




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)



DATE: **MAY 18 2015**

FILE #: 

IN RE: Petitioner: 
 Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

NO REPRESENTATIVE OF RECORD

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed is the non-precedent decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) for your case.

If you believe we incorrectly decided your case, you may file a motion requesting us to reconsider our decision and/or reopen the proceeding. The requirements for motions are located at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Motions must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) **within 33 days of the date of this decision**. The Form I-290B web page (www.uscis.gov/i-290b) contains the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. **Please do not mail any motions directly to the AAO.**

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg".

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the nonimmigrant visa petition. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. The petition will be denied.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129), the petitioner describes itself as a 4-employee "Computer Systems and Software Analysis and Consulting Services" firm established in [REDACTED]. In order to employ the beneficiary in what it designates as a "Computer Systems Analyst" position, the petitioner seeks to classify him as a nonimmigrant worker in a specialty occupation pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).

The Director found the initial evidence insufficient to establish eligibility for the benefit sought, and issued a Request for Evidence (RFE). Thereafter, the petitioner responded to the RFE. The Director reviewed the information and determined that the petitioner failed to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. The Director denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to establish that it has standing to file the instant visa petition as the beneficiary's prospective United States employer as that term is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) and failed to establish that the proffered position qualifies for classification as a specialty occupation position. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the Director's bases for denial were erroneous and contends that the petitioner satisfied all evidentiary requirements.

We base our decision upon our review of the entire record of proceeding, which includes: (1) the petitioner's Form I-129 and the supporting documentation; (2) the service center's RFE; (3) the petitioner's response to the RFE; (4) the Director's denial letter; and (5) the Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) and the petitioner's submissions on appeal. We reviewed the record in its entirety before issuing our decision.¹

As will be discussed below, we have determined that the Director did not err in her decision to deny the petition on the employer-employee and specialty occupation issues. Accordingly, the Director's decision will not be disturbed. The appeal will be dismissed, and the petition will be denied.

II. PROFFERED POSITION

The Labor Condition Application (LCA) submitted to support the visa petition states that the proffered position is a Computer Systems Analyst position, and that it corresponds to Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code and title 15-1121, Computer Systems Analysts, from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). The LCA further states that the proffered position is a wage Level I, entry-level, position.

¹ We conduct appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

In a letter dated April 1, 2014, [REDACTED] signing as the petitioner's CEO, stated: "[The petitioner provides] the full spectrum of software and web development services on our premises as well as in dedicated offshore centers and at customer sites." That letter also contains the following description of the duties of the proffered position:

As a Computer Systems Analyst with [the petitioner], [the beneficiary] will analyze, design and implement a complex set of Web-based applications for booking travel reservations. He will be responsible for extracting and defining user requirements. Furthermore, [the beneficiary] will identify where modifications to existing processes are required. He will also design new processes as necessary. In each situation, [the beneficiary] will perform comprehensive testing of any improved or newly developed applications prior to their implementation. His technical environment will include ASP.NET, C#, Java Script, HTML, and MS SQL Server/Management Studio, among others.

Mr. Miroshnichenko further stated the following:

Please note that this is not an itinerary H-1B in that [the beneficiary] will be assigned to work at our offices at [REDACTED]

[The petitioner] is the actual employer in that we retain the authority to pay, hire, fire, and supervise [the beneficiary] and control his work product.

With respect to the educational requirement for the proffered position, Mr. [REDACTED] stated in a letter dated August 19, 2014 that "[d]ue to the complex nature of [the proffered position's] work, this position requires the services of someone with at least a bachelor's degree in computer science/engineering, a related field, or the equivalent "

In a letter dated October 9, 2014 letter,² Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the petitioner has work to perform for clients, but that the beneficiary would be assigned to work on the petitioner's in-house project, avia4us.com,³ an "automatic travel reservations engine." Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the petitioner anticipates that the avia4us.com project will require 11,000 hours of work to be fully operational. He further stated that the proffered position requires a bachelor's degree in computer science or a related field because it "requires advanced knowledge of architecture, design, software implementation, web applications, web services, SQL Database design, development, optimization and profiling" and "debugging, tracing and logging skills to find and resolve issues on [the petitioner's] production servers, QA and UAT environments."

² Although that letter has a typewritten date of October 9, 2014 on the first page, Mr. [REDACTED] signature on the second page is accompanied by a handwritten date of October 3, 2014.

³ The petitioner also refers to [REDACTED] as simply "avia4us." For consistency's sake, we will refer to the project as "[REDACTED]"

III. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE

A. The Law

Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H-1B nonimmigrant in pertinent part as an alien:

subject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(1) . . . , who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) . . . , and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the [Secretary of Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary [of Labor] an application under section 212(n)(1)

The term "United States employer" is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows:

United States employer means a person, firm, corporation, contractor, or other association, or organization in the United States which:

- (1) Engages a person to work within the United States;
- (2) *Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee; and*
- (3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number.

(Emphasis added); *see also* 56 Fed. Reg. 61111, 61121 (Dec. 2, 1991).

B. Analysis

Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), it is noted that the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-1B visa classification. Section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act indicates that an alien coming to the United States to perform services in a specialty occupation will have an "intending employer" who will file a Labor Condition Application with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 212(n)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1) (2012). The intending employer is described as offering full-time or part-time "employment" to the H-1B "employee." Subsections 212(n)(1)(A)(i) and 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i), (2)(C)(vii) (2012). Further, the regulations indicate that "United States employers" must file a Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) in order to classify aliens as H-1B temporary "employees." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1), (2)(i)(A). Finally, the definition of "United States employer" indicates in its second prong that the petitioner must have an "employer-employee relationship" with the "employees under this part," i.e., the H-1B beneficiary, and that this relationship be evidenced by the employer's ability to "hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any

such employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining the term "United States employer").

Neither the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) nor U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) defined the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" by regulation for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, even though the regulation describes H-1B beneficiaries as being "employees" who must have an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer." *Id.* Therefore, for purposes of the H-1B visa classification, these terms are undefined.

The United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." *Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden*, 503 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1992) (hereinafter "*Darden*") (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated:

"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party."

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-324 (quoting *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. at 751-752); see also *Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells*, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003) (hereinafter "*Clackamas*"). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive." *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting *NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America*, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).

In this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. See generally 136 Cong. Rec. S17106 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. H12358 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). On the contrary, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the regulations define the term "United States employer" to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition.⁴

⁴ While the *Darden* court considered only the definition of "employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and did not address the definition of "employer," courts have generally refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the traditional common law definition." See, e.g., *Bowers v.*

Specifically, the regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1B employers to have a tax identification number, to engage a person to work within the United States, and to have an "employer-employee relationship" with the H-1B "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Accordingly, the term "United States employer" not only requires H-1B employers and employees to have an "employer-employee relationship" as understood by common-law agency doctrine, it imposes additional requirements of having a tax identification number and to employ persons in the United States. The lack of an express expansion of the definition regarding the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" combined with the agency's otherwise generally circular definition of United States employer in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) indicates that the regulations do not intend to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law definition" or, more importantly, that construing these terms in this manner would thwart congressional design or lead to absurd results. *Cf. Darden*, 503 U.S. at 318-319.⁵

Accordingly, in the absence of an express congressional intent to impose broader definitions, both the "conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine" and the *Darden* construction test apply to the terms "employee" and "employer-employee relationship" as used in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, section 212(n) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).⁶

Therefore, in considering whether or not one will be an "employee" in an "employer-employee relationship" with a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1B nonimmigrant petitions, USCIS must focus on the common-law touchstone of "control." *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450; *see also* 8 C.F.R.

Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), *aff'd*, 27 F.3d 800 (2nd Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1000 (1994).

However, in this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee" in section 212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1B visa classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the common law agency definition. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose administration is entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. *See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 844-845 (1984).

⁵ To the extent the regulations are ambiguous with regard to the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship," the agency's interpretation of these terms should be found to be controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." *Auer v. Robbins*, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citing *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 359, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 1850, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (quoting *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*, 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945)).

⁶ That said, there are instances in the Act where Congress may have intended a broader application of the term "employer" than what is encompassed in the conventional master-servant relationship. *See, e.g.*, section 214(c)(2)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F) (referring to "unaffiliated employers" supervising and controlling L-1B intracompany transferees having specialized knowledge); section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (referring to the employment of unauthorized aliens).

§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining a "United States employer" as one who "has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise *control* the work of any such employee" (emphasis added)).

The factors indicating that a worker is or will be an "employee" of an "employer" are clearly delineated in both the *Darden* and *Clackamas* decisions. *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324; *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 445; see also *Restatement (Second) of Agency* § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. See *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 445; see also *New Compliance Manual*, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the *Darden* decision); see also *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (determining that hospitals, as the recipients of beneficiaries' services, are the "true employers" of H-1B nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service agency is the actual petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiaries).

It is important to note, however, that the factors listed in *Darden* and *Clackamas* are not exhaustive and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties relevant to control may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. See *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; *New Compliance Manual* at § 2-III(A)(1).

Furthermore, when examining the factors relevant to determining control, USCIS must assess and weigh each actual factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or change that factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. See *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 323-324. For example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the *right* to assign them, it is the *actual* source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, and not who has the *right* to provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. See *id.* at 323.

Lastly, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the worker is an employee. *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, . . . the answer to whether [an individual] is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship . . . with no one factor being decisive.'" *Id.* at 451 (quoting *Darden*, 503 U.S. at 324).

Applying the *Darden* and *Clackamas* tests to this matter, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee."

While social security contributions, worker's compensation contributions, unemployment insurance contributions, federal and state income tax withholdings, and other benefits are still relevant factors

in determining who will control an alien beneficiary, other incidents of the relationship, e.g., who will oversee and direct the work of the beneficiary, who will provide the instrumentalities and tools, where will the work be located, and who has the right or ability to affect the projects to which the alien beneficiary is assigned, must also be assessed and weighed in order to make a determination as to who will be the beneficiary's employer. Without full disclosure of all of the relevant factors, we are unable to find that the requisite employer-employee relationship will exist between the petitioner and the beneficiary.

In the instant case, the petitioner first asserted that the beneficiary would work on a "complex set of Web-based applications for booking travel reservations." As to this project, the service center's RFE specifically requested:

Evidence of sufficient production space and equipment to support the beneficiary's specialty occupation work.

Copies of critical reviews of your software in trade journals that describes [sic] the purpose of the software, its cost, and its ranking among similarly produced software manufacturers;

Copy of the marketing analysis for your final software product; and/or

Copy of a cost analysis for your software product.

In response to the RFE, the petitioner submitted, *inter alia*: (1) a document headed, "Architectural Design and API Specifications for Travel reservations engine" that purports to describe a project; (2) documents, including master services agreements (MSAs), Work Orders, Statements of Work (SOWs), etc., pertinent to the assignment of the petitioner's workers to work at other companies' sites, on those other companies' projects, generally through at least one intermediary; (3) a letter, dated January 22, 2014, from [REDACTED] signing as an HR Generalist at [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] Texas; (4) another letter from Ms. [REDACTED] dated August 11, 2014; (5) a letter, dated June 1, 2014, offering the proffered position to the beneficiary; and (6) a letter, dated July 24, 2014, from [REDACTED] signing as CEO of [REDACTED], Illinois.

The "Architectural Design and API Specifications for Travel reservations engine" purports to describe either a project under development or an application available for installation. It does not clarify whether the petitioner developed or is developing this project. Although it contains references to [REDACTED] it is not accompanied by any evidence that the petitioner has any business relationship with [REDACTED]. While the letters from [REDACTED] refer to ongoing business relationships they have with the petitioner, they do not specifically mention the "Web-based applications for booking travel reservations" project or any work that will specifically be assigned to the beneficiary.

We note that the petitioner provided an undated document entitled "Business Plan International Travel Agency" which identified a specific project "[REDACTED]" with the Form I-129. In the "Executive Summary" portion of the business plan, the petitioner stated that the [REDACTED] project will be a sole proprietorship owned and operated by [the petitioner]," and described [REDACTED] in its "Management Summary" as "a small organization." The business plan also states that the petitioner expects to have a "stable work-load for the [REDACTED] project for at least 2-3 Computer Systems Analysts in 2014-2015 with the possibility of growing the team to the size of 4-7 in 2015-2017." As described in the "Mission" portion of the business plan, [REDACTED] is a travel agency providing consulting and custom travel arrangements and packages. The plan further elaborates that avia4us.com will be "a full service agency [that] sells standard travel agency goods and services, including airfare and travel packages," as well as offering additional services such as "assistance with passports, [and] providing access to top-of-the-line equipment and supplies." The plan further describes [REDACTED] twofold "distribution strategy" as to: (1) "focus on the target market in the [REDACTED] area to whom it will sell directly"; and (2) "establish distribution capability on the World Wide Web." The plan lists the sales objectives as to achieve sales of \$200,000 in the first year of operations, and \$800,000 by the third year of operations.

The record, however, does not contain sufficiently detailed evidence of the job duties the beneficiary specifically would perform in relation to the [REDACTED] project. While the petitioner asserts that there are over 11,000 hours of work to reach the project's operating capacity, it has not explained how many of those hours would be assigned to the beneficiary, or which of the particular duties would be assigned to him. We note that the business plan references "2014-2015" and "2015-2017," but at no time does it describe, in detail, the extent of the project and its timeline with respect to the proffered position and the intended employment dates requested on the Form I-129.

In fact, there are questions about the credibility of the petitioner's claimed in-house employment for the beneficiary, i.e., the development of the petitioner's claimed proprietary travel reservation engine, [REDACTED]. The evidence of record lacks sufficient, credible evidence demonstrating that [REDACTED] is a bona fide project which actually exists and is being developed by the petitioner.

For instance, the petitioner asserts that all work on this "project" will take place on-site at the petitioner's business premises located at the address listed on the Form I-129, specifically, [REDACTED] Illinois. However, there are several references to [REDACTED] as being an altogether separate business entity located separately from the petitioner. The petitioner's business plan describes [REDACTED] as a "sole proprietorship" as well as a "small organization." It describes [REDACTED] as not only being a travel reservation *engine*, but "a full service *agency*" that will "sell directly" to its target customers, in addition to providing online sales and services (emphasis added). Further, the petitioner confusingly states that [REDACTED] is "located in the heart of the [REDACTED]" while also stating that it "has identified three potential locations for office space" for [REDACTED] in [REDACTED], Illinois.

The petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence that it actually has an in-house project developing the [REDACTED] on-line reservation system as it claims. As such, it has not demonstrated that the beneficiary would work on that project. The petitioner's response to the RFE and the

"TRAVEL" clause in the petitioner's June 1, 2014 letter offering employment to the beneficiary strongly suggest that the petitioner intends, if the visa petition is approved, to provide the beneficiary to other companies to work at their locations on their projects, as such work becomes available. The evidence, however, is insufficient to show that while the beneficiary is at those remote sites working for those other companies, the petitioner would assign the beneficiary's tasks and supervise his performance of them.

The evidence, therefore, is insufficient to establish that the petitioner qualifies as a United States employer, as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). Merely claiming in its letters that the petitioner exercises complete control over the beneficiary, without evidence supporting the claim, does not establish eligibility in this matter. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm'r 1972)). The evidence of record prior to adjudication did not establish that the petitioner would act as the beneficiary's employer in that it will hire, pay, fire, or otherwise control the work of the beneficiary. Despite the Director's specific request for evidence such as a letter from the end client, the petitioner failed to submit such evidence. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14).

Based on the tests outlined above, the petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the beneficiary as an H-1B temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). The appeal will be dismissed and the petition denied for this reason.

IV. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION

The remaining issue discussed in the decision of denial is whether the petitioner has demonstrated that, if the visa petition were approved, the petitioner would employ the beneficiary in a specialty occupation.

A. The Law

Section 214(i)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an occupation that requires:

- (A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and
- (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) states, in pertinent part, the following:

Specialty occupation means an occupation which [(1)] requires theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering, mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology, and the arts, and which [(2)] requires the attainment of a bachelor's degree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), to qualify as a specialty occupation, a proposed position must meet one of the following criteria:

- (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position;
- (2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
- (3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or
- (4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree.

As a threshold issue, it is noted that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must logically be read together with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). In other words, this regulatory language must be construed in harmony with the thrust of the related provisions and with the statute as a whole. *See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (holding that construction of language which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred); *see also COIT Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp.*, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); *Matter of W-F-*, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (BIA 1996). As such, the criteria stated in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) should logically be read as being necessary but not necessarily sufficient to meet the statutory and regulatory definition of specialty occupation. To otherwise interpret this section as stating the necessary *and* sufficient conditions for meeting the definition of specialty occupation would result in particular positions meeting a condition under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) but not the statutory or regulatory definition. *See Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000). To avoid this result, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) must therefore be read as providing supplemental criteria that must be met in accordance with, and not as alternatives to, the statutory and regulatory definitions of specialty occupation.

As such and consonant with section 214(i)(1) of the Act and the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) consistently interprets the term "degree" in the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher

degree, but one in a specific specialty that is directly related to the proffered position. See *Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff*, 484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"). Applying this standard, USCIS regularly approves H-1B petitions for qualified aliens who are to be employed as engineers, computer scientists, certified public accountants, college professors, and other such occupations. These professions, for which petitioners have regularly been able to establish a minimum entry requirement in the United States of a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the particular position, fairly represent the types of specialty occupations that Congress contemplated when it created the H-1B visa category.

To determine whether a particular job qualifies as a specialty occupation, USCIS does not simply rely on a position's title. The specific duties of the proffered position, combined with the nature of the petitioning entity's business operations, are factors to be considered. USCIS must examine the ultimate employment of the alien, and determine whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation. See generally *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d 384. The critical element is not the title of the position nor an employer's self-imposed standards, but whether the position actually requires the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and the attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree in the specific specialty as the minimum for entry into the occupation, as required by the Act.

We note that, as recognized by the court in *Defensor, supra*, where the work is to be performed for entities other than the petitioner, evidence of the client companies' job requirements is critical. See *Defensor v. Meissner*, 201 F.3d at 387-388. The court held that the former Immigration and Naturalization Service had reasonably interpreted the statute and regulations as requiring the petitioner to produce evidence that a proffered position qualifies as a specialty occupation on the basis of the requirements imposed by the entities using the beneficiary's services. *Id.* at 384. Such evidence must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate the type and educational level of highly specialized knowledge in a specific discipline that is necessary to perform that particular work.

B. Analysis

As was explained above, the evidence does not demonstrate that the beneficiary would work on an in-house project and does not demonstrate where else the beneficiary would work or on what other subject matter. The lack of clarity regarding the beneficiary's actual tasks and job responsibilities precludes a finding that the proffered position is a specialty occupation under any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for the particular position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; (4) the factual justification for a petitioner normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the degree of specialization and

complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. The visa petition must be denied on this basis alone.⁷

Also, at a more basic level, as reflected in this decision's discussion of the evidentiary deficiencies, the record lacks credible evidence that when the petitioner filed the petition, the petitioner had secured work of any type for the beneficiary to perform during the requested period of employment. That is, the petitioner asserted that the beneficiary would be developing its in-house on-line travel reservation project, but provided insufficient evidence of the existence of such a project. Further, although evidence suggests that the petitioner intends to assign the beneficiary to work on other companies' projects at other companies' locations, the record does not show that the petitioner had secured such work for the beneficiary when it filed the visa petition.

Thus, we conclude that the record of proceeding provides an inadequate factual basis for us to determine that, at the time of the petition's filing, the petitioner had secured for the beneficiary definite, non-speculative work conforming to the petition's description of the proffered position.

USCIS regulations affirmatively require a petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit it is seeking at the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(1). A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See *Matter of Michelin Tire Corp.*, 17 I&N Dec. 248.⁸ Moreover,

⁷ Much of the petitioner's evidence, including letters and vacancy announcements, is directed toward demonstrating that computer systems analyst positions qualify as specialty occupation positions by virtue of requiring a minimum of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent. However, as the petitioner has not demonstrated the nature of the duties the beneficiary would perform if the visa petition were approved, it has not demonstrated that the proffered position is a computer systems analyst position. As such, that evidence has not been shown to have any direct relevance to whether the proffered position is a specialty occupation position. Further, we note that the petitioner has cited the U.S. Department of Labor's *Occupational Outlook Handbook (Handbook)* on appeal as evidence that computer systems analyst positions qualify as specialty occupation positions. However, even if the proffered position had been shown to be a computer systems analyst position, the *Handbook* would not be persuasive evidence that it is a specialty occupation position, as the *Handbook* does not indicate that computer systems analyst positions, as a category, require a minimum of a bachelor's degree in a specific specialty or its equivalent. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Occupational Outlook Handbook*, 2014-15 ed., "Computer Systems Analysts," <http://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-systems-analysts.htm#tab-4> (last visited May 12, 2015), which indicates computer systems analyst positions do not require a specialized degree or the equivalent, but that a business or liberal arts degree and skills in information technology or computer programming may be sufficient.

⁸ The agency made clear long ago that speculative employment is not permitted in the H-1B program. For example, a 1998 proposed rule documented this position as follows:

Historically, the Service has not granted H-1B classification on the basis of speculative, or undetermined, prospective employment. The H-1B classification is not intended as a vehicle

the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. 8 U.S.C. 1361 (Section 291 of the Act). The petitioner has thus not established that, at the time the petition was submitted, it had secured work for the beneficiary that would entail performing the duties as described in the petition and that was reserved for the beneficiary for the duration of the period requested.

V. CONCLUSION

An application or petition that does not comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by us even if the service center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that we conduct appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Moreover, when we deny a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it shows that we abused our discretion with respect to all of the enumerated grounds. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1037, *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683; *see also BDPCS, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n*, 351 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("When an agency offers multiple grounds for a decision, we will affirm the agency so long as any one of the grounds is valid, unless it is demonstrated that the agency would not have acted on that basis if the alternative grounds were unavailable.").

The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is

for an alien to engage in a job search within the United States, or for employers to bring in temporary foreign workers to meet possible workforce needs arising from potential business expansions or the expectation of potential new customers or contracts. To determine whether an alien is properly classifiable as an H-1B nonimmigrant under the statute, the Service must first examine the duties of the position to be occupied to ascertain whether the duties of the position require the attainment of a specific bachelor's degree. See section 214(i) of the *Immigration and Nationality Act* (the "Act"). The Service must then determine whether the alien has the appropriate degree for the occupation. In the case of speculative employment, the Service is unable to perform either part of this two-prong analysis and, therefore, is unable to adjudicate properly a request for H-1B classification. Moreover, there is no assurance that the alien will engage in a specialty occupation upon arrival in this country.

63 Fed. Reg. 30419, 30419 - 30420 (June 4, 1998). While a petitioner is certainly permitted to change its intent with regard to non-speculative employment, e.g., a change in duties or job location, it must nonetheless document such a material change in intent through an amended or new petition in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)(i)(B) also contemplates that speculative employment is not permitted stating that a "petition may not be filed . . . earlier than 6 months before the date of actual need for the beneficiary's services or training"

(b)(6)

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the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The petition is denied.