



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)

DATE: APR 02 2013

OFFICE: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Michael T. Keary
Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and, after consideration of a subsequent joint motion to reopen and reconsider, issued a decision affirming the initial decision to deny the petition due to the petitioner's failure to establish the proffered position as a specialty occupation. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

On the Form I-129 visa petition, the petitioner describes itself as a jewelry retailer and distributor established in 2000.¹ In order to continue its employment of the beneficiary in what it designates as a systems analyst position,² the petitioner seeks to extend his classification as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The director denied the petition on the basis of his determination that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation.

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains the following: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's request for additional evidence (RFE); (3) the petitioner's response to the RFE; (4) the director's letter denying the petition; (5) the Form I-290B and supporting documentation comprising a joint motion to reopen and reconsider; (6) the director's decision affirming the prior decision to deny the petition; and (7) the Form I-290B and the allied documents submitted on appeal.

Upon review of the entire record of proceeding, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to overcome the director's ground for denying this petition. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed, and the petition will be denied.

¹ Although the petitioner describes itself as a jewelry retailer and distributor on the Form I-129, it also provides a North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Code of 541511, "Custom Computer Programming Services." U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, North American Industry Classification System, 2012 NAICS Definition, "541511 Custom Computer Programming Services," <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch> (accessed January 18, 2013). The NAICS description of "Custom Computer Programming Services" states that "[t]his U.S. industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in writing, modifying, testing, and supporting software to meet the needs of a particular customer." *Id.*

Accordingly, the petitioner has provided conflicting information regarding its business operations, in that it claims to be a jewelry retailer and distributor but assigns itself the NAICS code for a company engaged in the business of "writing, modifying, testing, and supporting software to meet the needs of a particular customer." It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

² The Labor Condition Application (LCA) submitted by the petitioner in support of the petition was certified for the SOC (O*NET/OES) Code 15-1051.00, the associated Occupational Classification of "Computer Systems Analysts," and a Level I (entry-level) prevailing wage rate.

The AAO will now address the director's determination that the proffered position is not a specialty occupation. Based upon a complete review of the record of proceeding, the AAO agrees with the director and finds that the evidence fails to establish that the position as described constitutes a specialty occupation.

To meet its burden of proof in this regard, the petitioner must establish that the employment it is offering to the beneficiary meets the following statutory and regulatory requirements.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) defines the term "specialty occupation" as one that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

An occupation which requires [(1)] theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires [(2)] the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. See *K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); see also *COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. See *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) consistently interprets the term “degree” in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. See *Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing “a degree requirement in a specific specialty” as “one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position”). Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not rely simply upon a proffered position’s title. The specific duties of the position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity’s business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the beneficiary, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. See generally *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d at 384. The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer’s self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

In her September 28, 2011 letter submitted in response to the director’s RFE, counsel stated that the beneficiary would spend fifty percent of his time performing the following duties:

- Designing, developing, testing, and implementing the company’s software system and financial and business applications utilizing his knowledge of Java, Java Server Page, JavaScript, C,

C++, VC++, XML, HTML, SQL Server, Oracle, Web Logic, APACHE, Java Studio, Symantec Visual Café, Developer 2000, Dream Viewer, Front Page, Unix, Windows, etc.;

- Maintaining a solid understanding of design implementation issues, including a thorough understanding of color palettes, color depth, and image formats; and
- Designing and maintaining interior web page layouts and content formatting.

Counsel stated that the beneficiary would spend thirty percent of his time performing the following duties:

- Performing user acceptance testing and creating use cases and CFV³ documentation;
- Enhancing the usability of the petitioner's website;
- Uploading the petitioner's website to the internet; and
- Enhancing the search engine optimization of the petitioner's website.

Counsel stated that the beneficiary would spend ten percent of his time performing the following duties:

- Fine-tuning existing systems and software applications;
- Designing brochures, internet and print advertisements, event postcards, marketing materials, sales presentations, and signage design for the petitioner's website; and
- Presenting and coordinating design changes to the website in conjunction with input from the petitioner's management.

Counsel stated that the beneficiary would spend ten percent of his time performing the following duties:

- Testing, debuting, troubleshooting, and upgrading business applications and company software; and
- Testing the petitioner's website for functionality in different browsers and at different resolutions.

The AAO will now discuss the application of each supplemental, alternative criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to the evidence in this record of proceeding.

³ Counsel did not explain her use of the abbreviation "CFV."

The AAO will first discuss the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(I), which is satisfied by establishing that a baccalaureate or higher degree, or its equivalent, in a specific specialty is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position that is the subject of the petition.

The AAO recognizes the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL) *Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook)* as an authoritative source on the duties and educational requirements of the wide variety of occupations it addresses.⁴ The AAO agrees with the petitioner that the duties of the proffered position generally align with those of computer systems analysts as described in the *Handbook*. The *Handbook's* discussion of the duties and educational requirements of computer systems analysts states, in pertinent part, the following:

Computer systems analysts study an organization's current computer systems and procedures and make recommendations to management to help the organization operate more efficiently and effectively. They bring business and information technology (IT) together by understanding the needs and limitations of both. . . .

Computer systems analysts typically do the following:

- Consult with managers to determine the role of the IT system in an organization
- Research emerging technologies to decide if installing them can increase the organization's efficiency and effectiveness
- Prepare an analysis of costs and benefits so that management can decide if computer upgrades are financially worthwhile
- Devise ways to make existing computer systems meet new needs
- Design and develop new systems by choosing and configuring hardware and software
- Oversee installing and configuring the new system to customize it for the organization
- Do tests to ensure that the systems work as expected
- Train the system's end users and write instruction manuals, when required

⁴ The *Handbook*, which is available in printed form, may also be accessed online at <http://www.stats.bls.gov/oco/>. The AAO's references to the *Handbook* are from the 2012-13 edition available online.

Analysts use a variety of techniques to design computer systems such as data-modeling systems, which create rules for the computer to follow when presenting data, thereby allowing analysts to make faster decisions. They also do information engineering, designing and setting up information systems to improve efficiency and communication

U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, 2012-13 ed., "Computer Systems Analysts," <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-systems-analysts.htm#tab-2> (accessed January 18, 2013).

The *Handbook* states the following with regard to the educational requirements necessary for entrance into this field:

Most computer systems analysts have a bachelor's degree in a computer-related field. . . .

* * *

Although many analysts have technical degrees, such a degree is not always a requirement. Many systems analysts have liberal arts degrees and have gained programming or technical expertise elsewhere.

Some analysts have an associate's degree and experience in a related occupation

Id. at <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-systems-analysts.htm#tab-4>.

These statements from the *Handbook* do not indicate that a bachelor's degree or the equivalent, in a specific specialty, is normally required for entry into this occupation. The AAO turns first to its statement that "most" systems analysts possess a bachelor's degree in a computer-related field, which is not sufficient to satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(I).

The first definition of "most" in *Webster's New Collegiate College Dictionary* 731 (Third Edition, Hough Mifflin Harcourt 2008) is "[g]reatest in number, quantity, size, or degree." As such, if merely 51% of systems analyst positions require at least a bachelor's degree in computer science or a closely related field, it could be said that "most" systems analyst positions require such a degree. It cannot be found, therefore, that a particular degree requirement for "most" positions in a given occupation equates to a normal minimum entry requirement for that occupation, much less for the particular position proffered by the petitioner. Instead, a normal minimum entry requirement is one that denotes a standard entry requirement but recognizes that certain, limited exceptions to that standard may exist. To interpret this provision otherwise would run directly contrary to the plain language of the Act, which requires in part "attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States." Section 214(i)(1) of the Act.

Furthermore, the *Handbook* specifically states that an associate's degree combined with work experience is sufficient for some systems analyst positions. Additionally, with regard to positions

that do require attainment of a bachelor's degree or equivalent, the *Handbook* indicates that a degree in a specific specialty is not normally required: the *Handbook* states that technical degrees are not always required, and that many systems analysts have liberal arts degrees and gained their programming or technical expertise "elsewhere."

Furthermore, the petitioner submitted an LCA that was certified for a wage-level that is only appropriate for a comparatively low, entry-level position relative to others within its occupation, which signifies that the beneficiary is only expected to possess a basic understanding of the occupation.⁵

The materials from the DOL's Occupational Information Network (O*NET OnLine) do not establish that the proffered position satisfies the first criterion described at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), either. O*NET OnLine is not particularly useful in determining whether a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is a requirement for a given position, as O*NET OnLine's JobZone designations make no mention of the specific field of study from which a degree must come. As was noted previously, the AAO interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. The Specialized Vocational Preparation (SVP) rating is meant to indicate only the total number of years of vocational preparation required for a particular position. It does not describe how those years are to be divided among training, formal education, and experience and it does not specify the particular type of degree, if any, that a position would require. For all of these reasons, the O*NET OnLine excerpt submitted by counsel is of little evidentiary value to the issue presented on appeal.

⁵ The *Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance* issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) states the following with regard to Level I wage rates:

Level 1 (entry) wage rates are assigned to job offers for beginning level employees who have only a basic understanding of the occupation. These employees perform routine tasks that require limited, if any, exercise of judgment. The tasks provide experience and familiarization with the employer's methods, practices, and programs. The employees may perform higher level work for training and developmental purposes. These employees work under close supervision and receive specific instructions on required tasks and results expected. Their work is closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy. Statements that the job offer is for a research fellow, a worker in training, or an internship are indicators that a Level I wage should be considered [emphasis in original].

The proposed duties' level of complexity, uniqueness, and specialization, as well as the level of independent judgment and occupational understanding required to perform them, are questionable, as the petitioner submitted an LCA certified for a Level I, entry-level position. The LCA's wage-level indicates that the proffered position is actually a low-level, entry position relative to others within the occupation. In accordance with the relevant DOL explanatory information on wage levels, this wage rate indicates that the beneficiary is only required to possess a basic understanding of the occupation; that he will be expected to perform routine tasks requiring limited, if any, exercise of judgment; that he will be closely supervised and his work closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy; and that he will receive specific instructions on required tasks and expected results.

Nor does the record of proceeding contain any persuasive documentary evidence from any other relevant authoritative source establishing that the proffered position's inclusion in the Computer Systems Analysts category is sufficient in and of itself to establish the proffered position as, in the words of this criterion, a "particular position" for which "[a] baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry."

As the evidence in the record of proceeding does not establish that a baccalaureate degree, or its equivalent, in a specific specialty is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position that is the subject of this petition, the petitioner has not satisfied the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1).

Next, the AAO finds that the petitioner has not satisfied the first of the two alternative prongs of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2). This prong alternatively calls for a petitioner to establish that a requirement of a bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is common to the petitioner's industry in positions that are both: (1) parallel to the proffered position; and (2) located in organizations that are similar to the petitioner.

In determining whether there is such a common degree requirement, factors often considered by USCIS include: whether the *Handbook* reports that the industry requires a degree; whether the industry's professional association has made a degree a minimum entry requirement; and whether letters or affidavits from firms or individuals in the industry attest that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed individuals." See *Shanti, Inc. v. Reno*, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 (D.Minn. 1999) (quoting *Hird/Blaker Corp. v. Sava*, 712 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).

Here and as already discussed, the petitioner has not established that its proffered position is one for which the *Handbook* reports an industry-wide requirement for at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent. Also, there are no submissions from professional associations, individuals, or similar firms in the petitioner's industry attesting that individuals employed in positions parallel to the proffered position are routinely required to have a minimum of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent for entry into those positions.

Nor do the seven job vacancy announcements contained in the record of proceeding satisfy the first alternative prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2). First, the petitioner has not submitted any evidence to demonstrate that the positions being advertised in these vacancy announcements are "parallel" to the one being proffered here.⁶ Second, the petitioner has not submitted any evidence to demonstrate that any of these advertisements is from a company "similar" to the petitioner. The petitioner has submitted no evidence to establish that any of these advertisers are similar to the petitioner in size, scope, scale of operations, business efforts, expenditures, or other fundamental

⁶ For example, Tiffany & Co., Zale Corporation, Macy's, rue21, Target Corporation, and Barneys New York all require work experience, and Bloomingdale's states a preference for such experience. However, as noted above, the petitioner submitted an LCA that was certified for a wage-level that is only appropriate for a comparatively low, entry-level relative to others within its occupation, which signifies that the beneficiary is only expected to possess a basic understanding of the occupation.

dimensions.⁷ Nor has the petitioner established that the job-vacancy announcements require a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty.⁸ Nor does the petitioner submit any evidence regarding how representative these advertisements are of the industry's usual recruiting and hiring practices with regard to the position advertised. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)).⁹

Therefore, the petitioner has not satisfied the first of the two alternative prongs described at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2), as the evidence of record does not establish a requirement for at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty as common to the petitioner's industry in positions that are both (1) parallel to the proffered position and (2) located in organizations that are similar to the petitioner.

Next, the AAO finds that the petitioner did not satisfy the second alternative prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2), which provides that "an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree."

⁷ As noted above, by virtue of its provision of NAICS code 541511, the petitioner claimed on the Form I-129 that it engages in "custom computer programming services," an industry which "comprises establishments primarily engaged in writing, modifying, testing, and supporting software to meet the needs of a particular customer." See U.S. Dep't of Commerce at <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch>.

However, none of these advertisements appear to have come from a custom computer programming service.

⁸ Tiffany & Co., Zale Corporation, Target Corporation, Barneys New York, and Bloomingdale's require a bachelor's degree, but they do not require that it be in a specific specialty.

⁹ Furthermore, according to the *Handbook* there were approximately 664,800 persons employed as computer systems analysts in 2010. *Handbook* at <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-systems-analysts.htm#tab-6> (accessed January 18, 2013). Based on the size of this relevant study population, the petitioner fails to demonstrate what statistically valid inferences, if any, can be drawn from the seven submitted vacancy announcements with regard to determining the common educational requirements for entry into parallel positions in similar organizations. See generally Earl Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research* 186-228 (1995). Moreover, given that there is no indication that the advertisements were randomly selected, the validity of any such inferences could not be accurately determined even if the sampling unit were sufficiently large. See *id.* at 195-196 (explaining that "[r]andom selection is the key to [the] process [of probability sampling]" and that "random selection offers access to the body of probability theory, which provides the basis for estimates of population parameters and estimates of error").

As such, even if these seven job-vacancy announcements established that the employers that issued them routinely recruited and hired for the advertised positions only persons with at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty closely related to the positions, it cannot be found that these seven job-vacancy announcements that appear to have been consciously selected could credibly refute the findings of the *Handbook* published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics that such a position does not require at least a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty for entry into the occupation in the United States.

In this particular case, the petitioner has failed to credibly demonstrate that the duties the beneficiary would perform on a day-to-day basis constitute a position so complex or unique that it can only be performed by a person with at least a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty. The duties proposed for the beneficiary are similar to those outlined in the *Handbook* as normally performed by computer systems analysts, and the petitioner's description of the duties which collectively constitute the proffered position lacks the detail and specificity required to establish that they surpass or exceed the duties performed by typical computer systems analysts in terms of complexity or uniqueness. As noted above, the *Handbook* indicates that the performance of these typical duties does not normally require a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty. The AAO finds further that, even outside the context of the *Handbook*, the petitioner has simply not established complexity or uniqueness as attributes of the proffered position, let alone as attributes with such an elevated level as to require the services of a person with at least a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty.

Also, the AAO incorporates here by reference and reiterates its earlier discussion regarding the LCA and its indication that the proffered position is a low-level, entry position relative to others within the occupation. Based upon the wage rate, the beneficiary is only required to have a basic understanding of the occupation. Moreover, that wage rate is indicative of a position where the beneficiary would perform routine tasks that require limited, if any, exercise of independent judgment; would be closely supervised and monitored; would receive specific instructions on required tasks and expected results; and would have his work reviewed for accuracy.

The petitioner therefore failed to establish how the beneficiary's responsibilities and day-to-day duties constitute a position so complex or unique it can be performed only by an individual with at least a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty.

Consequently, as it did not show that the particular position for which it filed this petition is so complex or unique that it can only be performed by a person with at least a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty, the petitioner has not satisfied the second alternative prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2).

The AAO turns next to the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3), which entails an employer demonstrating that it normally requires a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty for the position. The AAO's review of the record of proceeding under this criterion necessarily includes whatever evidence the petitioner has submitted with regard to its past recruiting and hiring practices and with regard to employees who previously held the position in question.

To satisfy this criterion, the record must contain documentary evidence demonstrating that the petitioner has a history of requiring the degree or degree equivalency, in a specific specialty, in its prior recruiting and hiring for the position. The record must establish that a petitioner's imposition of a degree requirement is not merely a matter of preference for high-caliber candidates but is necessitated

by the performance requirements of the proffered position.¹⁰ In the instant case, the record does not establish a prior history of recruiting and hiring for the proffered position only persons with at least a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty.

While a petitioner may believe or otherwise assert that a proffered position requires a degree, that opinion alone without corroborating evidence cannot establish the position as a specialty occupation. Were USCIS limited solely to reviewing a petitioner's claimed self-imposed requirements, then any individual with a bachelor's degree could be brought to the United States to perform any occupation as long as the employer artificially created a token degree requirement, whereby all individuals employed in a particular position possessed a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty or its equivalent. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d at 387. In other words, if a petitioner's assertion of a particular degree requirement is not necessitated by the actual performance requirements of the proffered position, the position would not meet the statutory or regulatory definition of a specialty occupation. *See* section 214(i)(1) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "specialty occupation").

To satisfy this criterion, the evidence of record must show that the specific performance requirements of the position generated the recruiting and hiring history. A petitioner's perfunctory declaration of a particular educational requirement will not mask the fact that the position is not a specialty occupation. USCIS must examine the actual employment requirements, and, on the basis of that examination, determine whether the actual performance requirements of the position necessitate a petitioner's history of requiring a particular degree in its recruiting and hiring for the position. *See generally Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d at 387. In this pursuit, the critical element is not the title of the position, or the fact that an employer has routinely insisted on certain educational standards, but whether performance of the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation as required by the Act. To interpret the regulations any other way would lead to absurd results: if USCIS were constrained to recognize a specialty occupation merely because the petitioner has an established practice of demanding certain educational requirements for the proposed position - and without consideration of how a beneficiary is to be specifically employed - then any alien with a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty could be brought into the United States to perform non-specialty occupations, so long as the employer required all such employees to have baccalaureate or higher degrees. *See id.* at 388.

In her September 28, 2011 letter counsel conceded that the petitioner has never employed "anyone specific completing these job duties[.]" Although the fact that a proffered position is a newly-created one is not in itself generally a basis for precluding a position from recognition as a specialty occupation, certainly an employer that has never recruited and hired for the position cannot satisfy the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3), which requires a demonstration that it normally requires a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty for the position.

¹⁰ Any such assertion would be undermined in this particular case by the fact that the petitioner indicated in the LCA that it would be paying the beneficiary a wage-rate that is only appropriate for a low-level, entry position relative to others within the occupation.

As the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a history of recruiting and hiring only individuals with a bachelor's degree, or the equivalent, in a specific specialty for the proffered position, it has failed to satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(3).

Next, the AAO finds that the petitioner has not satisfied the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4), which requires the petitioner to establish that the nature of the proffered position's duties is so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to perform them is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty.

Both on its own terms and also in comparison with the three higher wage-levels that can be designated in an LCA, the petitioner's designation of an LCA wage-level I is indicative of duties of relatively low complexity.

As earlier noted, the *Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance* issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) states the following with regard to Level I wage rates:

Level I (entry) wage rates are assigned to job offers for beginning level employees who have only a basic understanding of the occupation. These employees perform routine tasks that require limited, if any, exercise of judgment. The tasks provide experience and familiarization with the employer's methods, practices, and programs. The employees may perform higher level work for training and developmental purposes. These employees work under close supervision and receive specific instructions on required tasks and results expected. Their work is closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy. Statements that the job offer is for a research fellow, a worker in training, or an internship are indicators that a Level I wage should be considered [emphasis in original].

The pertinent guidance from the Department of Labor, at page 7 of its *Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance* describes the next higher wage-level as follows:

Level II (qualified) wage rates are assigned to job offers for qualified employees who have attained, either through education or experience, a good understanding of the occupation. They perform moderately complex tasks that require limited judgment. An indicator that the job request warrants a wage determination at Level II would be a requirement for years of education and/or experience that are generally required as described in the O*NET Job Zones.

The above descriptive summary indicates that even this higher-than-designated wage level is appropriate for only "moderately complex tasks that require limited judgment." The fact that this higher-than-here-assigned, Level II wage rate itself indicates performance of only "moderately complex tasks that require limited judgment," is very telling with regard to the relatively low level of complexity imputed to the proffered position by virtue of its Level I wage-rate designation.

Further, the AAO notes the relatively low level of complexity that even this Level II wage-level reflects when compared with the two still-higher LCA wage levels, neither of which was designated on the LCA submitted to support this petition.

The aforementioned *Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance* describes the Level III wage designation as follows:

Level III (experienced) wage rates are assigned to job offers for experienced employees who have a sound understanding of the occupation and have attained, either through education or experience, special skills or knowledge. They perform tasks that require exercising judgment and may coordinate the activities of other staff. They may have supervisory authority over those staff. A requirement for years of experience or educational degrees that are at the higher ranges indicated in the O*NET Job Zones would be indicators that a Level III wage should be considered.

Frequently, key words in the job title can be used as indicators that an employer's job offer is for an experienced worker. . . .

The *Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance* describes the Level IV wage designation as follows:

Level IV (fully competent) wage rates are assigned to job offers for competent employees who have sufficient experience in the occupation to plan and conduct work requiring judgment and the independent evaluation, selection, modification, and application of standard procedures and techniques. Such employees use advanced skills and diversified knowledge to solve unusual and complex problems. These employees receive only technical guidance and their work is reviewed only for application of sound judgment and effectiveness in meeting the establishment's procedures and expectations. They generally have management and/or supervisory responsibilities.

Here the AAO again incorporates its earlier discussion and analysis regarding the implications of the petitioner's submission of an LCA certified for the lowest assignable wage-level. By virtue of this submission the petitioner effectively attested that the proffered position is a low-level, entry position relative to others within the occupation, and that, as clear by comparison with DOL's instructive comments about the next higher level (Level II), the proffered position did not even involve "moderately complex tasks that require limited judgment" (the level of complexity noted for the next higher wage-level, Level II). The AAO also finds that, separate and apart from the petitioner's submission of an LCA with a wage-level I designation, the petitioner has also failed to provide sufficiently detailed documentary evidence to establish that the nature of the specific duties that would be performed if this petition were approved is so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to perform them is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty.

(b)(6)

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For all of these reasons, the evidence in the record of proceeding fails to establish that the proposed duties meet the specialization and complexity threshold at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4).

Finally, the unpublished AAO decision cited by counsel on appeal does not establish the proffered position as specialty occupation under any of the criteria contained at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that AAO precedent decisions are binding on all USCIS employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding.

As the petitioner has not satisfied at least one of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), it cannot be found that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed and the petition will be denied on this basis.

In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.