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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)

20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090

Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

[Redacted]

DATE: MAR 08 2013

OFFICE: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

FILE: [Redacted]

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:


[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

for 
Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition, and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

On the Form I-129 visa petition, the petitioner describes itself as a software information technology and professional services company¹ established in 2001. In order to employ the beneficiary in what it designates as a systems analyst position,² the petitioner seeks to classify him as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The director denied the petition on the basis of her determination that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate the existence of a “reasonable and credible offer of employment.”

The record of proceeding before the AAO contains the following: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director’s request for additional evidence (RFE); (3) the petitioner’s response to the RFE; (4) the director’s letter denying the petition; and (5) the Form I-290B and supporting documentation.

Upon review of the entire record of proceeding, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to overcome the director’s ground for denying this petition. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed, and the petition will be denied.

Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO finds four additional aspects which, although not addressed in the director’s decision, nevertheless also preclude approval of the petition, namely: (1) the petitioner’s failure to demonstrate the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary;³ (2) its failure to demonstrate that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation; (3) its failure to demonstrate that it had secured work for the entire period of requested employment when it filed the petition;⁴ and (4) its failure to demonstrate

¹ The petitioner provided a North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Code of 541511, “Custom Computer Programming Services.” U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, North American Industry Classification System, 2012 NAICS Definition, “541511 Custom Computer Programming Services,” <http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch> (accessed Feb. 15, 2013).

² The Labor Condition Application (LCA) submitted by the petitioner in support of the petition was certified for the SOC (O*NET/OES) Code 15-1121, the associated Occupational Classification of “Computer Systems Analysts,” and a Level I (entry-level) prevailing wage rate.

³ While the director alluded to the petitioner’s failure to make such a demonstration, she did not make an explicit finding that the petitioner had failed to do so.

⁴ Again, while the director alluded to the petitioner’s failure to make such a demonstration, she did not make an explicit finding that the petitioner had failed to do so.

that the beneficiary is qualified to perform the duties of a specialty occupation.⁵ For these additional four reasons, the petition must also be denied.

In adjudicating this petition, the AAO will first address the four additional grounds for denial it has identified on appeal. Only then will it address the director's sole ground for denying the petition.

Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-1B nonimmigrant in pertinent part as an alien:

subject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(1) . . . , who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) . . . , and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the [Secretary of Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary [of Labor] an application under section 212(n)(1)

"United States employer" is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows:

United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other association, or organization in the United States which:

- (1) Engages a person to work within the United States;
- (2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and
- (3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number.

The record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner or any of its clients will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary.

Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), it is noted that the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-1B visa classification. Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act indicates that an alien coming to the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation will have an "intending employer" who will file a Labor Condition Application with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 212(n)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1) (2012). The intending employer is described as offering full-time or part-time "employment" to the H-1B "employee." Subsections 212(n)(1)(A)(i) and 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i), (2)(C)(vii) (2012). Further, the regulations indicate that "United States employers" must file a Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) in order to classify aliens as H-1B temporary "employees." 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(1), (2)(i)(A). Finally, the definition of

⁵ The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis (See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004)), and it was in the course of this review that the AAO identified these additional four grounds for denial.

“United States employer” indicates in its second prong that the petitioner must have an “employer-employee relationship” with the “employees under this part,” i.e., the H-1B beneficiary, and that this relationship be evidenced by the employer’s ability to “hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term “United States employer”).

Neither the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) nor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) defined the terms “employee” or “employer-employee relationship” by regulation for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, even though the regulation describes H-1B beneficiaries as being “employees” who must have an “employer-employee relationship” with a “United States employer.” *Id.* Therefore, for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, these terms are undefined.

The United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term “employee,” courts should conclude that the term was “intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.” *Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden*, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter “*Darden*”) (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated:

“In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.”

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324 (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. at 751-752); see also *Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells*, 538 U.S. at 440 (hereinafter “*Clackamas*”). As the common-law test contains “no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.” *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting *NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America*, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).

In this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of “employer” in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, “employment” in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or “employee” in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. See generally 136 Cong. Rec. S17106 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. H12358 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). On the contrary, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the regulations define the term

“United States employer” to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition.⁶

Specifically, the regulatory definition of “United States employer” requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to engage a person to work within the United States, and to have an “employer-employee relationship” with the H-1B “employee.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term “United States employer” not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an “employer-employee relationship” as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms “employee” or “employer-employee relationship” combined with the agency’s otherwise generally circular definition of United States employer in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond “the traditional common law definition” or, more importantly, that construing these terms in this manner would thwart congressional design or lead to absurd results.

⁶ While the *Darden* court considered only the definition of “employee” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and did not address the definition of “employer,” courts have generally refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA’s use of employer because “the definition of ‘employer’ in ERISA, unlike the definition of ‘employee,’ clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the traditional common law definition.” See, e.g., *Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd.*, 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), *aff’d*, 27 F.3d 800 (2nd Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994).

However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of “employer” in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, “employment” in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or “employee” in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the term “United States employer” was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition. A federal agency’s interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 844-845 (1984).

The regulatory definition of “United States employer” requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to employ persons in the United States, and to have an “employer-employee relationship” with the H-1B “employee.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term “United States employer” not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an “employer-employee relationship” as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms “employee,” “employed,” “employment” or “employer-employee relationship” indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond “the traditional common law definition.” Therefore, in the absence of an intent to impose broader definitions by either Congress or USCIS, the “conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine,” and the *Darden* construction test, apply to the terms “employee,” “employer-employee relationship,” “employed,” and “employment” as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). That being said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term “employer” than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. See, e.g., section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to “unaffiliated employers” supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

Cf. Darden, 503 U.S. at 318-319.⁷

Therefore, in the absence of an express congressional intent to impose broader definitions, both the “conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine” and the *Darden* construction test apply to the terms “employee” and “employer-employee relationship” as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).⁸

Therefore, in considering whether or not one will be an “employee” in an “employer-employee relationship” with a “United States employer” for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS must focus on the common-law touchstone of “control.” *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450; *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining a “United States employer” as one who “has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise *control* the work of any such employee . . .” (emphasis added)).

The factors indicating that a worker is or will be an “employee” of an “employer” are clearly delineated in both the *Darden* and *Clackamas* decisions. *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324; *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 445; *see also Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker’s relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer’s regular business. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 445; *see also New Compliance Manual*, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the *Darden* decision); *see also Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (determining that hospitals, as the recipients of beneficiaries’ services, are the “true employers” of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the actual petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries).

It is important to note, however, that the factors listed in *Darden* and *Clackamas* are not exhaustive and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties relevant to control may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties,

⁷ To the extent the regulations are ambiguous with regard to the terms “employee” or “employer-employee relationship,” the agency’s interpretation of these terms should be found to be controlling unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” *Auer v. Robbins*, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citing *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 359, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 1850, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (quoting *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*, 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945))).

⁸ That said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term “employer” than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.*, section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to “unaffiliated employers” supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. See *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *New Compliance Manual* at § 2-III(A)(1).

Furthermore, when examining the factors relevant to determining control, USCIS must assess and weigh each actual factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or change that factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. See *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324. For example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the right to assign them, it is the actual source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, not who has the right to provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. See *id.* at 323.

Lastly, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the worker is an employee. *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, . . . the answer to whether [an individual] is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship . . . with no one factor being decisive.'" *Id.* at 451 (quoting *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324).

The petitioner's April 9, 2012 letter, which the beneficiary also signed, called for the beneficiary to provide his services to the petitioner's clients. In its May 11, 2012 letter of support, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would provide his services to its client at [REDACTED] Oregon, and the petitioner also provided that location as the beneficiary's work address on the Form I-129.⁹ That the beneficiary would not be providing his services to the petitioner directly is therefore not in dispute.

When it filed the petition, the petitioner submitted a Master Service Agreement ("MSA") executed between the petitioner and [REDACTED] on April 10, 2012, which called for the petitioner to provide [REDACTED] with personnel. The petitioner also submitted a work order that was prepared pursuant to the MSA, which called for the beneficiary to provide his services to [REDACTED] as a "Data Warehouse/ETL Developer" for an unspecified period of time. The petitioner also submitted an April 20, 2012 letter from [REDACTED], in which that company's president stated that although it had entered into a staffing contract with the petitioner, the petitioner would be responsible for managing the schedules, payroll, and taxes of its employees. It is noted that the letter from [REDACTED] did not reference the beneficiary or his specific position.

In its July 12, 2012 letter submitted in response to the director's RFE, the petitioner argued that it would in fact engage the beneficiary in an employer-employee relationship and cited, *inter alia*, its language in its April 9, 2012 letter to the beneficiary offering him employment, his optional health insurance coverage through the company, and its provision of vacation and holiday leave to the beneficiary. The petitioner claimed further that the beneficiary would work for AnalyticsWare directly, and that he would not work for a third-party client company.

Applying the *Darden* and *Clackamas* tests to this matter, the AAO finds that the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship"

⁹ The petitioner's office is located in [REDACTED], Texas.

with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." The record lacks detailed, probative information from AnalyticsWare, the actual user of the beneficiary's services, regarding the specific duties the beneficiary would perform for that company. The April 20, 2012 letter from [REDACTED] references neither the beneficiary nor his job duties. Although the Work Order does name the beneficiary, its description of the job duties are vague and generic, and do not describe the actual duties he would perform in meaningful detail, and in relation to [REDACTED] business. Furthermore, the binding nature of this Work Order, as well as the MSA to which it is attached, and therefore their evidentiary value, have not been established. The AAO notes that the MSA was not signed by both the petitioner and [REDACTED] and neither party signed the Work Order. Furthermore, the Work Order is not dated, and does not contain any dates of engagement.

The relevant evidence and arguments by counsel do not demonstrate the requisite employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary. While social security contributions, worker's compensation contributions, unemployment insurance contributions, federal and state income tax withholdings, and other benefits are still relevant factors in determining who will control an alien beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, e.g., who will oversee and direct the work of the beneficiary, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, where will the work be located, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the alien beneficiary is assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to make a determination as to who will be the beneficiary's employer. Without full disclosure of all of the relevant factors, the AAO is unable to find that the requisite employer-employee relationship will exist between the petitioner and the beneficiary.

While social security contributions, worker's compensation contributions, unemployment insurance contributions, federal and state income tax withholdings, and other benefits are still relevant factors in determining who will control an alien beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, e.g., who will oversee and direct the work of the beneficiary, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, where will the work be located, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the alien beneficiary is assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to make a determination as to who will be the beneficiary's employer. Without full disclosure of all relevant factors, the AAO is unable to find that the requisite employer-employee relationship will exist between the petitioner and the beneficiary.

The evidence, therefore, is insufficient to establish that the petitioner qualifies as a United States employer, as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Merely claiming in its letters that the petitioner exercises complete control over the beneficiary, without evidence supporting the claim, does not establish eligibility in this matter, particularly in a situation, such as exists here, where the petitioner would be providing the beneficiary to one of its clients. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)).

On appeal, counsel cites a January 8, 2010 memorandum issued by USCIS (the "Neufeld memo"),¹⁰ in support of her argument that the petitioner has demonstrated the existence of an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary. According to counsel, the petitioner complied with the Neufeld memorandum because the "'totality of the circumstances' must be considered" and that, if the "'big picture' and all of the evidence" is taken into account, the petition should be approved.

Counsel's arguments are not persuasive. The AAO has in fact considered the totality of the petitioner's evidence, and that evidence is not persuasive. Even if the AAO were to set aside the evidentiary deficiencies identified above in the Work Order and MSA, which it will not do, the relevant evidence would still fail to demonstrate that the petitioner would engage the beneficiary in an employer-employee relationship. Those documents simply do not describe the duties that the beneficiary would perform in probative detail, and there is no other information from the end-client user of the beneficiary's services, or anyone else, for that matter, describing those services.

Based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it or any of its clients will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the petition must be denied on this basis also. Thus, even if it were determined that the petitioner had overcome the director's grounds for denying this petition (which it has not), the petition could still not be approved.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petition must also be denied due to the petitioner's failure to establish that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation. As recognized in *Defensor v. Meissner*, it is necessary for the end-client to provide sufficient information regarding the proposed job duties to be performed at its location in order to properly ascertain the minimum educational requirements necessary to perform those duties. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 387-388. In other words, as the nurses in that case would provide services to the end-client hospitals and not to the petitioning staffing company, the petitioner-provided job duties and alleged requirements to perform those duties were irrelevant to a specialty occupation determination. *See id.*

Here, the record of proceeding in this case is similarly devoid of sufficient information from the end-client, [REDACTED] regarding the job duties to be performed by the beneficiary for it. The petitioner's failure to establish the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the beneficiary, therefore, precludes a finding that the proffered position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2;

¹⁰ See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Director, Service Center Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, *Determining Employer-Employee Relationship for Adjudication of H-1B Petitions, Including Third-Party Site Placements*, HQ 70/6.2.8 (Jan. 8, 2010).

(4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4.¹¹

Accordingly, as the petitioner has not established that it has satisfied any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), it cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty

¹¹ Furthermore, even if the proffered position were established as being that of a systems analyst, a review of the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL's) *Occupational Outlook Handbook* (the *Handbook*) does not indicate that, as a category, such a position qualifies as a specialty occupation in that the *Handbook* does not state a normal minimum requirement of a U.S. bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent for entry into the occupation of programmer analyst. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, 2012-13 ed., "Computer Systems Analysts," <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-systems-analysts.htm#tab-2> (accessed Feb. 15, 2013). As such, absent evidence that the position of systems analyst satisfies one of the alternative criteria available under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), the instant petition could not be approved for this additional reason.

It is noted further that the petitioner submitted a certified Labor Condition Application that was certified for a wage-level that is only appropriate for a comparatively low, entry-level position relative to others within its occupation, which signifies that the beneficiary is only expected to possess a basic understanding of the occupation.

The *Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance* issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) states the following with regard to Level I wage rates:

Level 1 (entry) wage rates are assigned to job offers for beginning level employees who have only a basic understanding of the occupation. These employees perform routine tasks that require limited, if any, exercise of judgment. The tasks provide experience and familiarization with the employer's methods, practices, and programs. The employees may perform higher level work for training and developmental purposes. These employees work under close supervision and receive specific instructions on required tasks and results expected. Their work is closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy. Statements that the job offer is for a research fellow, a worker in training, or an internship are indicators that a Level I wage should be considered [emphasis in original].

See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Employment & Training Administration, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/Policy_Nonag_Progs.pdf (accessed Feb. 15, 2013).

The proposed duties' level of complexity, uniqueness, and specialization, as well as the level of independent judgment and occupational understanding required to perform them, are questionable, as the petitioner submitted an LCA certified for a Level I, entry-level position. The LCA's wage-level indicates that the proffered position is actually a low-level, entry position relative to others within the occupation. In accordance with the relevant DOL explanatory information on wage levels, this wage rate indicates that the beneficiary is only required to possess a basic understanding of the occupation; that he will be expected to perform routine tasks requiring limited, if any, exercise of judgment; that he will be closely supervised and his work closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy; and that he will receive specific instructions on required tasks and expected results. These factors undermine further any claim that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation.

occupation. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed and the petition will be denied on this basis. Thus, even if it were determined that the petitioner had overcome the director's grounds for denying this petition (which it has not), the petition could still not be approved.

Next, the AAO will discuss its finding regarding the petitioner's failure to establish that at the time of this petition's filing, it had secured work for the entire period of requested employment, that is, October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2015. Neither the MSA nor the Work Order contain concrete dates of engagement. On appeal, counsel states that in the petitioner's industry, it is standard to issue work orders or statements of work for short-term project, which typically last for six to nine months, and that it "is neither typical nor normal for a company to have a [statement of work] that covers a three-year period of time." However, the Work Order submitted by the petitioner does not cover any particular period of time. Counsel argues further that the MSA between the petitioner and AnalyticsWare "is valid indefinitely unless terminated by either party." However, this argument is not convincing. First, the "scope" portion of the MSA specifically states that "[t]his Agreement does not commit [redacted] to order any Services," and the following paragraph states that "[a]n executed work order will represent the parties' commitment to provide and pay for Services." Thus, counsel's attempt to use the language of the MSA to demonstrate the existence of an open-ended project or binding contractual obligation between the petitioner and AnalyticsWare covering the entire period of requested employment fails, as the MSA limits its own applicability in the absence of a work order. This argument is further unconvincing because it undermines counsel's own, prior argument: after arguing first that the petitioner cannot produce a statement of work covering the entire period of requested employment because executing such a long commitment would go against the industry standard, counsel proceeds to argue that, notwithstanding this argument, the petitioner and [redacted] nonetheless have a permanent, open-ended commitment that lasts for a minimum of three years.

None of the documents submitted by the petitioner constitute evidence establishing that, by the time of the petition's filing, it had secured definite, non-speculative employment with the beneficiary covering the entire three-year period of employment requested in the petition. USCIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the time the petition is filed. *See* 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(12). A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). Thus, even if it were found that the petitioner would be the beneficiary's United States employer as that term is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), the petitioner has not demonstrated that it would maintain such an employer-employee relationship for the duration of the period requested.¹² Accordingly, the petition must be denied on this basis also.

¹² The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1B program. A 1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows:

Historically, the Service has not granted H-1B classification on the basis of speculative, or undetermined, prospective employment. The H-1B classification is not intended as a vehicle for an alien to engage in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in temporary foreign workers to meet possible workforce needs arising from potential business expansions or the expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether an alien is properly classifiable as an H-1B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must

Finally, as noted at the outset of this discussion, the AAO also finds, beyond the decision of the director, that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary is qualified to perform the duties of a specialty occupation. Thus, even if the petitioner had established that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation, which it did not, the petition still could not be approved because the petitioner has not demonstrated the beneficiary's qualifications to perform its duties.

Section 214(i)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(2), states that an alien applying for classification as an H-1B nonimmigrant worker must possess:

- (A) full state licensure to practice in the occupation, if such licensure is required to practice in the occupation,
- (B) completion of the degree described in paragraph (1)(B) for the occupation, or
- (C) (i) experience in the specialty equivalent to the completion of such degree, and
 - (ii) recognition of expertise in the specialty through progressively responsible positions relating to the specialty.

In implementing section 214(i)(2) of the Act, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C) states that an alien must also meet one of the following criteria in order to qualify to perform services in a specialty occupation:

- (1) Hold a United States baccalaureate or higher degree required by the specialty occupation from an accredited college or university;
- (2) Hold a foreign degree determined to be equivalent to a United States baccalaureate or higher degree required by the specialty occupation from an accredited college or university;

first examine the duties of the position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). The Service must then determine whether the alien has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the case of speculative employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis and, therefore, is unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1B classification. Moreover, there is no assurance that the alien will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this country.

63 Fed. Reg. 30419, 30419 - 30420 (June 4, 1998). While a petitioner is certainly permitted to change its intent with regard to non-speculative employment, e.g., a change in duties or job location, it must nonetheless document such a material change in intent through an amended or new petition in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E).

- (3) Hold an unrestricted state license, registration or certification which authorizes him or her to fully practice the specialty occupation and be immediately engaged in that specialty in the state of intended employment; or
- (4) Have education, specialized training, and/or progressively responsible experience that are equivalent to completion of a United States baccalaureate or higher degree in the specialty occupation, and have recognition of expertise in the specialty through progressively responsible positions directly related to the specialty.

Therefore, to qualify an alien for classification as an H-1B nonimmigrant worker under the Act, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possesses the requisite license or, if none is required, that he or she has completed a degree in the specialty that the occupation requires. Alternatively, if a license is not required and if the beneficiary does not possess the required U.S. degree or its foreign degree equivalent, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary possesses both (1) education, specialized training, and/or progressively responsible experience in the specialty equivalent to the completion of such degree, and (2) recognition of expertise in the specialty through progressively responsible positions relating to the specialty.

As the beneficiary did not earn a baccalaureate or higher degree from an accredited college or university in the United States, he does not qualify to perform the duties of a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(1). As he does not possess a foreign degree that has been determined to be equivalent to a baccalaureate or higher degree from an accredited college or university in the United States, he does not qualify to perform the duties of a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(2), either.¹³ As the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary holds an unrestricted state license, registration or certification to perform the duties of a specialty occupation, he does not qualify to perform the duties of a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(3), either. Accordingly, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(4), remains as the only avenue for the petitioner to demonstrate the beneficiary's qualifications to perform the duties of the proffered position.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(4) requires a demonstration that the beneficiary's education, specialized training, and/or progressively responsible experience is equivalent to the

¹³ Although the record of proceeding contains an evaluation of the beneficiary's academic credentials, it does not establish that those credentials are equivalent to a bachelor's degree awarded by an accredited institution of higher education in the United States. Instead, it finds his academic studies equivalent to three years of study toward a bachelor's degree in business administration from a regionally accredited university in the United States. Accordingly, that evaluation does not satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(2). Although this evaluation also evaluates the beneficiary's work experience, and that portion of the evaluation will be discussed below when the AAO analyzes the beneficiary's qualifications under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(4) and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(1), this particular portion of the evaluation is not material to the AAO's analysis under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(2) because it addresses the beneficiary's work experience. In order to be relevant under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(2), an evaluation must be based upon the beneficiary's academic credentials alone.

completion of a United States baccalaureate or higher degree in the specialty occupation, and that the beneficiary also has recognition of that expertise in the specialty through progressively responsible positions directly related to the specialty. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D), equating a beneficiary's credentials to a United States baccalaureate or higher degree under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(4) is determined by at least one of the following:

- (1) An evaluation from an official who has authority to grant college-level credit for training and/or experience in the specialty at an accredited college or university which has a program for granting such credit based on an individual's training and/or work experience;
- (2) The results of recognized college-level equivalency examinations or special credit programs, such as the College Level Examination Program (CLEP), or Program on Noncollegiate Sponsored Instruction (PONSI);
- (3) An evaluation of education by a reliable credentials evaluation service which specializes in evaluating foreign educational credentials;¹⁴
- (4) Evidence of certification or registration from a nationally-recognized professional association or society for the specialty that is known to grant certification or registration to persons in the occupational specialty who have achieved a certain level of competence in the specialty;
- (5) A determination by the Service that the equivalent of the degree required by the specialty occupation has been acquired through a combination of education, specialized training, and/or work experience in areas related to the specialty and that the alien has achieved recognition of expertise in the specialty occupation as a result of such training and experience.

The record contains an evaluation of the beneficiary's academics and work experience prepared by [REDACTED] Chairman of the Board of Directors of Foreign Credential Evaluations, Inc., dated April 17, 2012. According to [REDACTED], the beneficiary's foreign education and work experience are equivalent to a bachelor's degree in business administration, with a concentration in computer science, awarded by an accredited institution of higher education in the United States.

However, [REDACTED] evaluation does not demonstrate that the beneficiary is qualified to perform the duties of a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(1), as the petitioner has not demonstrated that [REDACTED] currently possesses the authority to grant college-level credit for training and/or experience at an accredited college or university which has a program for granting such credit based on an individual's training and/or work experience. Simply going on record

¹⁴ The petitioner should note that, in accordance with this provision, the AAO will accept a credentials evaluation service's evaluation of *education only*, not experience.

without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165.

For all of these reasons, the beneficiary does not qualify to perform the duties of a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(1).

No evidence has been submitted to establish, nor does the petitioner assert, that the beneficiary satisfies 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(2), which requires submission of the results of recognized college-level equivalency examinations or special credit programs, such as the College Level Examination Program (CLEP), or Program on Noncollegiate Sponsored Instruction (PONSI).

Nor does the beneficiary qualify under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(3). As was the case under 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(1) and (2), the beneficiary is unqualified under this criterion because he did not earn a baccalaureate or higher degree from an accredited college or university in the United States and does not possess a foreign degree that has been determined to be equivalent to a baccalaureate or higher degree from an accredited college or university in the United States.

No evidence has been submitted to establish, nor does the petitioner assert, that the beneficiary satisfies 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(4), which requires that the beneficiary submit evidence of certification or registration from a nationally-recognized professional association or society for the specialty that is known to grant certification or registration to persons in the occupational specialty who have achieved a certain level of competence in the specialty.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5) states the following with regard to analyzing an alien's qualifications:

For purposes of determining equivalency to a baccalaureate degree in the specialty, three years of specialized training and/or work experience must be demonstrated for each year of college-level training the alien lacks. . . . It must be clearly demonstrated that the alien's training and/or work experience included the theoretical and practical application of specialized knowledge required by the specialty occupation; that the alien's experience was gained while working with peers, supervisors, or subordinates who have a degree or its equivalent in the specialty occupation; and that the alien has recognition of expertise in the specialty evidenced by at least one type of documentation such as:

- (i) Recognition of expertise in the specialty occupation by at least two recognized authorities in the same specialty occupation;¹⁵

¹⁵ *Recognized authority* means a person or organization with expertise in a particular field, special skills or knowledge in that field, and the expertise to render the type of opinion requested. A recognized authority's opinion must state: (1) the writer's qualifications as an expert; (2) the writer's experience giving such opinions, citing specific instances where past opinions have been accepted as authoritative and by whom; (3) how the conclusions were reached; and (4) the basis for the conclusions supported by copies or citations of any research material used. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

- (ii) Membership in a recognized foreign or United States association or society in the specialty occupation;
- (iii) Published material by or about the alien in professional publications, trade journals, books, or major newspapers;
- (iv) Licensure or registration to practice the specialty occupation in a foreign country; or
- (v) Achievements which a recognized authority has determined to be significant contributions to the field of the specialty occupation.

Although the record contains some information regarding the beneficiary's work history, it does not establish that this work experience included the theoretical and practical application of specialized knowledge required by the proffered position; that it was gained while working with peers, supervisors, or subordinates who held a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in the field; and that the beneficiary achieved recognition of expertise in the field as evidenced by at least one of the five types of documentation delineated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5)(i)-(v). The evidence in the record of proceeding is simply not sufficient to merit USCIS recognition of the beneficiary's education, training, and/or experience as equivalent to at least a bachelor's degree, or its equivalent, in a specific specialty.

Accordingly, the beneficiary does not qualify under any of the criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5)(i)-(v) and therefore does not qualify to perform the duties of a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(4). As such, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary qualifies to perform the duties of a specialty occupation. Thus, even if it were determined that the petitioner had overcome the director's grounds for denying this petition (which it has not), the petition could still not be approved.

Lastly, the AAO will turn to the director's ground for denying this petition: her determination that the petitioner failed to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable and credible offer of employment to the beneficiary. Upon review, the AAO agrees with the director's determination.

As noted above, the AAO finds that the petitioner has failed to establish the binding nature, and therefore also the evidentiary value, of the documents that are central to this particular petitioner: (1) the MSA; and (2) the Work Order. Neither of these documents is signed by both the petitioner and [REDACTED], contains dates of engagement, or describes the duties to be performed by the beneficiary in probative detail. Furthermore, the petitioner neglected to provide several items listed by the director in her RFE that could have supported the petitioner's claim of a credible offer of employment. The list of items suggested by the director included copies of relevant portions of valid contracts, statements of work, work orders, service agreements, or letters between [REDACTED] and the end-clients who would actually use the products or services produced by the

beneficiary while performing services for [REDACTED]¹⁶ evidence regarding production space and equipment to support the beneficiary's work; documentation and descriptions of any particular projects upon which the beneficiary would work; copies of company brochures or pamphlets published by [REDACTED] printouts from its website, or any other printed works published by [REDACTED] detailing its products or services; copies of critical reviews of [REDACTED] software; a copy of the marketing analysis for [REDACTED] software products; or a copy of a cost analysis for [REDACTED] software products. While the director emphasized the non-exhaustive nature of this list, and stated that the petitioner could include any and all evidence it desired, the petitioner did not provide any of these items beyond two pages of very general information regarding [REDACTED] business operations that established, at best, the company's existence.

As currently constituted, the record of proceeding fails to demonstrate any binding commitment between the petitioner and [REDACTED] for placement of the beneficiary at [REDACTED] premises, let alone one covering the entire period of requested employment. Even if this glaring deficiency were overlooked, the record of proceeding would still also fail to establish what the beneficiary would actually be doing while providing his services to [REDACTED]. Finally, as noted above, the petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that it would engage the beneficiary in an employer-employee relationship. The fact that the petitioner also failed to demonstrate the beneficiary's qualifications to perform the duties of any specialty occupation, let alone the particular position proffered here, detracts further from the petitioner's argument that it has made a reasonable, credible proffer of employment.

The AAO agrees with the director's determination that petitioner has failed to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable and credible offer of employment to the beneficiary. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed and the petition will be denied on this basis.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the service center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Moreover, when the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it shows that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683.

¹⁶ The record contains numerous assertions that the beneficiary would work for [REDACTED] directly, and would not be placed at a third-party site. Be that as it may, [REDACTED] is presumably a for-profit company selling either products or services. Evidence that [REDACTED] has a market for its products or services would have helped to demonstrate the non-speculative nature of the petitioner's proffer of employment, which is important in a case such as this, where the petitioner has failed to establish both the substantive nature of the beneficiary's duties, as well as the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

(b)(6)

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.