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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



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Date: **OCT 05 2011**

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
Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

The petitioner states that it is an information technology consulting company that seeks to employ the beneficiary as a programmer analyst. The petitioner, therefore, endeavors to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The director denied the petition, finding that the beneficiary is not eligible pursuant to the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act (AC21), as amended by the Twenty-First Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act (DOJ21), for an exemption from the limitation contained in section 214(g)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4), because a final decision was made on the alien's employment-based immigrant petition.

The record indicates that the beneficiary has resided in the United States in H-1B classification since August 1, 2003. On September 14, 2009, the petitioner filed a petition requesting an extension of H-1B status for the beneficiary which would have placed the beneficiary beyond his six-year limit. The director noted that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) records indicated that the beneficiary's Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, Form I-140 [REDACTED] filed with the Nebraska Service Center on July 13, 2007 was denied on July 31, 2008. USCIS records further indicate that the petitioner's appeal of the denial was dismissed on October 26, 2009.

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains: (1) Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's denial letter; and (3) Form I-290B and supporting documentation. The AAO reviewed the record in its entirety before issuing its decision.

The director's denial was based on the petitioner's failure to establish eligibility for an exemption from the limitation contained in section 214(g)(4) of the Act. However, a review of the record demonstrates a more critical issue pertaining to the petitioner's eligibility to extend its employment of the beneficiary in H-1B status.

The petition must be denied as it was filed after the expiration of the petition it sought to extend. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(14). In this matter, the petition that the petitioner is seeking to extend (WAC 06 166 50352) expired on September 9, 2009. The instant petition was filed on September 14, 2009, five days after the original petition's expiration.

As opposed to a discretionary extension of stay application, there is no discretion to grant a late-filed petition extension. In this matter, the director did not raise this issue in the denial, and thus it appears that the director erroneously exercised favorable discretion to the petitioner under the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(c)(4)(i). The director's omission is harmless, however, because the AAO conducts a *de novo* review, evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in the record according to its probative value and credibility. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

The petition must be denied as it was filed after the expiration of the petition it sought to extend. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(14).

For this additional reason, the beneficiary is also not eligible for an exemption to the six-year limitation on the authorized period of stay in H-1B visa status.

In general, section 214(g)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1184(g)(4) provides that: “[T]he period of authorized admission of [an H-1B nonimmigrant] shall not exceed 6 years.” However, AC21, as amended by DOJ21, removes the six-year limitation on the authorized period of stay in H-1B visa status for certain aliens whose labor certifications or immigrant petitions remain undecided due to lengthy adjudication delays, and broadens the class of H-1B nonimmigrants who may avail themselves of this provision.

As amended by § 11030(A)(a) of DOJ21, § 106(a) of AC-21 reads:

(a) EXEMPTION FROM LIMITATION. -- The limitation contained in section 214(g)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(4)) with respect to the duration of authorized stay shall not apply to any nonimmigrant alien previously issued a visa or otherwise provided nonimmigrant status under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)), if 365 days or more have elapsed since the filing of any of the following:

- (1) Any application for labor certification under section 212(a)(5)(A) of such Act (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)), in a case in which certification is required or used by the alien to obtain status under section 203(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)).
- (2) A petition described in section 204(b) of such Act (8 U.S.C. § 1154(b)) to accord the alien a status under section 203(b) of such Act.

Section 11030(A)(b) of DOJ21 amended § 106(a) of AC-21 to read:

(b) EXTENSION OF H-1B WORKER STATUS--The Attorney General shall extend the stay of an alien who qualifies for an exemption under subsection (a) in one-year increments until such time as a final decision is made—

- (1) to deny the application described in subsection (a)(1), or, in a case in which such application is granted, to deny a petition described in subsection (a)(2) filed on behalf of the alien pursuant to such grant;
- (2) to deny the petition described in subsection (a)(2); or

(3) to grant or deny the alien's application for an immigrant visa or for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

If the alien is not otherwise eligible for an extension of H-1B status, however, then U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will not approve a request for extension of H-1B status. As opposed to an H-1B petition for new employment, the request for an extension of status must establish that the alien beneficiary is in valid H-1B status at the time the Form I-129 is filed. See Memorandum from William R. Yates, Acting Associate Director for Operations, Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, *Guidance for Processing H-1B Petitions as Affected by the Twenty-First Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act (Public Law 107-273): Adjudicator's Field Manual Update AD03-09*. HQBCIS 70/6.2.8-P (April 24, 2003). "An extension of stay may not be approved for an applicant who failed to maintain the previously accorded status or where such status expired before the application or petition was filed." 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(c)(4). There are exceptions to this rule, but none of them apply to the instant petition. As previously discussed, the regulations also state, "A request for a petition extension may be filed *only if the validity of the original petition has not expired.*" 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(14) (emphasis added). The petition was filed in this case five days following the expiration of the original petition. The regulations are clear and do not allow for an extension of status when the petition being extended is no longer valid at the time the petition was filed.

Although the instant petition cannot be approved for the reasons discussed above, it is noted for the record that USCIS will not consider a decision to be final for purposes of this analysis when a timely and non-frivolous I-140 appeal is pending. USCIS records show that at the time the extension request was filed on September 14, 2009, the appeal was pending and a final decision to deny the petition had not yet been entered. Consequently, the AAO withdraws the director's statement to the contrary. However, despite this finding, the petition may not be approved because the beneficiary was not maintaining valid H-1B status at the time the instant petition extension was filed and, therefore, further review or discussion of the original explanation for the director's denial in the matter at hand is moot.

Lastly and beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the proffered position is a specialty occupation.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

An occupation which [(1)] requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which [(2)] requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) consistently interprets the term “degree” in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

In addressing whether the proffered position is a specialty occupation, the record contains only minimal documentary evidence as to where and for whom the beneficiary would be performing his services, and whether his services would be that of a programmer analyst.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv) provides that “[a]n H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation shall be accompanied by [d]ocumentation . . . or any other required evidence sufficient to establish . . . that the services the beneficiary is to perform are in a specialty occupation.” Moreover, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv)(A)(I) indicates that contracts are one of the types of evidence that may be required to establish that the services to be performed by the beneficiary will be in a specialty occupation.

The petitioner’s letter of support dated September 8, 2009 provided the following list of some of the major duties of the beneficiary:

- Research, design, and development of computer software systems, analyzing software requirements, developing and directing software systems, testing procedures, programming, documentation, coordinating installation of software systems.
- Analy[ze] and develop business logic for computer applications that includes windows and web based[.]
- Detailed description of writing program instructions (code), prepare sample data, testing programs, troubleshooting.
- Writing [REDACTED] queries in [REDACTED] language, tuning [REDACTED] queries, create stored procedures, packages for processing and displaying data.
- Design and development of front-end modules using Visual Basic, Java, HTML, VB Scripts, etc. Designing and normalization of data base tables, building relationships. Setting up error-traps using error handling routines.

- Design and develop reports[.]
- Maintenance, Support Performing new program enhancements on regular basis for the application system.

However, no independent documentation to further explain the nature and scope of these duties was submitted.

The petitioner, as an information technology consulting company, is engaged in an industry that typically outsources its personnel to client sites to work on particular projects. As evidenced by the beneficiary's resume, the beneficiary is currently working on a project for the [REDACTED] which is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States. The record contains no contractual agreements or work orders which demonstrate the work location of the beneficiary or the duration of the current project. Moreover, the beneficiary's resume further indicates that during the course of his employment with the petitioner (since 2003), the beneficiary has provided services to other companies including [REDACTED]. It is apparent, therefore, that the beneficiary would be providing services to various end clients of the petitioner, and the beneficiary's duties would vary based on the needs of a specific client project.

Without evidence of contracts, work orders, or statements of work describing the duties the beneficiary would perform and for whom, the petitioner failed to establish that the duties that the beneficiary would perform are those of a specialty occupation.

USCIS routinely looks to *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, for guidance, which requires an examination of the ultimate employment of the beneficiary to determine whether the position constitutes a specialty occupation. The petitioner in *Defensor*, [REDACTED] is a medical contract service agency that brought foreign nurses into the United States and located jobs for them at hospitals as registered nurses. The court in *Defensor* found that Vintage had "token degree requirements," to "mask the fact that nursing in general is not a specialty occupation."

The court in *Defensor* held that for the purpose of determining whether a proffered position is a specialty occupation, the petitioner acting as an employment contractor is merely a "token employer," while the entity for which the services are to be performed is the "more relevant employer." *Id.* at 387-388. The *Defensor* court recognized that evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. *Id.* The *Defensor* court held that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. *Id.* In *Defensor*, the court found that that evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical if the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner. *Id.*

The job description provided by the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary will be working on client projects and will be assigned to various clients worksites when contracts are executed. The petitioner's failure to provide evidence of work orders or employment contracts between the petitioner and clients renders it impossible to conclude for whom the beneficiary will ultimately provide services for the entire validity period, and exactly what those services would entail. The AAO, therefore, cannot analyze whether his duties would require at least a baccalaureate degree or the equivalent in a specific specialty, as required for classification as a specialty occupation. Accordingly, even if the beneficiary was otherwise eligible for an extension of status, the petitioner has not established that the proposed position qualifies as a specialty occupation under any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) or that the beneficiary would be performing the duties of a specialty occupation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(B)(I).¹

¹ To ascertain the intent of a petitioner, USCIS must look to the Form I-129 and the documents filed in support of the petition. It is only in this manner that the agency can determine the exact position offered, the location of employment, the proffered wage, et cetera. If a petitioner's intent changes with regard to a material term and condition of employment or the beneficiary's eligibility, an amended or new petition must be filed. To allow a petition to be amended in any other way would be contrary to the regulations. Taken to the extreme, a petitioner could then simply claim to offer what is essentially speculative employment when filing the petition only to "change its intent" after the fact, either before or after the H-1B petition has been adjudicated. The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1B program. A 1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows:

Historically, the Service has not granted H-1B classification on the basis of speculative, or undetermined, prospective employment. The H-1B classification is not intended as a vehicle for an alien to engage in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in temporary foreign workers to meet possible workforce needs arising from potential business expansions or the expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether an alien is properly classifiable as an H-1B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must first examine the duties of the position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). The Service must then determine whether the alien has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the case of speculative employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis and, therefore, is unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1B classification. Moreover, there is no assurance that the alien will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this country.

63 Fed. Reg. 30419, 30419 - 30420 (June 4, 1998). While a petitioner is certainly permitted to change its intent with regard to non-speculative employment, e.g., a change in duties or job location, it must nonetheless document such a material change in intent through an amended or new petition in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E).

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. The appeal will be dismissed and the petition denied.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.