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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

DATE: **JAN 30 2014** OFFICE: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director (hereinafter "director") denied the nonimmigrant visa petition, and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

On the Form I-129 visa petition, the petitioner describes itself as a design and manufacturing firm. In order to employ the beneficiary in what it designates as an industrial designer position, the petitioner seeks to classify her as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The director denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to establish that it would employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation position. On appeal, counsel asserted that the director's basis for denial was erroneous and contended that the petitioner satisfied all evidentiary requirements.

As will be discussed below, the AAO has determined that the director did not err in her decision to deny the petition on the specialty occupation issue. Accordingly, the director's decision will not be disturbed. The appeal will be dismissed, and the petition will be denied.

The AAO bases its decision upon its review of the entire record of proceeding, which includes: (1) the petitioner's Form I-129 and the supporting documentation filed with it; (2) the service center's request for additional evidence (RFE); (3) the petitioner's response to the RFE; (4) the director's denial letter; and (5) the Form I-290B and counsel's submissions on appeal.

The issue before the AAO is whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) states, in pertinent part, the following:

Specialty occupation means an occupation which [(1)] requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which [(2)] requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, a proposed position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as providing supplemental criteria that must be met in accordance with, and not as alternatives to, the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

As such and consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) consistently interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. *See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"). Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been

able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not simply rely on a position's title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity's business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *See generally Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384. The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

The Labor Condition Application (LCA) submitted to support the visa petition states that the proffered position is an industrial designer position, and that it corresponds to Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code and title 27-1021, Commercial and Industrial Designers from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). The LCA further states that the proffered position is a Level I, entry-level, position.

With the visa petition, counsel submitted evidence that the beneficiary received a bachelor of fine arts degree in product design from [REDACTED] in Los Angeles, California.

Counsel also submitted a letter dated March 27, 2013 in which he provided the following description of the duties of the proffered position:

- Engage in research regarding the product – consider the needs of the user and what purpose the product will serve (20%);
- Undertake market research, review design and consumer publications, and meet with suppliers and manufacturers (10%);
- Gather, analyze and synthesize data, using guidelines from the client or manufacturer (10%);
- Create a diagram that illustrates the perceived product by hand or using computer software (50%); and,
- Consult with other professionals to make the product easier to use, safer, and in some cases, cheaper or easier to manufacture (10%).

Counsel did not then state that the proffered position requires a minimum of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty or reveal, if it does, what that specific specialty is. Further, counsel did not reveal the type of products, or the range of products, the beneficiary would design in the proffered position, and did not give examples of products the beneficiary might design, or of products the petitioner's employees had designed in the past. No support letter from the petitioner was submitted with the petition.

On April 29, 2013, the service center issued an RFE in this matter. The service center requested evidence that the petitioner would employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation. The director outlined the specific evidence to be submitted. The RFE specifically requested that the petitioner, "[p]rovide a more detailed description of the work to be performed by the beneficiary for the entire requested period of validity."

In response, counsel submitted (1) a position evaluation dated May 7, 2013; (2) counsel's own letter, dated May 21, 2013; and (3) the petitioner's organizational chart.

The May 7, 2013 position evaluation was produced by a professor of industrial engineering at [REDACTED]. It states that, based on the duties contained in counsel's March 27, 2013 letter, the proffered position is "so complex that it is absolutely crucial for the candidate for this position to have a bachelor's degree in Industrial Design or Product Design."

In his May 21, 2013 letter, counsel reiterated the duty description previously provided. Counsel also stated:

[The beneficiary's] job duties as Industrial Designer require sketching, computer-aided design and drafting (CADD), industrial materials and processes and manufacturing methods. Also problem-solving skills and analytical ability are required to keep the company profitable which are normally acquired through college level education, such as Product Design, Industrial Design or related.

Counsel also stated, "[The proffered position] requires minimum of Bachelor degree in Product Design, Industrial Design or related." Counsel still did not reveal the type of products or the range of products the beneficiary would design in the proffered position, and did not provide examples of products the beneficiary might design or examples of products the petitioner's employees had developed in the past.

The director denied the petition on June 4, 2013, finding, as was noted above, that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the proffered position qualifies as a position in a specialty occupation by virtue of requiring a minimum of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent. More specifically, the director found that the petitioner had satisfied none of the supplemental criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). In that decision, the director observed that the duties of the proffered position are so abstractly phrased that they might be the duties of a fashion designer.

On appeal, counsel submitted (1) two vacancy announcements; and (2) an evaluation, dated June 17, 2013, from the same evaluator who produced the May 7, 2013 evaluation submitted in response to the RFE. That evaluation repeats the assertion that, based on the duty description provided, the proffered position is so complex that it requires a bachelor's degree in industrial design or product design. The evaluator did not indicate whether he knows what type of product the beneficiary would design in the proffered position, or what type of product the petitioner's business produces, or anything else about the petitioner's business.

In an appeal brief, counsel asserted that the duties of the proffered position are sufficiently described such that the type of position offered, and whether it requires a minimum of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent, can be determined. Counsel cited the U.S. Department of Labor's *Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook)* as support for the proposition that the proffered position is an industrial designer position, rather than a fashion designer position.

The AAO finds that despite the director's request for additional evidence demonstrating that the proffered position is a specialty occupation under any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), the record is devoid of substantial documentary evidence as to the specific duties of the proffered position. Given the lack of detail and corroborating evidence, the AAO cannot determine that the proffered position substantially reflects the duties of an industrial designer. The petitioner has never described the type of products the beneficiary would design, or the range of products the beneficiary would design, nor even provided any examples of the products the beneficiary would design. The petitioner provided no examples of products its employees have designed in the past. The petitioner also has not explained whether the petitioner requires product designs in the ordinary course of its business for its own use, or whether the beneficiary would design products for other companies.

Furthermore, the specific nature of the petitioner's business has never been explained, other than counsel's vague description that the petitioner is a "widely known company of design & manufacturing fashion products and functional products that has been in business since 2010."¹ What products the petitioner may have designed and manufactured in the past, or may intend to design and to manufacture in the future, has never been revealed. The record, as constituted, precludes a determination that the duties of the proffered position are those of an industrial designer. Based on the lack of documentary evidence, the AAO has determined that the petitioner has failed to distinguish the proffered position from a position that does not qualify as a specialty occupation. Thus, there is no basis upon which it can be determined that the petitioner has demonstrated a need for an industrial designer and that the beneficiary will be performing the claimed duties of an industrial designer on a full-time basis here in the United States. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these

¹ Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaighbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).


proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv) provides that "[a]n H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation shall be accompanied by [d]ocumentation . . . or any other required evidence sufficient to establish . . . that the services the beneficiary is to perform are in a specialty occupation." Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). Furthermore, there must be sufficient, corroborating evidence in the record that demonstrates not only actual, non-speculative employment for the beneficiary, but also enough details and specificity to establish that the work the beneficiary will perform for the petitioner will more likely than not be in a specialty occupation.

Without additional knowledge of the petitioner's business and its business products, the AAO is unable to determine the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the beneficiary. USCIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the time the petition is filed. *See* 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(1) and 103.2(b)(12). The petitioner's failure to establish the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the beneficiary precludes a finding that the proffered position is a specialty occupation under any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. Without the additional evidence requested, the AAO is unable to find that the proffered position is a specialty occupation position.

As the petitioner has failed to present sufficient, credible evidence of the actual job duties the beneficiary will perform, it has therefore failed to demonstrate that the occupation more likely than not requires a bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent as a minimum for entry. *See* INA § 214(i)(1). The petitioner also has not shown through submission of documentary evidence, that it meets any of the four criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). Rather, while counsel claims that the petitioner requires an industrial designer and that it requires a minimum of a bachelor's degree in product design, industrial design, or a related field, it has not credibly shown that the petitioner requires an industrial designer and that the work requires such a degree. Thus, the petitioner has not met its burden of proof in this regard, and, therefore, it cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. The appeal will be dismissed and the petition denied for this reason.

The AAO does not need to examine the issue of the beneficiary's qualifications, because the petitioner has not provided sufficient documentation to demonstrate that the position is a specialty occupation. In other words, the beneficiary's credentials to perform a particular job are relevant only when the job is found to be a specialty occupation. As discussed in this decision, the petitioner



did not submit sufficient evidence regarding the proffered position to determine that it is a specialty occupation and, therefore, the issue of whether it will require a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, also cannot be determined. Therefore, the AAO need not and will not address the beneficiary's qualifications.

In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.