



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)



DATE: **AUG 25 2015**


PETITION RECEIPT #: 

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



Enclosed is the non-precedent decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) for your case.

If you believe we incorrectly decided your case, you may file a motion requesting us to reconsider our decision and/or reopen the proceeding. The requirements for motions are located at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Motions must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) **within 33 days of the date of this decision**. The Form I-290B web page (www.uscis.gov/i-290b) contains the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. **Please do not mail any motions directly to the AAO.**

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg".

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, the petitioner describes itself as a "Montessori Education" provider with 22 employees established in [REDACTED]. In order to employ the beneficiary in what it designates as a full-time "Instructor" at an annual wage of \$25,000, the petitioner seeks to classify her as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The Director denied the petition, finding that the evidence of record did not establish that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation. The petitioner now files this appeal, asserting that the Director's decision was erroneous.

The record of proceeding contains: (1) the petitioner's Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the service center's request for evidence (RFE); (3) the petitioner's response to the RFE; (4) the Director's decision; and (5) the Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) and supporting documentation. We reviewed the record in its entirety before issuing our decision.¹

For the reasons that will be discussed below, we agree with the Director that the petitioner has not established eligibility for the benefit sought. Accordingly, the Director's decision will not be disturbed. The appeal will be dismissed.

II. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION

The primary issue is whether the petitioner has provided sufficient evidence to establish that it will employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation position.

A. Legal Framework

For an H-1B petition to be granted, the petitioner must provide sufficient evidence to establish that it will employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation position. To meet its burden of proof in this regard, the petitioner must establish that the employment it is offering to the beneficiary meets the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.

¹ We conduct appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

Also, in light of the petitioner's references to the requirement that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) apply the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, we affirm that, in the exercise of our appellate review in this matter, as in all matters that come within our purview, we apply the "preponderance of evidence" standard of review as articulated in the controlling precedent decision, *Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-376 (AAO 2010).

Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) states, in pertinent part, the following:

Specialty occupation means an occupation which [(1)] requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which [(2)] requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, a proposed position must meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and

regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 387. To avoid this result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as providing supplemental criteria that must be met in accordance with, and not as alternatives to, the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

As such and consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) consistently interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. *See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"). Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not simply rely on a position's title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity's business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *See generally Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384. The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

B. Proffered Position

The petitioner attested on the required Labor Condition Application (LCA) that the occupational classification for the position is "Teachers and Instructors, All Other," SOC (ONET/OES) Code 25-3099, at a Level I wage.

In the letter of support submitted with the petition, the petitioner stated that it specializes in Montessori education and provided the following description of the proffered position:

- Create instruction that supports the development of the cognitive, emotional, social, physical and spiritual growth of the child.

- Use the School Curriculum and current research based instructional practices to develop interdisciplinary units of instruction that meet both the group and individual needs of students.
- Maintain an on-going dialogue with specialty instructors and coordinating curriculum integration and implementation with these instructors.
- Use various assessment tools/strategies such as observations, children's work samples, continuums of development, portfolios, etc. to help make instructional decisions for individual students.
- Develops and participates in parent programs that help develop an understanding of the Montessori Curriculum.
- Communicate to board members and parents in the school community about the classroom and curriculum.

The petitioner also stated in that letter that the proffered position requires a bachelor's degree in human development, education, or a related field.

C. Analysis

A baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position

We will first address the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1). This criterion requires that a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position.

USCIS recognizes the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL's) *Occupational Outlook Handbook* (the *Handbook*) as an authoritative source on the duties and educational requirements of the wide variety of occupations that it addresses.² As noted above, the petitioner asserted in the LCA that the proffered position falls under the occupational category "Teachers and Instructors, All Other."

The *Handbook* does not contain a detailed report for "Teachers and Instructors, All Other." Although employment categories for hundreds of occupations are covered in detail in the *Handbook*, in certain instances, the *Handbook* is not determinative. When the *Handbook* does not support the proposition that a proffered position is one that meets the statutory and regulatory provisions of a specialty occupation, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to provide persuasive evidence that the proffered position more likely than not satisfies this or one of the other three criteria, notwithstanding the absence of the *Handbook's* support on the issue. In such case, it is the petitioner's responsibility to provide probative evidence (e.g., documentation from other objective, authoritative sources) that supports a finding that the particular position in question qualifies as a

² All of the references are to the 2014-2015 edition of the *Handbook*, which may be accessed at the Internet site <http://www.bls.gov/OCO/>. The excerpts of the *Handbook* regarding the duties and requirements of the referenced occupational category are hereby incorporated into the record of proceeding.

specialty occupation. Whenever more than one authoritative source exists, an adjudicator will consider and weigh all of the evidence presented to determine whether the particular position qualifies as a specialty occupation. The petitioner has not cited to another source to satisfy this requirement.

Regarding the opinion letters submitted by the petitioner, Dr. [REDACTED] and Ms. [REDACTED] did not list the reference materials on which they relied upon as the bases for their conclusions. It appears that Dr. [REDACTED] and Ms. [REDACTED] did not base their opinions on any objective evidence, but instead restated the proffered position's description as provided by the petitioner. We may, in our discretion, use advisory opinion statements submitted by the petitioner as expert testimony. *Matter of Caron International*, 19 I&N Dec. 791 (Comm'r 1988). However, where an opinion is not in accord with other information or is in any way questionable, we are not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. *Id.* Moreover, the letters conclude that the proffered position requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree without specifying a specific specialty. A petitioner must demonstrate that the proffered position requires a precise and specific course of study that relates directly and closely to the position in question. There must be a close correlation between the required specialized studies and the position; thus, the mere requirement of a degree, without further specification, does not establish the position as a specialty occupation. *Cf. Matter of Michael Hertz Associates*, 19 I&N Dec. 558 (Comm'r 1988) ("The mere requirement of a college degree for the sake of general education, or to obtain what an employer perceives to be a higher caliber employee, also does not establish eligibility."). Thus, while a general-purpose bachelor's degree may be a legitimate prerequisite for a particular position, requiring such a degree, without more, will not justify a finding that a particular position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation. *See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F.3d at 147 (1st Cir. 2007).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv) provides that "[a]n H-1B petition involving a specialty occupation shall be accompanied by [d]ocumentation . . . or any other required evidence sufficient to establish . . . that the services the beneficiary is to perform are in a specialty occupation." In the instant case, the duties and requirements of the position as described in the record of proceeding do not indicate that this particular position proffered by the petitioner is one for which a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is normally the minimum requirement for entry. Thus, the petitioner has not satisfied the criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(1).

*The requirement of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty,
or its equivalent, is common to the industry in parallel
positions among similar organizations*

Next, we will review the record regarding the first of the two alternative prongs of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2). This prong alternatively calls for a petitioner to establish that a requirement of a bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is common for positions that are identifiable as being (1) in the petitioner's industry, (2) parallel to the proffered position, and also (3) located in organizations that are similar to the petitioner.

In determining whether there is such a common degree requirement, factors often considered by USCIS include: whether the *Handbook* reports that the industry requires a degree; whether the industry's professional association has made a degree a minimum entry requirement; and whether letters or affidavits from firms or individuals in the industry attest that such firms "routinely employ and recruit only degreed individuals." See *Shanti, Inc. v. Reno*, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 (D. Minn. 1999) (quoting *Hird/Blaker Corp. v. Sava*, 712 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).

As previously discussed, the petitioner has not established that its proffered position is one for which the *Handbook* (or other independent, authoritative source) reports a standard industry-wide requirement for at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent. Thus, we incorporate by reference the previous discussion on the matter. Also, there are no submissions from the industry's professional association indicating that it has made a degree a minimum entry requirement.

The petitioner submitted copies of job advertisements in support of the assertion that the degree requirement is common to the petitioner's industry in parallel positions among similar organizations. However, the petitioner's reliance on the job announcements is misplaced.

Contrary to the purpose for which the advertisements were submitted, the job posting for [REDACTED] does not indicate that a bachelor's degree is required. Specifically, it requires a "Bachelor degree, or in college." Further, all of the postings submitted by the petitioner state that a degree is required, but it does not indicate that at least a bachelor's degree in a directly related specific specialty (or its equivalent) is required³. The job

³ As discussed, the degree requirement set by the statutory and regulatory framework of the H-1B program is not just a bachelor's or higher degree, but a degree in a specific specialty that is directly related to the duties of the position. See 214(i)(1)(b) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).

In addition, although a general-purpose bachelor's degree may be a legitimate prerequisite for a particular position, requiring such a degree, without more, will not justify a finding that a particular position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation. See *Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F.3d at 147. Specifically, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained in *Royal Siam* that:

[t]he courts and the agency consistently have stated that, although a general-purpose bachelor's degree, such as a business administration degree, may be a legitimate prerequisite for a particular position, requiring such a degree, without more, will not justify the granting of a petition for an H-1B specialty occupation visa. See, e.g., *Tapis Int'l v. INS*, 94 F.Supp.2d 172, 175-76 (D.Mass.2000); *Shanti*, 36 F. Supp.2d at 1164-66; cf. *Matter of Michael Hertz Assocs.*, 19 I & N Dec. 558, 560 ([Comm'r] 1988) (providing frequently cited analysis in connection with a conceptually similar provision). This is as it should be: otherwise, an employer could ensure the granting of a specialty occupation visa petition by the simple expedient of creating a generic (and essentially artificial) degree requirement.

Id.

postings suggest, at best, that a bachelor's degree is sometimes required for the position but not at least a bachelor's degree in a *specific specialty* (or its equivalent). Finally, even if all of the vacancy announcements were for parallel positions with organizations similar to the petitioner and in the petitioner's industry and required a minimum of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent, the evidence of record does not demonstrate what statistically valid inferences, if any, can be drawn from these announcements with regard to the common educational requirements for entry into parallel positions in similar organizations.⁴

As the documentation does not establish that the petitioner has met this prong of the regulations, further analysis regarding the specific information contained in each of the job postings is not necessary.⁵ That is, not every deficit of every job posting has been addressed.

The petitioner also submitted two letters from other schools describing their requirements for Montessori teacher positions. The letter from [REDACTED] states that it requires Montessori teachers to have either a bachelor's degree "in a related field" or, "at least 4 years of experience teaching children in a Montessori environment." Similarly, the letter from [REDACTED] states that its school requires a bachelor's degree or "at least 3 years of experience in the field." Contrary to the purpose for which these letters were submitted, the letters do not establish that these schools require a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty for teaching positions at these schools.

The petitioner has not established that a requirement of a bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is common to the petitioner's industry in positions that are (1) in the petitioner's industry, (2) parallel to the proffered position, and also (3) located in organizations that are similar to the petitioner. For the reasons discussed above, the petitioner has not satisfied the first alternative prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2).

⁴ USCIS "must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true." *Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010). As just discussed, the relevance of the job advertisements to the proffered position has not been established. Even if their relevance had been established, the evidence of record still does not demonstrate what inferences, if any, can be drawn from these few job postings with regard to determining the common educational requirements for entry into parallel positions in similar organizations in the same industry. *See generally* Earl Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research* 186-228 (1995).

⁵ The petitioner did not provide any independent evidence of how representative the job postings are of the particular advertising employers' recruiting history for the type of job advertised. As the advertisements are only solicitations for hire, they are not evidence of the actual hiring practices of these employers.

The particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent

The evidence of record also does not satisfy the second alternative prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2), which provides that "an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree." A review of the record of proceeding indicates that the petitioner has not credibly demonstrated that the duties the beneficiary will be responsible for or perform on a day-to-day basis constitute a position so complex or unique that it can only be performed by a person with at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent. Even when considering the petitioner's general descriptions of the proffered position's duties, the evidence of record does not establish why a few related courses or industry experience alone is insufficient preparation for the proffered position. While a few related courses may be beneficial, or even required, in performing certain duties of the position, the petitioner has not demonstrated how an established curriculum of such courses leading to a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, is required to perform the duties of the proffered position. The description of the duties does not specifically identify any tasks that are so complex or unique that only a specifically degreed individual could perform them. The record lacks sufficiently detailed information to distinguish the proffered position as more complex or unique from other positions that can be performed by persons without at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent.

This is further evidenced by the LCA submitted by the petitioner in support of the instant petition. The petitioner attested on the submitted LCA that the wage level for the proffered position is a Level I (entry) wage.⁶ Such a wage level which only requires a basic understanding of the occupation; the performance of routine tasks that require limited, if any, exercise of judgment; close supervision and work closely monitored and reviewed for accuracy; and the receipt of specific instructions on required tasks and expected results, is contrary to a position that requires the performance of complex duties.⁷

⁶ See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Emp't & Training Admin., *Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagric. Immigration Programs* (rev. Nov. 2009), available at http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/NPWHC_Guidance_Revised_11_2009.pdf.

⁷ The issue here is that the petitioner's designation of this position as a Level I, entry-level position undermines its claim that the position is particularly complex, specialized, or unique compared to other positions *within the same occupation*. Nevertheless, it is important to note that a Level I wage-designation does not preclude a proffered position from classification as a specialty occupation. In certain occupations (doctors or lawyers, for example), an entry-level position would still require a minimum of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, for entry. Similarly, however, a Level IV wage-designation would not reflect that an occupation qualifies as a specialty occupation if that higher-level position does not have an entry requirement of at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent. That is, a position's wage level designation may be a consideration but is not a substitute for a determination of whether a proffered position meets the requirements of section 214(i)(1) of the Act.

As the evidence of record does not demonstrate how the proffered position is so complex or unique relative to other positions within the same occupational category that do not require at least a baccalaureate degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent for entry into the occupation in the United States, it cannot be concluded that the petitioner has satisfied the second alternative prong of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(2).

The employer normally requires a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, for the position

The third criterion of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) entails an employer demonstrating that it normally requires a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, for the position. To this end, we review the petitioner's past recruiting and hiring practices, as well as information regarding employees who previously held the position, and any other documentation submitted by a petitioner in support of this criterion of the regulations.

To merit approval of the petition under this criterion, the record must establish that a petitioner's imposition of a degree requirement is not merely a matter of preference for high-caliber candidates but is necessitated by performance requirements of the position. While a petitioner may assert that a proffered position requires a specific degree, that statement alone without corroborating evidence cannot establish the position as a specialty occupation. Were USCIS limited solely to reviewing a petitioner's claimed self-imposed requirements, then any individual with a bachelor's degree could be brought to the United States to perform any occupation as long as the petitioner artificially created a token degree requirement, whereby all individuals employed in a particular position possessed a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty, or its equivalent. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 388. In other words, if a petitioner's stated degree requirement is only designed to artificially meet the standards for an H-1B visa and/or to underemploy an individual in a position for which he or she is overqualified and if the proffered position does not in fact require such a specialty degree or its equivalent, to perform its duties, the occupation would not meet the statutory or regulatory definition of a specialty occupation. *See* § 214(i)(1) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "specialty occupation").

To satisfy this criterion, the evidence of record must show that the specific performance requirements of the position generated the recruiting and hiring history. A petitioner's perfunctory declaration of a particular educational requirement will not mask the fact that the position is not a specialty occupation. USCIS must examine the actual employment requirements, and, on the basis of that examination, determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. *See generally Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F. 3d 384. In this pursuit, the critical element is not the title of the position, or the fact that an employer has routinely insisted on certain educational standards, but whether performance of the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation as required by the Act. To interpret the regulations any other way would lead to absurd results: if USCIS were constrained to recognize a specialty occupation merely because the petitioner has an established practice of demanding certain educational requirements for the proffered position - and without consideration of how a

beneficiary is to be specifically employed - then any alien with a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty could be brought into the United States to perform non-specialty occupations, so long as the employer required all such employees to have baccalaureate or higher degrees. *See id.* at 388.

The petitioner stated in the Form I-129 petition that it has 22 employees and that it was established in [REDACTED] (approximately seven years prior to the filing of the H-1B petition). In response to the RFE, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart. The chart indicates that nine individuals serve as teachers. Moreover, we note that of the nine teachers listed on the organizational chart, educational credentials were provided for only five individuals. The petitioner did not provide the total number of people it has employed to serve in the proffered position. Consequently, it cannot be determined how representative the petitioner's claims regarding five individuals over a seven year period is of the petitioner's normal recruiting and hiring practices.

At the outset, it is important to note that all of the five individuals received education at foreign institutions and no equivalency evaluations were submitted. One of the five individuals earned a teachers certification from "[REDACTED]" in [REDACTED] TX which is not a bachelor's degree issued from an accredited college or university. The petitioner also submitted a certificate from a individual not shown on the organizational chart, [REDACTED]. The certificate is for a nine month "Upper Elementary Montessori Teacher Training Program," and is not a bachelor's degree issued from an accredited college or university.

Further, the petitioner did not provide the job duties and day-to-day responsibilities of the positions that it claims are the same as the proffered position. The petitioner also did not submit any information regarding the complexity of the job duties, supervisory duties (if any), independent judgment required or the amount of supervision received. Accordingly, aside from job title, it is unclear whether the duties and responsibilities of these individuals are the same or similar to the proffered position.

The petitioner did not provide documentary evidence demonstrating that it normally requires at least a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, directly related to the duties of the position. The petitioner has not satisfied the third criterion of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

The nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent

We will next address the alternative criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)(4), which is satisfied if the petitioner establishes that the nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform them is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent.

In the instant case, relative specialization and complexity have not been sufficiently developed by the petitioner as an aspect of the proffered position. We again refer to our earlier comments and findings with regard to the implication of the petitioner's designation of the proffered position in the

LCA as a Level I (the lowest of four assignable levels) wage. That is, the Level I wage designation is indicative of a low, entry-level position relative to others within the occupational category, and hence one not likely distinguishable by relatively specialized and complex duties. Upon review of the totality of the record, the petitioner has not established that the nature of the specific duties is so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent.

For the reasons discussed above, the evidence of record does not satisfy the fourth criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A).

The evidence of record does not satisfy any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) and, therefore, it cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation. The appeal will be dismissed and the petition denied for this reason.

As a final matter, we will briefly address the petitioner's assertion on appeal that we concluded in a previous matter that a "pre-school Montessori teach [*sic*] was a specialty occupation." We are not required to approve petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. *See, e.g., Matter of Church Scientology International*, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm'r 1988). If any of the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported assertions that are contained in the current record, they would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. It would be "absurd to suggest that [USCIS] or any agency must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent." *Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery*, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). A prior approval does not compel the approval of a subsequent petition or relieve the petitioner of its burden to provide sufficient documentation to establish current eligibility for the benefit sought. 55 Fed. Reg. 2606, 2612 (Jan. 26, 1990). A prior approval also does not preclude USCIS from denying an extension of an original visa petition based on a reassessment of eligibility for the benefit sought. *See Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch*, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, our authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved nonimmigrant petitions on behalf of a beneficiary, we would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service center. *Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS*, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), *aff'd*, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

As set forth above, we find that the evidence of record does not sufficiently establish that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed and the petition denied.

In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met.

(b)(6)



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NON-PRECEDENT DECISION

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.