



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)




DATE: **JUL 09 2015**

PETITION RECEIPT #: 

IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



Enclosed is the non-precedent decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) for your case.

If you believe we incorrectly decided your case, you may file a motion requesting us to reconsider our decision and/or reopen the proceeding. The requirements for motions are located at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Motions must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) **within 33 days of the date of this decision**. The Form I-290B web page (www.uscis.gov/i-290b) contains the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. **Please do not mail any motions directly to the AAO.**

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the nonimmigrant visa petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129), the petitioner describes itself as a 263,637-employee (worldwide) "Information Technology Consulting Firm," established in [REDACTED]. In order to employ the beneficiary in a position it designates as a "Web Developer" position, the petitioner seeks to classify her as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The Director denied the petition determining that the evidence of record did not establish: (1) that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation; (2) the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary; and (3) that the Labor Condition Application (LCA) submitted by the petitioner covers all of the locations where the beneficiary will be employed. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the Director's bases for denial of the petition were erroneous and contends that it has satisfied all evidentiary requirements.

The record of proceeding includes: (1) the Form I-129 and supporting documentation; (2) the service center's Request for Evidence (RFE); (3) the petitioner's response to the RFE; (4) the notice of decision; and (5) the Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, and the petitioner's brief in support of the appeal and additional evidence. We reviewed the record in its entirety before issuing our decision.¹

Upon review of the entire record of proceeding, we find that the petitioner has not overcome the Director's grounds for denying this petition. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed and the petition will remain denied.

II. THE PROFFERED POSITION

On the Form I-129, the petitioner indicated that it is seeking the beneficiary's services as a web developer on a full-time basis at a rate of pay of \$62,400 per year with an employment start date of October 1, 2014. The petitioner submitted the required LCA certified for a job prospect within the occupational classification of "Web Developers" - SOC (ONET/OES Code) 15-1134, at a Level II

¹ We conduct appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

Also, in light of the petitioner's references, on appeal, to the requirement that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) apply the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, we affirm that, in the exercise of our appellate review in this matter, as in all matters that come within our purview, we follow the preponderance of the evidence standard as specified in the controlling precedent decision, *Matter of Chawathe*, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-376 (AAO 2010).

wage. The LCA identifies the beneficiary's work location as [REDACTED] Minnesota. On the Form I-129, the petitioner noted that the beneficiary would work off-site.

In its letter, dated March 28, 2014, in support of the petition, the petitioner stated that it "selected the Beneficiary to participate onsite in [its] project for [its] client, [REDACTED] and that "[it] is not involved in staffing this project for [REDACTED] (i.e. supplying employees to meet [REDACTED] staffing needs." The petitioner added that "[REDACTED] has engaged [the petitioner] to undertake and complete information technology project(s) to meet its business needs" and that "the work the Beneficiary will perform is part of [the petitioner's] regular business."

The petitioner stated that in the proffered position of Web Developer, "the Beneficiary will apply her technical expertise in computer science, analysis and programming and her responsibilities will include, but not be limited to, the following:

- Design, build, or maintain web sites, including performing web site updates.
- Confer with management or development teams to prioritize needs, resolve conflicts, develop content criteria, or choose solutions.
- Back up files from web sites to local directories for instant recovery in case of problems.
- Identify problems uncovered by testing or customer feedback, and correct problems or refer problems to appropriate personnel for correction.
- Evaluate code to ensure that it is valid, is properly structured, meets industry standards and is compatible with browsers, devices, or operating systems.
- Analyze user needs to determine technical requirements.
- Develop or validate test routines and schedules to ensure that test cases mimic external interfaces and address all browser and device types.

The petitioner added:

[T]he position requires the application of sophisticated technologies and principals that can only be gained through the attainment of at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in Computer Science, Engineering, Information Systems, or a directly related field. [The petitioner's] policy is to hire as Web Developers only individuals who possess at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in Computer Science, Engineering, Information Systems, or a directly related field.

In response to the service center's RFE, the petitioner submitted a letter stating that the beneficiary had been engaged to work on the [REDACTED] project as a web developer and that her services would be required through at least August 2017. The letter also listed the beneficiary's duties as follows:

- Analysis and gathering of requirements from Clients and make sure all developing and documentation processes are developed as per [the petitioner] and client quality standards.

- Preparing Low Level Design, Program, Unit Test Specifications and System test plan for the components.
- Understand the requirements thoroughly from the customer and building the web pages including layout, appearance, and function.
- Complete design and construction of various functional modules and unit testing them.
- Preparing test case documents based on the requirements/design documents.
- Setting up the Test environment and involving in test data setup activities.
- Responsible for fixing any bugs and enhancing the web pages according to requirements from end users.
- Development of new features based on the requirements.
- Providing status updates to Clients & Coordination with the Off-shore team to ensure quality deliverable.
- Report the weekly and monthly status in the specified format.
- Be responsible for the overall quality and timeliness of the deliverable.

III. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

We will first consider whether the evidence of record establishes that the petitioner meets the regulatory definition of a United States employer as that term is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In this context, the evidence of record must establish that the petitioner will have "an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee." *Id.*

A. Legal Framework

Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-1B nonimmigrant in pertinent part as an alien:

subject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(1) . . ., who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) . . ., and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the [Secretary of Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary [of Labor] an application under section 212(n)(1)

The term "United States employer" is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows:

United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other association, or organization in the United States which:

- (1) Engages a person to work within the United States;

- (2) *Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and*
- (3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number.

(Emphasis added); *see also* 56 Fed. Reg. 61111, 61121 (Dec. 2, 1991).

Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), it is noted that the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-1B visa classification. Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act indicates that an alien coming to the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation will have an "intending employer" who will file a Labor Condition Application with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 212(n)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1) (2012). The intending employer is described as offering full-time or part-time "employment" to the H-1B "employee." Subsections 212(n)(1)(A)(i) and 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i), (2)(C)(vii) (2012). Further, the regulations indicate that "United States employers" must file a Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) in order to classify aliens as H-1B temporary "employees." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1), (2)(i)(A). Finally, the definition of "United States employer" indicates in its second prong that the petitioner must have an "employer-employee relationship" with the "employees under this part," i.e., the H-1B beneficiary, and that this relationship be evidenced by the employer's ability to "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "United States employer").

Neither the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) nor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) defined the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" by regulation for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, even though the regulation describes H-1B beneficiaries as being "employees" who must have an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer." *Id.* Therefore, for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, these terms are undefined.

The United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." *Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden*, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "*Darden*") (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated:

"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method

of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party."

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324 (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. at 751-752); see also *Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells*, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003) (hereinafter "*Clackamas*"). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive." *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting *NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America*, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).

In this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. See generally 136 Cong. Rec. S17106 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. H12358 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). On the contrary, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the regulations define the term "United States employer" to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition.²

Specifically, the regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to engage a person to work within the United States, and to have an "employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an "employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" combined with the agency's otherwise generally circular definition of United States employer in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition" or, more importantly, that

² While the *Darden* court considered only the definition of "employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and did not address the definition of "employer," courts have generally refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the traditional common law definition." See, e.g., *Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd.*, 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), *aff'd*, 27 F.3d 800 (2nd Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994).

However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 844-845 (1984).

construing these terms in this manner would thwart congressional design or lead to absurd results. *Cf. Darden*, 503 U.S. at 318-319.³

Accordingly, in the absence of an express congressional intent to impose broader definitions, both the "conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine" and the *Darden* construction test apply to the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).⁴

Therefore, in considering whether or not one will be an "employee" in an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS must focus on the common-law touchstone of "control." *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450; *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining a "United States employer" as one who "has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise *control* the work of any such employee" (emphasis added)).

The factors indicating that a worker is or will be an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly delineated in both the *Darden* and *Clackamas* decisions. *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324; *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 445; *see also* *Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. *See Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 445; *see also* *New Compliance Manual*, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the *Darden* decision); *see also* *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (determining that hospitals, as the recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the "true employers" of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the actual petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries).

It is important to note, however, that the factors listed in *Darden* and *Clackamas* are not exhaustive and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties relevant to control may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must

³ To the extent the regulations are ambiguous with regard to the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship," the agency's interpretation of these terms should be found to be controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." *Auer v. Robbins*, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citing *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 359, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 1850, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (quoting *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*, 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945))).

⁴ That said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term "employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.*, section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. See *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *New Compliance Manual* at § 2-III(A)(1).

Furthermore, when examining the factors relevant to determining control, USCIS must assess and weigh each actual factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or change that factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. See *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324. For example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the right to assign them, it is the actual source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, and not who has the right to provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. See *id.* at 323.

Lastly, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the worker is an employee. *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, . . . the answer to whether [an individual] is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship . . . with no one factor being decisive.'" *Id.* at 451 (quoting *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324).

B. Analysis

Applying the *Darden* and *Clackamas* tests to this matter, the evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee."

The petitioner initially submitted excerpts from its Master Professional Services Agreement (MPSA) with its end-client [REDACTED]. In response to the service center's RFE, the petitioner submitted what appears to be the complete MPSA, but did not provide any specific statements of work (SOWs) for the beneficiary. The record of proceeding does not contain SOWs valid for the requested period of employment for the beneficiary or any evidence from [REDACTED] other than the MPSA and the supplements discussed above. There are no documents from [REDACTED] with specific references to the beneficiary by name.

Moreover, a complete copy of Supplement G was not submitted.⁵ The submitted portion of Supplement G shows that the petitioner had extensive work at the [REDACTED] facility that would continue for the majority of the requested employment period and includes language restricting the petitioner's rights regarding the beneficiary. For example, section 18 of the Supplement G specifically allows the end-client the option to replace the petitioner's personnel.⁶ While the

⁵ Specifically, under the heading Statement of Work (page 3) of the Supplement G, the parties noted that the services the petitioner would perform are set forth in Schedule G-2, and that the petitioner will ensure that its personnel assigned to services under the G-2 supplement will have certain certifications and those skill sets identified in Schedule G-15. Supplement G referenced 16 attached schedules in all but the evidence of record does not include these attachments.

⁶ This option references the MPSA at section 8.5(b) which provides the framework for the end-client's replacement of the petitioner's personnel.

exercise of this option may or may not occur, this is a limitation on the petitioner's right to utilize the beneficiary's services for this particular assignment. It is this language, along with the lack of attachments to the Supplement G that raise questions regarding other limitations on the petitioner's right to control. For example, the Supplement G does not include the G-2 attachment outlining the description of proposed services. Thus, it is not possible to conclude that the beneficiary's services would even be required under the Supplement G. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Absent all documents surrounding the chain of proposed employment, delineating the contractual terms and conditions relevant to the employer-employee common law touchstone of control - we are unable to determine that balancing all of the relevant indicia of control would favor the petitioner - rather than one of the other parties - so as to establish the requisite employer-employee relationship.

Next, we note that while social security contributions, worker's compensation contributions, unemployment insurance contributions, federal and state income tax withholdings, and other benefits are still relevant factors in determining who will control an alien beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, e.g., who will oversee and direct the work of the beneficiary, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, where will the work be located, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the alien beneficiary is assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to make a determination as to who will be the beneficiary's employer. We fully considered all of the submissions from the petitioner in this matter. However, without full disclosure of all of the relevant factors relating to the end-client, including evidence corroborating the beneficiary's actual work assignment, for the duration of the requested employment period, we are unable to find that the requisite employer-employee relationship will exist between the petitioner and the beneficiary.

The evidence, therefore, is insufficient to establish that the petitioner qualifies as a United States employer, as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Merely claiming in its letters that the beneficiary is the petitioner's employee and that the petitioner exercises control over the beneficiary, without sufficient, corroborating evidence to support the claim, does not establish eligibility in this matter. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190).

Based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). For this reason the petition must be denied.

IV. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION

The next issue in this matter is whether the record establishes that the proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation.

A. Legal Framework

To meet its burden of proof in this regard, the petitioner must establish that the employment it is offering to the beneficiary meets the following statutory and regulatory requirements.

Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) states, in pertinent part, the following:

Specialty occupation means an occupation which [(1)] requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which [(2)] requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, a proposed position must meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute

as a whole. See *K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); see also *COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. See *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as providing supplemental criteria that must be met in accordance with, and not as alternatives to, the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

As such and consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) consistently interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. See *Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"). Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not simply rely on a position's title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity's business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. See generally *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384. The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

We note that, as recognized by the court in *Defensor, supra*, where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner, evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical. See *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 387-388. The court held that the former Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. *Id.* at 384. Such

evidence must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate the type and educational level of highly specialized knowledge in a specific discipline that is necessary to perform that particular work.

B. Analysis

For H-1B approval, the petitioner must demonstrate that a legitimate need for an employee exists and that it has secured H-1B caliber work for the beneficiary for the entire period of employment requested in the petition.⁷ In addition, USCIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(1). A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm'r 1978).

In this matter, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary would be assigned to work for the end-client, [REDACTED], for the entire validity period requested, October 1, 2014 to August 11, 2017. However, the evidence of record does not contain sufficient evidence corroborating the petitioner's assertions regarding the beneficiary's claimed assignment. That is, the evidence of record does not establish that the submitted MPSA and supplements actually relate to the beneficiary and authorizes her assignment to [REDACTED] for the entire validity period, as claimed. The record of proceeding does not contain any evidence from [REDACTED] other than the MPSA and the supplements discussed above and there are no documents from [REDACTED] with specific references to the beneficiary by name. Also, no documents from [REDACTED] specifically reference the proffered position.

⁷ The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1B program. For example, a 1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows:

Historically, the Service has not granted H-1B classification on the basis of speculative, or undetermined, prospective employment. The H-1B classification is not intended as a vehicle for an alien to engage in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in temporary foreign workers to meet possible workforce needs arising from potential business expansions or the expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether an alien is properly classifiable as an H-1B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must first examine the duties of the position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"). The Service must then determine whether the alien has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the case of speculative employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis and, therefore, is unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1B classification. Moreover, there is no assurance that the alien will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this country.

63 Fed. Reg. 30419, 30419 - 30420 (June 4, 1998). While a petitioner is certainly permitted to change its intent with regard to non-speculative employment, e.g., a change in duties or job location, it must nonetheless document such a material change in intent through an amended or new petition in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E).

Supplement C to the MPSA which the petitioner claims "governs the project to which the beneficiary will be assigned" appears to have expired on October 31, 2014. Also, Supplement G to the MPSA which "extend[s] the contractual relationship between [the petitioner] and [redacted]" indicates that the supplement term ends on February 1, 2017. Thus, even assuming *arguendo* that the MPSA and Supplements C and G relate to the beneficiary and authorize her assignment to [redacted] the petitioner still has not sufficiently established how the submitted documents constitute reliable evidence of the beneficiary's claimed assignment there for the entire requested validity period (October 1, 2014 to August 11, 2017). Although the petitioner's counsel asserts in response to the RFE that the petitioner "anticipates that the project will be extended and consequently specialty occupation work will exist for the beneficiary for the employment period requested in the instant petition," the evidence of record does not contain evidence corroborating this assertion. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)).

As the record of proceeding does not contain sufficient evidence establishing that the beneficiary would be assigned to work for [redacted] for the entire validity period requested - and considering that the petitioner is in the business of supplying workers to third-party clients or customers - we cannot find that the petitioner has demonstrated a legitimate need for the beneficiary's services. In other words, the petitioner has not demonstrated that it has secured definitive, non-speculative H-1B caliber work for the beneficiary for the entire period of employment requested in the petition.

Moreover, while the petitioner provided a list of job duties, petitioner-provided duties are often outside the scope of consideration for establishing whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. See *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387-388 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that the petitioner-provided job duties and alleged requirements to perform those duties were irrelevant to a specialty occupation determination where the nurses in that case would provide services to the end-client hospitals and not to the petitioning staffing company). Nevertheless, even if we were to consider the petitioner's descriptions, we still would not find them sufficient to explain the circumstances of the beneficiary's assignment at [redacted]. The petitioner's descriptions of the duties of the proffered position are overly broad and not explained in the context of [redacted] or the particular project to which the beneficiary will be assigned.

Overall, the evidence of record is insufficient to establish the substantive nature of the work to be performed by the beneficiary. The failure to establish the substantive nature of the work, therefore, precludes a finding that the proffered position satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its

equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4.⁸

Accordingly, as the petitioner has not established that it has satisfied any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), it cannot be found that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation. The appeal will be dismissed for this additional reason.

V. VALIDITY OF THE LCA

The remaining issue before us is whether the LCA is valid for all locations where the beneficiary will be employed. However, since the employer-employee and specialty occupation bases for denial are dispositive of the petitioner's appeal, we need not address the remaining ground identified by the Director.

VI. CONCLUSION

An application or petition that does not comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by us even if the service center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that we conduct appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Moreover, when we deny a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it shows that we abused our discretion with respect to all of the enumerated grounds. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1037, *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683; *see also BDPCS, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n*, 351 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("When an agency offers multiple grounds for a decision, we will affirm the agency so long as any one of the grounds is valid, unless it is demonstrated that the agency would not have acted on that basis if the alternative grounds were unavailable.").

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of

⁸ It is noted that, even if the proffered position were established as being that of a web developer, a review of the U.S. Department of Labor's *Occupational Outlook Handbook* (hereinafter the *Handbook*) does not indicate that such a position qualifies as a specialty occupation in that the *Handbook* does not state a normal minimum requirement of a U.S. bachelor's or higher degree in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, for entry into the occupation of web developer. The *Handbook* reports that the educational requirements for web developers vary, and that such requirements range from a high school diploma to a bachelor's degree. The *Handbook* also indicates that the typical and most common degree requirement for a web developer position is an associate's degree, not a bachelor's degree. *See* U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, 2014-15 ed., "Web Developers," <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/web-developers.htm#tab-4> (last visited June 29, 2015).

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the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.