




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)



DATE: JUL 29 2014


OFFICE: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

FILE: 

IN RE:


Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The service center director denied the nonimmigrant visa petition. The matter is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

On the Form I-129 visa petition, the petitioner describes itself as an information technology (IT) consulting business established in 1999. In order to employ the beneficiary in what it designates as a programmer analyst position, the petitioner seeks to classify him as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The director denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director's basis for denial of the petition was erroneous and contends that the petitioner satisfied all evidentiary requirements.

The record of proceeding before us contains: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the director's request for evidence (RFE); (3) counsel's response to the RFE; (4) the notice of decision; and (5) the Form I-290B and supporting materials.¹ We reviewed the record in its entirety before issuing our decision.

For the reasons that will be discussed below, we agree with the director that the petitioner has not established eligibility for the benefit sought. Accordingly, the director's decision will not be disturbed. The appeal will be dismissed, and the petition will be denied.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the I-129 petition, the petitioner indicates that it wishes to employ the beneficiary as a programmer analyst on a part-time basis at the rate of \$28 per hour.² On the Form I-129, the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary will work off-site at "[client] sites as assigned."

In the support letter dated March 27, 2013, the petitioner provides the following description for the proffered position:

- Participate and monitor all change management activities related to planning for an assigned portfolio of projects, including creation of test data.
- Outgoing and comfortable with working with a large group of customer contacts[.]

¹ Counsel requested an extension for the submission of a brief in support of this appeal, which was granted until February 4, 2014. However, it was not received until February 12, 2014, and was untimely. Nevertheless, we reviewed the brief and the supporting materials, and find that the petitioner has not established eligibility for the benefit sought.

² In the Form I-129, the petitioner was asked to provide the number of hours per week that the beneficiary would be employed. The petitioner indicated "28/hr." No further explanation was provided. In the letter of support, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would work 10 to 40 hours per week.

- Self-starter and take responsibility for [completing] assignments on time.
- Implement test scripts based on requirements created by Developers.
- Develop test deliverables (Test plan, defect report, status report, etc.) and automate testing script design for various platforms.
- Script development, Test Execution analysis of test results, including recommendations, setting up automation environment and preparation of testing documentation. Work with Quality center, Oracle SQL Developer and SharePoint for handling defect calls across multiple groups.
- Log the defects identified during testing. Testing new machines and reporting bugs and create test plans passes as directed. Test features and report bugs with the content such as missing content and graphical errors.
- Verify all fixes as noted by development teams in the bug database.
- Trouble-shooting where required on elusive or hard to reproduce bugs.
- Work on various software design patterns and be able to apply appropriate design. Analyze systems, program, develop, test and troubleshoot sophisticated software applications under direct supervision[.]
- Determine computer software or hardware needed to set up or alter system[.] Analyze systems, program, develop, test and troubleshoot sophisticated software applications under direct supervision.
- Understand the application/software being tested.
- Prepare test scenarios to verify the functionality and confirm if the business requirements are met.
- Analyze requirements to ensure testability, report gaps and discrepancies.
- Design software strategy, test plans, test scenarios, test scripts and procedures.
- Execute and analyze software compatibility tests for large, complex functional applications using quality assurance principles, processes, and methodologies.
- Design and update manual and automated testing tools and data, and provide information for non-functional requirements.
- Develop standard, methods and procedures to determine quality.

To perform these duties, the necessary background is typically acquired through a bachelor's degree in Computer Science, Science, Engineering, or any other related field. Hence, [the petitioner] hires only those candidates that posses[ses] at a minimum of bachelor's degree, or its equivalent, in Computer Science, Business Administration, Engineering or a related field.

With the initial petition, the petitioner submitted a copy of the beneficiary's Master of Science degree in Civil Engineering and academic transcript from the [redacted]. In addition, the petitioner submitted a copy of the beneficiary's foreign diploma and transcript; however, the petitioner did not submit an educational evaluation of the beneficiary's foreign academic credentials.

In support of the petition, the petitioner also submitted several documents, including the following:

- A Labor Condition Application (LCA). The occupational category is designated as "Computer Programmers" – SOC (ONET/OES Code) 15-1131, at a Level I (entry) wage. The LCA lists the beneficiary's places of employment as follows:

[REDACTED]

- A Subcontracting Consulting Agreement between the petitioner and [REDACTED] effective March 28, 2013.⁴ The document indicates that [REDACTED] hereby engages [the petitioner] to perform certain services for [REDACTED] in support of [REDACTED] performance of services for certain of its clients who are specified on Exhibit 'A' hereto (individually, a 'Client' and collectively, the 'Clients')." The petitioner did not provide an Exhibit A.

The director found the initial evidence insufficient to establish eligibility for the benefit sought, and issued an RFE on June 25, 2013. The director outlined the specific evidence to be submitted.

On September 19, 2013, counsel responded with a brief and additional supporting evidence.⁵ In

³ Notably, the petitioner did not include [REDACTED] Virginia or [REDACTED] Minnesota as a work location for the beneficiary in the Form I-129 petition. No explanation was provided by the petitioner.

⁴ It must be noted that the petitioner did not initial the bottom of the pages of the agreement.

⁵ In response to the RFE, counsel claims that "as per LCA regulations, petitioner is required to obtain LCA for its Principal place of Business, and accordingly listed its principal place of business in LCA although it never intended to utilize beneficiary's services in-house." However, we find that the instructions to the LCA (ETA Form 9035 & 9035E) do not indicate that the petitioner is required to obtain LCA for its principal place of business. Instead, it states the following:

It is important for the employer to define the place of intended employment with as much geographic specificity as possible. The place of employment address listed . . . must be a physical location and cannot be a P.O. Box. The employer may use this section to identify up to three (3) physical locations and corresponding prevailing wages covering each location where work will be performed and the electronic system will accept up to 3 physical locations and prevailing wage information.

Thus, the instructions require that the employer list the place of intended employment "with as much geographic specificity as possible" and, further notes that the employer may identify up to three physical locations, including street address, city, county, state, and zip code, where work will be performed. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) regulations state that "[e]ach LCA shall state . . . [t]he places of intended employment." 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(c)(4) (emphasis added).

Further, with certain limited exceptions, the applicable DOL regulations define the term "place of employment" as the worksite or physical location where the work actually is performed by the H-1B nonimmigrant. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.715.

addition, counsel states that the "Petitioner's client, [REDACTED] has contracted beneficiary's services in the position offered for the end client, [REDACTED]. Counsel further claims that the petitioner is unable to provide end client agreements due to confidentiality issues.⁶

In response to the director's RFE, counsel provided, in part, the following:

- A letter from [REDACTED] senior recruiter for [REDACTED] dated September 12, 2013. In the letter, Mr. [REDACTED] states that the beneficiary "is working as a contractor through the vendor [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] on in[sic] the project [REDACTED]." He further indicates that the beneficiary "started working on this project since 04/08/2013." In addition, Mr. [REDACTED] states that "[t]his project is currently scheduled for one year and can continue for another two years." He further states that the beneficiary "is working under [REDACTED]." However, in the same paragraph, Mr. [REDACTED] asserts that the beneficiary "has been supervised by [REDACTED] Manager [the petitioner][sic], routinely via phone and weekly reports."
- A letter from [REDACTED] HR Associate for [REDACTED]. The letter is dated August 8, 2013. In the letter, Ms. [REDACTED] states that the beneficiary "will work as a Test Analyst." Further, Ms. [REDACTED] provides the beneficiary's duties in the position.⁸

⁶ While the petitioner did not specifically claim that the agreements were privileged, the petitioner does claim that the agreements were confidential. While a petitioner should always disclose when a submission contains confidential information, the claim does not provide a blanket excuse for the petitioner's failure to provide such a document if that document is material to the requested benefit. Although a petitioner may always refuse to submit confidential information if it is deemed too sensitive, the petitioner must also satisfy the burden of proof and runs the risk of a denial. *Cf. Matter of Marques*, 16 I&N Dec. 314 (BIA 1977).

⁶ While the petitioner did not specifically claim that the agreements were privileged, the petitioner does claim that the agreements were confidential. While a petitioner should always disclose when a submission contains confidential information, the claim does not provide a blanket excuse for the petitioner's failure to provide such a document if that document is material to the requested benefit. Although a petitioner may always refuse to submit confidential information if it is deemed too sensitive, the petitioner must also satisfy the burden of proof and runs the risk of a denial. *Cf. Matter of Marques*, 16 I&N Dec. 314 (BIA 1977).

Moreover, both the Freedom of Information Act and the Trade Secrets Act provide for the protection of a petitioner's confidential business information when it is submitted to USCIS. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), 18 U.S.C. § 1905. Additionally, the petitioner may request pre-disclosure notification pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,600, "Predisclosure Notification Procedures for Confidential Commercial Information." Exec. Order No. 12,600, 1987 WL 181359 (June 23, 1987).

⁷ It must be noted that the company's letterhead indicates [REDACTED]. However, in the letter, Ms. [REDACTED] refers to the company as [REDACTED]. No explanation was provided.

⁸ Notably, the duties do not match the tasks provided by the petitioner for the proffered position in the letter of support.

- A credential evaluation and a position evaluation from [redacted] of [redacted]. The credential evaluation indicates that a combination of the beneficiary's education and professional experience amount to the equivalent of a Master of Science degree in Engineering with a concentration in Computer Information Systems offered at a regionally accredited University in the United States of America. In the "Expert Opinion on Position" part of the letter, Mr. [redacted] states that the minimum requirement for the position is "[a] four year Bachelor[']s (BS) degree in Science or Engineering or Business Administration [or] a related field from a regionally accredited college or Institute of Higher Learning in the United States or an equivalent degree awarded by another country."

The director reviewed the response, and found the evidence insufficient to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. The director denied the petition on October 28, 2013. Counsel submitted an appeal of the denial of the H-1B petition. With the brief, counsel submitted (1) a credential evaluation/rationale of opinion from [redacted] (2) letter from [redacted] registrar; and (3) an abstract of the beneficiary's dissertation.

II. PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD

On appeal, counsel references the preponderance of the evidence standard. We note that with respect to the preponderance of the evidence standard, *Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-376 (AAO 2010), states in pertinent part the following:

Except where a different standard is specified by law, a petitioner or applicant in administrative immigration proceedings must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.

* * *

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case.

* * *

Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is

"more likely than not" or "probably" true, the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. See *INS v. Cardoza-Foncesca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (discussing "more likely than not" as a greater than 50% chance of an occurrence taking place). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Thus, in accordance with this standard, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) examines each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard does not relieve the petitioner from satisfying the basic evidentiary requirements set by regulation. The standard of proof should not be confused with the burden of proof. Specifically, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing eligibility for the benefit sought. A petitioner must establish that it is eligible for the requested benefit at the time of filing the petition. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; see e.g., *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). As will be discussed, in the instant case, that burden has not been met.

III. ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED BY THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION

A. Employer-Employee Relationship

We reviewed the record of proceeding in its entirety. As a preliminary matter, we will discuss additional issues, beyond the decision of the director, that preclude the approval of the petition.⁹ More specifically, the petitioner has not established that it meets the regulatory definition of a United States employer. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Specifically, the petitioner has not established that it will have "an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee." *Id.*

Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-1B nonimmigrant in pertinent part as an alien:

subject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(1) . . . , who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) . . . , and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the [Secretary of Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary [of Labor] an application under section 212(n)(1)

The term "United States employer" is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows:

⁹ We conduct appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other association, or organization in the United States which:

- (1) Engages a person to work within the United States;
- (2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and
- (3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number.

The record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary.

Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), it is noted that the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-1B visa classification. Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act indicates that an alien coming to the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation will have an "intending employer" who will file a Labor Condition Application with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 212(n)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1) (2012). The intending employer is described as offering full-time or part-time "employment" to the H-1B "employee." Subsections 212(n)(1)(A)(i) and 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i), (2)(C)(vii) (2012). Further, the regulations indicate that "United States employers" must file a Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) in order to classify aliens as H-1B temporary "employees." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1), (2)(i)(A). Finally, the definition of "United States employer" indicates in its second prong that the petitioner must have an "employer-employee relationship" with the "employees under this part," i.e., the H-1B beneficiary, and that this relationship be evidenced by the employer's ability to "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "United States employer").

Neither the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") nor USCIS defined the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" by regulation for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, even though the regulation describes H-1B beneficiaries as being "employees" who must have an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer." *Id.* Therefore, for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, these terms are undefined.

The United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." *Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden*, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "*Darden*") (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated:

"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry

are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party."

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324 (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. at 751-752); see also *Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells*, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003) (hereinafter "*Clackamas*"). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive." *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting *NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America*, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).

In this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. See generally 136 Cong. Rec. S17106 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. H12358 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). On the contrary, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the regulations define the term "United States employer" to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition.¹⁰

¹⁰ While the *Darden* court considered only the definition of "employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and did not address the definition of "employer," courts have generally refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the traditional common law definition." See, e.g., *Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd.*, 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), *aff'd*, 27 F.3d 800 (2nd Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994).

However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 844-845 (1984).

The regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to employ persons in the United States, and to have an "employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an "employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms "employee," "employed," "employment" or "employer-employee relationship" indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition."

Specifically, the regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to engage a person to work within the United States, and to have an "employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an "employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" combined with the agency's otherwise generally circular definition of United States employer in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition" or, more importantly, that construing these terms in this manner would thwart congressional design or lead to absurd results. *Cf. Darden*, 503 U.S. at 318-319.¹¹

Accordingly, in the absence of an express congressional intent to impose broader definitions, both the "conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine" and the *Darden* construction test apply to the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).¹²

Therefore, in considering whether or not one will be an "employee" in an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS must focus on the common-law touchstone of "control." *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450; *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining a "United States employer" as one who "has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may

Therefore, in the absence of an intent to impose broader definitions by either Congress or USCIS, the "conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine," and the *Darden* construction test, apply to the terms "employee," "employer-employee relationship," "employed," and "employment" as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). That being said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term "employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.*, section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

¹¹ To the extent the regulations are ambiguous with regard to the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship," the agency's interpretation of these terms should be found to be controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." *Auer v. Robbins*, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citing *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 359, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 1850, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (quoting *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*, 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945))).

¹² That said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term "employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.*, section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise *control* the work of any such employee" (Emphasis added)).

The factors indicating that a worker is or will be an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly delineated in both the *Darden* and *Clackamas* decisions. *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324; *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 445; *see also Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 445; *see also New Compliance Manual*, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the *Darden* decision); *see also Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (determining that hospitals, as the recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the "true employers" of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the actual petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries).

It is important to note, however, that the factors listed in *Darden* and *Clackamas* are not exhaustive and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties relevant to control may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *New Compliance Manual* at § 2-III(A)(1).

Furthermore, when examining the factors relevant to determining control, USCIS must assess and weigh each actual factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or change that factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. *See Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324. For example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the *right to* assign them, it is the *actual* source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, not who has the *right to* provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. *See id.* at 323. Lastly, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the worker is an employee. *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, . . . the answer to whether [an individual] is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship . . . with no one factor being decisive.'" *Id.* at 451 (quoting *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324).

Applying the *Darden* and *Clackamas* tests to this matter, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee."

In the instant case, the petitioner claims that it will pay the beneficiary's salary. We acknowledge that the method of payment of wages can be a pertinent factor to determining the petitioner's relationship with the beneficiary. However, while such items such as wages, contributions, federal

and state income tax withholdings, and other benefits are relevant factors in determining who will control an alien beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, e.g., where will the work be located, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, who will oversee and direct the work of the beneficiary, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the alien beneficiary is assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to make a determination as to who will be the beneficiary's employer.

For H-1B classification, the petitioner is required to submit written contracts between the petitioner and the beneficiary, or if there is no written agreement, a summary of the terms of the oral agreement under which the beneficiary will be employed. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv) states, in pertinent part, the following:

- (A) General documentary requirements for H-1B classification in a specialty occupation. An H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation shall be accompanied by:

* * *

- (B) Copies of any written contracts between the petitioner and beneficiary, or a summary of the terms of the oral agreement under which the beneficiary will be employed, if there is no written contract.

In the instant case, the petitioner did not provide any written contracts or a summary of the terms of the oral agreement.

As previously noted, when making a determination of whether the petitioner has established that it has or will have an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary, we look at a number of factors, including who will provide the instrumentalities and tools required to perform the specialty occupation. In the instant case, the director specifically noted this factor in the RFE. Moreover, the director provided examples of evidence for the petitioner to submit to establish eligibility for the benefit sought, which included documentation regarding the source of the instrumentalities and tools needed to perform the job. However, upon review of the record of proceeding, the petitioner did not provide any information on this matter. Here, the petitioner was given an opportunity to clarify the source of instrumentalities and tools to be used by the beneficiary, but it failed to address or submit any probative evidence on the issue.

Moreover, through the RFE, the director provided the petitioner an opportunity to submit documentation regarding the beneficiary's role in hiring and paying assistants. In the instant case, the petitioner did not address this issue or provide any documentation regarding the beneficiary's role in hiring and paying assistants.

In addition, through the RFE, the director provided the petitioner an opportunity to address the tax treatment of the beneficiary. However, the petitioner did not provide any information on this issue.

Further, the petitioner has not established the duration of the relationship between the parties. More specifically, on the Form I-129, the petitioner requested that the beneficiary be granted H-1B classification from October 1, 2013 to September 26, 2016. In the supporting documentation, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary will work at [REDACTED] Minnesota [REDACTED]. With the initial petition, the petitioner also submitted a Subcontractor Consulting Agreement between the petitioner and [REDACTED], effective March 28, 2013. The agreement is signed by [REDACTED] for the petitioning company, and [REDACTED] Vice President for [REDACTED]. Notably, [REDACTED]; address is [REDACTED], MA [REDACTED] which is not a location identified as the beneficiary's place of employment. The agreement states that "[REDACTED] hereby engages [the petitioner] to perform certain services for [REDACTED] in support of [REDACTED] performance of services for certain of its clients who are specified on Exhibit 'A' hereto (individually, a 'Client' and collectively, the 'Clients')." Notably, the petitioner did not provide the Exhibit A referenced in the agreement. We observe that neither the beneficiary nor the proffered position is listed in the agreement. Therefore, the agreement does not provide any specific information establishing the beneficiary's place of employment or the duration of the beneficiary's work.

In response to the director's RFE, counsel states the "[p]etitioner's client, [REDACTED] has contracted [the] beneficiary's services in the position offered for the end client, [REDACTED]." In support, counsel submitted a letter from [REDACTED] senior recruiter for [REDACTED] dated September 12, 2013. In the letter, Mr. [REDACTED] verifies that the beneficiary is working as a contractor on project [REDACTED] and also indicates that "[the beneficiary] started working on this project since 4/8/2013." Mr. [REDACTED] further indicates that "[t]his project is currently scheduled for one year and can continue for another two years." Thus, according to Mr. [REDACTED] the beneficiary's services are currently scheduled to end in April 2014 with a possibility of continuing for another two years. Mr. [REDACTED] also provides a bullet point list of the beneficiary's duties, which contains general and vague tasks such as implement test scripts based on requirements created by developers, develop test deliverables (test plan, defect report, status report, etc.) and automate testing script design for various platforms, and log the defects identified during testing. The list of duties fails to provide the beneficiary's specific role in performing such tasks.

Counsel also submitted a letter from [REDACTED] HR Associate for [REDACTED]. In the letter, Ms. [REDACTED] states that the beneficiary "will work as a Test Analyst." We observe that she does not indicate the proffered position of programmer analyst but rather a "Test Analyst." No explanation for the variance was provided by the petitioner or by Ms. [REDACTED]. Further, there is no indication that the duties of a programmer analyst are the same as a test analyst. Moreover, she failed to provide any information regarding the expected duration of the project, when the project commenced, whether or not the project has been extended in the past, et cetera.

The petitioner did not submit any further evidence establishing any additional projects or specific work for the beneficiary. In response to the RFE, counsel states it "listed its place of business in LCA although it never intended to utilize [the] beneficiary's services in-house." The petitioner requested the beneficiary be granted H-1B classification from October 1, 2013, to September 26, 2016. However, the documentation does not establish that the beneficiary would be employed as a programmer analyst (performing the duties as stated by the petitioner) for the entire duration of the

requested period. USCIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(1). A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm'r 1978). Thus, even if it were found that the petitioner would be the beneficiary's United States employer as that term is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), the petitioner has not demonstrated that it would maintain such an employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary for the duration of the period requested.¹³

Further, a key element in this matter is who would have the ability to hire, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiary for the duration of the H-1B petition. It must be noted that the record indicates that the beneficiary will be physically located in [REDACTED] Minnesota. The petitioner is located approximately 1113 miles away in [REDACTED] Virginia.

Notably, Mr. [REDACTED] states in his letter that the beneficiary "is working under [REDACTED], [a] Manager at [REDACTED]." However, further in the same letter, Mr. [REDACTED] states that the beneficiary "has been supervised by [REDACTED], Manager [the petitioner][sic] routinely via phone and weekly reports." No explanation for the variance was provided by the petitioner or Mr. [REDACTED]. We observe that in the RFE, the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide documentation to clarify the petitioner's employer-employee relationship with the beneficiary. The director provided a list of the types of evidence to be submitted, which included a request that the petitioner provide such documentation as a brief description of who will supervise the beneficiary, along with the person's duties and/or other similarly probative documents. However, the petitioner failed to provide specific information regarding the beneficiary's supervisor (e.g., brief description of job duties, location).

¹³ The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1B program. A 1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows:

Historically, the Service has not granted H-1B classification on the basis of speculative, or undetermined, prospective employment. The H-1B classification is not intended as a vehicle for an alien to engage in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in temporary foreign workers to meet possible workforce needs arising from potential business expansions or the expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether an alien is properly classifiable as an H-1B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must first examine the duties of the position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). The Service must then determine whether the alien has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the case of speculative employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis and, therefore, is unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1B classification. Moreover, there is no assurance that the alien will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this country.

63 Fed. Reg. 30419, 30419 - 30420 (June 4, 1998). While a petitioner is certainly permitted to change its intent with regard to non-speculative employment, e.g., a change in duties or job location, it must nonetheless document such a material change in intent through an amended or new petition in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E).

Upon complete review of the record of proceeding, we find that the evidence in this matter is insufficient to establish that the petitioner qualifies as a United States employer, as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). The evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner would act as the beneficiary's employer. Despite the director's specific request for evidence on this issue, the petitioner failed to submit sufficient evidence to corroborate its claim. The non-existence or other unavailability of required evidence creates a presumption of ineligibility. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2)(i). Based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

There is a lack of probative evidence to support the petitioner's assertions. It cannot be concluded, therefore, that the petitioner has satisfied its burden and established that it qualifies as a United States employer with standing to file the instant petition in this matter. *See* section 214(c)(1) of the Act (requiring an "Importing Employer"); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A) (stating that the "United States employer . . . must file" the petition); 56 Fed. Reg. 61111, 61112 (Dec. 2, 1991) (explaining that only "United States employers can file an H-1B petition" and adding the definition of that term at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as clarification). Accordingly, the petition cannot be approved, and the appeal must be dismissed.

B. Specialty Occupation

Moreover, we will now address another basis for denial of the petition. More specifically, we find that the petitioner failed to establish that it would employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation. For an H-1B petition to be granted, the petitioner must provide sufficient evidence to establish that it will employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation position. To meet its burden of proof in this regard, the petitioner must establish that the employment it is offering to the beneficiary meets the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) states, in pertinent part, the following:

Specialty occupation means an occupation which [(1)] requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which [(2)] requires the

attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, a proposed position must also meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 387. To avoid this result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as providing supplemental criteria that must be met in accordance with, and not as alternatives to, the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

As such and consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), USCIS consistently interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. *See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"). Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its

equivalent directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

The petitioner asserted that the beneficiary would be employed as a programmer analyst. However, to determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not simply rely on a position's title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity's business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *See generally Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384. The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

Here, the petitioner and counsel have provided inconsistent information regarding the educational requirement for the proffered position.

- Specifically, in the March 27, 2013 letter of support, the petitioner stated, "To perform these duties, the necessary background is typically acquired through a bachelor's degree in Computer Science, Science, Engineering, or any other related field."
- However, in the same letter, the petitioner asserted that "[the petitioner] hires only those candidates that possess at a minimum of bachelor's degree, or its equivalent, in Computer Science, Business Administration, Engineering or a related field."
- In response to the RFE, counsel claimed that "the position offered (Programmer Analyst) generally requires [a] bachelor's degree or its equivalent in computer science, information systems, engineering or equivalent."
- In addition, the letter from [REDACTED] states that the position requires "[a] four year Bachelor[']s (BS) degree in Science or Engineering or Business Administration [or] a related field from a regionally accredited college or Institute of Higher Learning in the United States or an equivalent degree awarded by another country."

No explanation for the variances was provided. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

Moreover, it must be noted that within the record of proceeding, the petitioner and its counsel have represented that the position requires a bachelor's degree in computer science, science (without further specification), engineering, business administration, and/or information systems.

In general, provided the specialties are closely related, e.g., chemistry and biochemistry, a minimum of a bachelor's or higher degree in more than one specialty is recognized as satisfying the "degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent)" requirement of section 214(i)(1)(B) of the Act. In such a case, the required "body of highly specialized knowledge" would essentially be the same. Since there must be a close correlation between the required "body of highly specialized knowledge" and the position, however, a minimum entry requirement of a degree in two disparate fields, such as philosophy and engineering, would not meet the statutory requirement that the degree be "in *the* specific specialty (or its equivalent)," unless the petitioner establishes how each field is directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position such that the required "body of highly specialized knowledge" is essentially an amalgamation of these different specialties. Section 214(i)(1)(B) of the Act (emphasis added).

In other words, while the statutory "the" and the regulatory "a" both denote a singular "specialty," we do not so narrowly interpret these provisions to exclude positions from qualifying as specialty occupations if they permit, as a minimum entry requirement, degrees in more than one closely related specialty. *See* section 214(i)(1)(B) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). This also includes even seemingly disparate specialties providing, again, the evidence of record establishes how each acceptable, specific field of study is directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position.

Again, the petitioner and counsel have represented that a bachelor's degree in a number of disciplines is acceptable, specifically, computer science, science, engineering, business administration, and information systems. However, it must be noted that these include broad categories that cover numerous and various specialties.¹⁴ Therefore, it is not readily apparent that a degree in any and all of these fields is directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position proffered in this matter.

¹⁴ We note that the term "business" is defined as "1. The occupation, work, or trade in which one is engaged. . . . 2. Commercial, industrial, or professional dealings. 3. A commercial enterprise or establishment." WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 153 (2008). A degree in business administration may include a range of disciplines, some of which may not directly relate to the duties of the proffered position. For instance, U.S. News and World Report publishes a guide for colleges. The entry for Harvard University indicates that its business school offers concentrations in a range of disciplines, including arts administration, e-commerce, health care administration, human resources management, not-for-profit management, organizational behavior, public administration, public policy, real estate, sports business, as well as many others. *See* U.S. News and World Report on the Internet at http://www.usnewsuniversitydirectory.com/graduate-schools/business/harvard-university_01110.aspx (last visited July 24, 2014).

The term "science" is defined as "1a. The observation, identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical explanation of natural phenomena. . . . 2. Methodological activity, disciplines, or study <culinary science> 3. An activity that appears to require study and method." WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1012 (2008). U.S. News and World Report's guide for colleges designates science programs into various subcategories, including biological sciences, chemistry, earth sciences, math, physics, statistics, as well as social science programs such as criminology, economics, English, history, political science, psychology, and sociology. *See* U.S. News and World Report on the Internet at <http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-science-schools> (last visited July 24, 2014).

Here and as indicated above, the petitioner, who bears the burden of proof in this proceeding, fails to establish either (1) that all of the disciplines are closely related fields, or (2) that all of the disciplines are directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the proffered position. Absent this evidence, it cannot be found that normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position proffered in this matter is a bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, under the petitioner's own standards.

As the evidence of record fails to establish how these dissimilar fields of study form either a body of highly specialized knowledge or a specific specialty, or its equivalent, the petitioner's assertion that the job duties of this particular position can be performed by an individual with a bachelor's degree in any of these fields suggests that the proffered position is not in fact a specialty occupation. Therefore, absent probative evidence of a direct relationship between the claimed degrees required and the duties and responsibilities of the position, it cannot be found that the proffered position requires, at best, anything more than a general bachelor's degree. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)).

Furthermore, we note that, as recognized by the court in *Defensor, supra*, where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner, evidence of the client's job requirements is critical. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 387-388. That is, it is necessary for the end-client to provide sufficient information regarding the proposed job duties to be performed at its location in order to properly ascertain the minimum educational requirements necessary to perform those duties. *Id.* at 387-388. The court held that the legacy INS had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. *Id.* at 384. Such evidence must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate the type and educational level of highly specialized knowledge in a specific discipline that is necessary to perform that particular work.

As mentioned, the record of proceeding contains a letter from Mr. [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] dated September 12, 2013. Mr. [REDACTED] claims that "[REDACTED] requires that [the petitioner] staff[s] the project with a professional who holds a four-year Bachelor's degree and/or Master's degree, or its educational/experiential equivalent in a relevant specialty occupation field." However, the client does not state a requirement for a degree in a specific specialty. We here reiterate that the degree requirement set by the statutory and regulatory framework of the H-1B program is not just a bachelor's or higher degree, but such a degree in a *specific specialty* that is directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the position. *See* 214(i)(1)(b) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

Further, the petitioner and the end-client did not provide any information with regard to the order of importance and/or frequency of occurrence with which the beneficiary will perform the functions and tasks. Thus, the record fails to specify which tasks are major functions of the proffered position. Moreover, the evidence does not establish the frequency with which each of the duties

will be performed (e.g., regularly, periodically or at irregular intervals). As a result, the record does not establish the primary and essential functions of the proffered position.

Moreover, while the petitioner has identified its proffered position as that of a programmer analyst, the descriptions of the beneficiary's duties, as provided by the petitioner and the client, lack the specificity and detail necessary to support the petitioner's contention that the position is a specialty occupation. While a generalized description may be appropriate when defining the range of duties that are performed within an occupation, such generic descriptions generally cannot be relied upon by the petitioner when discussing the duties attached to specific employment for H-1B approval. In establishing such a position as a specialty occupation, especially one that may be classified as a staffing position or labor-for-hire, the description of the proffered position must include sufficient details to substantiate that the petitioner has H-1B caliber work for the beneficiary. Here, the job description fails to communicate (1) the actual work that the beneficiary would perform on a day-to-day basis; (2) the complexity, uniqueness and/or specialization of the tasks; and/or (3) the correlation between that work and a need for a particular level education of highly specialized knowledge in a specific specialty.

The failure to establish the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the beneficiary precludes a finding that the proffered position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4.

For the reasons related in the preceding discussion, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has satisfied any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) and, therefore, it cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. For this additional reason, the appeal must be dismissed and the petition denied.

IV. REVIEW OF THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION

Beneficiary's Qualifications

We do not need to examine the issue of the beneficiary's qualifications, because the petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the proffered position is a specialty occupation. In other words, the beneficiary's credentials to perform a particular job are relevant only when the job is found to be a specialty occupation.

As discussed in this decision, the petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence regarding the proffered position to determine whether it will require a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent. Absent this determination that a baccalaureate or higher degree in a

specific specialty, or its equivalent, is required to perform the duties of the proffered position, it also cannot be determined whether the beneficiary possesses that degree, or its equivalent. Therefore, we need not and will not address the beneficiary's qualifications further, except to note that, in any event, the combined evaluations of the beneficiary's education and work experience submitted by the petitioner is insufficient to establish that the beneficiary possesses the equivalent of a U.S. bachelor's degree in any specific specialty. Specifically, as the claimed equivalency was based in part on experience, there is no evidence that the evaluator has authority to grant college-level credit for training and/or experience in the specialty at an accredited college or university which has a program for granting such credit based on an individual's training and/or work experience and that the beneficiary also has recognition of expertise in the specialty through progressively responsible positions directly related to the specialty.¹⁵ See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(C)(4) and (D)(I). As such, since evidence was not presented that the beneficiary has at least a U.S. bachelor's degree in any specific specialty, or its equivalent, the petition could not be approved even if eligibility for the benefit sought had been otherwise established.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by us even if the service center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 145 (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Moreover, when we deny a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it shows that we abused our discretion with respect to all of our enumerated grounds. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683.

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 128. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

¹⁵ On appeal, counsel submitted an undated letter from [REDACTED] Acting Registrar at [REDACTED]. However, the letter does not establish that at the time of the evaluations (1) [REDACTED] had a program for granting college-level credit in the pertinent academic specialty for training and/or work experience in that specialty, and (2) this evaluator had authority for granting such credit based upon an individual's training and/or work experience. Accordingly, Mr. [REDACTED] evaluations do not meet the standard of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(I) for competency to render to USCIS an opinion on the educational equivalency of work experience.