

**identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy**

**PUBLIC COPY**

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services



D2

DATE: **OCT 06 2011** OFFICE: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:   
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



**INSTRUCTIONS:**

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The service center director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will remain denied.

The petitioner claimed on the Form I-129 to be a computer services firm with 42 employees and a gross annual income of \$4 million. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as a computer analyst<sup>1</sup> pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The director denied the petition on the basis of her determination that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate: (1) that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation; and (2) that the petitioner qualifies as a U.S. employer or agent.

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains the following: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's request for additional evidence; (3) the petitioner's response to the director's request; (4) the director's decision denying the petition; and (5) the Form I-290B and supporting documentation. The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). Upon review of the entire record, we find that the petitioner has failed to overcome the director's grounds for denying this petition.

In its September 29, 2009 letter of support, the petitioner stated that it was "engaged in the business of providing software development and consulting services." The petitioner described the proposed position as a "programmer analyst/computer engineer," and stated that the beneficiary's duties would include the following responsibilities:

- Analyzing, researching, designing, and writing specifications in order to effectively maintain, enhance, and develop applications software;
- Analyzing user requirements, procedures, and problems in order to automate processing and improve existing systems using Oracle, Informatica, UNIX, Cognos, PL/SQL, Visual Basic, ASP, .Net, SQL Server, Java, HTML, DHTML, Business Objects, and others;
- Designing new applications;
- Developing application prototypes;
- Writing detailed descriptions of user needs, program functions, and steps required to develop or modify computer programs;
- Promoting efficient user utilization of systems;
- Cooperating with, and providing technical support to, project teams and members and associates in order to analyze current operational procedures, identify problems, and learn to specify input and output requirements;
- Developing and maintaining proficiency in utilizing technical and analytical tools to give optimum results to the management and business;
- Performing studies to aid the development of new systems to cope with current project needs;
- Planning and preparing technical reports, memoranda, and instruction manuals; and

---

<sup>1</sup> The petitioner described the proposed position as a computer programmer on the Form I-129, as a computer analyst on the labor condition application, and as both a computer analyst and programmer analyst in its letter of support.

- Performing analysis, conversion coding, code walkthrough, and unit and integration testing.

The record also contains an employment agreement executed between the petitioner and beneficiary. At page one of this agreement, in the section entitled "Scope of Duties," the petitioner and beneficiary agreed to the following:

Employee shall perform such system analysis, software design and development, computer programming, program testing and implementation, consulting, technical writing or other specialized technical work as directed to perform by [the petitioner] for [the petitioner] or its Client(s), and agrees to work at premises designated by [the petitioner].

At page two of the agreement, in the section entitled "Direction," the petitioner and beneficiary agreed to the following:

Employee agrees to follow and abide by all applicable policies and procedures of [the petitioner], even though from time to time, Employee may be required by [the petitioner] to work at the direction of [the petitioner's] Client.

Counsel submitted two letters from the petitioner in response to the director's request for additional evidence. In his January 15, 2010 letter, the petitioner's president stated, in pertinent part, the following:

This statement . . . is a written summary of the terms of an oral agreement . . . [which] was communicated via the intermediary agent and is between [the petitioner] and the End User Firm on whose site the Beneficiary will render H-1B services.

\* \* \*

The End User Firm shall advise [the petitioner] of its job requirements for the work to be performed by the Beneficiary. . . .

[The petitioner] shall ensure that the Beneficiary is qualified by education and experience to perform the job requirements of the End User Firm. . . .

[The petitioner] shall be responsible for supervising and shall control the Beneficiary's work at [the] End User Firm's site. . . .

In his January 25, 2010 letter, the petitioner's president stated, in pertinent part, the following:

The Petitioner and the End User Firm both require at least a Bachelor's Degree. . . .

\* \* \*

This educational job requirement is the same educational job requirement which the End User Firm has communicated to the Petitioner via the intermediary agent.

\* \* \*

The Petitioner and the End User Firm both require the H-1B position to be filled. . . .

The record also contains copies of the petitioner's U.S. corporate income tax returns, which indicate that it is in the business of computer consulting.

Although the petitioner referenced both an "end user firm" and an "intermediary agent," neither entity was identified by name.

The first issue before us on appeal is whether the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation. Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) states, in pertinent part, the following:

*Specialty occupation* means an occupation which [(1)] requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and [(2)] which requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, a proposed position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory

language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of a specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 387. To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), USCIS consistently interprets the term “degree” in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

We note that, as recognized by the court in *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 387, where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner, evidence of the client companies’ job requirements is critical. The court held that the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary’s services. *Id.* at 387-388. Such evidence must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate the type and educational level of highly specialized knowledge in a specific discipline that is necessary to perform that particular work. In this particular case, the record lacks substantive evidence about any particular project on which the beneficiary would work during the period of requested employment. As noted previously, although the petitioner referenced both an “end user firm” and an “intermediary agent,” neither entity was identified by name. Nor was any information regarding work that the beneficiary would perform for either entity identified.

Although counsel references the document entitled “Current Itinerary of Services” on appeal, that document states that the beneficiary would be working on an internal e-Learning project. However, that statement conflicts with the evidence of record discussed above, which indicates clearly that the beneficiary would be performing service for the petitioner’s clients. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner’s proof may, of course, lead to a

reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Id.*

The record lacks substantive evidence from any end-user entities that may generate work for the beneficiary and whose business needs would ultimately determine what the beneficiary would actually do on a day-to-day basis. In short, the petitioner has failed to establish the existence of H-1B caliber work for the beneficiary.

The record lacks evidence that when the petitioner filed the petition, the petitioner had secured work for the beneficiary to perform during the requested period of employment. USCIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the time the petition is filed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1). A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978).

Moreover, even if the petitioner had demonstrated that it had work for the beneficiary to perform, which it did not do, the petitioner still failed to demonstrate that its proposed position is a specialty occupation.

We recognize the U.S. Department of Labor's *Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook)* as an authoritative source on the duties and educational requirements of the wide variety of occupations that it addresses. The petitioner alternatively refers to its proposed position as a computer analyst, a computer programmer, and a programmer analyst. These three occupational categories are addressed in two chapters of the *Handbook*: (1) "Computer Software Engineers and Computer Programmers"; and (2) "Computer Systems Analysts."

The *Handbook* describes computer programmers as follows:

[C]omputer programmers write programs. After computer software engineers and systems analysts design software programs, the programmer converts that design into a logical series of instructions that the computer can follow (A section on computer systems analysts appears elsewhere in the *Handbook*). The programmer codes these instructions in any of a number of programming languages, depending on the need. The most common languages are C++ and Python.

Computer programmers also update, repair, modify, and expand existing programs. Some, especially those working on large projects that involve many programmers, use computer-assisted software engineering (CASE) tools to automate much of the coding process. These tools enable a programmer to concentrate on writing the unique parts of a program. Programmers working on smaller projects often use "programmer environments," applications that increase productivity by combining compiling, code walk-through, code generation, test data generation, and debugging functions. Programmers also use libraries of basic code that can be modified or customized for a specific application. This approach yields more reliable and

consistent programs and increases programmers' productivity by eliminating some routine steps.

As software design has continued to advance, and some programming functions have become automated, programmers have begun to assume some of the responsibilities that were once performed only by software engineers. As a result, some computer programmers now assist software engineers in identifying user needs and designing certain parts of computer programs, as well as other functions. . . .

\* \* \*

[M]any programmers require a bachelor's degree, but a 2-year degree or certificate may be adequate for some positions. Some computer programmers hold a college degree in computer science, mathematics, or information systems, whereas others have taken special courses in computer programming to supplement their degree in a field such as accounting, finance, or another area of business. . . .

*Handbook*, 2010-11 ed., available at <http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos303.htm> (last accessed September 21, 2011). The *Handbook's* section on computer systems analysts reads, in pertinent part:

In some organizations, programmer-analysts design and update the software that runs a computer. They also create custom applications tailored to their organization's tasks. Because they are responsible for both programming and systems analysis, these workers must be proficient in both areas. (A separate section on computer software engineers and computer programmers appears elsewhere in the *Handbook*.) As this dual proficiency becomes more common, analysts are increasingly working with databases, object-oriented programming languages, client-server applications, and multimedia and Internet technology.

\* \* \*

[W]hen hiring computer systems analysts, employers usually prefer applicants who have at least a bachelor's degree. For more technically complex jobs, people with graduate degrees are preferred. For jobs in a technical or scientific environment, employers often seek applicants who have at least a bachelor's degree in a technical field, such as computer science, information science, applied mathematics, engineering, or the physical sciences. For jobs in a business environment, employers often seek applicants with at least a bachelor's degree in a business-related field such as management information systems (MIS). Increasingly, employers are seeking individuals who have a master's degree in business administration (MBA) with a concentration in information systems.

Despite the preference for technical degrees, however, people who have degrees in other areas may find employment as systems analysts if they also have technical skills. Courses in computer science or related subjects combined with practical experience can qualify people for some jobs in the occupation. . . .

*Id.* at <http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos287.htm>. This information from the *Handbook* does not indicate that positions such as the one proposed by the petitioner normally require at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty. While the *Handbook* indicates that a bachelor's degree level of education in a specific specialty may be preferred for particular positions, the generically described position's duties proposed for the beneficiary do not demonstrate a requirement for the theoretical and practical application of highly specialized computer-related knowledge. As the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it has any work for the beneficiary to perform,<sup>2</sup> it has certainly failed to demonstrate that such work would require the attainment of a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty.

As the *Handbook* indicates no specific degree requirement for employment in this occupational field, and as it is not self-evident that, as described in the record of proceeding, the proposed duties comprise a position for which the normal entry requirement would be at least a bachelor's degree, or its equivalent, in a specific specialty, we conclude that the performance of the proposed position's duties does not require the beneficiary to hold a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty. Accordingly, we find that the petitioner has not established its proposed position as a specialty occupation under the requirements of the first criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

Next, we find that the petitioner has not satisfied the first of the two alternative prongs of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2). This prong alternatively requires a petitioner to establish that a bachelor's degree, in a specific specialty, is common to the petitioner's industry in positions that are both: (1) parallel to the proffered position; and (2) located in organizations that are similar to the petitioner.

In determining whether there is such a common degree requirement, factors often considered by USCIS include: whether the *Handbook* reports that the industry requires a degree; whether the industry's professional association has made a degree a minimum entry requirement; and whether letters or affidavits from firms or individuals in the industry attest that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed individuals." See *Shanti, Inc. v. Reno*, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 (D.Minn. 1999) (quoting *Hird/Blaker Corp. v. Sava*, 712 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).

As already discussed, the petitioner has not established that its proposed position is one for which the *Handbook* reports an industry-wide requirement for at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty. Further, the petitioner did not submit documentation to establish that similar firms routinely require at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty for its positions like the one the petitioner is offering.

The petitioner also failed to satisfy the second alternative prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2), which provides that "an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree." The evidence of record does not refute

---

<sup>2</sup> As the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it has any work for the beneficiary to perform, we are unable to examine any of the beneficiary's actual duties. As such, counsel's citation to *Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F. 3d 139 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2007) does not assist him in establishing the proposed position as a specialty occupation.

the *Handbook's* information to the effect that a bachelor's degree is not required in a specific specialty. The record lacks sufficiently detailed information to distinguish the proffered position as unique from or more complex than similar positions that can be performed by persons without a specialty degree or its equivalent.

We turn next to the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3), which requires that the petitioner demonstrate that it normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position. To determine a petitioner's ability to meet the third criterion, we normally review the petitioner's past employment practices, as well as the histories, including the names and dates of employment, of those employees with degrees who previously held the position, and copies of those employees' diplomas.<sup>3</sup> The petitioner, however has submitted no such evidence of a past hiring history of requiring a minimum of a bachelor's degree in a specific field of study. Accordingly, the petitioner has not satisfied the third criterion of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

The fourth criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) requires a petitioner to establish that the nature of its position's duties is so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to perform them is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree. We find that the evidence in the record of proceeding does not support the proposition that the performance of the proposed duties requires a higher degree of IT/computer knowledge than would normally be required of analysts not equipped with at least a bachelor's degree, or its equivalent, in a specific specialty. The AAO, therefore, concludes that the proposed position has not been established as a specialty occupation under the requirements at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4).

For the reasons related in the preceding discussion, the petitioner has failed to establish that its proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation under the criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1)-(4). The AAO, therefore, affirms the director's determination that the petitioner failed to establish that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation.

Next, we find that the petitioner has failed to establish that it will be the beneficiary's employer or agent. Under the test of *Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden* (*Darden*), 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "*Darden*"), the United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended

---

<sup>3</sup> Even if a petitioner believes or otherwise assert that a proposed position requires a degree, that opinion alone without corroborating evidence cannot establish the position as a specialty occupation. Were USCIS limited solely to reviewing a petitioner's claimed self-imposed requirements, then any individual with a bachelor's degree could be brought to the United States to perform any job so long as the employer artificially created a token degree requirement, whereby all individuals employed in a particular position possessed a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty or its equivalent. See *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d at 387. In other words, if a petitioner's degree requirement is only symbolic and the proposed position does not in fact require such a specialty degree or its equivalent to perform its duties, the occupation would not meet the statutory or regulatory definition of a specialty occupation. See section 214(i)(1) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "specialty occupation"). Here, the petitioner has failed to establish the referenced criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3) based on its normal hiring practices.

to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.” *Darden*, 503 U.S. 318 at 322-323 (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated the following:

In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.

*Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324 (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. at 751-752); see also *Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells*, 538 U.S. at 440 (hereinafter “*Clackamas*”). As the common-law test contains “no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.” *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting *NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America*, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> While the *Darden* court considered only the definition of “employee” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and did not address the definition of “employer,” courts have generally refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA’s use of employer because “the definition of ‘employer’ in ERISA, unlike the definition of ‘employee,’ clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the traditional common law definition.” See, e.g., *Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd.*, 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), *aff’d*, 27 F.3d 800 (2nd Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994). However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of “employer” in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, “employment” in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or “employee” in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the term “United States employer” was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition. A federal agency’s interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 844-845 (1984).

The regulatory definition of “United States employer” requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to employ persons in the United States, and to have an “employer-employee relationship” with the H-1B “employee.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term “United States employer” not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an “employer-employee relationship” as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms “employee,” “employed,” “employment” or “employer-employee relationship” indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond “the traditional common law definition.” Therefore, in the absence of an intent to impose broader definitions by either Congress or USCIS, the “conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.” and the *Darden*

Therefore, in considering whether or not one is an "employee" in an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS must focus on the common-law touchstone of "control." *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450; *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii)(2) (defining a "United States employer" as one who "has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise *control* the work of any such employee . . . ." (emphasis added)).

Factors indicating that a worker is or will be an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly delineated in both the *Darden* and *Clackamas* decisions. 503 U.S. at 323-324; *see also* *Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *cf. New Compliance Manual*, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1), (EEOC 2006) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the *Darden* decision).

It is important to note that the factors listed in *Darden* and *Clackamas* are not exhaustive and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *New Compliance Manual* at § 2-III(A)(1).<sup>5</sup>

Applying the *Darden* test to this matter, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." Under *Defensor*, it was determined that hospitals, as the recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the "true employers" of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the actual petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately

---

construction test, apply to the terms "employee," "employer-employee relationship," "employed," and "employment" as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). That being said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term "employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.*, section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling I-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

<sup>5</sup> When examining the factors relevant to determining control, USCIS must assess and weigh each actual factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or change that factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. *See Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324. For example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the *right to* assign them, it is the *actual* source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, not who has the *right to* provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. *See id.* at 323.

hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 388.

The evidence of record is insufficient to establish that a credible offer of employment existed between the petitioner and the beneficiary at the time the petition was filed. There is no information from any of the end-user clients of the petitioner, for whom the beneficiary would actually be providing services, describing the duties that she would perform for them. Other than putting the beneficiary on its payroll and providing benefits, it is unclear what role the petitioner would have in the beneficiary's assignments. No independent evidence was provided to indicate that the petitioner would control whether there is any work to be performed or that the petitioner would even oversee the beneficiary's work. Therefore, it must be concluded that the "end user firms" referenced by the petitioner would oversee any work the beneficiary would perform.

Furthermore, absent documentation such as purchase orders, statements of work, or contracts between the ultimate end-user clients and the beneficiary, the petitioner cannot alternatively be considered an agent in this matter. The definition of agent at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(F) provides for two types of agents: (1) "an agent performing the function of an employer"; and (2) "a company in the business as an agent involving multiple employers as the representative of both the employers and the beneficiary." Again, absent such documentation, the petitioner cannot be considered an agent.

In view of the above, it appears that the beneficiary will not be an "employee" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the petitioner or even with a "United States employer" represented by the petitioner in a documented agent relationship. It has not been established that the beneficiary will be "controlled" by the petitioner or that the termination of the beneficiary's employment is the ultimate decision of the petitioner. Therefore, based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

The AAO therefore affirms the director's finding that the petitioner does not qualify as a United States employer, as it failed to establish that it will control the beneficiary's work such that it will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary.

We are not persuaded by counsel's assertions made on appeal that the director's decision was based upon "unclear administrative findings" or that the director applied "extra-regulatory requirements" to this case, as the statutory and regulatory criteria at issue here, as well as caselaw interpreting those criteria, are cited above.

Finally, we take note of the fact that the beneficiary has been previously granted H-1B status for employment with the petitioner. However, each nonimmigrant petition is a separate proceeding with a separate record. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(d). In making a determination of statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited to the information contained in the record of proceeding. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(ii). Although the AAO may attempt to hypothesize as to whether the prior petition was similar to the position proposed here or was approved in error, no such determination may be

made without review of the original record, in its entirety. If the prior petition was approved based upon evidence substantially similar to the evidence contained in this record of proceeding, however, that approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. USCIS is not required to approve petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. *See, e.g., Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). Neither USCIS nor any other agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. *Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery* 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), *cert denied*, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988).

The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the proposed position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation or that it qualifies as a U.S. employer or agent. Accordingly, the beneficiary is ineligible for nonimmigrant classification under section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act and this petition must remain denied.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden and the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.