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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

DATE: **APR 30 2013** OFFICE: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

for Michael T. Kelly
Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition, and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

On the Form I-129 visa petition, the petitioner describes itself as an information technology and development company¹ established in 1998. In order to continue its employment of the beneficiary in what it designates as a programmer analyst position,² the petitioner seeks to extend her classification as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The director denied the petition on the basis of his determination that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation.

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains the following: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's request for additional evidence (RFE); (3) the petitioner's response to the RFE; (4) the director's letter denying the petition; and (5) the Form I-290B and supporting documentation.

Upon review of the entire record of proceeding, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to overcome the director's ground for denying this petition. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed, and the petition will be denied.

Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO finds an additional aspect which, although not addressed in the director's decision, nevertheless also precludes approval of the petition, namely, the petitioner's failure to demonstrate that it had secured work for the entire period of requested employment when it filed this petition.³ For this additional reason, the petition must also be denied.

The AAO notes further that the petitioner provided as the supporting Labor Condition Application (LCA) for this petition an LCA which does not correspond to the petition, in that the LCA was certified for a wage level below that which is compatible with the level of responsibility the petitioner claimed

¹ The petitioner provided a North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Code of 541511, "Custom Computer Programming Services." U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, North American Industry Classification System, 2012 NAICS Definition, "541511 Custom Computer Programming Services," <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch> (accessed Mar. 22, 2013).

² The Labor Condition Application (LCA) submitted by the petitioner in support of the petition was certified for the SOC (O*NET/OES) Code 15-1021.00, the associated Occupational Classification of "Computer Programmers," and a Level I (entry-level) prevailing wage rate.

³ The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis (*See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004)), and it was in the course of this review that the AAO identified these additional four grounds for denial.

for the proffered position through its descriptions of its constituent duties.⁴ This aspect of the petition not only undermines the credibility of the petition as a whole and any claim as to the proffered position or the duties comprising it as being particularly complex, unique, and/or specialized, but also precludes approval of the petition because the petition is not accompanied by an LCA that was certified for a wage-level that corresponds to the levels of responsibility, judgment, and occupational knowledge that the petitioner has claimed that the proffered position requires.

In its July 24, 2011 letter of support, the petitioner claimed that it “is engaged in the business of marketing and [the] distribution of computer software and value-added business solutions to Fortune 1000 organizations.” The petitioner claimed that it has employed the beneficiary as a programmer analyst since June 2004, and that it wishes to extend her period of authorized employment for three additional years.

The petitioner claimed that the duties of the proffered position would include the following:

- Analyzing the communication, informational, and programming requirements of the petitioner’s clients;
- Planning, developing, testing, and documenting computer programs;
- Designing programs and implementing software application and packages customized to meet client needs;
- Designing programs and implementing software applications and packages designed to address clients’ needs and demands;
- Analyzing users’ data, and consulting with clients to address their needs and demands;
- Identifying existing operation procedures and clarifying program objectives;
- Reviewing, repairing, and modifying software programs in order to ensure the technical accuracy and reliability of computer programs;
- Working with clients on the use of software applications; and
- Providing troubleshooting and debugging support.

The petitioner makes several assertions on appeal regarding the complexity and specialized nature of the proffered position and its constituent duties. For example, the petitioner referenced the “responsibility attendant to” the proffered position, and stated the following:

⁴ See *id.*

The beneficiary is critical[ly] and uniquely valuable to our ability to provide the support required for the client . . . The beneficiary has been working with [the petitioner's client] since June 2006 and has acquired a deep working relationship of their complex technology industry, which is difficult and hard to find in the marketplace, and possesses sound software technology experience that makes [her] a uniquely qualified resource for this assignment. If compared to the Petitioner's own employees, the beneficiary would be ranked among the most knowledgeable about our client's business. The petitioner asserts that it will be difficult for it to manage the client's expectations without the beneficiary's contributions. . . .

However, as will now be discussed, these assertions materially conflict with the wage level designated in the LCA that the petitioner submitted with the petition. As noted above, the LCA submitted by the petitioner in support of the instant position specifies the occupational classification for the position as "Computer Programmers," SOC (O*NET/OES) Code 15-1021.00, at a Level I (entry-level) wage. The *Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance*⁵ issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) states the following with regard to Level I wage rates:

Level I (entry) wage rates are assigned to job offers for beginning level employees who have only a basic understanding of the occupation. These employees perform routine tasks that require limited, if any, exercise of judgment. The tasks provide experience and familiarization with the employer's methods, practices, and programs. The employees may perform higher level work for training and developmental purposes. These employees work under close supervision and receive specific instructions on required tasks and results expected. Their work is closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy. Statements that the job offer is for a research fellow, a worker in training, or an internship are indicators that a Level I wage should be considered [emphasis in original].

The petitioner's assertions regarding the proposed duties' level of complexity and the occupational understanding required to perform them are materially inconsistent with the petitioner's submission of an LCA certified for a Level I, entry-level position, which DOL describes as a wage rate "assigned to job offers for beginning level employees who have only a basic understanding of the occupation." The LCA's wage level (Level I, the lowest of the four that can be designated) is only appropriate for a low-level, entry position relative to others within the occupation. In accordance with the relevant DOL explanatory information on wage levels quoted above, this wage rate is appropriate for positions in which that the beneficiary is only required to have a basic understanding of the occupation; will be expected to perform routine tasks requiring limited, if any, exercise of judgment; will be closely supervised and her work closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy; and will receive specific instructions on required tasks and expected results.

This aspect of the LCA undermines the credibility of the petition, and, in particular, the credibility of the petitioner's assertions regarding the proffered position's educational demands and level of responsibilities. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a

⁵ Available at http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/Policy_Nonag_Progs.pdf (last accessed Mar. 22, 2013).

reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Further, as mentioned earlier and as will now be discussed in further detail, the material conflict between the wage-level designated in the LCA, on the one hand, and, on the other, the levels of responsibility, judgment, and occupational knowledge that the petitioner claims for the petition, means that the petition is not supported by a corresponding LCA and, therefore, cannot be approved.

It should be noted that, for efficiency's sake, the AAO's discussion and findings regarding the material conflict between assertions in the petition and the LCA wage-level are hereby incorporated as part of this decision's later analyses of each criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has clearly stated that its LCA certification process is cursory, that it does not involve substantive review, and that it makes the petitioner responsible for the accuracy of the information entered in the LCA. With regard to LCA certification, the regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 655.715 states the following:

Certification means the determination by a certifying officer that a labor condition application is not incomplete and does not contain obvious inaccuracies.

Likewise, the regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 655.735(b) states, in pertinent part, that "[i]t is the employer's responsibility to ensure that ETA [(the DOL's Employment and Training Administration)] receives a complete and accurate LCA."

Further, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(i)(B)(2) also makes clear that certification of an LCA does not constitute a determination that a position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation:

Certification by the Department of Labor of a labor condition application in an occupational classification does not constitute a determination by that agency that the occupation in question is a specialty occupation. The director shall determine if the application involves a specialty occupation as defined in section 214(i)(1) of the Act. The director shall also determine whether the particular alien for whom H-1B classification is sought qualifies to perform services in the specialty occupation as prescribed in section 214(i)(2) of the Act.

While the DOL is the agency that certifies LCA applications before they are submitted to USCIS, DOL regulations note that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (i.e., its immigration benefits branch, USCIS) is the department responsible for determining whether the content of an LCA filed for a particular Form I-129 actually supports that petition. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.705(b), which states, in pertinent part (emphasis added):

For H-1B visas . . . DHS accepts the employer's petition (DHS Form I-129) with the DOL certified LCA attached. *In doing so, the DHS determines whether the petition is supported by an LCA which corresponds with the petition, whether the occupation named in the [LCA] is a specialty occupation or whether the individual is a fashion model of distinguished merit and ability, and whether the qualifications of the nonimmigrant meet the statutory requirements of H-1B visa classification.*

As previously noted, the conflict between the LCA and the petition adversely affects the merits of the petition, because it materially undermines the credibility of the petition's statements with regard to the nature and level of work that the beneficiary would perform.

The AAO will now address the director's determination that the proffered position is not a specialty occupation. Based upon a complete review of the record of proceeding, the AAO agrees with the director and finds that the evidence fails to establish that the position as described constitutes a specialty occupation.

To meet its burden of proof in this regard, the petitioner must establish that the employment it is offering to the beneficiary meets the following statutory and regulatory requirements.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) defines the term "specialty occupation" as one that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The term "specialty occupation" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as:

An occupation which requires [(1)] theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which requires [(2)] the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;

- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this illogical and absurd result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as stating additional requirements that a position must meet, supplementing the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

Consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) consistently interprets the term “degree” in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. *See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing “a degree requirement in a specific specialty” as “one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position”). Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not rely simply upon a proffered position’s title. The specific duties of the position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity’s business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the beneficiary, and determine whether the position qualifies

as a specialty occupation. *See generally Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d at 384. The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

In his February 16, 2012 decision denying the petition, the director found the record of proceeding devoid of evidence demonstrating the existence of a viable in-house project or other specialty-occupation-level work available for the duration of the three-year period of time requested in the petition. With regard to a viable in-house project, the director noted that although the petitioner submitted general information about what appeared to be an in-house project, the record lacked evidence of client contracts specifying the project's name, location, start- and end-dates and invoices or purchase orders demonstrating the sale of the project. With regard to placement of the beneficiary at a third-party site, the director noted that although the petitioner submitted copies of several consulting-type agreements executed between the petitioner and several of its clients, the record lacked documentation, such as work orders, establishing a work assignment for the beneficiary.

The petitioner claims on appeal that the beneficiary has been working on an in-house project for its client, [REDACTED] since June 2006. In addition to the petitioner's comments regarding the [REDACTED] project the AAO excerpted above, the petitioner states the following with regard to this project:

The beneficiary is currently working as [a] programmer [a]nalyst [at] our office site namely [REDACTED] for their [s]oftware development products mainly [s]olutions with respect to computer and information requirements, creating original software programs, developing software applications, training of personnel, implementing hardware, network[,] and communications arrangements[,] and updating existing programs and systems. The staffing level of each client and each engagement fluctuates over the course of time[,] and [the petitioner] move[s] [its] consultants from project to project, client to client, depending on project status.

The petitioner also submits on appeal a Master Services Agreement (MSA) and Statement of Work executed between the petitioner and [REDACTED]; an Agreement for IT Services executed between the petitioner and [REDACTED] and an MSA executed between the petitioner and [REDACTED]

Upon review, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate the existence of a specialty occupation. The record lacks a detailed description of the specific duties to be performed by the beneficiary on the [REDACTED] project upon which he is to work. The list of duties provided by the petitioner was vague, overly broad, and generic, and the proposed duties were not described in specific relation to the [REDACTED] project or, even more broadly, to the petitioner's business. Nor did the petitioner provide any meaningful information regarding the [REDACTED] project itself. Nor does the record contain evidence of any type of business relationship between the petitioner and [REDACTED]

The other documents submitted prior to and on appeal, including the various staffing, vendor, and MSAs and work orders/statements of work do not reference the beneficiary, and, they do not describe any project upon which she is to work.

The generic nature of the duties as described by the petitioner combined with its failure to provide any meaningful information regarding the project upon which it claims the beneficiary will work precludes a finding that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation under any of the criteria described above because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines: (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4.⁶

Accordingly, as the petitioner has not established that it has satisfied any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), it cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed and the petition will be denied on this basis.

Furthermore, the record lacks credible evidence that the petitioner had secured work of any type for the beneficiary to perform during the requested period of employment at the time it filed the petition. USCIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(12). A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). For this reason also, the petition will be denied.

Finally, it is noted that this is an extension petition filed on behalf of the beneficiary. The director's decision does not indicate whether he reviewed the prior approvals of the other nonimmigrant petitions. If the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported and contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, the approvals would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. *Matter of Church Scientology International*,

⁶ It is noted that, even if the proffered position were established as being that of a programmer analyst, a review of the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL's) *Occupational Outlook Handbook* (the *Handbook*) does not indicate that, as a category, such a position qualifies as a specialty occupation in that the *Handbook* does not state a normal minimum requirement of a U.S. bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent for entry into the occupation of programmer analyst. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, 2012-13 ed., "Computer Systems Analysts," <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-systems-analysts.htm#tab-4> (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). As such, absent evidence that the position of programmer analyst satisfies one of the alternative criteria available under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), the instant petition could not be approved for this additional reason.

19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm'r 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that USCIS or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. *Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery*, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988).

Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service center. *Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS*, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), *aff'd*, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001).

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the service center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Moreover, when the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it shows that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683.

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.