an amended or new petition must be filed. To allow a petition to be amended in any other way would be contrary to the regulations. Taken to the extreme, a petitioner could then simply claim to offer what is essentially speculative employment when filing the petition only to "change its intent" after the fact, either before or after the H-1B petition has been adjudicated. The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1B program. A 1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows:

Historically, the Service has not granted H-1B classification on the basis of speculative, or undetermined, prospective employment. The H-1B classification is not intended as a vehicle for an alien to engage in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in temporary foreign workers to meet possible workforce needs arising from potential business expansions or the expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether an alien is properly classifiable as an H-1B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must first examine the duties of the position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). The Service must then determine whether the alien has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the case of speculative employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis and, therefore, is unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1B classification. Moreover, there is no assurance that the alien will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this country.

Moreover, while DOL is the agency that certifies LCA applications before they are submitted to USCIS, DOL regulations note that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (i.e., its immigration benefits branch, USCIS) is the department responsible for determining whether the content of an LCA filed for a particular Form I-129 actually supports that petition. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 655.705(b), which states, in pertinent part:

For H-1B visas . . . DHS accepts the employer's petition (DHS Form I-129) with the DOL certified LCA attached. *In doing so, the DHS determines whether the petition is supported by an LCA which corresponds with the petition*, whether the occupation named in the [LCA] is a specialty occupation or whether the individual is a fashion model of distinguished merit and ability, and whether the qualifications of the nonimmigrant meet the statutory requirements of H-1B visa classification.

[Italics added].

The LCA and Form I-129 in this matter, which indicate the proffered wage as being \$60,000 per year, do not correspond with the offer letter, which indicates that \$60,000 is only an expected annual wage based on a projected consulting billing rate, and not a guaranteed salary. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190). In light of the fact that the record of proceeding indicates that the beneficiary will likely earn a different salary than the one identified in the Form I-129 and the LCA filed with it, USCIS cannot conclude that this LCA actually supports and fully corresponds to the H-1B petition. A petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1). A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. at 248.

Further, as the petitioner has indicated in the offer letter to the beneficiary that it would not provide the wage required by the LCA attestations in the LCA and the Form I-129, the petition must be denied. The principal function of the LCA in the H-1B process is to secure the petitioner's attestation that it will abide by the terms of that document as signed by the petitioner. In the Form I-129 Supplement H, the petitioner expressly attests that it agrees to, and will abide by, the terms of the LCA for the beneficiary's authorized period of stay for H-1B employment.⁵ The DOL regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(c)(2), which provides a general summation of each of these attestations, states, in pertinent part:

Undertaking of the Employer. In submitting the LCA, and by affixing the signature of the employer or its authorized agent or representative on Form ETA

63 Fed. Reg. 30419, 30419 - 30420 (June 4, 1998). While a petitioner is certainly permitted to change its intent with regard to non-speculative employment, e.g., a change in duties or job location, it must nonetheless document such a material change in intent through an amended petition in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E).

⁵ See section 1 of the Form I-129 Supplement H.

9035E or Form ETA 9035, the employer (or its authorized agent or representative on behalf of the employer) attests the statements in the LCA are true and promises to comply with the labor condition statements (attestations) specifically identified in Forms ETA 9035E and ETA 9035, as well as set forth in full in the Form ETA 9035CP. The labor condition statements (attestations) are described in detail in [20 C.F.R.] §§ 655.731 through 655.734, and the additional attestations for LCAs filed by certain H-1B-dependent employers and employers found to have willfully violated the H-1B program requirements are described in [20 C.F.R.] §§ 655.736 through 655.739.

Apparently, the petitioner is unaware of the full import of its signing the LCA and the Form I-129, and it should fully apprise itself of the DOL regulation regarding the wage requirement undertaken by signing the LCA, at 20 C.F.R. 655.731 (entitled, "What is the first LCA requirement, regarding wages?"). That regulation prohibits the type of contingent-wage practice in which the petitioner would engage.

Finally, the AAO finds that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that it will comply with the terms and conditions of employment. The director based her decision on the wages paid to another H-1B worker previously employed by the petitioner.

According to the evidence of record, [REDACTED] worked on the petitioner's payroll from June 6, 2005 to May 29, 2009. Mr. Trivedi's 2008 Form W-2 indicated that [REDACTED] earned \$58,826.83 in taxable wages. The petitioner's proffered salary for [REDACTED] is \$70,000 per year.

The petitioner did not address this issue on appeal. However, regardless of whether or not the other H-1B employee was paid the proffered wage, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it will comply with the terms and conditions of employment with respect to the beneficiary because, as stated previously, the offer letter to the beneficiary indicates that \$60,000 is only an expected and conditional annual wage based on a projected consulting billing rate, and not a guaranteed salary. Because the petitioner has not guaranteed that the beneficiary will be paid the proffered wage, the petitioner has failed to produce evidence that it will comply with the terms and conditions of employment.

The appeal will be dismissed and the petition denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.